Occupying Mexico doesn't seem like a good idea to me. Just saying.
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Occupying Mexico doesn't seem like a good idea to me. Just saying.
Well it's not like anybody's done it yet so it might turn out alright.
(I hope I remember my history correct....
o )
Well it's not like anybody's done it yet so it might turn out alright.
(I hope I remember my history correct....
Napoleon III led France to invade Mexico during the 1860s (under the pretense of the Mexican government refusing to pay back debts) while the US was preoccupied with their own civil war. He installed a friendly regime in Mexico through a military intervention. It didn't go too well, and led to the puppet-king Maximilian I's execution by revolutionaries.
So unless FDR blatantly puts a US administrator of Mexico (which isn't possible unless the minister files are modded), there won't be any trouble in regards to how this will go.
Though this war would have been more convenient had the army triumvirate taken power after Zapata's death, but FDR should have a reliable neighbor south of the border rather than a loose cannon.
Nathan Madien: It's a provocation. The oil industry is the only sector Zapata never managed to nationalize, and his successor isn't sitting on nearly as solid a base of support.
Viden: Only if you don't do exactly what they tell you to do.
Enewald: The Germans!? They've been America's enemy for the last twenty years!
yourworstnightm: They're not quite Syndicalist. "Radical socialist," as a matter of fact.
Onni_Manni/MercZ: The French occupation stands out, though Napoleon III's investment in Mexico was fairly small, and the Americans were actively helping the Mexican rebels. But this is a bit hasty, I'd say. There's no war at the moment.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented Roosevelt's ultimatum to the Cuban government on April 22. The United States demanded the immediate extradition of Fritz Kuhn and a formal apology for harboring such a prominent rebel leader. The Cubans were caught in a serious dilemma: the National exiles had brought with them substantial capital that could and already had been invested in the moribund economy, Kuhn not least among them. To hand him over would inevitably alienate these very people; yet there was the risk of American military intervention hanging over the country. Though some within the Cuban government saw the ultimatum as a bluff, thinking the country had not yet truly recovered from the effects of the civil war, President Gomez was not willing to take that chance. A compromise was reached and the Cuban government responded: Kuhn would be handed over if the United States were willing to pay the amount he had bribed them with.
The response infuriated Roosevelt, who immediately publicized the Cuban terms. Public support for the President's course spiked, with many in the South expressing their disgust that the Cubans would contemplate selling Kuhn back to the Americans. Syndicalists were far more wary, seeing events unfolding as a precedent that may be used later to apprehend Reed, still in Paris.
Reacting swiftly to events transpiring around it, Mexico honored its promise to come to Cuba's aid in the event of American hostilities. Within hours of the news of Cuban response going public, Mexican authorities moved swiftly to seize all American oil industry within their borders. Domestically, the move was a triumph for President Lombardo, who had always sought to silence his critics within the military with an unquestionable success. But Lombardo had seriously miscalculated the foreign response; like many Cubans, Lombardo presumed that Roosevelt was not seriously contemplating a war over Mexican oil or Fritz Kuhn. He also expected Cuba would remain idle following his move. Instead, the Mexican support only emboldened Gomez, who believed hostilities were now inevitable. Acting on the President's orders, Cuban troops stormed the American base at Guantanamo Bay.
Faced with the seizure of American assets, Roosevelt's hand was forced. Already fed up with Cuban intransigence, he could scarcely tolerate such a blatant and direct assault on the United States' interests. To back down now would be a complete humiliation on the international stage and seriously undermine the President's support at home. Therefore, on April 25, Roosevelt, addressing a joint session of Congress in person, requested a formal declaration of war on Mexico and Cuba. The President methodically listed off each country's transgressions against the United States, concluding that:
Roosevelt's speech, and the Congressional response, reflected the mood of the American people; the actions carried out by the Cuban and Mexican governments were unacceptable, but the prospect of war in order to rectify these actions was met with little enthusiasm. The patriotic indignation toward their southern neighbors was mixed with a reluctance for war, a mentality forged by the crucible of the civil war and the losses it had brought. The war was necessary, but unwanted. The Senate voted 74-16 in favor of war, and the House 321-52. Asked for his opinion by Cuban reporters, Fritz Kuhn remarked 'America first. America always. America forever...'
