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So basically, what you are saying is that you disagree with him, but offer no reason why and no counter argument.
I cant tell whether this is a cunning strategy to out-debate your opponent, rudeness, incontinence or just trolling?
PragerU. Great. Pick one.
This is the US's own Dolchstosslegende, debunked many times.
They forget, as so often, context.
The claim in the video that the US won (decisively no less) 'cause North Vietnam took part in the Paris Peace Accords' is in itself a remarkable contortion of reality.
Backing that up, in the next sentence, that the US would back up South Vietnam against Northern aggression is ...strange. If the North had just been defeated, decisively nonetheless, why was Northern aggression so likely to occur?
It is basically the American version of the 'Dolchstoßlegende':
"We did not lose, the liberals fucked us!"
The reason the US started 'winning' the Vietnam war, later on, was that North Vietnam changed their tactics from decentralized guerilla attacks (which cannot be targeted by airpower) and covert movements of regular units with hit and run attacks (extremely hard to target by airpower effectively) to 'proper' Warsaw Pact armor heavy tactics.
And, surprise, the US is quite adept at smothering armored assaults with airpower.
Had the war gone on the Vietnamese would have simply reverted back to the guerilla tactics and kept at it.
Note that there was never civil war in the North, just in the South.
Make of that what you will.
So the 1-2 million US troops were barely noteworthy? The Western Front was crumbling, an entire French sector decided to stop fighting, which for some reason the Germans never figured out. Without US troops the Spring Offensive would have done a lot better, maybe even succeeded to a large degree. The Spring Offensives were mostly a reaction to worrying about the eventuality of US troops destroying their Western Army. Without that need they likely would have the manpower to hold their gains from Russia. Germany could hold out a long time and were willing to do more to win or at least not lose than the allies, so a more favorable armistice is likely.
The first US engagement of that scale was Meuse-Argonne. Started in late September 1918 and not the main threat to the German position really. In fact the entire thing was somewhat of a mess from start to finish with the Americans making a lot of the same mistakes the British and French had been making in the previous years.
This is not true. American troops were involved in the Spring Offensives but only in the later parts, and not in the numbers often portrayed.
If you're referring to the 1917 Mutinies they are massively overstated, hideously misrepresented, and over by 1918. What they represented was really a military manifestation of soldiers going on strike over conditions and the constant offensives rather than a refusal to defend France.
Again, this is not true. American troops were involved, but towards the end of the Spring Offensives. These offensives themselves are also often misrepresented, German success diminished over the course of the five pushes as the Allies adapted defensive tactics and got their act together. Really the dangerous pushes were the first and third, and the defeat of these can't really be attributed to American troops.
As I noted, the main American contributions were finances and convincing the Germans that they couldn't simply run out the clock.
Arguing we didn't "lose" in Vietnam because we didn't have the political will is daft: ofc we could have theoretically won Vietnam if we had decided to escalate the conflict to ludicrous proportions (ie send a million troops and storm the North) or otherwise occupy South Vietnam indefinitely, but these were never viable options. This wasn't a world war or a total war; it was a limited war by default. Permanent stalemate is basically defeat, and the fact the NVA overran Saigon shortly after we left goes to show that no, we really didn't defeat the NVA. Our intervention in Vietnam was doomed from the start.
Later on our contribution in the 100 day's offensive was about as significant as Denmark's contribution is to the Afghan war.
Our only real contribution to the Spring offensive was morale: Allied troops were extremely depressed going into 1918, the German offensives were grinding through them, and then suddenly there are millions of Americans in Europe (not fighting or doing anything useful mind you). You could argue that our mere presence boosted morale to such an extent that allied positions held in areas where they may otherwise have collapsed, but that is about it.
Later on our contribution in the 100 day's offensive was about as significant as Denmark's contribution is to the Afghan war.
No, the American contribution to the Spring Offensive was that there was one in the first place.
The Spring Offensive was an attempt by the Germans to bring Britain and France to the knees before the Americans were there.
No Americans, no Spring Offensive and the Entente spents another 2 years on 'Great Offensives' before it collapses.
Or alternatively, the Entente goes on the offensive in 1918 with greater success than in previous years, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottomans collapse, and the Germans are left in a similar situation to real life just with things slightly less against them. The domestic situation however is still a timebomb.
Something akin to the Spring Offensive was in the cards regardless thanks to the troop surge from the Eastern front. Had they ever opened their eyes and realized the sorry state of the French... Then Kaisserreich becomes the default mode for Hearts of Iron
Edit: Actually I dont know about that last part.
