January – February 1952: The Presidential Election of 1952 – Part I
On January 6th, 1952, the Concordat Articles were formally signed between representatives of Premier Togliatti of the Italian Socialist Republic (RSI), and those of OTO, including envoys from France, Great Britain, and the United States. It brought to end what many derided as Italy’s
”fictional war” with the western powers. Only in recent months, when American advances brought the fighting to Italy’s doorstep, did actual combat truly broke out. Giving little besides access to the Soviet war effort, under suspicion by Moscow after Pope Pius’ ‘house arrest’, the RSI had held back from the war, and to no one’s surprise, leapt at the first opportunity to leave it behind. At the insistence of the United States, with milder support from Britain, the House of Savoy was to be restored to Italy, which became a kingdom once more in name, though Togliatti’s government would remain intact.
Palmiro Tagliatti, Prime Minister of the restored Kingdom of Italy
The Italian mainland would retain its territorial integrity, though Italy formally recognized Britain’s control of Sardinia. To give weight to the illusion of royal restoration, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), became the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and Togliatti became Prime Minister. Many in Washington especially, would grumble that the agreement left a virtual communist government in control of a major European country. Though the next few years would see the rise of the Social Nationalists (PSN), the Concordat Articles represented the of many compromises that the Lindbergh Administration would have to contend with, as the concerns and interests of allies clashed with the ideological forces behind the Great Crusade. Similar negotiations with Spain appeared to be reaching a similar conclusion, namely the avoidance of a protracted war of occupation and the face-saving changes in the governing regime.
In the United States, Senator McCarthy was fuming. The Concordat Articles, in his view, bent if not broke with the fundamental tenets of anti-Communism, namely
”never to compromise the integrity of our mission.” Though much of his opposition was kept private, some of it did leak through into his speeches in the Senate and his public comments. For example, in mid-January, McCarthy described the administration’s recent policies in Europe as
”tepid” and
”lacking quite enough will.” Behind the scenes, the rift was very real. No one in the press knew of the January 13th incident where McCarthy refused to meet with National Chairman Ralph Brewster. Although the two would meet a few days later, it was indicative of McCarthy's distaste for
”international politics”.
Senator McCarthy represented the faction of the National Party which favored the harsh application of anti-Communism
The issue brought home a very real question in the National Party – what was it going to be after Lindbergh stepped down, and the President seemed to be sending signals that he would not run again in 1952. Many, of course, were calling on him to do so, yet by February, scrutiny was falling on Senators McCarthy and Johnson, and a certain distance between them began to grow. With the primaries approaching, the first hints of opposing views and disagreements began to subtly creep into the public consciousness. McCarthy, for his part, labeled Johnson as a
”part-time crusader”, suspecting Johnson of left-wing leanings on social issues and the Just and Proper Deal, though anti-Communist in foreign policy. Johnson was just as sharp, once dubbing McCarthy
”that political hack with the one-man band – Communists! Communists! Communists!” Many in the party ranks wanted Lindbergh to run for a fourth term precisely to avoid the kind of party split that Johnson and McCarthy seemed to be creating.
National leaders wanted Lindbergh to preserve party unity
There was also the question of peace terms and the resolution of the war in Europe. McCarthyite Nationals, or ‘McCarthyites’ as they were dubbed, demanded the restoration of all Europe, the elimination of all Communist regimes, and the destruction of the Soviet Union itself. There was very little left to the imagination. Johnsonian Nationals favored what they called a
”Quarantine Doctrine”. To them, the Soviet regime was a virus, too daunting in breadth and depth to cure, yet needing isolation, lest its poison continue to seep into the world. To this end, this faction had a wider international view, favoring strengthening especially those countries on the immediate Soviet border – Finland, a strong Poland and Romania, Turkey, a great Arabian state, a free India, and a united China. Some of these views, of course, would have to take into consideration the will of the Axis powers, though the doctrine included the Axis as part of the strong border policy. Johnson first voiced a hint of this policy in a January 28th speech, where he intimated that the Soviet Union
”should be made cast off all its imperial trappings, be reduced to its base state, and be made to languish in a self-imposed prison of bolshevism.” It did not help his cause, however, that the leading American generals in the war, MacArthur and Patton, were both fervent advocates of the McCarthyite position, and favored peace
”to be dictated by our tanks in Moscow”, as MacArthur mentioned. Patton’s tanks – which were approaching the outskirts of Berlin – were as much an argument in the election as the candidates’ rhetoric.
Generals MacArthur and Patton were strong proponents of complete victory
The Democrats and Republicans were smelling blood, and were gearing up their own election campaigns on these issues. It could seen that the Democrats favored a mild peace, ranging from Harriman’s ‘Europe-Only’ policy – expulsion of the Soviet influence from Europe, leave Asia to its own devices – to Stevenson’s clarion call of
”How Much Sacrifice Is Enough?”. Despite the overall support for the war, there was a certain feeling of neglect amongst the Nationals’ traditional base of support – the business sector, and both the Democrats and Republicans hoped to pick up votes by appealing to a ‘friendlier business’ policy, less so for the Democrats, but a very real possibility otherwise. Cabot Lodge’s call for tax cuts were quite appealing to many businessmen, though the President’s own subsequent call would mitigate this effect. John D. Rockefeller, Jr’s camp was advancing the bold course of the ‘American Custom’, what he called a trade barrier around North, Central, and South America, while reducing if not eliminating tariff barriers within the hemisphere. Those who dealt with Caribbean cash crops – the fruit companies, the sugar plantation owners, were delighted at the proposal, though there was a lukewarm response from Big Oil – who nervously pondered taxed imports from the Middle East, and fear from farmers who foresaw cheap imports of Argentinian grain. An astute William Buckley, Jr. called it
”Chamberlain’s Imperial Preference rehashed”, though few knew if it was a compliment or not.
Rockefeller Jr.’s ‘American Custom’ proposal represented a controversial Republican position
The 1952 election was about more than simply the end of the war, Lindbergh’s Great Crusade. It was, in one newspaper editorial’s words,
”a referendum on the National Party”. Many felt that the end of the war against the Soviet Union would reduce the frequency of future wars after that. The United States, satiated and victorious, would have no more need for an anti-Communist, militarist party – or so the Democrats and Republicans hoped.