The United States declares war on Mexico and Cuba.
Viden: Only if you don't do exactly what they tell you to do.
Enewald: The Germans!? They've been America's enemy for the last twenty years!
yourworstnightm: They're not quite Syndicalist. "Radical socialist," as a matter of fact.
Onni_Manni/MercZ: The French occupation stands out, though Napoleon III's investment in Mexico was fairly small, and the Americans were actively helping the Mexican rebels. But this is a bit hasty, I'd say. There's no war at the moment.
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull presented Roosevelt's ultimatum to the Cuban government on April 22. The United States demanded the immediate extradition of Fritz Kuhn and a formal apology for harboring such a prominent rebel leader. The Cubans were caught in a serious dilemma: the National exiles had brought with them substantial capital that could and already had been invested in the moribund economy, Kuhn not least among them. To hand him over would inevitably alienate these very people; yet there was the risk of American military intervention hanging over the country. Though some within the Cuban government saw the ultimatum as a bluff, thinking the country had not yet truly recovered from the effects of the civil war, President Gomez was not willing to take that chance. A compromise was reached and the Cuban government responded: Kuhn would be handed over if the United States were willing to pay the amount he had bribed them with.
The response infuriated Roosevelt, who immediately publicized the Cuban terms. Public support for the President's course spiked, with many in the South expressing their disgust that the Cubans would contemplate selling Kuhn back to the Americans. Syndicalists were far more wary, seeing events unfolding as a precedent that may be used later to apprehend Reed, still in Paris.
Reacting swiftly to events transpiring around it, Mexico honored its promise to come to Cuba's aid in the event of American hostilities. Within hours of the news of Cuban response going public, Mexican authorities moved swiftly to seize all American oil industry within their borders. Domestically, the move was a triumph for President Lombardo, who had always sought to silence his critics within the military with an unquestionable success. But Lombardo had seriously miscalculated the foreign response; like many Cubans, Lombardo presumed that Roosevelt was not seriously contemplating a war over Mexican oil or Fritz Kuhn. He also expected Cuba would remain idle following his move. Instead, the Mexican support only emboldened Gomez, who believed hostilities were now inevitable. Acting on the President's orders, Cuban troops stormed the American base at Guantanamo Bay.
Faced with the seizure of American assets, Roosevelt's hand was forced. Already fed up with Cuban intransigence, he could scarcely tolerate such a blatant and direct assault on the United States' interests. To back down now would be a complete humiliation on the international stage and seriously undermine the President's support at home. Therefore, on April 25, Roosevelt, addressing a joint session of Congress in person, requested a formal declaration of war on Mexico and Cuba. The President methodically listed off each country's transgressions against the United States, concluding that:
The United States does not face the peril of imminent military attack, nor do we seek war as a means of conquest and the acquisition of wealth and territory. Rather, this nation faces a threat of a different sort; should we flinch at this moment, and back down from the challenge now presented to us, it will mean that America has no wish to defend itself beyond its borders. The message that we send today by our actions will be clear: either we show here that America will suffer at the mercy of the whims of other nations, or we declare that America will not tolerate such disregard for its national honor and the rights of its citizens, and will not accept anything less than the rightful standing we are accorded as a nation.
Roosevelt's speech, and the Congressional response, reflected the mood of the American people; the actions carried out by the Cuban and Mexican governments were unacceptable, but the prospect of war in order to rectify these actions was met with little enthusiasm. The patriotic indignation toward their southern neighbors was mixed with a reluctance for war, a mentality forged by the crucible of the civil war and the losses it had brought. The war was necessary, but unwanted. The Senate voted 74-16 in favor of war, and the House 321-52. Asked for his opinion by Cuban reporters, Fritz Kuhn remarked 'America first. America always. America forever...'
The United States declares war on Mexico and Cuba.
Should be an easy victory, Mexico never has a big army (at least in the games I've played)
How ironic...the United States declaring war on Cuba, a country it helped liberate from Spainish control.
The war was forced upon Roosevelt, though.
The war was forced upon Roosevelt, though.
