No, in this case, silver is the commodity. Peasants has to use the coinage in circulation to buy silver and pay taxes with silver.
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No, in this case, silver is the commodity. Peasants has to use the coinage in circulation to buy silver and pay taxes with silver.
I think we are talking about two different things. That may be true for the early Ming, but once the silver started flowing in from Spain's Latin American mines, its price dropped.
From wiki
"From 1500 to 1800 Mexico and Peru produced about 80%[2] of the world's silver with 30% of it eventually ending up in China."
Correct, but it only temporarily alleviated the problem that started much earlier in the 15th century. Once Spain started having trouble in the early 17th century, the silver stopped flowing, and the problem became worse.
Silver was never the standard currency for the common folk, few people carried silver at all unless it's to pay taxes or for special occasions. Common folk in Ming averages maybe 1.5 Tael(~6 dutch guilders) in expenses a year.
I do believe feudalism constituted an advantage in Europe and Japan over other places that were usually dominated by larger, centralized governments.
European feudalism gave birth to institutions such as joint-stock companies, municipalities, regulated taxation and the division of powers. The Japanese developed many similar institutions and were quick to adopt European advances, because they fundamentally understood those advances and recognized their value as they worked in the same, politically pluralistic feudalism.
Sure, some Goan smiths could produce good guns, but such practices wouldn't become widespread in Asia because there was an absence of the institutions that enable capital intensive practices to spread. India was a subcontinent dominated by centralized and corrupt governments.
The fundamental disadvantage of sprawling centralized states in a premodern world is borne from the absence of communication and monitoring technologies that would enable a centralized government to effectively produce public goods such as property rights. The principal authorities cannot stamp out corruption among their agent authorities, who start to use their powers to steal from the subjects, rather than enforce their rights. The large size of the population means that there is a lack of reciprocity between the ruler and his subjects; petitions go unanswered and the state officials are not held accountable. Large distances and difficult geography only add to the problem. Any attempt to resolve grievances systematically would just swamp the court in petitions and paperwork, containing all kinds of claims which the government would struggle to verify. Additionally, imperial governments would jealously guard their absolute power; often crushing any sign of localized authority, which a European feudal government would have to accommodate in a feudal arrangement. While this provides security for the imperial government; preventing the rise of potential rivals, it also means that local interests are not defended from corruption among imperial agents. The basic difference here is that Europe was heavily fortified and wars were often incredibly lengthy, with numerous costly sieges, while Asian governments often possessed a crushing military advantage over their subjects and could resolve wars rapidly. Thus the principal authorities in Europe were compelled to accommodate local authorities. This was of course, a good thing because in smaller, compact principalities like the ones that made up the Holy Roman Empire, the principal authorities were closer to the people and therefore could better observe the activities of their agent authorities. The people were closer to their principal authority, and could petition him without overwhelming the court in confusing paperwork.
What this meant, in economic terms, is that Europeans transitioned from labor intensive technologies to capital intensive technologies. I believe this was enabled by the superior public goods provided by feudal governments. The stability of property rights and other local laws meant that long standing businesses formed, which then meant innovations in business organization. Book keeping only really makes sense if you have a business that needs to transition from one owner to the next multiple times. Joint-stock companies only really make sense if you have some large capital intensive project and you need to draw in resources from multiple people while managing risk.
Europeans embraced more centralized governments with the arrival of advanced gunpowder weapons. These weapons meant that rapid wars of conquest were once again possible, and rebellions were harder, because rebels couldn't hide behind walls. Still, when Louis XIV centralized France, he tore down the castles build by the aristocracy and compelled many of them to live in his palace in the capital.
I don't think these early centralized governments were necessarily more effective. They were better at fighting wars. However, by the time European countries became truly centralized, technology soon unlocked the ability to communicate instantly through vast distances, while printing technology and social progress meant literacy rates grew rapidly. A centralized bureaucracy became not only viable, but preferable to feudalism. Even so, European centralization usually worked with local governments, at the expense of feudal authorities, so it wasn't as if the capitals of Europe monopolized political power.
