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18.1. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. FIRST MEASURES
  • 18.1. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. FIRST MEASURES.

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    Aureus of Decius. On the reverse, GENIVS EXERC ILLYRICIANI, one of the first times in which the "army of Illyricum" is expressly praised or acknowledged.

    After his victory at Verona, Decius hurried to Rome where he was properly acknowledged as augustus by the Senate. Soon, he showed himself to be a very different rule than the late Philip. He was a man of relatively advanced age when he rose to the purple; having been born sometime between 190 and 201 CE at a village called Budalia, a village near Sirmium in Lower Pannonia (modern Martinci and Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia respectively). It’s not clear if his family was of senatorial stock or if he was its first member to enter the ranks of the Senate. The Illyrian provinces provided very few senators as they were relatively underdeveloped provinces by Roman standards and latifundia there were rare, but in ancient sources (contemporary III century sources and later pro-pagan sources) he’s called “a man of noble lineage”. It’s also possible that he came from the Illyrian gentry of equestrian rank from Pannonia which provided the bulk of the officers for the Danubian army.

    In this sense, Decius was the first Illyrian emperor, an important precedent. And although perhaps he came from the same milieu from which the Illyrian Soldatenkaiser would sprout, he was a man completely assimilated into the senatorial ordo.

    What’s sure is that he married very well, to a woman named Annia Cupressenia Herennia Etruscilla, of impeccable Italian senatorial pedigree. Most probably, this marriage was key for the advancement of his career. Not much is known about it before 249 CE. For some reason, most historians assume that he’d centered mostly in military appointments, when in fact there’s no solid records for that, only vague accounts in written sources that describe him as “an experienced commander” without further details, which in view of his performance against the Goths I’d say it’s somewhat open to question.

    What’s known for certain from epigraphic sources about his career is thus:
    • He was consul in 232 CE under Severus Alexander (that means that he was 40 years old or older by then).
    • He was later governor of Moesia and Lower Germany between 232 CE and 235 CE, again under Severus Alexander. These were border provinces with important garrisons, and thus perhaps that’s why he was considered as a man of military experience. Notice though that apart from the 234-235 CE war against the Alamanni, this was a period of peace in the northern border.
    • He was governor of Hispania Tarraconensis under Maximinus Thrax. This province was a military backwater, and the fact that Maximinus (who was an experienced military man) sent him there instead of appointing him to another border province inspires little confidence about his military credentials. It’s remarkable though that during the 238 CE senatorial uprising Decius remained loyal to Maximinus; the reasons are unknown.
    He had two sons from his marriage with Herennia Etruscilla: the elder one Herennius Etruscus (Quintus Herennius Etruscus Messius Decius) born c. 227 CE and the younger one Hostilian (Gaius Valens Hostilianus Messius Quintus), born sometime in the 230s.

    Upon his arrival to Rome after September 249 CE, he showed himself as a man very different from the late Philip the Arab, for in the three months left of that year he displayed considerable energy and took a series of important measures.

    He had the Senate decree the ultimate punishment for Philip the Arab, the damnatio memoriae, which suggests that there was something deeply personal in his usurpation against his predecessor and the killing of both Philip and his son (which again undermines Zosimus’ tale of him accepting the post of emperor at a sword’s point). If the rumors about Philip the Arab’s sympathy or even belonging to the Christian faith are true, this could’ve been a catalyst for Decius’ vindictiveness.

    He changed his name, which became Imperator Caesar C. Messius Quintus Traianus Decius Augustus. Quite clearly, he wanted to associate himself with the memory of the optimus princeps. This suggest a deep conservatism on Decius’ part; he wanted to restore Rome’s ancient glory looking back to Trajan’s “golden era”, and it was also probably a propaganda trick because he was going to engage soon in a campaign in Dacia and the Lower Danube as Trajan had done. Another goal of this name change was to raise the confidence of the people and the army in his own military prowess, by associating himself with the great warrior emperor.

    He raised his wife Herennia Etruscilla to the rank of augusta and his elder son Herennius Etruscus to that of caesar and heir apparent, thus signaling his dynastic ambitions.

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    Aureus of Herennia Etruscilla. On the reverse, PVDICITIA AVG (as could be expected from an honorable Roman matron)

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    Antoninianus of Herennius Etruscus. On the reverse, PRINCIPI IVVENTVTIS.

    David S. Potter states that Decius also commanded a remarkable series of antoniniani to be issued by the Roman mint, commemorating his deified predecessors. But the list of deified emperors does not reflect a standard list that was used in sacrifices to the deified emperors through standard celebrations of the imperial cult. Rather it looks like a deliberate selection of emperors who might truly be thought to deserve the honor (according to Decius’ criteria, of course). The series begins with Augustus and includes Vespasian, Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus, Commodus, Septimius Severus, and Severus Alexander. While Decius’ contemporaries might not have noticed the omission of Claudius or Pertinax in this line, the omission of the three Gordiani would clearly have drawn attention to what was going on. Decius was rewriting Roman history.

    As Potter notes, it was not just, of course, the history of the more distant past that he was interested in rewriting. Something also had to be done about the circumstances of his own revolt against Philip. Zosimus and Zonaras both tell the story, which they must have taken from Dexippus about the session of the Senate when Philip offered to abdicate, and Decius stood and took the responsibility over his shoulders to do what had to be done. The point of the story about Decius and Philip was that Decius had done nothing wrong, unworthy though Philip was to reign. It may be that the peculiar story about Philip's role in Gordian's death, which bears little, if any, relation to the actual event, also dates to this period.

    And most importantly, he issued his famous decree about sacrifices, which caused the first great empire-wide persecution against Christians. This was an order that all his subjects sacrifice to the gods for the well-being of the state. The text of the edict appears to have been relatively detailed. The consistency evident in the numerous texts that have survived from Egypt recording the act of sacrifice suggests that precise forms of observance were laid out. The Egyptian texts, collectively known as libelli, a term that contemporary Christians used for them (probably because the word was used in the edict), consist of a record of the act of sacrifice, the names of the officials in charge of overseeing the sacrifice, and a statement by the individual performing the sacrifice testifying to his or her loyalty to the "ancestral gods" and to the consumption of sacrificial food and drink.

    It appears from Christian texts that all the inhabitants of a province were required to perform this act by a specified day or be liable to serious penalties. The similitude with the systems of census registration and tax collection are obvious. In both cases it was up to the individual taxpayer to make the proper declaration or payment by a specific time, and it was possible to check if a person had done this because of the tax registers.

    The language of the oath is of interest, precisely because it is so vague. A simple reference to the "ancestral gods" did not force any individual to sacrifice to any god specifically, though it had the coincidental, and probably unintentional, effect of forcing Christians to decide if they could sacrifice under such circumstances. Decius was not trying to assert the superiority of a specifically Roman pantheon over any other gods; rather it appears that he was stressing consistency in the practice of worship. Whatever else people did, they were expected, at least once, to perform the same action before the gods as everyone else.

    His goal was probably to have all people declare their affinity with the gods who had preserved the empire hitherto, and to legitimize his position through a most public act of devotion showing urbi et orbe that he was taking steps, in his position of pontifex maximus and head of the traditional Roman religion to seek the help of the gods in response to the undercurrent of unease caused by the passing of the millennium and the natural catastrophes and the deathly epidemic that were ravaging the empire.

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    Image and translation of the text of an Egyptian libellus from Decius' reign.

    The response that Decius may have been looking for may be best illustrated by a letter he wrote to the people of Aphrodisias in Caria thanking them for their display of piety in response to his order (ancient Aphrodisians engraved all imperial letters and edicts concerning their city in a public monument that has survive to this day):
    It was to be expected that you, because of the goddess for whom your city is named, and because of your relationship and loyalty to the Romans (Note: Aphrodisias still enjoyed the status of a free city, allied to Rome), that you would have rejoiced at the establishment of our rule and made the appropriate prayers and sacrifices.
    Potter also points to the fact that Decius had been probably born during the reign of Septimius Severus and could remember the constitutio antoniniana, which may be the model for his action. Emperors in the past had used decrees about taxation early in their reigns to get people's attention, but what makes the parallel between the acts of Decius and Caracalla relevant is that in both cases they asked for something more than a passive response from their subjects. It is also significant that in both cases they invoked the need to celebrate the gods along with the emperor. The impulse to join local cult to the imperial government, on the imperial government's own terms, was a substantial reversal of the ordinary practice of religion in the classical world. Cities that made particular displays of loyalty were well rewarded: Thessalonica received recognition for three imperial festivals (exalting it above its rival, Beroea), Anazarbus in Cilicia received recognition for an additional festival, giving it one more than its rival, Tarsus, while the citizens of Mopsuestia were allowed to proclaim themselves "Decians."

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    Reconstruction of the city center of Aphrodisias in Caria. The structure formed by two long parallel bodies in the center of the picture is the Sebasteion, a peculiar construction intended to exalt the emperors and the glory of the empire.

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    Drawing of the monumental propylon that gave entry to the Sebasteion of Aphrodisias in Caria.

    And finally, Potter also points out that the unknown author of the Thirteenth Sybilline Oracle thought (if something can be discerned in such a strange and obscure text) that the edict on sacrifices was issued "because of the previous king." This same anonymous author connected it with the persecution of Christians who refused to sacrifice, perhaps in connection with what may have been a widely held belief in some parts of the empire that Philip had a soft spot in his heart for them.

    As a curious aside, the SHA wrote that in his zeal to restore the glories of Rome, Decius wanted to restore the office of censor, and left the Senate to elect who would hold the office. The Senate unanimously elected the senator Publius Licinius Valerianus (the future emperor), who declined to accept, and the project was discreetly dismissed. This strange tale by the SHA is not corroborated by any other ancient source, although its spirit would be completely in line with Decius’ ultraconservative tendencies. Also, what the SHA labelled as the old republican office of censor could very well have been an office to be created ex novo with the same name as the old republican magistrature but with a completely different task, that of supervising the enacting of Decius’ decree about sacrifices. If that were the case, Valerian probably declined the post because it would have tainted him politically forever.

    And after issuing this decree, which probably only served to raise trouble all across the empire, Decius prepared to leave the Urbs for the Balkans, to deal with the Goths and their allied tribes who had attacked the Roman provinces there. Potter is lapidary in his judgement of Decius as a military commander:
    He was an incompetent soldier, and his conduct on campaign in the next two years was as inept as any in the long annals of Roman military history.
    Potter is harsh in his judgement, and Ilkka Syvänne, who is a military historian (about whose opinions I have expressed my reserves previously and I will again do so in the future, but in this one I agree with him) is even harsher.
     
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    18.2. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE CHANGING SITUATION IN THE EMPIRE’S NORTHERN BORDERS.
  • 18.2. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE CHANGING SITUATION IN THE EMPIRE’S NORTHERN BORDERS.