Ironic? A country under the yoke of US imperialism (You see, they are "independent" but only if they agree with Washington D.C.) since 1898, when Spain was treacherously attacked by the USA.
PS: Roosevelt is a warmonger. He follows US tradition of declaring wars of agression one after another.
Enewald: In the end, is there really a difference?
Kurt_Steiner: I wouldn't be too sure about that. This Roosevelt isn't much of a bare-knuckle boxer.
Sectorknight21: It is quite common for America to rush head first into a new war. Oddly enough, it only backfires every other time. Will America break the streak this time, or will it be doomed to repeat history?
yourworstnightm: You think the Pope might intervene on Mexico and Cuba's behalf?
Nathan Madien/Viden: I won't comment on that subject beyond what I say in my main posts, though I will say "warmonger" isn't neccesarily the most accurate term to describe Roosevelt's attitude toward the situation. Now that I think about it, I have not really been too clear about Roosevelt's whole attitude toward the country's foreign policy...
America at War - Part I
Though America's government and citizenry may have been prepared for a war with its southern neighbors, its military certainly was not. Since the crisis had broken out in March, Roosevelt took no steps toward readying the armed forces beyond dispatching the Atlantic Fleet to Miami; though only Georgia and Michigan remained unincorporated into the Union, the majority of the army remained on-station in the Midwest and South, and the old armies of the civil war had been broken apart and redistributed into individual and independent districts. As such, the United States only had two divisions within a hundred miles of the Mexican border.
In contrast, the Mexican army had stationed sixteen divisions along the length of the border. Immediately, panic spread through American towns and cities within striking distance of this substantial force. Rumors of Mexican army contingents raiding as far north as Phoenix became common, but proved of little substance. Ironically, it was President Lombardo that advocated a bold thrust into the United States' exposed underbelly, hoping that a stunning success might force Roosevelt to the bargaining table and bring a quick end to hostilities. But the military objected; but both Generals Augustin Mendoza and Pablo Quiroga, firm advocates of a purely defensive strategy, overrode Lombardo's plans.
The squabbling within the Mexican high command allowed the United States precious time to redeploy its forces. Stillwell, already on-hand in Texas, was immediately given command of a newly reformed II. Army and dispatched to the Rio Grande to organize a defensive line to blunt any Mexican incursions, and the cavalry corps under Lt. General DeWitt, was hurried from its positions in southern Colorado to California. Neither could seriously contemplate resisting a determined Mexican thrust, nor could they do anything to stop any Mexican divisions from crossing through the thousand-mile gap between Texas and California.
Unaware that no such invasion would be forthcoming, MacArthur hurriedly began the redeployment. General Hodges was already on-hand in Florida, and was given command of a new I. Army, to which another two divisions were being attached for an eventual invasion of Cuba. To bolster the Mexican front, an additional eight divisions were dispatched, divided roughly evenly between Texas, California, and Arizona. Another three divisions, amalgamated into V. Army under General Collins, was shipped to Washington D.C. In conjunction, the Pacific Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral King, set sail from Pearl Harbor for San Diego. Though intelligence on the size of the Mexican and Cuban navies was sketchy at best, Secretary of the Navy Harold Stark was perhaps justified in his confidence that they would pose little threat to either America's fleet assets or her coasts.
Large portions of the Army are hurriedly redeployed to the Mexican border.
Altogether, the forces the United States was arraying for the combined war totaled 15 divisions, with an additional 3 held in reserve, as well as two aircraft carriers, one battleship, and six cruisers, and six wings of Air Corps fighters and bombers. Outnumbered, MacArthur believed that the United States' veteran soldiers and command staff, as well as its qualitative superiority, would prove decisive on the battlefield. To accentuate this disparity, Roosevelt rushed the nascent Armored Corps off the drawing board and into production. Three new divisions began to take form, as orders for the new M4A1 'Sherman' tanks, based on the advances made by the Syndicalists in Europe and America, flooded Detroit. Planners in Washington hoped that these new armored formations could be deployed as early as mid-September and prove their worth on the field of battle.