European feudalism gave birth to institutions such as joint-stock companies, municipalities, regulated taxation and the division of powers. The Japanese developed many similar institutions and were quick to adopt European advances, because they fundamentally understood those advances and recognized their value as they worked in the same, politically pluralistic feudalism.
Sure, some Goan smiths could produce good guns, but such practices wouldn't become widespread in Asia because there was an absence of the institutions that enable capital intensive practices to spread. India was a subcontinent dominated by centralized and corrupt governments.
The fundamental disadvantage of sprawling centralized states in a premodern world is borne from the absence of communication and monitoring technologies that would enable a centralized government to effectively produce public goods such as property rights. The principal authorities cannot stamp out corruption among their agent authorities, who start to use their powers to steal from the subjects, rather than enforce their rights. The large size of the population means that there is a lack of reciprocity between the ruler and his subjects; petitions go unanswered and the state officials are not held accountable. Large distances and difficult geography only add to the problem. Any attempt to resolve grievances systematically would just swamp the court in petitions and paperwork, containing all kinds of claims which the government would struggle to verify. Additionally, imperial governments would jealously guard their absolute power; often crushing any sign of localized authority, which a European feudal government would have to accommodate in a feudal arrangement. While this provides security for the imperial government; preventing the rise of potential rivals, it also means that local interests are not defended from corruption among imperial agents. The basic difference here is that Europe was heavily fortified and wars were often incredibly lengthy, with numerous costly sieges, while Asian governments often possessed a crushing military advantage over their subjects and could resolve wars rapidly. Thus the principal authorities in Europe were compelled to accommodate local authorities. This was of course, a good thing because in smaller, compact principalities like the ones that made up the Holy Roman Empire, the principal authorities were closer to the people and therefore could better observe the activities of their agent authorities. The people were closer to their principal authority, and could petition him without overwhelming the court in confusing paperwork.
What this meant, in economic terms, is that Europeans transitioned from labor intensive technologies to capital intensive technologies. I believe this was enabled by the superior public goods provided by feudal governments. The stability of property rights and other local laws meant that long standing businesses formed, which then meant innovations in business organization. Book keeping only really makes sense if you have a business that needs to transition from one owner to the next multiple times. Joint-stock companies only really make sense if you have some large capital intensive project and you need to draw in resources from multiple people while managing risk.
Europeans embraced more centralized governments with the arrival of advanced gunpowder weapons. These weapons meant that rapid wars of conquest were once again possible, and rebellions were harder, because rebels couldn't hide behind walls. Still, when Louis XIV centralized France, he tore down the castles build by the aristocracy and compelled many of them to live in his palace in the capital.
I don't think these early centralized governments were necessarily more effective. They were better at fighting wars. However, by the time European countries became truly centralized, technology soon unlocked the ability to communicate instantly through vast distances, while printing technology and social progress meant literacy rates grew rapidly. A centralized bureaucracy became not only viable, but preferable to feudalism. Even so, European centralization usually worked with local governments, at the expense of feudal authorities, so it wasn't as if the capitals of Europe monopolized political power.
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The early 17th century is the time the Ming feel so the fall in production was more of a Qing issue.
I'm not sure that is an accurate description of India. It was often split between multiple states with only occasional periods of unity.
While Indian political and administrative history is subject to several different interpretations, if there is anything that the majority of Indian political historians agree on, it is that India as a subcontinent was generally not dominated by centralized governments...
Likewise, if there is anything that can be clearly said about Indian military history, it is that strong forts were absolutely central to Indian warfare and politics, and that India was very heavily fortified, with everyone from the local landlord to the highest king/emperor having personal military retinues and personal forts that served as the bases of their power, leading to a situation where even relatively "strong" empires like the Mughals had to negotiate with local leaders rather than merely suppressing them with the awesome military force of a highly centralized state...