    Traditionally, the danger posed by the “barbarian hordes” that could invade Italy across the Alps had been the Romans’ national nightmare, ever since Brennus’ Gauls sacked Rome in the IV century BCE. The last great scare had been the invasion by the Cimbri and Teutones in the late II century BCE. After that, the Roman conquest of Gaul and the Danubian provinces under Caesar and Augustus had brought a degree of security to Italy, and the northern “barbarians” had become either an object of contemptuous disdain, to be contained through diplomacy and punitive expeditions, or to be used by nostalgic traditionalists as examples of the “original virtues” that the Romans had supposedly lost.

    From the first century onwards, many northern “barbarians” served in the Roman army, and the proportion of such people probably increased as the provincialization of the imperial interior made army service less and less attractive to Roman civilians. The benefits of service in the army to a foreigner from beyond the northern borders were substantial: not only did service in an auxiliary (non-citizen) unit pay well, it brought with it Roman citizenship after honorable discharge and often a substantial discharge bonus. Many of these foreigners who served in the army became entirely used to a Roman way of life, living out their lives inside the empire and dying there as Roman citizens after long years of service. Others, however, returned to their native communities beyond the frontier, bringing with them Roman habits and tastes, along with Roman money and products of different sorts. Their presence contributed to the demand for more Roman products beyond the frontiers, which helped increase trade between the empire and its neighbors.

    After Augustus’s time, even in periods of peace, Roman military power was always present as a threat for the empire’s neighbors. Military victories were a vital legitimizing device for imperial power and very few emperors were secure enough on their thrones to pass up the occasional aggressive war. The need for imperial victories translated into periodic assaults upon the empire’s neighbors, the imposition of tribute, the taking of hostages, the collection of slaves, the pillaging of villages by Roman soldiers. Roman military aggression was by no means relentless, but it was never beyond the realm of possibility. Every generation born along the imperial frontier at some point experienced the attentions of the Roman military. The empire and its army were thus in and of themselves an ongoing spur to social change in the barbarian societies that bordered the imperial frontiers: their leaders had every incentive to make themselves more potent militarily. To the Romans, their northern neighbors were little more than punching bags to exercise their military muscle whenever they felt like it.

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    The Column of Marcus Aurelius in Rome celebrates the victories of this emperor in the Marcomannic Wars. Unlike the Trajan Columns, in this case the Roman sculptors did not avoid showing the dark side of Roman punitive expeditions; in this part of the relief, Germanic captives are being slaughtered en masse.

    This complacency arose from the fact that the (mainly Germanic) peoples who lived in barbarico were divided into small tribal policies based on clan and family ties that posed no threat militarily to Rome. But paradoxically, the drift towards greater military competence amongst Rome’s northern neighbors was only exacerbated by direct Roman interference in their political life. Roman dogma held that all “barbarians” were dangerous and that it was therefore best to keep them at odds with one another as much as possible. To keep “barbarian” leaders in a state of mutual hostility, Roman emperors frequently subsidized some kings directly. This support built up royal prestige and hence governing capacity, while reducing the importance of those leaders who were denied the same support. This type of interference allowed emperors to manage not just relations between these peoples and the empire, but also the relationships between different “barbarian” groups. Along the northern border of the empire, access to Roman luxury goods was often as important as the items themselves. The ability to acquire wealth meant the ability to redistribute it, and to be able to give gifts enforced a leader’s own social dominance. In other words, conspicuous wealth translated into active power. For these purposes, gold and silver were especially important, and were the dominant medium for storing wealth. Distribution patterns of silver coinage beyond the Roman border tend to vary according to the political importance of particular regions at particular times: in Germania, for instance, we find a huge concentration of 70,000 silver denarii in just a few decades between the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus, when campaigning along that frontier was regular and intense. What that and other evidence demonstrates is that the emperors and their governors regularly manipulated political life in barbaricum through economic subsidy. Yet this strategy, however necessary it might seem within the mental paradigms of Roman government and however effective it might be, was also fraught with dangers.

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    Roman soldiers executing POWs, column of Marcus Aurelius, Rome.

    It started to fail during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Among the northern peoples that the Romans called Germani, the largest and most powerful one had been that of the Marcomanni. In 165 CE, the victorious vexillationes of the European legions returned to their bases from the East, carrying with them a devastating epidemic that today scholars consider to have been the first appearance of smallpox in the Mediterranean basin. And as could be expected, one of the groups which were hit the worst was precisely the army, which became critically weakened in numbers. The Marcomanni and their allies seized the opportunity, and they invaded the upper Danubian provinces, endangering Italy itself. It took Marcus Aurelius more than 20 years of almost constant warfare to crush his foes (in the case of the Marcomanni, they never recovered from Roman reprisals).

    Raising the status of some leaders above that of their neighbors and natural peers could provide them with both means and motive for military action that they would otherwise have lacked. Leaders buttressed by Roman subsidy were able to attract more warrior clients into their following, thus enlarging the political groups they led. As it happened with Roman soldiers, barbarian warriors were better behaved when kept employed at the tasks for which they were suited. Fighting one’s “barbarian” neighbors was useful in this respect, but nearby Roman provinces, with their accessible wealth and a road system that made it easy for raiding parties to move rapidly about, became a hugely tempting target when imperial attentions were preoccupied elsewhere. The attractions of Roman wealth, combined with the hostility that was undoubtedly generated by periodic incursions of Roman soldiers, meant that there were strong structural reasons for attacks on the Roman northern border. These same structural reasons might occasionally inspire a particularly powerful “barbarian” king to conceive more grandiose plans.

    The larger the force, the most probabilities for success it had whether against other “barbarian” groups or against Rome, so this new social dynamic soon led to a catastrophic development for Rome: large loose confederations appeared where until then there had been solely small tribal groups. Some of their names (as reported by Graeco-Roman authors) have preserved the nature of their mixed and unrooted nature: Alamanni (all the men), Iuthungi (the young ones, perhaps a subgroup of the Alamanni), Franci (probably coming from a Germanic root meaning "fierce", "bold" or "insolent"). These confederations were not centralized entities by any means, and they did not recognize anything remotely resembling a sole monarch in most cases; in the IV century the Franks and Alamanni were still described as being led by several reges or iudices, each of which was probably the leader of one war band whose main worry was the upkeep and preservation of its own group of followers. Still, this development allowed the Germanic peoples to put in the field forces much larger than just a century before.

    This development is first attested in the upper Danube, where the name Alamanni is first reported by Cassius Dio in his description of Caracalla’s 213 CE campaign. The Franci are named for the first time in the 250s CE, same as the Iuthungi. It’s probably not a coincidence that they appeared for the first time in this decade, when the Roman empire entered a deep crisis, with its armies decimated by plague and civil wars, and the fiscal difficulties that the empire experienced had possibly caused a sharp drop (or the complete elimination) of subsidies. In the Rhine and upper Danube borders, the process seems to have been relatively quick and complete, probably because it was in this area where Germanic peoples had been most divided into smaller tribal units.

    In the middle Danube, the process was very slow or non-existent in the III century. The Quadi were still the main problem for Roman forces here, together with the Sarmatian Iazyges. The only newcomers to this scene were the Vandals, an eastern Germanic group possibly based around modern Silesia and Moravia which launched several raids on Pannonia.

    But it was on the lower Danube where the greatest danger for Rome arose. In this area, the traditional foes of Rome were the Carpi (also known as “free Dacians”), who launched continuous raids against Dacia, and the Sarmatian Roxolani. But now, a new and very powerful “barbarian” group appeared there. This group was the Goths. Historians, like David S. Potter, are somewhat reluctant to call these newcomers with the name “Goth” in the III century CE. The reluctance is perhaps understandable, because the Goths are associated in the archaeological record with the Chernyakhov culture in Ukraine, which is only archaeologically attested in the IV century CE, and not earlier.

    Then there’s also the issue of linguistics. Greek and Roman authors of the III century CE did not use the word “Goth” to refer to this people until the decade of the 270s CE. Unfortunately, no contemporary records of the III century Gothic wars has survived. We know that the Greek author Dexippus of Athens wrote a history of the Gothic wars from 238 CE to 270 CE, which was titled Skythica, and was used as a source by many later authors who wrote about these events, especially by the SHA, Zosimus and Zonaras.

    He was a contemporary of the events and he was personally involved as an Athenian magistrate in the fight against Germanic invaders and the defense of Athens and Greece. Through the fragments that have survived from his Skythica, Dexippus is considered by modern scholars as the main available source for events. And Dexippus never called these new foes “Goths”. Instead, he used the archaic term “Skythai” for them (borrowed from Herodotus and Thucydides). The late V century CE author Zosimus called them “Boranoi” (strange, as by then the word “Goth” was well in use), and they were called “Boradoi” by the III century CE Christian author Gregory of Neocaesarea.

    In my opinion, that’s perhaps a bit too much caution, because there’s evidence for the use of the word “Goth” and of names in Gothic language by members of this people in the III century CE. The earliest appearance of the word “Goth” in Latin is on an inscription from the Roman province of Arabia that’s dated to the reign of Septimius Severus. This inscription, found at I’nāt on the southern Hauran proclaims the monument of a certain Guththa, son of Erminarius, who is described as the commander of the tribal troops (gentiles, a word used by the Romans as synonymous with numeri), stationed among the Mothani, which were the natives of Motha, modern Imtān. The names Guththa and Erminarius have been shown without doubt to be Germanic ones, and so we’re dealing here with a commander of Gothi gentiles. But not all scholars accept that these names, although undoubtedly Germanic, are Gothic names. The inscription is dated (in the local era of the province) to 208 CE. This also raises the question that the Romans had contact with the Goths much earlier than 238 CE and that already Septimius Severus was employing them as mercenaries in the East (meaning that it’s very possible that Caracalla and Gordian III did the same in their own eastern campaigns). Also, Dexippus names as leaders of the Skythai (at least in the surviving fragments) two people with clear Gothic names: Ostrogotha and Cniva.

    The main problem when dealing with the origins (or, to use the word conined by the Austrian scholar Herwig Wolfram, ethnogenesis) of the Goths, the only extant ancient source that deals with the matter at large is the VI century CE Jordanes. Jordanes was a Goth who wrote in Constantinople in the VI century CE during the reign of Justinian a Latin book titled De origine actibusque Getarum ("The Origin and Deeds of the Getae/Goths”, usually abbreviates as Getica), which was a history of the Goths. This book was an epitome of a much more extensive History of the Goths written in Latin by the Roman officer Cassiodorus (Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator), who was Roman consul and magister officiorum under the Ostrogothic king of Italy Theoderic the Great.

