January 1, 1936: The Land of Military Neglect
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, tired of foreign wars and foreign affairs the peoples of the United States were visited with a severe case of pacifism, and to such a degree that the public wanted nothing to do with European affairs, and nothing at all to do with things military. It was the common consensus among the common man, that with two large oceans separating the U.S. from the nearest global issue, there was little threat of home invasion, and even less chance of having to send troops abroad. With this current public philosophy having a stranglehold on the country, the army had been neglected, left to rust and grow old from its former WWI greatness like a car parked in the yard left to rust. A mere four divisions, three infantry and one cavalry, were the entire defensive force covering the continental United States. As compared to other nations this was an incredibly undersized force. Considering the sheer size of the country, this was nothing more than a token force, and could not even be constituted as a show of force. Would an entire foreign army land on American soil, there was little this small force could do to stop it.
The situation for the average soldier and officer was appalling. Poor pay, bad equipment, bad food, low morale. In this stale isolationist atmosphere with no view of improvement in the military, with no hint of conflict in his lifetime a progressive thinking Lt. Colonel named Patton asked out of Fort Myers so that he could transfer to the cavalry in the midwest, to get back to his daily horse riding. Perhaps such a warrior could not stand being so close to all the pacifists within the capitol and press. It is safe to say that the atmosphere of the day was extremely frustrating to any of the military higher ups. With no resources to build an army, and without public support to put research into building a better equipped one, their daily demonstrations to the government were continually denied until one by one they gave up trying.
The state of the American Armed Forces in 1936 was woefully inadequate, both in men, material, equipment and technology. Under Chief of Staff Malin Craig little was done to improve the situation. But as the shadows of war began to reach their way around the globe even in its isolation the United States could not be so blind as to do nothing. While there was little room for improvement and enlargement in the military budget, and while the public would never stand for such a thing, nevertheless Malin Craig and his staff did go about a new defensive plan. It was not on a grand scale, as the public would never stand for it, but nevertheless it was begun, mostly in quiet, away from the press. It aimed to improve where it could, by what little it could, for as little cost as it could. It was a three pronged plan broken down into three spheres: Units, Fortifications, and Technologies.
1. Table of Organization and Equipment
Army
With the size of the army being extremely undersized with no immediate chance of reinforcement, the Staff in Washington could do little to improve upon its main weakness: Its size. Therefore focus was put on improving the command structure of the existing units. Without proper funds for maneuvers and training to find its best leaders under simulated combat conditions, this was a tough task, and as a result the change of command throughout the outfits was of minimal gain. The Division CO's thus assigned were far from exemplary choices. Until such time as impending war on their doorstep forced them into serious training and maneuvers, the status quo was to choose existing leaders, rather than searching down the ranks for more capable ones.
The 1st Army Corps, consisting of the 1st Division, the Big Red One, was all that was spared to defend the Washington DC/ Virginia region. Its commander was replaced by the defensive minded Lt.Gen McLain.
The command of the 2nd Army Corps, put in charge of all of New England and made up of only the 2nd Indianhead Division was given to Mj. General Raff.
In defense of the entire west coast, the 3rd Army Corps comprised of the sole Rock of the Marne 3rd Infantry Division was handed over to Mj.Gen J.W. Anderson.
Outdated by 1936, the 1st Cavalry Division, still on horseback was responsible for the defense of all of the deep south and Texas. It was commanded by a Mj. Gen Doe. Perhaps the people doing the command assignments selected him merely for his well known anonymous name to highlight the fact that this one division on horseback was all they had to defend such a large area.
In the Philippines, along with 9 Philippino divisions, the 370th Infantry division, a misnomer for a 5 division strong army, was given to Mj.Gen Robertson. It rankled the Staff to no end that the Philippines had more army divisions than the entire United States.
Air Force
While the philosophy of air power had not yet come of age, the United States nevertheless was way behind the curve compared to other world powers. The Air Force was nearly as woefully undersized as the Army, fielding only three Tactical Bomber wings made up of the out of date A-17A. Portland housed the only Strategic Bomber wing in the country, made up of the also out of date B-18 Bolo. Houston held the one and only Dive Bomber wing, made up of the extremely short distanced A-35 Vengeance. With a range of 200 miles it was of no use in the vast expanses of the southwest. Los Angeles and New York held the only fighter cover, made up entirely of old P-35 Guardsmen. It was a simply pathetic attempt at an Air Force, and considering the pacifism of the country coupled with the old guard idea that battle ships and boots on the ground were the way to win a war, it is not surprising that the Air Force was in as bad a state as it was.