Two of the key factors in the centralisation of post-medieval Europe were the huge increase in the expense of maintaining an army that could effectively challenge royal power and the increasing technological sophistication of gunpowder weapons no longer allowing a minor noble to effectively resist the central state by holing up in a castle that required a long, expensive siege to take. Did something similar not happen on the subcontinent?
What do you mean this is a Qing issue? Ming fell because of the massive revolts caused by people not being able to pay taxes/soldiers not get paid. Which is directly related to the shortage of silver and hyperinflation of silver prices.
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India is huge. Many kingdoms that didn't ever conquer the whole subcontinent were nonetheless massive and exercised absolute power. The steady infusion of Nomadic warriors meant that the subcontinental states were often militarily dominant over their subjects, unlike most European kingdoms. Also during the Middle ages and early modern ages, India was frequently dominated by nearly continent-wide Turkic empires; the last being the Mughals.
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No, they didn't. I can't think of even a single Indian kingdom that exercised anything close to "absolute power." In the 17th and 18th century, some states like Mysore developed regimes that closely resembled what Max Weber would call "sultanist" states, with relatively centralized governments, but this was a very late development that was made possible due to (among other things) the massive influx of New World silver into India during that time, leading to an increased monetization of the political economy and enabling the establishment of salaried bureaucracies in lieu of giving out land or revenue grants to government subordinates. This was not possible in earlier times due to the relative lack of money (precious metal) in India; several studies have highlighted this lack of money in India, such as John Deyell's Living Without Silver: A Monetary History of Early Medieval North India. In addition to the increased monetization of the economy, the widespread diffusion of gunpowder weapons also strengthened central governments in India vis-a-vis local governments. For the vast majority of history, however, India did not have any regimes that could be remotely called "absolutist." Even the Mughal empire, which was probably the most highly centralized and most powerful empire in Indian history prior to the late 19th century British Raj, was extremely decentralized when compared to Frederick the Great's Prussia or Napoleon's France. The Mughal Empire even at its height was a patchwork of directly-controlled imperial crownlands (the khalisa lands, which were managed directly by the imperial revenue department and could be seen as an extension of the emperor's household), "feudal" estates (jagirs) granted to imperial subordinates in lieu of cash salaries, and native princely states that could be called "vassals" of the Mughals (such as several of the states in Rajputana and Central India). Regional governors retained considerable authority of their own, and broke free of Mughal imperial rule once the center lacked a strong emperor. By the time the British acquired their first major territories in India during the 1750s, the Mughal Empire had entirely disintegrated into regional administrations headed by the nawabs (governors).
I don't know where you got your ideas about Indian political history, but they don't match the ground reality at all. Your post reminded me of that ridiculous, outdated Marxist concept of "Oriental despotism" or "Asiatic despotism." You literally said that the entire Asian world (minus Japan) had highly centralized governments, and that "Asian governments often possessed a crushing military advantage over their subjects and could resolve wars rapidly." (exact quote) What the hell is an "Asian government"? The governments found in China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Ottoman Empire were quite different from one another (to say the least). There is no "essential" similarity between them, that distinguishes them collectively from the "West" as a collective. The term "Asian" is completely meaningless here.
If you want to see how pre-modern Indian states actually operated in reality, some good case studies to read would be Cynthia Talbot's Precolonial India in Practice, Burton Stein's Peasant, State, and Society in Medieval South India, and Hermann Kulke's The State in India, 1000-1700.
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In the matter of Indian fortifications, @victimizer was mistaken. That's true.
As for centralized governments in India, it's rather different story. I think the best way to describe the difference is to introduce the term "decency". Indian princes were limited by very weak constrictions as to how far they might go in respect to their neighbours or subjects. They always pursued the goal of absolute dominance. Ergo, centralization. But competition was tough, and India is huge.