Determined not to expand the Army beyond its present size, Roosevelt realized that the war would not be one of conquest. Having already asserted in his April 25 address to the joint session of Congress that the United States was not seeking war for territorial gain, a strategy that did not cripple Mexico or Cuba was preferred. Chaos south of the border had been an issue that had long bedeviled previous administrations, and it would be all too easy for Mexico to slip back into anarchy if it were handed a crushing defeat. Already angered over the declarations of war, the countries of Latin America would be even more estranged, and trade would predictably suffer significantly as a result. Bolivia took the first step toward this end, announcing on April 27 that it would be canceling all the trade deals it had negotiated with the American government over the last ten years.
Grumbling in private that political and economic issues of secondary importance were taking precedence over the primary matter of winning the war, MacArthur developed a rather uninspired two-pronged approach to Mexico; II. Army would advance across the Rio Grande and march south along the eastern coast while IV. Army acted likewise in the west. Between them, III. Army would hold its ground, pinning a large portion of its Mexican counterpart in place. Ultimately, II. Army would then swing inland and advance on Mexico City; with the capital under American control, the war would be as good as over.
In spite of its small size and moribund economy, the Cubans managed to field a total of nine divisions spread out unevenly across the length of the island. Though these were of dubious quality, the island's terrain provided for easy defense against invading forces. In the southeast, around Guantanamo, the terrain was least conducive to an invading army, but also the least defended. General Hodges proposed that I. Army land ashore there, liberating the Guantanamo Bay military base in the process. Concerns were voiced that Havana should be the immediate target, but Hodges argued that, with practical mastery of the Caribbean waters, the Navy could deploy troops elsewhere at its leisure, so long as the bulk of the Cuban army moved to counter the initial landings.
The initial invasion plans.
But even the best-laid plans do not survive for very long once put into action. And with both of America's opponents standing on the defensive in anticipation of any move, the outnumbered United States Army could very well find itself needing a new plan sooner than anyone expected.
Kurt_Steiner: I wouldn't be too sure about that. This Roosevelt isn't much of a bare-knuckle boxer.
Sectorknight21: It is quite common for America to rush head first into a new war. Oddly enough, it only backfires every other time. Will America break the streak this time, or will it be doomed to repeat history?
yourworstnightm: You think the Pope might intervene on Mexico and Cuba's behalf?
Nathan Madien/Viden: I won't comment on that subject beyond what I say in my main posts, though I will say "warmonger" isn't neccesarily the most accurate term to describe Roosevelt's attitude toward the situation. Now that I think about it, I have not really been too clear about Roosevelt's whole attitude toward the country's foreign policy...
-----
America at War - Part I
Though America's government and citizenry may have been prepared for a war with its southern neighbors, its military certainly was not. Since the crisis had broken out in March, Roosevelt took no steps toward readying the armed forces beyond dispatching the Atlantic Fleet to Miami; though only Georgia and Michigan remained unincorporated into the Union, the majority of the army remained on-station in the Midwest and South, and the old armies of the civil war had been broken apart and redistributed into individual and independent districts. As such, the United States only had two divisions within a hundred miles of the Mexican border.
In contrast, the Mexican army had stationed sixteen divisions along the length of the border. Immediately, panic spread through American towns and cities within striking distance of this substantial force. Rumors of Mexican army contingents raiding as far north as Phoenix became common, but proved of little substance. Ironically, it was President Lombardo that advocated a bold thrust into the United States' exposed underbelly, hoping that a stunning success might force Roosevelt to the bargaining table and bring a quick end to hostilities. But the military objected; but both Generals Augustin Mendoza and Pablo Quiroga, firm advocates of a purely defensive strategy, overrode Lombardo's plans.
The squabbling within the Mexican high command allowed the United States precious time to redeploy its forces. Stillwell, already on-hand in Texas, was immediately given command of a newly reformed II. Army and dispatched to the Rio Grande to organize a defensive line to blunt any Mexican incursions, and the cavalry corps under Lt. General DeWitt, was hurried from its positions in southern Colorado to California. Neither could seriously contemplate resisting a determined Mexican thrust, nor could they do anything to stop any Mexican divisions from crossing through the thousand-mile gap between Texas and California.