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I do agree that there was almost certainly going to be an offensive of some sort in 1918 due to the troop surge. However, the French were in no sorry state by 1918. Even at their worst during the Mutinies of the year before, they had only opposed further offensive action; they were still willing to act on the defensive at least according to their own claims. Moreover, with most of their demands for better conditions fulfilled, their morale had recovered sufficiently by 1918 to permit the resumption of actual offensive actions, much less further defensive action against German attacks. While the major question might be how much it was reliant on the morale boost of the Americans, we know that historically the French were capable of taking on most of the attacks of the Spring Offensive directed at them rather than at the British: Matz and Second Marne, to wit. Even where the German attack enjoyed success due to incompetent commanders at the Third Aisne, the offensive petered out due to logistical matters before it could take Paris (again), and the counterattack again knocked them back. Ultimately, the French Army of 1918 was nowhere near the condition of, say, the Austro-Hungarian Army of late 1918 where national troops refused to act in defense of the whole.
In fact, that actually ties into what I believe would be most likely, which is that the war would be won elsewhere. The Vardar Offensive in the Balkans saw no Americans and had the dual effects of knocking the Bulgarians out of the war and opening up Hungary to direct attack. With the Allies across the Danube by November, the Hungarian government sought a cease-fire that ended the war on the Italian front. With the Austrians also seeking terms due to the secession of most of the entities within the nation, this opened all of southern Germany to the threat of Allied action slowed only by the speed that they could actually get there. This came as a complete and unwelcome surprise to the Germans, naturally, who had believed that their allies, even Austria-Hungary, could withstand more such attacks. With Italians in Innsbruck and the Greeks and Serbs moving north as fast as they could march, the Germans were not looking at an auspicious strategic situation regardless of the position of the lines in the West. This is essentially in accord with DoomBunny's post outlined earlier, just in a few more words. ^_^
In fact, that actually ties into what I believe would be most likely, which is that the war would be won elsewhere. The Vardar Offensive in the Balkans saw no Americans and had the dual effects of knocking the Bulgarians out of the war and opening up Hungary to direct attack. With the Allies across the Danube by November, the Hungarian government sought a cease-fire that ended the war on the Italian front. With the Austrians also seeking terms due to the secession of most of the entities within the nation, this opened all of southern Germany to the threat of Allied action slowed only by the speed that they could actually get there. This came as a complete and unwelcome surprise to the Germans, naturally, who had believed that their allies, even Austria-Hungary, could withstand more such attacks. With Italians in Innsbruck and the Greeks and Serbs moving north as fast as they could march, the Germans were not looking at an auspicious strategic situation regardless of the position of the lines in the West. This is essentially in accord with DoomBunny's post outlined earlier, just in a few more words. ^_^
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Without the USA, I think 1918 is too early for A-H collapse. German troops from the east will be used in France, sure, but without the prospect of vast US armies more will be diverted to the support of Germany's allies too. And if Bulgaria or the OE should collapse, they might be enough to form an army on the Danube or in the Balkan to keep Austria on board.
People who speculate about France collapsing if only the German situation on the western front were marginally better really need to account for the fact that France was sending troops to other fronts!
Right, but as I pointed out, American troops really weren't arriving in massive numbers at this point. It's not until September you really see a largescale American commitment (i.e., more than a couple of divisions), and even in terms of smallscale commitment it was fairly limited.
The problem elsewhere however is that by 1918, the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies had largely begun to disintegrate by themselves. In the former desertion was so bad that there were groups of men roaming the countryside with heavy weapons, whilst troops at the front were dealing with pitiful rations, and someone (the Kaiser) had the bright idea to relax discipline. In the latter a lot of the troops had no shoes (in the mountains, in Winter), and rations were even worse. Both these armies ended up collapsing not through battlefield action, so much as one hefty kick of the door bringing down the whole rotten structure. Vittorio-Veneto for example was a case of massive collapse, but one rather divorced from the battlefield circumstances.
The Ottomans had a different problem; simply being outpowered. Obviously one cannot assume things happen, but in real life by the end of 1918 (or even sooner if the Germans launch no Spring Offensive) the British (and minor allies) will be pushing into Anatolia and Thrace.
As for the German prospects of holding in the case of their allies collapsing, they're really not good. Even with extra troops available, the Germans would need to find troops to cover the Western Front, garrison the East, and cover a Southern Front extending from Switzerland to the Black Sea. Meanwhile the Allies will have so much extra strength to bring to the fight against Germany; the Italians up through Austria, the French, Greeks, Serbs and British from Macedonia, and the British and Imperial forces engaged in the Levant and Mesopotamia.