    This work by Cassidorus was not intended to be an “objective” work (if such a notion even existed in those times), but rather a courtly history intended to exalt the Theoderic’s people and especially his own family the Amali by linking it to the legendary origins of the Goths. In other words, it was a work with a clear and deliberate political agenda, which was its primary objective. In this sense, the accuracy of the Getica as a source for a realistic history of the Goths is quite disputed among scholars, especially because its contents seem to be a crude rehash by Cassiodorus of works by previous Latin and Greek authors, containing gross major anachronistic mistakes and outright and bizarre fabrications. The Austrian historian Herwig Wolfram though believes that there might be a kernel of truth in Cassiodorus’ account; a Traditionskern which was essential for the existence of the group known historically as “Goths”. Wolfram and his followers argue that barbarian ethnicity was not a matter of genuine descent-communities, but rather of Traditionskerne (“nuclei of tradition”), small groups of aristocratic warriors who carried ethnic traditions with them from place to place and transmitted ethnic identity from generation to generation; larger ethnic groups coalesced and dissolved around these nuclei of tradition in a process of continuous becoming or ethnic reinvention that Wolfram named ethnogenesis. Because of this, “barbarian” ethnic identities were evanescent, freely available for adoption by those who might want to participate in them.

    To summarize, the Getica puts the legendary origin of the Goths in a land called Scandza, from where a leader called Berig departed with three ships in a legendary past. After crossing the see, they settled in a new land which they called Gothiscandza, where they grew numerous. And the historicity of the account goes downhill from here, as Berig’s descendants get involved in the Trojan War and even with Egyptian pharaohs (a clear attempt by the Roman Cassiodorus to inject some classical “respectability” into the historical record of the Goths; Roman authors writing for the Frankish kings also fabricated similar tales); the Getica does not regain any plausibility until it describes the first encounters of the Goths with the Roman army in the III century CE. According to the Getica, a king named Filimer decided that the now too numerous Goths had to leave Gothiscandza and settle in a new region called Oium or Aujum, which would correspond with what the Greeks and Romans called Scythia (roughly corresponding with modern Ukraine and southern Russia between the Carpathians and the Volga, the area also known as the Pontic steppe).

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    Landscape of Polish Kashubia in eastern Pomerania, which would have been perhaps the Gothiscandza of the Getica.

    Wolfram and other scholars believe that this “kernel” of truth could preserve the memory of what would have been in effect a group of migrant adventurers who originated from Scandinavia and settled in the southern Baltic coast, where the process of ethnogenesis of the people that would become the Goths began. Many scholars have been tempted to associate these proto-Gothic migrants who settled in the southern Baltic coast with the Wielbark culture, attested archaeologically in eastern Pomerania and Prussia from the I century CE to the first half of the III century CE. The Wielbark culture shows affinities with contemporary Scandinavian cultures, especially in burials and sacred places, and is considered to be thus at least under heavy Germanic influence. But it’s quite symptomatic that, while some historians seem willing to identify this culture with the proto-Goths and the predecessors of other East Germanic peoples closely linked to them like the Gepids and Rugii, archaeologists are far more skeptical and some historians (like Michael S. Kulikowski) share their scepticism. The Wielbark culture’s archaeological sites show a tendency to expand to the southeast along the course of the Vistula river, and by the early III century many of the oldest settlements nearer to the Baltic were abandoned. The problem for archaeologists is that this sudden disappearance of sites associated to the Wielbark culture does not correspond with the appearance of a new cultural complex with clear links to it in Ukraine and Moldova where the Goths appear “suddenly” in the early III century CE. The Chernyakhov culture, clearly associated to the Goths, is not attested until the IV century CE, and shows little or no material links with the Wielbark culture, which altogether makes archaeologists very reluctant to draw easy conclusions. Archaeological evidence in the Swedish province of Östergötland suggests a general depopulation during this period but again there is no clear evidence that this translated into a substantial emigration out of Scandinavia into eastern Pomerania and western Prussia, and thus the Goths could very well have originated in continental Europe,as Kulikowski thinks.

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    A stone circle in Kashubia (northern Poland) associated with the Wielbark culture.

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    A stone circle from Närke, Sweden.

    Some historians though (like Wolfram) have less trouble with it, and they see in this archaeological record a confirmation (in very broad lines) of Cassiodorus’ record. They also seek support for this theory in linguistic similarities, etymologies (despite Wolfram’s cautions against them in the introduction to his History of the Goths) and some parts of the Getica that indeed seem to show a detailed knowledge of Scandinavia (but which in turn could have been borrowed by Cassiodorus from now lost previous Graeco-Roman sources).

    In my opinion, the etymology is in this case strong enough to suggest that the original kernel of the Goths came indeed from Scandinavia, and more specifically from southern Sweden. When describing Scandza, the Getica says that there were three tribes living there called the Gautigoths (which could correspond to the Geatas/Gautar living in western Götaland by the Göta älv river), the Ostrogoths (which if it’s not one of Cassiodorus’ fabrications could perhaps correspond to the Geatas/Gautar who inhabited what is today the Swedish province of Östergötland) and Vagoths (which could correspond to the Gutar who inhabited the island of Gotland).

    Of these lands, the origin of the Goths which according to the Getica crossed the Baltic and settled in Gothiscandza could have been the island of Gotland, as the Gutasaga, written down in the XIII century states that:
    over a long time, the people descended from these three multiplied so much that the land couldn't support them all. Then they draw lots, and every third person was picked to leave, and they could keep everything they owned and take it with them, except for their land. … they went up the river Dvina, up through Russia. They went so far that they came to the land of the Greeks. … they settled there, and live there still, and still have something of our language.
    In ancient runic inscriptions dated to the IV century in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania, the Goths referred to themselves as Gut-þiuda (commonly translated as “Gothic people”) or as Gutans. The Geats (the original Germanic people which inhabited Götaland) were called Gēatas in Old English, and Gautar in Old Norse. In the case of the inhabitants of the island of Gotland, the etymology is still more suggestive, for the Old West Norse name for them is Gotar, and its equivalent in Old East Norse is Gutar; both terms are used without distinction to refer both to Gotlanders and Goths. Ptolemy referred to them as Goutai in the II century CE.

    Pliny and Tacitus described in their works that a people called the Gutones lived at the estuary of a river in the Baltic sea, and this could be a direct reference to the Goths who’d settled in Gothiscandza, and to the people of the Wielbark culture that existed in that place in Tacitus’ time.

    If we then consider that the people that formed the Wielbark culture came from Scandinavia, this does not mean that this was a full-scale colonization like in the American West. Most probably, a small Scandinavian warrior elite imposed its rule over the original population of the area. Before the establishment of the Wielbark culture, the area around the mouth of the Vistula was occupied by the Oksywie culture (II century BCE – early I century CE); scholars do not associate the Oksywie culture with any ethnicity or tribal group. The Roman author of the I century CE Pliny the Elder placed a people called Venedi (which later scholars have hypothetically classified as one of the proto-Slavic groups, related to the later Wends) living along the Baltic shore, and named them “Sarmatian Venedi”. The II century CE Alexandrine author Claudius Ptolemy placed a people that he called the “Greater Ouenedai” living along the entire “Venedic Bay”, which can be deduced from the context to be placed on the southern shore of the Baltic sea, and which could be identified with the Gulf of Gdańsk. In his Germania, Tacitus also named the Venedi, although he doubted if they should be classified as Germani or not. The Getica still places the Venedi at the lower Vistula region.

    It’s also possible that the Wielbark culture, apart from Goths and Venedi, also included the Germanic Rugii, attested in this area by Tacitus and Ptolemy. Historians have speculated that the Rugii moved to Pomerania from southern Norway in the I century CE (based again on etymological similarities); the Getica names the Ulmerugi as one of the peoples which were defeated and expelled by the Goths upon their arrival in Gothiscandza. Further to the southwest, archaeologists have placed another culture known as the Przeworsk culture (III century BCE – V century CE) which covered the middle and upper basins of the Oder and Vistula rivers, and stretched south across the Carpathians to the upper basins of the Dniester and Tisza rivers. The Przewolsk culture is sometimes associated with the Vandals, although it probably included several peoples with different ethnical backgrounds, of which the Vandals were perhaps just one among several. Further to the east, in the area of the Pripet marshes and the middle Dnieper basin, archaeologists place the Zarubintsy culture (III century BCE – I century CE), which is usually (but with the usual uncertainty and lack of evidence) with proto-Slavic peoples, and which showed heavy Scythian and Sarmatian influences from the nearby Pontic steppe.

    Rome_and_the_Barbarians_in_Eastern_and_Central_Europe_around_100_AD_by_Shchukin.png

    Cultures in central and eastern Europe in 100 CE.

    Burial and ritual places associated with the Wielbark culture don’t include all archaeological sites from the I-III centuries CE in the area, and continuation of practices from the older Oksywie culture is still attested, as well as from the neighboring Przeworsk culture once the sites associated with the Wielbark culture began spreading south along the Vistula valley in areas that had contained previously only sites associated with the Przeworsk culture. Scholars have suggested that the areas which show specifically Wielbark-like burial and cultic sites must’ve been the ones directly settled by the proto-Gothic elite, which were organized in small groups that asserted their political dominance over the original inhabitants, who kept their own rites and customs.

    A very significant detail mentioned by Tacitus in his Germania is that of all the Germanic peoples the Gothones were a rarity because they were ruled by kings:
    Beyond the Lygians dwell the Gothones, under the rule of a king; and thence held in subjection somewhat stricter than the other German[ic] nations, yet not so strict as to extinguish all their liberty. Immediately adjoining are the Rugians and Lemovians upon the coast of the ocean, and of these several nations the characteristics are a round shield, a short sword and kingly government.
    Archaeology does not show any hints of centralized kingship in Wielbark culture sites, but in the III century the Goths are described by Greek and Latin authors as being led by kings (like Cniva), which made them specially dangerous, as of all the enemies of Rome during the III century crisis, the Goths were, together with the Sasanians, the only ones able to raise military forces under a unified command on a scale comparable to the one possessed by the Romans.

    A very useful comparison that I read once about the character of Gothic rule in eastern Europe was a parallel with the Rus of the IX-X centuries; groups of ambitious, warlike migrants who settled in already inhabited areas and forced the original inhabitants to submit and pay tribute to them; coincidentally both the Goths and the Rus had the same Scandinavian origin in southern Sweden and used the river valleys to expand south to the Black sea coast, ending with attacks against the Roman empire. In both cases, it should be clear that the Rus armies that attacked Constantinople or the Gothic armies that attacked the Roman Danubian border were not formed exclusively by Germanic Goths or Rus; these groups formed only a small leading elite over a vast array of subject peoples from varied origins.