Unaware that no such invasion would be forthcoming, MacArthur hurriedly began the redeployment. General Hodges was already on-hand in Florida, and was given command of a new I. Army, to which another two divisions were being attached for an eventual invasion of Cuba. To bolster the Mexican front, an additional eight divisions were dispatched, divided roughly evenly between Texas, California, and Arizona. Another three divisions, amalgamated into V. Army under General Collins, was shipped to Washington D.C. In conjunction, the Pacific Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral King, set sail from Pearl Harbor for San Diego. Though intelligence on the size of the Mexican and Cuban navies was sketchy at best, Secretary of the Navy Harold Stark was perhaps justified in his confidence that they would pose little threat to either America's fleet assets or her coasts.
Large portions of the Army are hurriedly redeployed to the Mexican border.
Altogether, the forces the United States was arraying for the combined war totaled 15 divisions, with an additional 3 held in reserve, as well as two aircraft carriers, one battleship, and six cruisers, and six wings of Air Corps fighters and bombers. Outnumbered, MacArthur believed that the United States' veteran soldiers and command staff, as well as its qualitative superiority, would prove decisive on the battlefield. To accentuate this disparity, Roosevelt rushed the nascent Armored Corps off the drawing board and into production. Three new divisions began to take form, as orders for the new M4A1 'Sherman' tanks, based on the advances made by the Syndicalists in Europe and America, flooded Detroit. Planners in Washington hoped that these new armored formations could be deployed as early as mid-September and prove their worth on the field of battle.
Determined not to expand the Army beyond its present size, Roosevelt realized that the war would not be one of conquest. Having already asserted in his April 25 address to the joint session of Congress that the United States was not seeking war for territorial gain, a strategy that did not cripple Mexico or Cuba was preferred. Chaos south of the border had been an issue that had long bedeviled previous administrations, and it would be all too easy for Mexico to slip back into anarchy if it were handed a crushing defeat. Already angered over the declarations of war, the countries of Latin America would be even more estranged, and trade would predictably suffer significantly as a result. Bolivia took the first step toward this end, announcing on April 27 that it would be canceling all the trade deals it had negotiated with the American government over the last ten years.
Grumbling in private that political and economic issues of secondary importance were taking precedence over the primary matter of winning the war, MacArthur developed a rather uninspired two-pronged approach to Mexico; II. Army would advance across the Rio Grande and march south along the eastern coast while IV. Army acted likewise in the west. Between them, III. Army would hold its ground, pinning a large portion of its Mexican counterpart in place. Ultimately, II. Army would then swing inland and advance on Mexico City; with the capital under American control, the war would be as good as over.
In spite of its small size and moribund economy, the Cubans managed to field a total of nine divisions spread out unevenly across the length of the island. Though these were of dubious quality, the island's terrain provided for easy defense against invading forces. In the southeast, around Guantanamo, the terrain was least conducive to an invading army, but also the least defended. General Hodges proposed that I. Army land ashore there, liberating the Guantanamo Bay military base in the process. Concerns were voiced that Havana should be the immediate target, but Hodges argued that, with practical mastery of the Caribbean waters, the Navy could deploy troops elsewhere at its leisure, so long as the bulk of the Cuban army moved to counter the initial landings.
The initial invasion plans.
But even the best-laid plans do not survive for very long once put into action. And with both of America's opponents standing on the defensive in anticipation of any move, the outnumbered United States Army could very well find itself needing a new plan sooner than anyone expected.
Kurt_Steiner: I wouldn't be too sure about that. This Roosevelt isn't much of a bare-knuckle boxer.
The guy can't even stand up on his own, much less be a boxer.
Well, it has turned into a past-time, as you pointed out.
Sounds like a Korea waiting to happen. Sure, MacArthur could win victories...but then his mouth could get the better of him and he could end up being fired for overstepping his line.
MacArthur, like Patton, was a great general. MacArthur, like Patton, didn't know when to shut up. MacArthur, like Patton, could be their own worst enemy.
MacArthur as Caesar? Well...we all know what happened to Caesar at the end.
The question is: if MacArthur is Caesar, who is Brutus?
No, the real question is: If MacArthur is Caesar, then who rules after dear Caesar?
yourworstnightm/Kurt_Steiner: You think he could do it?