On top of that you have a British Empire which still has a lot of barrel left to scrape; the British never really utilised their colonial manpower reserves outside the Dominions (and even here South Africa and Australia got away without conscription, whilst in Canada it had no practical effect on manpower). Troops from Africa were not used in Europe, nor were Indians to a large extent. The French can also call on more men from the colonies, and indeed would be certain to do so.
The main problem you have if the US doesn't enter the war is not military, rather it is financial, and it is actually the most significant change and potentially a war-winner. By mid-1917 British credit would have run out, and the Americans had made it pretty clear that they wouldn't be so forthcoming with anymore.
Something akin to the Spring Offensive was in the cards regardless thanks to the troop surge from the Eastern front. Had they ever opened their eyes and realized the sorry state of the French... Then Kaisserreich becomes the default mode for Hearts of Iron
Edit: Actually I dont know about that last part.
The French really weren't in a sorry state. There certainly had been morale problems, but these were cases of military strikes against offensive action. The troops still wanted to win the war, they just didn't think costly and somewhat dubiously valuable offensives were the way to do that.
Salonika is very interesting as a front for this reason really. A French brainchild from the start, it's somewhat of a mixed bag.
Initially it was nothing more than a massive waste of strength; essentially dumping troops into a huge POW camp and giving them a hefty dose of malaria. But, once you reach 1918 it really comes into its own as a front. The Macedonian offensive collapsed the Central Powers in the Balkans, knocked out Bulgaria, dealt the Germans a hefty morale blow, opened up the way into the Danubian plain, and in an effect often forgotten was actually responsible for Ottoman surrender as well (cut off from all allied aid and with Allied troops marching on Constantinople had more effect than what were admittedly brilliant campaigns in the Levant and Mesopotamia).
Whether it was worth it in the long run is therefore somewhat debatable. The pay off was great, but the few years beforehand were troops sat around getting malaria and counting blades of grass less so. Then again there really wasn't anywhere else those troops could have gone other than the Western Front, so.
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Well, with no US it seems to me that most rational course for Germany would be attempting to repeat what they did with Russia and try to knock out another weak link among Allies, that is Italy. I suspect Caporetto 2.0 could be quite viable if Germans shifted bunch of their elite units to that front and could Italy realistically recover after that?
This is one option. Whether it would be successful against an improve Italian army reinforced by Allied troops is open to question, though one could probably see some success. What it would actually achieve however is less clear. Italian morale actually improved after Caporetto (because it actually gave the troops/populace something to fight for), and the Central Powers are probably too far away from anything major to deal damage to the war effort. The best to be hoped for is probably a prestige target like Venice or Padua and some substantial damage to the Italian forces. Maybe if one stretched it out across the entire year one could start making real deep progress, but eventually the Allies are going to get wise just as they did in the Spring Offensives.
Uh, no, the Italian army was in a state of collapse after Caporetto. What saved Italian morale was the arrival of British and French troops.
This is not the case. Certainly very many Italians surrendered, but they had little choice, as most were simply surrounded or taken in their dug-outs due to poor Italian defensive art. The rest of the army however fell back to the Piave, reformed the line, and got on with it. Certainly executions increased to keep men in line, but morale (and particularly civilian morale) actually improved as it became clear that they now had something to fight for, and that Cadorna was gone. Part of the issue was that previously, there had been no real attempt to motivate the soldiers beyond the odd "Extra pay for this suicide mission" or "Hey, charge the machine guns or I'll execute every tenth man". Now the Italians had a cause in defending the homeland from the old ogre of Austrian aggression, and the government and military authorities actually bothered to exploit this.
These would be the British and French troops who amounted to a few divisions, didn't arrive until after the Italians had reformed the line, and spent a good deal of time waiting around Mantua because they expected the Italians to collapse?
It's the thought that counts.
And I don't mean that as a joke. The very idea that your allies are actually bothering to show up when you're in dire straits helps morale, even before they do anything.
Except that the Italians had already begun offering stiffer resistance, and then went on to reform the line solidly without assistance.
Really the mass surrenders that took place initially were not so much a product of operational/morale problems as much as they were through tactical flaws in the defence. In a mistake the British and French later repeated on a lesser scale (and which the Germans had learned not to do during the Somme), there were too many troops in the forward areas, including guns, and communications were too easily cut. Basically the Italians put everything in the shop window and the German-Austrian forces ram-raided the place.