    Chernyakhov.PNG

    Path of the possible movement of the Goths and the cultures hypothetically associated with them. In green, Götaland, in pink the island of Gotland, in red the maximum expanse of the Wielbark culture in the late II century CE, and in orange the Chernyakhov culture of the IV century CE. In violet, the Roman empire.

    By the early III century, the slow southwards expansion of the proto-Goths led them into a large area, which included Ukraine, Moldova and parts of southeastern Poland and Belarus. At the same times, the oldest settlements associated with the Wielbark culture became depopulated. It’s unknown what led the proto-Goths to abandon their lands in the lower and middle Vistula valley (the Gothiscandza of the Getica). The climatic upheavals associated with the end of the Roman Climate Optimum (RCO) could be one reason, while just the ambition and the possibility to move into richer lands to the south could be another one (notice also that one does not include the other). The end of the RCO and the start of the Roman Transitional Period happened in the middle II century CE century; some scholars have speculated that the movement of the proto-Goths to the southeast could have started to happen around this time, and that the disturbances caused in the inner barbaricum by this migration could’ve been the one of the reasons for the Marcomannic attack against the Roman empire under Marcus Aurelius.

    In any case, the inscription from I’nāt in Roman Arabia states that possibly during the reign of Septimius Severus (193-211 CE), the Goths were already settled near the Roman border, and that for some time its relations with Rome were relatively peaceful. Their new territory included most of the area of the old Zarubintsy culture, and parts of the area of the Przewolsk culture, which still held further west, as well as a large expanse of Pontic steppe which until then had been ruled by Iranian Sarmatian peoples. The Goths must’ve imposed their political dominion over all of them, and just as it had happened with the Zarubintsy culture, they absorbed many cultural Sarmatian traits and customs, especially in military equipment and tactics. The Goths adopted the cavalry warfare that existed in the Eurasian steppe, and its military elite fought on horseback with armor, long sword, Sarmatian kontos and bows. This again put the Goths aside from all other Germanic peoples, who were predominantly infantry fighters, and who did not put much emphasis in archery, which became extremely important for the Goths as it was for all the steppe peoples. Also, instead of the traditional Germanic longbow, the Goths adopted the more powerful and smaller Scythian bow which had longer range and could be used on horseback.

    The Gothic armies that invaded the Roman empire after 238 CE were not formed exclusively by ethnical Goths, as I wrote before; otherwise they would’ve been unable to field the large numbers of men that Graeco-Roman authors ascribe to them unanimously. “Gothic” armies included contingents of subject peoples like Venedi, Sarmatians, Carpi and other Germanic groups that moved into this area with the Goths and whose relationship with the ethnical Goths is unclear. The Gepids are considered to have been a subgroup of the Goths, but the ties of other East Germanic peoples who lived in the area with the Goths like the Burgundians (who lived in the area around the upper Oder and upper Vistula basins), Rugii, Bastarnae (already present in the area in the early II century BCE), the Heruli and the Scirii (who probably moved south into the area along with the Bastarnae in the early II century BCE) are unclear. Some of them like the Gepids and Rugii seem to have moved south with the Goths, but other groups had already been settled there for a long time. Probably, they were all also treated as subject peoples (same as non-Germanic peoples) and were forced to pay tribute to the Goths and contribute to their wars with men.

    It’s due to this heterogeneous nature of the Gothic armies that some modern scholars prefer to use the archaic name of “Scythians” (Skythai) given to them by Dexippus in his imitation of Thucydides’ style, as it has less ethnical implications. In my opinion, that’s going a bit overboard with linguistic carefulness; Roman armies also included many non-Roman units and nobody has ever doubted to call those armies “Roman”. And ironically, many historians who use this “Scythian” terminology to refer to the III century Goths show little care in calling the Sasanian armies “Persians”, when in this case it’s much more justified to raise objections to the label of “Persian”; only the ruling dynasty itself was Persian, but neither the ruling elite and much less the army, was ethnically Persian or led or staffed by Persians.

    With a sophisticated military tradition, a united rulership in war and large numbers of available men, the Goths were a formidable enemy for Rome; the most dangerous among all the Germanic peoples and second only to the Sasanians. The straightforward decision by Tullius Menophilus to pay “subsidies” to them in 238 CE reflects a clear respect from the Roman part towards this new enemy, and what they presented as “subsidies” was probably much more like a regular tribute. The Romans stopped subsidies to weak border peoples all the time when it suited them, but they kept paying them to the Goths for ten years when the imperial finances were in a deplorable state and when such an action was deeply resented by the army (the salaries of the troops and officers were paid in increasingly debased silver coinage, but foreign tributes and subsidies were paid in good quality gold coinage, as Dio Cassius bitterly lamented in the case of Caracalla with the Alamanni). It’s also possible that some kind of real subsidy had been in place since earlier times, for the Romans usually recruited numeri (also called gentiles) units from foreign peoples with whom they’d signed a friendship treaty; the Romans took over the payment of a regular subsidy and in exchange the foreign people had to furnish the Roman army with armed contingents that usually came with their own weapons and officers and were allowed to fight according to their own custom; this could have been exactly the case of the unit of Gothi gentiles based at I’nāt, which kept their own leaders Ermanarius and his son Guththa. If this is the case, then the years between 200 and 248 CE saw a sharp and continuous decline in the strength of the Roman position towards the Goths, who from being a friendly and quite inoffensive border people became a real menace able to extort a regular tribute from an increasingly beleaguered empire.
     
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    18.3. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE START OF THE GOTHIC WAR.
  • 18.3. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE START OF THE GOTHIC WAR.

    As usual in the III century after the end of the chronicles of Cassius Dio and Herodian, we are utterly deprived of reliable contemporary sources. Dexippus’ Scythica would have been doubtless the primary source, as it dealt precisely with the wars between Rome and the Goths in the Balkans between 238 CE and 270 CE. But the work is lost, and only some short parts remain, in several forms:
    • Isolated fragments preserved by chance like the recently discovered Scythica Vindobonensia.
    • Direct quotes by later authors.
    • Use of information originally found in the Scythica by later authors, who either specifically refer to it or scholars have been able to detect (or suspect) that they used Dexippus’ work as a source.
    These later sources are the very short accounts in Zosimus, Syncellus and Zonaras and the Getica, based on a lost work by Cassiodorus, although again this work is to be used this caution, due to its primary aim to praise the antiquity of the Gothic people and the family of Theoderic the Great and to the fact that it was written in the first half of the VI century using material from unclear sources, because Jordanes’ epitome has not preserved Cassiodorus’ annotations about sources (if there were any, but it was usual in Graeco-Roman historiographic tradition). To complicate things further, the Historia Augusta (which also drew heavily from Dexippus’ work) has a gap exactly at this point in history. A section covering the reigns of Philip the Arab, Decius, Trebonianus Gallus, Aemilian and all but the end of the reign of Valerian is missing. That leaves modern scholars with only the scattered fragments by Dexippus, the accounts by Syncellus and the Getica, and other short works by authors from the IV and V centuries CE (like the Breviari of Aurelius Victor, Eutropius and Festus and the Epitome de Caesaribus). Other than that, there’s archaeology and numismatics, which can provide some help in trying to understand the events.

    All these sources except the Getica provide extremely short accounts for the 249-251 CE invasion, with only the Getica providing a detailed version with some differences related to the start of the campaign with respect to the other remaining sources.

    Herwig Wolfram links the decision by Philip the Arab to stop paying the tribute to the Goths to his previous defeat of the Carpi and other neighboring peoples who were probably members of the Gothic confederation (or subjects of the Goths, depending on the interpretation), and adds that Philip probably began military preparations against them. Wolfram does not precise this, but he implies that the decision was taken in the short space of time between April 249 CE (when the Viminacium mint stopped issuing coins in Pacatianus’ name) and July/August 249 CE, when the Danubian army acclaimed Decius as augustus and marched towards Italy and defeated Philip at Verona. This usurpation sent overboard any preparations ordered by Philip, and the marching of part of the Danubian army to Italy left the lower Danube border dangerously weakened in front of the impending Gothic attack.

    The Getica states that at this time, the Goths were ruled by a certain Ostrogotha. As we will see, this work, together with numismatic evidence implies that it was in late 247 CE or early 248 CE at the very latest when Philip cut the subsidies off. The Getica offers a quite strange account of events:
    Now when the aforesaid Philip — who, with his son Philip, was the only Christian emperor before Constantine — ruled over the Romans, in the second year of his reign Rome completed its one thousandth year. He withheld from the Goths the tribute due them; whereupon they were naturally enraged and instead of friends became his foes. For though they dwelt apart under their own kings, yet they had been allied to the Roman state and received annual gifts. And what more? Ostrogotha and his men soon crossed the Danube and ravaged Moesia and Thrace. Philip sent the senator Decius against him. And since he could do nothing against the Getae (Note: Goths), he released his soldiers from military service and sent them back to private life, as though it had been by their neglect that the Goths had crossed the Danube. When, as he supposed, he had thus taken vengeance on his soldiers, he returned to Philip. But when the soldiers found themselves expelled from the army after so many hardships, in their anger they had recourse to the protection of Ostrogotha, king of the Goths. He received them, was aroused by their words and presently led out three hundred thousand armed men, having as allies for this war some of the Taifali and Astringi andalso three thousand of the Carpi, a race of men very ready to make war and frequently hostile to the Romans. (…) Besides these tribes, Ostrogotha had Goths and Peucini (Note: possibly Bastarnae) from the island of Pence, which lies in the mouths of the Danube where they empty into the Sea of Pontus. He placed in command Argaith and Guntheric, the noblest leaders of his race. They speedily crossed the Danube, devastated Moesia a second time and approached Marcianople, the famed metropolis of that land. Yet after a long siege they departed, upon receiving money from the inhabitants.
    To summarize, according to the Getica, under this Ostrogotha the Goths attacked the empire twice. The first attack was led by Ostrogotha himself only with Gothic forces, and he raided Moesia and Thrace, and it took place in late 247 to spring/summer 248 CE (based on numismatic evidence, as we will see later). The second attack was led by two subordinates of Ostrogotha named Argaith and Guntheric, and included allied or subject peoples (Carpi, Taifali, Astringi, Peucini) and perhaps Germanic mercenaries or even Roman soldiers who had been dismissed from the Roman army of Moesia by Decius in 249 CE (I’ll explain this later); this second invasion would have affected Moesia and Dacia and took place between early spring and late fall of 250 CE. These first attacks by the Goths are usually dismissed by most scholars (amongst them by Wolfram, but are accepted by some Bulgarian archaeologists based on the evidence of coin hoards) for several reasons:
    • They do not appear in other accounts, although to be fair, they’re so short (just a paragraph in Zosimus) that I’m not sure if that can be held as a reason against the Getica’s tale.
    • The sequence of events is very confused, and it’s difficult to harmonize it with other accounts, both about the Gothic War and about Decius’ reign. The fragment about Decius dismissing the soldiers and them joining the Goths is particularly strange.
    • The fact that Ostrogotha is part of one of Cassiodorus’ fabricated lineage lines. He’s made to be a member of the Amal family, and thus an ancestor of Theodoric the Great. This is enough for most historians to dismiss this part of the Getica as yet another of Cassiodorus’s fabrications to please his master.
    On the other side, Bulgarian archaeologists have brought forward numismatic arguments that corroborate the account found in the Getica. Boris Gerov noted that a first group of coin hoards lack the characteristic coins that Philip issued in occasion of the millennium of Rome (the celebrations began on April 21st, 248 CE). This means that these hoards were buried in face of an invasion launched early on, in the winter-spring of 247-248 CE. All these hoards include coins of Philip issued prior to the millennium issues and are found as far south as the modern Bulgarian village of Levka, near the border with Turkey; the area of Levka must’ve been part of the territorium of Hadrianopolis in Roman times. Other hoards have been found at the village of Gramatikovo, which must’ve belonged to the territorium of the ancient city of Byzie in Roman times, as all the coins in this hoard were issued in its mint.