Nathan Madien: "MacArthur, like Patton, was a great general."
That, to be frank, is very debatable.
Enewald: Nope!
Viden: That reminds me, I re-introduced a tech team for the US that isn't in the Kaiserreich mod....
TheMaleRei: Truman?
America at War - Part II
Throughout late April and early May 1941, American reinforcements began to arrive in Texas to reinforce Stillwell's vastly-outnumbered II. Army while I. Army steadily amassed at the southern end of the Florida peninsula. With the exception of the daily bombing raids and flyovers by the Air Corps, there was little evidence that there was actually a war on.
This two week lull ended on May 6; I. Army was quickly loaded onto transports in Miami harbor and ferried south under the protective watch of Nimitz's Atlantic Fleet over the following days. Quickly realizing the American fleet's disappearance, the Cuban navy, a motley collection of antiquated destroyers, torpedo boats, and converted civilian craft, dispersed in a vain effort to locate and, if possible, disrupt the American fleet's progress. Although the initial landings at Guantanamo Bay were scheduled for May 12, intelligence reports indicated Cuban divisions along the whole length of the island were on the march. Hodges chose to postpone the landings until the Cubans' intentions could be discerned.
By the 16th, Nimitz could wait no longer and the landings were green-lighted. I. Corps under Mj. General Clark, rushed ashore, reclaiming the base with no opposition. But as the Americans advanced further inland, they stumbled across a heavily-entrenched Cuban division under General Perez. The combination of terrain and Perez's well-placed artillery stymied Clark's best efforts to advance. After three days of exhausting, though relatively bloodless fighting, I. Corps was forced to fall back to the base. Unable to accommodate three divisions at the beachhead, the remainder of I. Army was transported back to Miami. Ultimately, the United States' first battle of the war against Cuba and Mexico was a defeat.
Worried by the effect this unexpected setback might have on morale, Roosevelt pressed for an early start to the invasion of Mexico, even as IV. Army was still moving into position in California. General Wainright, commander of III. Army, was happy to oblige, suggesting Monclova, at the heart of Coahuila. An attack there would not compromise MacArthur's overall strategy, and was approved with little complaint. On May 19, Mj. General Wedemeyer's II. Corps crossed the Rio Grande near Del Rio, while Eisenhower provided support from Laredo, pinning the majority of the Mexican defenders along the river. Two Mexican divisions struggled to contain Wedemeyer, but were ultimately forced into a retreat after a day of fighting, leaving Monclova wide open.
While this was unfolding on the eastern end of the line, MacArthur's good fortune averted disaster on its western extremity. Having concentrated most of his heavy-hitting forces around San Diego, the IV. Army commander left hundreds of miles of desolate and empty borderland to the defense of garrison troops and DeWitt's cavalry corps. On May 24, these forces encountered the advanced units of four divisions crossing the border in the gap between San Diego and Yuma from their base of support at Mexicali. DeWitt rushed his forces in to hold General Cardenas' attack as close to the border as possible, while alerting MacArthur to the danger.
Having already seized Tijuana on May 21, MacArthur's divisions counter-attacked quickly, hitting Cardenas' right-flank hard. After two days of running battle, the Mexican flank buckled, and Cardenas retreated south down the peninsula. Compared to the fighting in Coahuila, this was a true American victory. Without any major ports along the peninsula, and with the Pacific Fleet in full control of the Gulf of California, two divisions were not completely isolated from the bulk of the Mexican army.
Within a day, however, the news of MacArthur's victory at Mexicali was soured by developments back in Coahuila. Having advanced deep into the Mexican interior, Wedemeyer finally reached Monclova on the 26th, but faced a determined counter-attack. Outnumbered, overextended, and without a proper supply line, II. Corps was quickly overwhelmed and fell back in disarray. Having exhausted themselves in the process of retaking Monclova, the Mexicans could not capitalize on the opportunity.
The first month of combat had proven a disappointment for the United States. Clark was bottled up at Guantanamo Bay, and sorties across the Rio Grande had proven disappointing. Only MacArthur's successes in the west brightened this otherwise gloomy and lackluster month.
The victory in the west, and the defeat in the east.