That is why we can repeatedly observe the rise of various empires, which quickly conquer - with unlimited cruelty - and pillage incredible riches. But once the spoils got consumed, troubles occured: warlords and province administrators sought to create (semi-)independent power bases, rebelling on first opportunity. If possible, they attempted to overthrow their former overlords and create a new empires in their stead. Over and over.
I'd say there were no limits to violence and oppression, hence no decency and loyalty.
As a result, yes, India was fragmented, but among highly oppressive princes seeking total centralization, no mercy, no trust. I think "tyranny" is the proper English word to describe such occurence.
Compare it with Europe. France's push to the east, towards the Alps and Rhine. Step by step, it took almost thousand years! Why?
The tiny principalities between Paris and Rhine were no match for military power of France, most of the time. But the political environment was very different from the Indian one. Decency mattered, and the law stood in support of it. With that, firm and long lasting alliances, seeking rather balance of power than brutal conquest at all cost. Thanks to decency, both contracts between overlord and vassal, and relations towards neighbours, developed into quite firm and long lasting. It was not easy to break such a bond of trust.
Medieval wars in Europe were many, but the intensity of violence was relatively small. A typical campaign lasted six weeks, and then six months of negotiations followed. Negotiations! All parties simultaneously presented legal arguments and sought alliances with other parties. There was an urgent need to prove that territorial (or similar) acquisition was JUST. Compromises and monetary compensations were typical outcomes of such wars.
These things were very, very different in Europe and in Asia. In the West, and in the Rest.
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This is a very interesting picture, but can you name me even a single example that matches what you are saying? Can you give me the name of a single one of the "highly oppressive princes seeking total centralization, no mercy, no trust"? What specifically are you talking about?
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It is certainly true that anything like 'Asian' typical... whatsoever never existed. Asia is composed from several subcontinents with separate civilizations.
However! We are talking about the West, i.e. Western Christendom. We are not trying to distinguish differences among, say, Muslim and Indian civilizations, but between 'the West and the Rest'. Quite naturally, 'the Rest' has become largerly reduced to 'Asia', because comparisons between the West on one side and Africa and America on other side are much less interesting in the context.
So here's my apology: Yes, I know and fully admit that Asia is no monolithic social occurence.
For convenience [it's easy to copy & paste] I've chosen an article from Wikipedia [not that I insist that it's a most reliable source, but I know Muhammad bin Tughluq's history from other sources, as well, and it generally confirms Wikipedia]:
Muhammad bin Tughluq
During Muhammad bin Tughluq's rule, Delhi Sultanate temporarily expanded to most of the Indian subcontinent, its peak in terms of geographical reach. He attacked and plundered Malwa, Gujarat, Mahratta, Tilang, Kampila, Dhur-samundar, Mabar, Lakhnauti, Chittagong, Sunarganw and Tirhut. His distant campaigns were expensive, although each raid and attack on non-Muslim kingdoms brought new looted wealth and ransom payments from captured people. The extended empire was difficult to retain, and rebellions all over Indian subcontinent became routine.
He raised taxes to levels where people refused to pay any. In India's fertile lands between Ganges and Yamuna rivers, the Sultan increased the land tax rate on non-Muslims by tenfold in some districts, and twentyfold in others. Along with land taxes, dhimmis were required to pay crop taxes by giving up half or more of their harvested crop. These sharply higher crop and land tax led entire villages of Hindu farmers to quit farming and escape into jungles; they refused to grow anything or work at all. Many became robber clans. Famines followed. The Sultan responded with bitterness by expanding arrests, torture and mass punishments, killing people as if he was "cutting down weeds". Historical documents note that Muhammad bin Tughluq was cruel and severe not only with non-Muslims, but also with certain sects of Musalmans. He routinely executed Sayyids (Shia), Sufis, Qalandars, and other Muslim officials. His court historian Ziauddin Barni noted,
"Not a day or week passed without spilling of much Musalman blood."