    1200px-MontesBalcanes.svg.png

    Haemus Mons was the ancient Latin name for the Balkan mountains, which separated Moesia from Thrace.

    The coin hoards attest at least two different directions of the Gothic invasion in the province of Thrace in 248 CE. The forces which reached the territories of Bizye and Hadrianopolis must have used the Eastern Haemus pass leading to the present city of Karnobat. Another direction of this invasion is marked by the hoards found near Oescus (near the present Danubian village of Gigen, Pleven district, north Bulgaria) and the present city of Trastenik in Lower Moesia, and also by those found near the present villages of Smolsko, Dragušinovo and the city of Bobovdol in the territories of Serdica (now Sofia) and Pautalia (now Kyustendil, SW Bulgaria) in Thrace

    Moesia-_Thrace_01.jpg

    Map of Moesia and Thrace with the cities mentioned in the text.

    About the second Gothic attack which threatened Marcianopolis, current evidence attests to two significant facts. On the one hand, it’s not possible to give an accurate date for the siege by the Goths and their allies under Argaith and Guntheric just by using the text of the Getica. On the other hand, one of the most impressive hoards ever found is the Reka Devnia (now Devnya, ancient Marcianopolis) hoard which ends with coins of Decius and his son Herennius Etruscus. It contains ca. 100,000 Roman silver coins (weighting around 350 kg in total) which are first hand testimony that some great danger befell the city of Marcianopolis around mid-250 CE (Herennius Etruscus was raised to the rank of caesar between May and November 250 CE). It is hardly by chance that these two facts coincide so closely in time, and there must be a link between the siege and the burying of 350 kg of silver coins in this city. Unfortunately, some of the coins were stolen after its discovery. At present, of 82,428 pieces studied out of a total of ca. 100,000, only three coins of Decius are attested, and one of Herennius Etruscus; the dating for the burial of this hoard based on the examined coins is mid-250 CE.

    In my opinion, it’s possible to harmonize the events as related by the Getica with the convoluted and confused events that took place in the Danube at this time. As seen before, Decius was in command of the whole Danubian front for a period stretching from April to early August 249 CE at the latest. That’s five months, being generous. In that short period of time, it’s impossible that so many events took place. A plausible explanation would be that the first Gothic attack under Ostrogotha first hit the lower Danube when Pacatianus was still in charge of the border and loyal to Philip, in later winter of 247 CE or early spring of 248 CE and that the perception by the soldiers of the Danubian army that they were left to fight the Goths on their own while Philip amused himself giving lavish spectacles in Rome was what caused them to raise their commander Pacatianus to the purple in the summer or fall of 248 CE.

    bulgaria-danube-river-vidin-dunav.jpg

    View of the Danube at the border between Romania and Bulgaria.

    Pacatianus would’ve been killed though by his own men by April 249 CE, perhaps because he failed in stopping Ostrogotha’s raid into Moesia and Thrace. Bear in mind that probably when Decius was first sent into the Balkans, he was sent to the province of Lower Pannonia with the hope of containing Pacatianus’ usurpation just to the lower Danube area, as Decius was a native of this province and had been its governor, so probably he had many contacts and influence networks there. Only after Pacatianus’ death did he take command over the whole Danubian front. And once again the soldiers, who probably despised Philip even more by now as he’d still failed to show himself in person in the Danube, acclaimed Decius as augustus (and Decius accepted). It’s also possible to harmonize the Getica’s tale about “dismissed soldiers”. Perhaps Decius dismissed some groups of Germanic numeri because he considered that they’d collaborated with the enemy, or again it’s possible that he purged the Moesian army of supporters of Pacatianus. Based on what we known about Decius’ personality, he was a staunch traditionalist, and that must have also affected his way of dealing with military discipline. Unfortunately, this action (if the Getica’s account is true) would’ve served only to send all these dismissed soldiers (either “barbarians” or Romans) to the side of the Goths, which would have been a very dangerous development, for now the Goths would have ex-Roman personnel among their ranks for their next attacks. That’s the only logical explanation for this part of the story and it would be quite in line with Decius’ personality and attitudes.

    As for the name and person of Ostrogotha, it was held to be a pure fabrication by Cassiodorus (Wolfram tried to place this figure at another time in Gothic history, in the 290s), until the discovery of the new fragment of Dexippus known as the Scythica Vindobonensia changed this. The Scythica Vindobonensia consists of two fragments from Dexippus’s work that were discovered in a palimpsest of liturgical works written in Greek and which had been copied in Syria around the XIII century (because of a curse against thieves inserted there by the patriarch of Antioch Theodosius IV). The manuscript was bought in Istanbul in the XVI century by the imperial ambassador to the Sublime Porte Oghier de Busbecq, who left it in his will to the imperial library, which became after 1918 the Austrian National Library. An Ostrogotha is named in one of these two fragments, but from the context of the passage, it seems that this Ostrogotha is a different one to the one mentioned in the Getica, or at least he plays a very different role. This fragment deals with Decius’ efforts to stop the Goths from retreating from the empire loaded with booty and prisoners, after they’ve sacked Thrace and have defeated Decius in a previous battle. So, this Ostrogotha is placed in command of a Gothic army while Cniva is leading the main invasion force returning north from Thrace, which disagrees with the role of the Ostrogotha of the Getica’s tale. The confusion will remain until (if) more fragments of Dexippus’ lost work come to light.

    Dexippus_Scythica_Vindobonensia_26.jpg

    One of the two folios of the Scythica Vindobonensia kept at the Austrian National Library in Vienna; spectral image of the original, erased text (in blue).

    The second Gothic invasion attested by the Getica and led by Argaith and Guntheric began possibly when Decius was already emperor and was still in the capital, in the winter/spring of 249-250 CE. In Rome, Decius would not have been surprised by the invasion, as he’d recently commanded the Danubian front himself, and perhaps had received instructions from Philip to take steps to prevent it. But instead of doing that, he’d launched a coup and a civil war and had left the border unguarded in front of an imminent attack. Firstly though, Decius had to leave things in Rome secure during his oncoming absence. According to Aurelius Victor, the eastern usurper Iotapianus was killed by his own men and his head sent to the emperor in Rome in the summer of 249 CE (to Philip or already to Decius, that’s not known). Apparently, the usurpation of Silbannacus in Gaul was also suppressed around this time without need for Decius to get involved personally, and according to Syvänne he sent a vanguard to the Balkans under the command of his eldest son, Herennius Etruscus, while he intended to follow as soon as possible. I wrote about the implausible claim of the SHA (in the surviving part of its Life of Valerian) that Decius had tried to revive the office of censor, and the Senate had chosen Valerian for the post, who refused. But the Byzantine author Zonaras also states that when Decius left Rome, he left there his youngest son Hostilian (a teenager), under the care of Valerian, who acted as Decius’ lieutenant in Rome. This coincidence in both accounts makes it probable that Valerian did indeed act as Decius’ lieutenant, and as such he was charged with applying Decius’ edict on sacrifices.

    Moesia Inferior was a heavily militarized province, with a garrison of two legions (Legio I Italica at Novae and Legio XI Claudia at Durostorum) plus auxiliaries, which amounted to 20,000 men or more in total. If the Getica’s tale is true, these forces, when still not weakened by Decius’ march on Italy, had been already unable to stop the first Gothic invasion in 248 CE. That means that either they’d been badly led, or that they were not up to the task, or that they’d been overwhelmed by the size of the enemy’s army (or any combination of these factors).

    scaletowidth

    Landscape of the Danubian plain, northern Bulgaria. This was the ancient Roman province of Lower Moesia.

    The numbers in the spring of 250 CE must’ve been even lower than that though, because Decius had probably taken at least part of the army with him to Italy (although if he only took vexillationes from the legions, these were usually only 1,000-2,000 men strong). We don’t know either if the Plague of Cyprian had reached Moesia yet, and if the dismissal of Germanic numeri and/or Roman soldiers by Decius the previous year was true, then the provincial army could`ve been further weakened. The legatus augusti pro praetore for Lower Moesia was the senator Gaius Vibius Afinius Trebonianus Gallus with his capital at Novae, and his response to the invasion was revealing: he completely refused field battle with the invaders and fortified himself with his troops in the main cities of the province. Given that the main tactic of the Roman army was engaging enemies in frontal battle, and that the Romans were usually confident enough in their own military superiority to accept combat against “barbarians” at odds quite unfavorable to themselves, this implies that the force mustered by the Goths and their allies must’ve been really imposing, enough to force the Roman provincial garrison to seek refuge into walled cities, while waiting for help from Decius. So, Argaith and Guntheric would have been able to surround Marcianopolis (the largest city in Moesia) at leisure, although their lack of skill in siege warfare meant that they could only try to force the city to surrender by hunger.

    This shows once again the difficulties implicit in the Augustan/Severan commanding system with provincial governors at charge of two legions at most in front of large-scale invasions. It was a system designed to difficult internal revolt and usurpation attempts, but with the growing scale of threats in the III century, this system was becoming increasingly obsolete to defend the empire. The huge problem was that, although Philip had been the first emperor to acknowledge the problem and had tried to fix it with his naming of commanders for large sectors of the border, the results had been less than satisfactory; of three successive commanders in the Danube, two had become usurpers.
     
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    18.4. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE EMPEROR MOVES TO THE LOWER DANUBE.
  • 18.4. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE EMPEROR MOVES TO THE LOWER DANUBE.