Nathan Madien: "MacArthur, like Patton, was a great general."
That, to be frank, is very debatable.
Enewald: Nope!
Viden: That reminds me, I re-introduced a tech team for the US that isn't in the Kaiserreich mod....
TheMaleRei: Truman?
------
America at War - Part II
Throughout late April and early May 1941, American reinforcements began to arrive in Texas to reinforce Stillwell's vastly-outnumbered II. Army while I. Army steadily amassed at the southern end of the Florida peninsula. With the exception of the daily bombing raids and flyovers by the Air Corps, there was little evidence that there was actually a war on.
This two week lull ended on May 6; I. Army was quickly loaded onto transports in Miami harbor and ferried south under the protective watch of Nimitz's Atlantic Fleet over the following days. Quickly realizing the American fleet's disappearance, the Cuban navy, a motley collection of antiquated destroyers, torpedo boats, and converted civilian craft, dispersed in a vain effort to locate and, if possible, disrupt the American fleet's progress. Although the initial landings at Guantanamo Bay were scheduled for May 12, intelligence reports indicated Cuban divisions along the whole length of the island were on the march. Hodges chose to postpone the landings until the Cubans' intentions could be discerned.
By the 16th, Nimitz could wait no longer and the landings were green-lighted. I. Corps under Mj. General Clark, rushed ashore, reclaiming the base with no opposition. But as the Americans advanced further inland, they stumbled across a heavily-entrenched Cuban division under General Perez. The combination of terrain and Perez's well-placed artillery stymied Clark's best efforts to advance. After three days of exhausting, though relatively bloodless fighting, I. Corps was forced to fall back to the base. Unable to accommodate three divisions at the beachhead, the remainder of I. Army was transported back to Miami. Ultimately, the United States' first battle of the war against Cuba and Mexico was a defeat.
Worried by the effect this unexpected setback might have on morale, Roosevelt pressed for an early start to the invasion of Mexico, even as IV. Army was still moving into position in California. General Wainright, commander of III. Army, was happy to oblige, suggesting Monclova, at the heart of Coahuila. An attack there would not compromise MacArthur's overall strategy, and was approved with little complaint. On May 19, Mj. General Wedemeyer's II. Corps crossed the Rio Grande near Del Rio, while Eisenhower provided support from Laredo, pinning the majority of the Mexican defenders along the river. Two Mexican divisions struggled to contain Wedemeyer, but were ultimately forced into a retreat after a day of fighting, leaving Monclova wide open.
While this was unfolding on the eastern end of the line, MacArthur's good fortune averted disaster on its western extremity. Having concentrated most of his heavy-hitting forces around San Diego, the IV. Army commander left hundreds of miles of desolate and empty borderland to the defense of garrison troops and DeWitt's cavalry corps. On May 24, these forces encountered the advanced units of four divisions crossing the border in the gap between San Diego and Yuma from their base of support at Mexicali. DeWitt rushed his forces in to hold General Cardenas' attack as close to the border as possible, while alerting MacArthur to the danger.
Having already seized Tijuana on May 21, MacArthur's divisions counter-attacked quickly, hitting Cardenas' right-flank hard. After two days of running battle, the Mexican flank buckled, and Cardenas retreated south down the peninsula. Compared to the fighting in Coahuila, this was a true American victory. Without any major ports along the peninsula, and with the Pacific Fleet in full control of the Gulf of California, two divisions were not completely isolated from the bulk of the Mexican army.
Within a day, however, the news of MacArthur's victory at Mexicali was soured by developments back in Coahuila. Having advanced deep into the Mexican interior, Wedemeyer finally reached Monclova on the 26th, but faced a determined counter-attack. Outnumbered, overextended, and without a proper supply line, II. Corps was quickly overwhelmed and fell back in disarray. Having exhausted themselves in the process of retaking Monclova, the Mexicans could not capitalize on the opportunity.
The first month of combat had proven a disappointment for the United States. Clark was bottled up at Guantanamo Bay, and sorties across the Rio Grande had proven disappointing. Only MacArthur's successes in the west brightened this otherwise gloomy and lackluster month.
The victory in the west, and the defeat in the east.
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