Muhammad bin Tughlaq founded a new city, called Jahanpannah (meaning, "Protection of the World"), which connected older Delhi with Siri. Later, he ordered that the capital of his Sultanate be moved from Delhi to Deogir in Maharashtra (renaming it to Daulatabad). He ordered a forced mass migration of Delhi's population. Those who refused were killed. One blind person who failed to move to Deogir, was dragged for the entire journey of 40 days - the man died, his body fell apart, and only his tied leg reached Daulatabad. The capital move failed because Daulatabad was arid and did not have enough drinking water to support the new capital. The capital then returned to Delhi. Nevertheless, Muhammad bin Tughlaq orders affected history as large number of Delhi Muslims who came to Deccan area, did not return to Delhi to live near Muhammad bin Tughlaq. This influx of the then Delhi residents into Deccan region led to a growth of Muslim population in central and southern India.
You asked for "the name of a single one". Here you have it.
And now, please, give me name of a single one similar European medieval king, please. I'm especially interested in a king who could possibly order his subjects to abandon the capital and move elsewhere. It never happened in Europe, but, like I said, "who could possibly order" it?
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Most Indian states collected taxes directly. Their kings had full powers over their subjects, no matter their place in society. Most European states were not this absolute.
I don't agree with his assessment but that's long discussion. Suffice it to say that there is really no evidence that people needed silver or any other precious metal to establish an effective monetary system. Most people didn't care about their coins precious content as long as someone could use the coins to pay their taxes. I think it's rather more likely that the infusion of precious metals simply coincides with various sprawling and centralizing empires rather than being the cause of such things.
The idea that the Frederick the Great could exercise power comparable to Mughal emperor is a breathtaking absurdity. The Mughal Emperor could basically seize whatever he wanted: the Mughal aristocracy was so fabulously wealthy that it shocked Europe, especially the contrast with the poverty of their people. This wealth was, of course, built on the basis of a largely centralized regime of extraction.
Oriental despotism isn't a myth, even if it is a simplistic concept. It's based on realities. India, the Middle east and the far east are hugely corrupt and full of countries with despotic governments. India itself remains a very harsh and corrupt society, despite its democratic pretensions.
Yes, and the Soviet Union was a patchwork of supposed republics. I don't see why you wish to ascribe powers to these principalities when they could do little to constrain the abuses of Mughal officials. There is very little that your lowly peasant could do if, for example, he was abused by a Mughal taxman. The Mughal empire was chaotic and it certainly made deals with people in positions of power, but it lacked the long term institutions of reciprocity that characterized European feudalism.
Sure. this is not evidence of a lack of centralization, but the lack of loyalty to the government absent an inspiring leader. There are plenty of centralized governments that shattered once instability hit. Centralization isn't a guarantee against that.
India had castles, but nothing compared to Europe. There is a reason why Europe was never again conquered by a single polity after the demise of the Karling empire. Like, for example, the region of Tuscany alone had hundreds of major castles. Each could be held with a garrison of a few dozen. A network of forts could easily tie an army that vastly outnumbered the defenders.
The reality is that Indian warfare was far more fluid; decisive battled more frequent. Perhaps Indian castles had less secure water supplies; I don't know.
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I've read some fortresses in Rajputana and Bundelkhand resisted Mughal sieges for years.
I think the degree of fortification was not as important as you indicate. Or, more accurately, it cannot explain ALL differences. It was just one of several factors.
Europe was certainly resilient to quick conquests, among Europeans as well as by against Mongols, Turks, a.o. Castles were part of the military strategy, and it worked thanks to "institutions of reciprocity", as you called them very aptly.
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LOL. Please provide some scholarly source that states "most Indian states collected taxes directly," and that "kings had full powers over their subjects, no matter their place in society."
Read Volume III of Max Weber's magnum opus Economy and Society to understand the relationship between monetization and political development. I am not interested in writing a long essay right now explaining how one leads to the other. Perhaps later.