    Finally, Decius left Rome and marched to the Danube. His elder son Herennius Etruscus had perhaps preceded him and his presence in Lower Pannonia is attested in an inscription by men of Legio II Adiutrix at Aquincum; based on this inscription celebrating him as caesar, some scholars have dated his appointment as such to a timeframe between May and September 250 CE. Father and son probably met there (Lower Pannonia was their main powerbase, and the Pannonian legions had raised Decius to the purple) and prepared a counterattack. Decius must’ve taken with him the central Roman army (Praetorian Guard, Legio II Parthica, Equites Singulares Augusti and other assorted units) as well as the Danubian forces which won the battle of Verona for him. The state of the central reserve, given that it had been recently defeated in battle less than a year before, cannot have been very good. We can’t know if they had suffered many casualties, and if that was the case, if there had been time to cover them with new recruits, and if these new recruits were really up to the task in front of them. It’s probable that auxiliary units and legionary vexillationes from the Pannonian legions also joined the army then.

    The first task undertaken by the two Decii must’ve been delivering Dacia from invaders (probably Carpi), as three inscriptions found at Carthago Nova in Hispania Tarraconensis (CIL II, 4949; 4957; 4958) honor Decius as Dacicus Maximus, and one of them (CIL II 4949) attests Decius with the further titles TRIB.POT.II COS.II, pointing to a date between mid-June and November/December 250 CE (we know from ancient sources that Decius assumed the consulate during every year of his short reign). In his De mortibus persecutorum, the early IV century Christian author Lactantius also wrote that Decius had made war against the Carpi who had occupied Dacia and Moesia. It’s important though to notice that Lactantius did not name the Goths, and that the inscriptions from Hispania only acclaim Decius as Dacicus Maximus, and not Germanicus/Gothicus Maximus. This probably implies that after hearing of the defeat of their Carpi allies by the approaching imperial army, Argaith and Guntheric decided to accept a ransom from the inhabitants of Marcianopolis (modern Devnya, in Bulgaria) and retreated to the northern bank of the Danube, as stated by the Getica during the fall/winter of 250 CE, thus ending the second Gothic invasion.

    Then, if we follow the tale of the Getica, in late winter or early spring of 251 CE, another very large army of “Skythians” led by the Gothic king Cniva crossed the lower Danube at Oescus (now ruined, near the Bulgarian village of Gigen) and invaded Lower Moesia. According to the Getica, this would have been the third Gothic invasion. The current scholarly consensus is that this was the only Gothic invasion, as it is the only one explicitly described in the extant fragments of the Skythica and in other ancient sources (although that’s not saying, much, as all of them are telegraphically short). According to Herwig Wolfram, Cniva’s army must have included Goths, Carpi, Bastarni and Vandals (notice though that according to the Getica, it was only in the second invasion when these allies/subject peoples joined the Goths).

    After crossing the Danube, according to the Getica Cniva divided his army:
    After his death (Note: Ostrogotha’s), Cniva divided the army into two parts and sent some to waste Moesia, knowing that it was undefended through the neglect of the emperors. He himself with seventy thousand men hastened to Euscia, that is, Novae. When driven from this place by the general Gallus (…)
    Syvänne considers that the Gothic army must’ve been formed by a large contingent of cavalry, but he bases this assertion on the tactics of the Goths in later times; which don’t have to be necessarily the same tactics they used in the III century. The Goths, like other “barbarians” of the III century CE were completely inept at siege warfare, which means that Trebonianus Gallus’ decision of barricading himself inside the province’s main fortified cities was a safe course of action in this situation; the Getica’s account confirms it: Trebonianus Gallus was able to resist Cniva’s attack and the Goths raised the siege and went looking for easier prey. The other part of the army that Cniva sent to “waste Moesia” must’ve been a smaller force and given that Cniva himself was operating in Lower Moesia, this sentence of the Getica only makes sense if this force went somewhere else; and the Getica accounts that this “somewhere” was Moesia. If Cniva was in Lower Moesia, this second force must’ve raided Upper Moesia, and perhaps one of its goals would have been to act as a shield against any approaching Roman army from the west. For some reason though, modern scholars state that this second force crossed the Balkan mountain range and invaded the province of Thrace, besieging Philippopolis (its main city, corresponding to modern Plovdiv in Bulgaria). Let’s follow though with the account of the Getica:
    When driven from this place (Note: Novae) by the general Gallus, he approached Nicopolis (Note: Nicopolis ad Istrum, now Nikyup), a very famous town situated near the latrus river. This city Trajan built when he conquered the Sarmatians and named it the City of Victory. When the Emperor Decius drew near, Cniva at last withdrew to the regions of Haemus (Note: the Balkan range), which were not far distant.
    This fragment bears forward an important problem with the Getica’s narrative: if there’d been already previous fighting against the Goths in 250 CE, the imperial army and Decius must’ve remained in the area. How can it be explained then that Cniva was able to cross the Danube and move freely around the province?

    The modern consensus, as I wrote before, is that there was just one Gothic invasion, led by Cniva. And that this invasion began in the winter or early spring of 250 CE and ended in the summer of 251 CE. This modern alternative though also raises another problem: that the Goths would’ve spent a year and a half within the empire with a large army, and given the nature of “barbarian” societies, it’s doubtful if that would have been feasible (to say nothing about logistic issues). Also, none of th extant sources states or implies that the Goths spent a winter within the empire. But it fits better with the known movements of Decius. On the other side, the Getica’s account of Cniva’s invasion gives a more realistic timeframe for the invasion (half a year) but then there’s the problem of accounting for Decius’ actions between the end of the 250 CE invasion and Cniva’s attack.

    I’ll leave the chronology aside for the time being and go ahead with the account of the campaign, for from this point onwards there seems to be some agreement in all surviving accounts, including the extant fragments of Dexippus’ Skythica.

    If we follow the Getica’s tale, Decius would’ve had to defeat the second (and smallest) Gothic force in Upper Moesia before being able to approach Nicopolis and force Cniva to lift the siege. Zosimus wrote than in his fight against the Goths Decius “won all the battles” which is a blatant lie because we know from the Skythica and the Getica that Decius suffered two major defeats at Cniva’s hands. The modern account of events though ignores this and haves Decius going straight against Cniva in the spring or early summer of 250 CE after arriving to the war theater.

    Cniva_01.jpg

    Map of Lower Moesia and northern Trace with the main cities mentioned in the text.

    Ilkka Syvänne though provides an unexpected source that could confirm that Decius did indeed defeat a second Gothic army in Moesia (although he adheres to the modern chronology of events). This source is the VI century CE military manual attributed to the Eastern Roman emperor Maurice, the Strategikon. This does not mean that Decius’ victory happened according to the sequence of events presented by the Getica, but I agree with Syvänne that having this encounter just before Decius’ first major clash with Cniva is the most probable setting for it:
    The Skythic tribes of the Goths employed this tactic against the Roman emperor Decius when they crossed the Danube and invaded Thrace and made war against him in Moesia. At the time, Decius was successful with the same stratagem, feigning flight in an intense combat that he did start to slay many of them.
    This passage of the Strategikon gives some important information. First, that Decius did indeed win at least one victory against the Goths. And second, that he managed to win it by means of a feigned retreat. Syvänne takes this as clear evidence that Decius was employing himself a mainly cavalry army, just as the Goths did, which is one of his most controversial assertions. But if this passage from the Strategikon is read within its context, it becomes clear that the author is not dealing specifically with cavalry tactics, but with ambushes in general, by infantry and/or cavalry, and specifically ambushes in swamps and marshes; what the passage in my opinion seems to imply is that Decius employed against the Goths an ambush similar to the one that they would later use against him. At the time of his death, Decius had assumed the title of Germanicus Maximus, he probably took this title between the lifting of the siege of Marcianopolis and this hypothetic victory.

    That the Goths employed a mainly cavalry army and used typical steppe tactics could also be deduced from a fragment in Syncellus’ account of the invasion:
    Scythians, those called Goths, when they had crossed the Ister river (Note: the Danube) in very large numbers under Decius, began occupying the dominion of Rome. They surrounded the Mysians, who were fleeing towards Nicopolis.
    This fragment describes probably a grand encirclement by Gothic cavalry of numbers of Moesian (“Mysians”) fugitives that were trying to seek refuge within the walls of Nicopolis, just like steppe peoples did in large scale hunts or when herding their large cattle or horse herds.

    After the defeat of the shielding Gothic force (Syncellus states that Decius killed thirty thousand Goths), Decius approached Nicopolis. It’s unclear what happened with the city, but the extant sources don’t report it falling to the Goths. And now, according to the Getica and the other sources, instead of retreating to the north (as would be expected of a frightened army menaced by a victorious and more powerful enemy) Cniva marched south and crossed the Balkan range through the Shipka pass. This could mean two things: either Decius had cut off Cniva’s line of retreat northwards, or he was not afraid in the least of Decius; if this were the case then it would be possible that he’d indeed managed to take Nicopolis (in his Res Gestae, Ammianus Marcellinus wrote that Nicopolis had indeed been destroyed) and now, more confident than ever, he decided to cross to the rich province of Thrace.

    1-nikopolis-ad-istrum_bulgaria-470x353.jpg

    Aerial view of the remains of Nicopolis ad Istrum, Bulgaria.

    Decius, elated by his recent victory (and perhaps angered by the events at Nicopolis) followed straight after him. At this point, I would like to make some comments about Decius and about what the scarce sources available let us know about this man’s character. Decius was a hyper-conservative character. His name seems to suggest an Italian provenance (Decius and Messius are ancient Oscan names), and although he was born in the Balkans, either his family was Italian and his father had been just deployed there, or they belonged to the considerable number of descendants of Italian soldiers who’d settled the area after service in the legions. Anyway, he probably considered himself to be more Roman than the Romans themselves and the second coming of Romulus. He believed in ancient Roman customs (including ancient Roman religion), the role of the Senate and in the Roman way of waging war. Which consisted in seeking a pitched battle whenever possible even at unfavorable odds, relying on the supposed superiority of Roman training, discipline and weaponry. Decius seems to have been deeply assured about the superiority of Roman arms, to the point of blindness and arrogance; the cunning Cniva beat him twice by using surprise and ambush, and both times Decius fell spectacularly in the trap; the second time with catastrophic results. Let’s retake the account of the Getica:
    Thence he (Note: Cniva) hastened to Philippopolis, with his forces in good array. When the Emperor Decius learned of his departure, he was eager to bring relief to his own city and, crossing Mount Haemus, came to Beroe. While he was resting his horses and his weary army in that place, all at once Cniva and his Goths fell upon him like a thunderbolt. He cut the Roman army to pieces and drove the Emperor, with a few who had succeeded in escaping, across the mountains again to Euscia (Note: Novae) in Moesia, where Gallus was then stationed with a large force of soldiers as guardian of the frontier.
    Syncellus also agrees with this, although with much less detail:
    Decius, after he had attacked them (the Goths) as Dexippus records, and had killed thirty thousand, was beaten in battle, with the result that Philippopolis, when it had been taken by them, was sacked and many Thracians were killed.
    Syncellus’ quote about thirty thousand Goths killed by Decius at Nicopolis is indeed taken straight from Dexippus, for it appears in one of the surviving fragments from the Scythica, the Letter of Decius, in which Decius promises help to the inhabitants of Philippopolis and boasts of his victory at Nicopolis. To summarize: Decius crossed the Shipka pass and reached the environs of the Thracian city of Colonia Augusta Traiana Beroea (the modern Bulgarian city of Stara Zagora) at top speed to try to stop the Goths before they advanced too deep into Thrace; he probably did so without taking the most elementary military precautions: without proper scouting and without setting up a proper encampment with proper guards. And Cniva, who had been laying in ambush waiting for Decius’ army to emerge from the mountain pass, attacked the Romans by surprise and cut them to pieces, with Decius having to flee for his life across the mountains, and not stopping until he reached Novae and met the governor of Lower Moesia Trebonianus Gallus.

    shipka3.jpg

    View from the Shipka pass, looking south towards the ancient Roman province of Thracia.