Navy
While the other two branches were understaffed, the Navy was given most of the allocated funds. With the philosophy that two large oceans separated the United States from any true threat, the Navy had been built up over the last decade until it had in fact become the largest in the world, numerically at least. 15 Battleships, 26 Cruisers, and 47 Destroyer groups made up the brunt of the attack. 17 sub-par submarine packs and 24 Transport groups made up the remainder of the force. Inherent with its outdated philosophy about air power not having a major role, merely 3 Aircraft Carriers existed, the USS Saratoga, Lexington and Ranger. In the planning stages to supplement these, the Yorktown and Enterprise were due for completion within the year, although the emphasis was still on gunned ships, as 9 Omaha Class Cruisers and 5 Mahan Class Destroyers were also under construction. Despite the size of the Navy, most of the force was kept in harbor or drydock, mostly understaffed and under equipped to save costs.
With the minuscule budget stretched so thin as it was there was no more funds available for additional ground troops. Nevertheless, cutting where he could from other units, George Marshall looking at the sole division guarding the capitol insisted for, and after much haggling received the go ahead on forming a single National Guard division to defend the Capitol. By February it was activated from Fort Myers as the DC National Guard commanded by Mj. Gen J.E.Wood. It was more window dressing than an actual defense against an organized invasion, but it sounded a lot more comforting to the military to have two divisions protecting Washington than just one.
2. Fortifications-
Being that manpower was at a premium due to the small size of the army, with forces being stretched way too thin to be of any real service, the Department of Defense looked for other avenues to bolster their armed forces. With an Army so small, the doctrine in place was and had to be a purely defensive one. Consequently, priority was put into building coastal defenses around the continental United States. Army Engineers were sent to three main regions to build minimal defensive fortifications. With the northeast being the prime industrial center, as well as the location of the capitol, basic coastal fortifications were built on a line from Boston, down thru New York, South Jersey, Maryland and Virginia. Washington D.C. itself was given basic land defenses.
A line of coastal forts were also built along the Gulf coast from Louisiana to Corpus Christi in an effort to begin a general defensive philosophy for that oil rich region. With one mere cavalry division to defend it, the defenses were useless, but it was put in place for the time when more forces were available for that area.
On the west coast, small coastal fortifications were likewise made from San Diego to San Francisco. In all, these three areas were very meager in their defenses, but it was far more than what had been there a year ago.
While it was of considerable use for the populace in travel, an effort was begun to improve the infrastructure of the interior to allow for quicker troop movement from east to west. The project involved work from Las Vegas through Denver into Oklahoma and eventually ending in Tennessee.
While some wished to build up defense of their many pacific island holdings, especially in light of seeing the Japanese empire slowly growing outward, these islands received neither manpower nor fortifications. Given the limited scope of the military, the continental U.S. was given full priority, and the possessions from Hawaii to Guam were basically made expendable, being of little value resource wise.
3. Technology and Doctrines-
The third sphere of the military improvement was to try and improve upon the current state of military hardware and strategies. Most of the equipment was World War I holdovers, and the military doctrine of the day had hardly changed in 18 years. Intelligence from abroad gave many indications that the Japanese and Germans were devising revolutionary new tactics and weapons systems. This necessitated overhauling current military thinking.
In keeping with the Continental Defensive Initiative, funds were given primarily to study new defensive strategies and policies. Chief on the agenda was the Tactical Defensive Regime. Based on the experiences gained in the Great War, it dealt mainly with the operations and interactions of smaller units. To explore future opportunities, research was given into Early War Experience Analysis, which was expected to be completed for analysis in early 1937. Once gathering all the data together and analyzing it, this would lay the groundwork for further study into various artillery doctrine improvements as well as more advanced continental defensive doctrines.
As much as Malin Craig, William Standly, and Oscar Westover fought over the scraps for researching new weapons for their respective branches of the Armed Services, there was simply nothing left to spend on investment of new items. Research and Development were in all effect shut down completely. As out of date as their tools might be, for the budget year of 1936 there was virtually nothing put in to R&D regarding weapons, vehicles, tanks, fighters, bombers or ships. While the Germans and Japanese were building entirely new state of the art weapons, the U.S. Army had its hands utterly and completely tied by the pacifistic American public. Those in high command, painfully aware of their growing vulnerability, could only thank God that 3000 miles of ocean separated them from their potential enemy.