Yes, it is fact that Prussia under Frederick the Great was far more centralized than the Mughal Empire at any point of its existence. The Mughal emperor "could basically seize whatever he wanted? LOL!
It is true that the "Mughal" aristocracy became quite wealthy, and there was a quite heavy tax burden placed on peasants after the 16th century, but this is not the same thing as arguing that the Mughal empire was a "highly centralized" despotic government. The local zamindars were the main beneficiaries of the exploitation, rather than the imperial regime itself. It was they who expanded their powers the most between the 16th and 18th centuries, leading to a degree of control over labor (which was more important and valuable than land) seldom seen prior to that time, and it was they who carved out new states for themselves (such as Bharatpur).
The Soviet Union was one of the most highly centralized states in human history; the Mughal Empire was nowhere close. Most of the military resources in the Mughal Empire did NOT belong to the emperor. The Emperor Akbar, for example, had a personal retinue of 24,000 men (12,000 cavalry and 12,000 musketeers) which was directly supported by imperial revenues collected directly by the imperial government's bureaucrats from the crownlands. This retinue could be said to constitute the "standing army" of the empire, and constituted the emperor's personal military strength. However, such a small force was obviously not sufficient to control such a large empire as the Mughals had. For this, the emperor was dependent on the military aristocracy, who provided the majority of the empire's military resources. Even in the middle of the 17th century, when the empire was at its peak, the military forces that were supported directly by the imperial establishment amounted to no more than 47,000 men, while the various mansabdars and local zamindars possessed an aggregate total of hundreds of thousands of men. Quoting from Military Manpower, Armies, and Warfare in South Asia by Kaushik Roy:
In addition to providing the vast bulk of the military resources, the local nobility/aristocracy also was responsible for tax collection and remitting a certain specified amount of revenue to the imperial state, while they kept the rest of the revenue for themselves. I am not sure who you are referring to when you talk about the "Mughal taxman." The empire did NOT tax its subjects directly, but was always dependent on local intermediaries (particularly the zamindars) to perform the duty of tax collection. It was not until the 19th century that revenues were collected directly from peasants on a large, pan-Indian scale (by the British imperial administration).
The Mughal empire, as a political edifice, could only survive to the extent that it could successfully co-opt preexisting elites into its imperial structure. That is not a characteristic of an "absolutist" regime. As soon as the empire failed to give sufficient room for the varied noble/aristocratic interests, the empire collapsed. One of the most important causes of the empire's collapse was Aurangzeb's attempt to expand the empire into the southern parts of India, and include these newly-conquered lands into the imperial crownlands rather than distribute them as jagirs (land grants).
The reason why many independent states popped up so quickly after Aurangzeb's death is because local/regional leaders had their own sources of military power that were independent of the central government.
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Every single district of India had a fort of some sort, and often multiple forts. Many fortresses could easily resist sieges for years, and would have required so much investment of time, men, and resources that the Mughals preferred to just bribe their enemies and promise them posts in the imperial administration (which was, as I posted above, a co-optive administration that sought to incorporate various elites with their preexisting rights and powers into an overarching political structure).