    This defeat is also attested by one of the extant fragments of Dexippus’ Scythica. It’s one of the two fragments from the Scythica Vindobonensia, in which Decius gives a (fictional) speech to his troops when they are to confront the victorious Gothic army which is returning north after the fall of Philippopolis, and he mentions a previous defeat:
    Men, I wish the military force and all the provincial territory were in a good condition and not humiliated by the enemy. But since the incidents of human life bring manifold sufferings (for such is the fate of mortals), it is the duty of prudent men to accept what happens and not to lose their spirit, nor become weak, distressed by the mishap in that plain or by the capture of the Thracians—in case any of you has been disheartened by these things. For each of these two misfortunes offers arguments against your discouragement: the former (Note: the defeat at Beroe) was brought about by the treachery of the scouts rather than by any deficiency of ours, and the Thracian town (Note: Philippopolis) they (Note:the Goths) took by ambushes rather than through prowess, having failed in their attacks.
    In other words, Decius blamed his defeat to “treachery” by the scouts of his army, admitting no fault of his own.

    It’s impossible to know the scale of Decius’ defeat at Beroe. The Getica states that it was a slaughter, but the fact that the Getica was basically a panegyric written by Cassiodorus to exalt the Gothic people and its king Theodoric the Great automatically makes this assertion suspicious. But the events that followed seem to vindicate the Getica’s depiction. Decius, who until then had acted impetuously and had sought direct battle with the Goths whenever possible, changed his ways, took refuge at Novae with Trebonianus Gallus and did absolutely nothing while Cniva and his Goths pillaged Thrace and besieged Philippopolis. This implies that Decius’ martial ardor must’ve cooled down considerably and that his army had suffered serious losses. The Getica also says that Trebonianus Gallus stood at Novae with large numbers of soldiers guarding the border. In my opinion, this means that, fearing more Gothic attacks or reinforcements from the north, Decius had left at least the complete garrison of Lower Moesia (two legions plus auxiliaries) under Gallus’ command, and he’d followed Cniva just with the central reserve and vexillationes (or complete legions) and auxiliary forces drawn from other Danubian provinces (probably Lower Pannonia, Upper Moesia and perhaps Dacia). But again, it’s impossible to know how many men Decius had led through the Shipka pass and how many were lost at Beroe.
     
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    18.5. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE FALL OF PHILIPPOPOLIS AND CNIVA’S RETREAT.
  • 18.5. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE FALL OF PHILIPPOPOLIS AND CNIVA’S RETREAT.

    The first consequence of Decius’ defeat was that the Goths were able to pillage Thrace at leisure and to put its largest city Philippopolis under siege. It’s not sure if Philippopolis was Thrace’s official capital though, as Roman governors seem to have resided mostly at Perinthus, but it was the provincial metropolis (the provincial koinon was located there) and largest city. The Getica states that within the besieged city there was the senatorial legate for Thrace Titus Iulius Priscus who presumably led the defense. The second consequence was a usurpation attempt at Rome led by the senator Iulius Valens Licinanus, who according to Aurelius Victor was hailed as augustus by the Roman people, but Valerian and Hostilian seem to have been able to put the revolt down quickly.

    The Getica states that Cniva took Philippopolis after a long siege, but this seems implausible to me for several reasons. First, because it would have been very difficult for Cniva to keep his army together for a long time. The modern consensus agrees with the Getica's statement, because as it makes Cniva’s campaign last from winter/spring 250 CE to the summer of 251 CE; in other words, the Goths besieged Philippopolis all the winter. It’s difficult for me to imagine a large Gothic force which had entered the empire just to loot it would have spent a whole winter in a tedious siege, without anything remotely similar to a logistical apparatus behind them and with large numbers of Roman forces to the north cutting their line of retreat. If we stick to the chronology supported by coin hoards and that can be deduced from the Getica’s text, the fall of Philippopolis must’ve been a quick affair.

    Antiquity-Amphitheater.jpg

    Plovdiv, Bulgaria (ancient Philippopolis). Remains of the Roman theater.

    Fortunately, one of the two fragments from the Scythica Vindobonensia describes clearly how did the Goths manage to take the city:
    (they) formed the rear-guard, claiming to be particularly valiant and having a reputation of being the fiercest. They pretended to withdraw but stayed in the area. Not shrinking from abiding there, they built a camp as secretly as they could and lodged not far from the enemies, so that the attack could be prepared within a short time. They did, however, refrain from lighting fires at night, fearing that they might be seen.
    When they believed that the Thracians had become firmly convinced of their withdrawal—so much so that a rebellion against those in power had arisen (as tends to happen where there is a mass of people) and caused carelessness with the guard duty, and some had given themselves to merriment, as if the war had ended and they had achieved a splendid victory—at that point they decided to attack the town. For an advantage gained by betrayal had also encouraged them: a man had stolen away from the town and provided Cniva with information about the city (as was said, either out of hatred against one of those in power or in the hope of a big reward). And he convinced the Scythians to hold on even more firmly to their plan of attacking by promising them to give those who would be dispatched the signal in accordance with what had been agreed in the place where the fortifications could be climbed most easily. Five men, who had volunteered out of zeal and in hope of money, were sent out by Cniva by night as scouts to check what had been reported and to test the arranged betrayal. Prizes were set by the king: 500 darics for the first to climb the walls (…)
    So according to Dexippus, who is a strictly contemporary and reliable source states that once more Cniva used a ruse to take the city, and that the Roman defenders once again fell for it. The fate of Philippopolis was a grim one, for according to Ammianus Marcellinus:
    After many disasters had been suffered and many cruel calamities had been inflicted, Philippopolis was destroyed and a hundred thousand people (unless the histories are false) were butchered within her walls.
    But the disasters for Decius did not end here. According to Aurelius Victor:
    At the same time, Lucius Priscus governor of Macedonia, proclaimed himself emperor with help from the Goths, who after having pillaged all of Thrace, had advanced into Macedonia.
    And according to the Getica:
    But Cniva took Philippopolis after a long siege and then, laden with spoil, allied himself to Priscus, the commander in the city, to fight against Decius.
    So, not only did Philippopolis fall, but the senatorial legate of Thrace Priscus allied himself with the Goths and launched a usurpation attempt. Modern scholars disagree about the possible sequence of events; some have suggested that Priscus did surrender the city in exchange for Cniva’s help. But combined with the new fragments from the Skythica that I quoted above, it seems clear to me that Philippopolis fell to a stratagem by Cniva, that Priscus entered talks with Cniva only after the fall of the city, and that perhaps Cniva used him to create confusion amongst the Romans, and that Priscus would’ve been little more than Cniva’s hostage and puppet. Anyway, usurpation was a capital offense, and according to Aurelius Victor, Priscus was immediately declared a hostis publicus by the Senate in Rome.

    1819_700.jpeg

    Philippopolis, digital reconstruction of the ancient Roman circus.

    After this successful campaign, and loaded with booty and prisoners, the Goths began their trek northwards back to their homeland. In the meanwhile, according to the Scythica Vindobonensia, Decius had been busy gathering a new army in Lower Moesia and getting ready to intercept the Goths during their return trip:
    Decius was concerned about the wrongdoing of the auxiliary troops and the capture of Philippopolis. And when the army was gathered, about 80,000 men, he wanted to renew the war if he could—as he thought that the situation was favorable to him, even though he had lost the auxiliary force—but also to liberate the Thracian captives and to prevent them from crossing to the other side. And for the moment, having built a trench at Hamisos [?], a place of Beroina [?], he stayed inside the encampment together with his army, watching for when the enemy were to cross. When the advance of Ostrogotha’s force was reported to him, he thought that he should encourage his soldiers, as a good opportunity arose.
    Several interesting appear in this fragment of Dexippus’ work.
    • Fist, that apparently Decius had gathered a massive army to try to stop the Goths. 80,000 men is a very large army for Roman standards; this implies again that the Gothic force was in turn truly massive, even if Dexippus’ numbers are probably exaggerated, but again he had been a contemporary of the facts. 80,000 men is the equivalent of the united garrisons of Lower Moesia, Upper Moesia, Dacia and the central Roman reserve. This was an army comparable in size to the ones used until then in the great eastern expeditions against the Arsacids or Sasanians, which could mobilize also large forces.
    • The second is that Decius seems to have resorted now to a purely defensive tactic, digging trenches and establishing military encampments. The translation of Dexippus’ text by G.Martin and J.Grusková that I’ve posted above shows the names of Hamisos and Beroina with question marks, because these place names are unknown to modern scholars, and so Martin and Grusková seem to be doubtful even of their translation. The most logical thing though would’ve been to blockade the mountain passes across the Balkan range.
    • Thirdly, that Decius was using what would become later the standard Roman tactic for dealing with plundering raids within the empire and wanted to attack the Goths when they were on their return trip, loaded with booty and captives and therefore more encumbered and less maneuverable.
    • Fourthly, that judging by the content of Decius’ fictional speech (such speeches were almost always fictions by ancient writers for dramatism’s sake, and to show off their rhetorical skills), that Roman morale was probably low after past defeats.
    • And finally, that it’s here where Dexippus’ Ostrogotha appears, but his apparition here contradicts the Getica’s tale. According to the latter, Ostrogotha had been king of the Goths and was already dead by then and had been succeeded by Cniva, but in this context he appears to be leading of the main bodies of Cniva’s army in its northwards march, probably the vanguard, as it is the first one to approach the Roman lines. But due to the loss of the rest of most of the Skythica, we don’t know if this reflects a mistake (deliberate or not) by the Getica, or simply that Ostrogotha was a common name amongst the Goths, and so that the two were not related.
    According to numismatic evidence, it was at this critical moment, and perhaps trying to reaffirm his authority and raise the morale of the army that Decius appointed his eldest son Herennius Etruscus as augustus and co-ruler; usually this would be accompanied by a sizeable donativum to the troops. As we will see later, there’s reason to believe that this was indeed the case.