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IMHO, the main reasons for Europe's ascension to dominance are geography and competition. I've read various opinions on the subject, and those seem most convincing to me. If you look at the map of the world, there is no other place like Europe - long, huge peninsula, almost entirely within temperate climate zone, with many choke points separating regions - like Alps, Adriatic Sea, Carpathians or The English Channel...Ideal place for development of various cultures and states, interconnected but independent. Unlike China, Andes or India, European civilization has never really been united into one single state (Roman Empire doesnn't count, not only because it didin't cover northern part of Europe, mainly because it was obviously a different civilization anyway - related, but different), it was always divided into several stronger powers that competed with each other. For example, when Christopher Columbus was sent away from the Portuguese court, where he tried to gain support, he went on to Spain (and rest is history...). When Chinese Emperor in 1430s decided to end the voyages of Treasure Fleets - that was the end of chinese intercontinental journeys. Also, look at ancient Rome - they progressed immensly during the Punic wars (for example, developed the navy for the first time), and during wars with hellenisitc states (like adoption of Greek stoic philosophy), but when they became an universal empire, which did not have any real rivals for about 2 centuries - they stagnated (for example, supposedly their lawyers reached peak of creativity and logical approach in Ist century A.D.). So, geographical advantage and competition (although, that is obiously a great simplification). And then it snowballed - because of the competition they were first to search for wealth outside of their regions, and developed maritime technology first, and they were the closest to Americas of all advanced Old World societies...And really, whoever got first to the riches of New World, had enormous advantage - diseases proved vital to the conquest and enormous enriching of Europe happened, which was probably the beginning of modern economy. Also, important factor is that in Europe, maybe due to competition, inventions were much quicker spread across the population (or across its educated segments...). In China, many important discoveries were made earlier, but where not made widespread and accesible.
Also, there is one important concern about such discussions - when we ponder why the Europeans progressed the quickest and where the most advanced (I say were...because now world is global and interconnected, and we cannot say that Europe is still way ahead, can we?) we should take into consideration that Europe is probably the only place in which the IDEA of progress emerged. And it happened not so long ago, probably before the Enlightement people weren;t aware that humanity as a whole slowly develops more and more advanced technologies and ways of thinking. Before that, more popular was the opposite notion - ancient Greeks believed that the golden age of humanity was long gone ago. In Middle Ages people believed that humanity declines slowly, as it gets further in time from the times of Christ. In the Rennaisance there was a belief that Classical era was the best, and civilization is only slowly recovering after the dark middle ages. In many civilzations and philosophies (like in Buddhism for instance) time was considered circular rather than linear, and that it follows patterns of rise and decline, instead of progressing. To many societies it wasn't most important thing in the world to be on the cutting edge of technological development (what about XVI centry Japan, which abandoned the use of guns in order to maintain it's strict social hierarchy with samurai as the ruling class, not threatened by gun-wielding commoners)
So...A phiospohical question... Maybe we're judging other civilizations using criteria of our own civilization ? Maybe "progress" and "being advanced" is not the only way that we should measure or judge human societies ?
Also, there is one important concern about such discussions - when we ponder why the Europeans progressed the quickest and where the most advanced (I say were...because now world is global and interconnected, and we cannot say that Europe is still way ahead, can we?) we should take into consideration that Europe is probably the only place in which the IDEA of progress emerged. And it happened not so long ago, probably before the Enlightement people weren;t aware that humanity as a whole slowly develops more and more advanced technologies and ways of thinking. Before that, more popular was the opposite notion - ancient Greeks believed that the golden age of humanity was long gone ago. In Middle Ages people believed that humanity declines slowly, as it gets further in time from the times of Christ. In the Rennaisance there was a belief that Classical era was the best, and civilization is only slowly recovering after the dark middle ages. In many civilzations and philosophies (like in Buddhism for instance) time was considered circular rather than linear, and that it follows patterns of rise and decline, instead of progressing. To many societies it wasn't most important thing in the world to be on the cutting edge of technological development (what about XVI centry Japan, which abandoned the use of guns in order to maintain it's strict social hierarchy with samurai as the ruling class, not threatened by gun-wielding commoners)
So...A phiospohical question... Maybe we're judging other civilizations using criteria of our own civilization ? Maybe "progress" and "being advanced" is not the only way that we should measure or judge human societies ?
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I wouldn't define Denmark as feudal either, since you can't really call the peasants serfs. And we did have a large amount of freemen for much of the medieval times and while the amount shrank from around the 1300s to the 1500s it never disappeared. The tenants got a contract for a farm and then had to do a certain amount of work on the manor fields. But they were free to walk away if they wanted and it wasn't certain that the next generation got a contract for a farm. That isn't serfdom as far as I am aware.
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