    11368992714_652f6aaaa1_c.jpg

    Antoninianus with Herennius Etruscus as augustus. On the obverse: IMP C Q HER ETR MES DECIO AVG. On the reverse: PIETAS AVGG.

    What happened immediately after this is unclear and again shrouded in confusion: according to the Getica, the Roman forces harassed the Gothic column, and in one of these skirmishes before the final battle at Abritus Herennius Etruscus was killed by an arrow. Decius’ reaction to the death of his son is disputed in ancient sources; some claim that he showed a heroic stoicism worthy of the legendary heroes of Rome, but the Getica’s tale seems more realistic to me, for it implies that it finally unhinged Decius and made him drop all precaution just before his final encounter with Cniva:
    In the battle that followed they quickly pierced the son of Decius with an arrow and cruelly slew him. His father saw it, and although he is said to have exclaimed, to cheer the hearts of his soldiers: "Let no one mourn; the death of one soldier is not a great loss to the republic," he was yet unable to endure it, because of his love for his son. So he rode against the foe, demanding either death or vengeance (…)
    This is perhaps the place to insert a brief comment about the figure of Decius according to ancient authors. The loss of almost all the works by III century authors, and especially Dexippus’ Skythica, is particularly lamentable in this respect, for they belonged to an era when religious controversy had still not distorted historical writing. All our data comes from the IV century CE and later, when the empire had become officially Christian, and Decius was labelled by Christian authors as the precursor of the Antichrist, or worse. On the other side, pro-pagan authors who bemoaned the abandonment of traditional religion and rites chose Decius as their hero because he had persecuted the hated Christians. So, for Zosimus Decius was a heroic figure and a true Roman and for others an “enemy of God”. The Christian author Lactantius wrote gleefully about his death and shameful end; while for Eutropius, Aurelius Victor and Zosimus he had an admirable and heroic death. Dexippus would at least have provided a more impartial view. For a work written in Constantinople under Justinian and summarizing a work written by the most pious Cassiodorus (who would later in life become an abbot) in the Christian Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy, the Getica is quite refrained in its comments about Decius and so it appears to me that its content in this respect should be taken as reliable.
     
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    18.6. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE BATTLE OF ABRITUS
  • 18.6. THE REIGN OF DECIUS. THE BATTLE OF ABRITUS.

    With a grieving Decius seeking a decisive encounter (at this point, apart from having lost his son, probably it was clear to Decius that he had to win if he wanted to keep his life and that of his remaining family, because if he failed yet again the army would abandon him for the first usurper who appeared), the emperor fought a final and fatal battle with Cniva. Let’s see how some of the ancient the sources describe this final encounter. First, the Getica:
    and when he came to Abrittus, a city of Moesia, he was himself cut off by the Goths and slain, thus making an end of his dominion and of his life. This place is to-day called the Altar of Decius, because he there offered strange sacrifices to idols before the battle.
    Secondly, Syncellus’ Ecloga Chronographica (which, although written in the IX century CE, explicitly used Dexippus as a source):
    And the same Decius, the fighter against God, when he had attacked Scythians who were returning to their own territory, was killed very piteously in Abrytus, the place called Forum Thembronium, with his son, and the Scythians returned with a great number of captives and much booty.
    Thirdly, the Strategikon (Book IV, Chapter 3. About the ambushes conducted by both sides):
    Others, using the same sort of stratagem in marshy terrain, trace two or three solid firm paths across them and inform their army about them when it comes into formation. The troops set themselves in line in front of said paths and once the action has begun they simulate flight, using these paths and they lead the enemy directly into the swamp. Then the ambushed forces hidden on the flanks charge suddenly against them and the men who have feigned flight counterattack and destroy the enemy. The Skythic tribes of the Goths used this stratagem against the Roman emperor Decius when they crossed the Danube and invaded Thrace and made war against him in Moesia.
    So, Decius fought another battle against Cniva, and this time he did not survive it; Lactantius stated that most of his army perished there with him, although his hatred towards Decius doesn’t make him the most reliable of sources. Ammianus Marcellinus put the defeat at Abritus among the worst defeats ever suffered by the Romans, in the same group as the battle of Teutoburg, the Marcomannic attack against the Roman empire and the battle of Adrianople. The comparison with Adrianople and Teutoburg seems to imply a total encirclement and annihilation of the Roman army, but recent archaeological digs by a Bulgarian team led by G.Radoslavova seem to imply that part of the Roman army was able to flee the battlefield.

    Decius probably had less men than the Goths, for his initial resort to purely defensive tactics seems to hint at this; the same can be deduced from his harassing of the Gothic column. This means that Cniva did probably enjoy a comfortable numerical superiority over the Roman army, and that if he managed to lure it into a terrain where the Romans could not use their superior training and discipline to establish a proper battle array he could hope for another victory.

    The exact site of the battle has been established firmly with little room for doubt by Bulgarian archaeologists. The remains of Roman colony of Abritus are located near the modern town of Razgrad in Bulgaria. For decades, large numbers of Roman artifacts dated to the III century CE have been found in a wide area to the northwest of Razgrad, especially in a field known by the locals as “Poleto”, south of the village of Dryanovets. At Poleto, Bulgarian archaeologists G.Radoslavova, G.Dzanev and N.Nikolov found large number of military-related artifacts, like pegs from soldiers’ tents, iron nails from soldiers’ shoes, an iron catapult arrowhead, iron spear butts, etc. The most important findings though were bronze bracing of helmets, some of which were numbered at the rear with the numbers IV, VII and XIV, most likely referring to the numerals of the legions involved in the battle. In the same site, gold and silver coins of emperors Septimius Severus to Decius were found. These Bulgarian archaeologists consider that Poleto was the site of the Roman camp. Many more Roman military artifacts dated to the III century CE have been found scattered in neighboring villages, up to 12.5 km from Poleto. Among these artifacts there are symbolically important objects that could only have been lost under extreme circumstances:
    • The bronze insignia of beneficiarius consularis (a functionary in the office of the governor of the province).
    • A bronze legionary insignia, with the figurine of a Capricorn and the inscription LEG XIIII G. The Capricorn was the emblem of Legio XIV Gemina.
    Poleto.jpg


    Location of the "Poleto" field, 2 km south from Dryanovets, on a low palteau slightly rised from the valley of the Beli Lom river, which can bee seen running in a southeast to nortwest course across the picture; along it runs a Bulgarian country road (marked "2003" on the map), which coincides almost exactly with the ancient Roman road that Cniva and his armt were following headed to the northwest. The battlefield is highlighted in yellow. Razgrad (ancient Abritus) is located 13 km to the southeast. Source: Google Earth.


    All the scattered coin hoards found in this area are characterized because the newest coins found in them belong to the last issues of Decius reign, including coins naming Herennius Etruscus as augustus. These coin hoards are of various sizes, with the largest among them (for example, one containing four golden rings, thirty aurei, a small gold ingot and several hundred antoniniani) belonged to high-ranking officers and were buried immediately before or after the battle.

    This team of Bulgarian archaeologists provides the following reconstruction for the events before and after the battle. Decius left Oescus and headed east to intercept Cniva’s army with a force made up of vexillationes (more probable than full legions) from Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia), Legio IV Flavia Felix (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia) and Legio VII Claudia (based at Viminacium, also in Upper Moesia). Probably the Praetorian Guard also accompanied him, perhaps also Legio II Parthica and other palatine units like the Equites Singulares Augusti. Probably the army was reinforced by auxiliaries and vexillationes or full legions from the garrison of Lower Moesia (Legio I Italica based at Novae, and Legio XI Claudia, based at Durostorum), this latter force was probably commanded by the legatus augusti pro praetore of Lower Moesia Trebonianus Gallus.

    The Roman army would’ve set up a campsite south of the modern village of Dryanovets. This was a strategic location, as it controlled two roads: the one leading from Abritus to the northwest along the Beli Lom river valley, and the other from Abritus to Sexaginta Prista, a small town already on the Danube. North of the camp, on a low hill a small fortification (whose remains have been unearthed) would’ve been built to function as a watch post and checkpoint. The Roman army remained in this place for a while, buying provisions from the neighboring villages (hence the origin for many of the smaller scattered coin hoards containing coins of low value, which have been found at places with remains of settlements from Roman times). Immediately before the battle, or having heard of the defeat, Roman officers buried their money and valuables underground. For the Bulgarian archaeologists, the battle took place “undoubtedly” close to the camp. As almost all ancient sources state that the battle and Decius’ death happened in a marshland, they think that the most probable place for the battle is the Beli Lom river valley, immediately southeast of the modern village of Dryanovets, 2 km east of the Roman army’s campsite. This location was known anciently as “Buyuk gyol” (“The big marsh” or “The big puddle”), because the terrain was regularly flooded by the recurring overflows from the Beli Lom river.

    If this localization is correct, then the place mentioned by Dexippus as Forum Thembronium would coincide with the Roman settlement in the lands southeast of the modern village of Dryanovets. After the defeat of the Roman army, its camp would’ve been captured and plundered, and the surviving Roman troops would’ve fled in several directions. A part of them would’ve fled to the northwest, along the Beli Lom riverbed. Others would’ve retreated to the west, towards the Roman settlement in the lands of the modern village of Ezerche and the road to Sexaginta Prista. Another group would’ve fled south, towards the settlement to the south of the modern village of Osenets, and along the valley of the small Dermendere river (left tributary of the Beli Lom river), towards the settlement to the south of the modern village of Balkanski. To Radoslavova’s team, it seems that the major part of the surviving Roman forces retreated to the east along the Beli Lom river towards Abritus. And a remnant would’ve reached the settlements at the modern villages of Radingrad and Poroishte.

    Radoslavova_01.jpg

    Radoslavova_02.jpg


    Radoslavova_03.jpg


    Radoslavova_04.jpg


    Sequence of maps quoted from the paper titled The Battle at Abritus in AD 251: Written Sources, Archaeological and Numismatical Data, by Galena Radoslavova, Georgi Dzanev and Nikolay Nikolov, published in Archaeologi Bulgarica 2, 2011.

    This report by Bulgarian archaeologists clarifies some issues about the battle of Abritus while opening new ones. First, there’s the issue of the path followed by Cniva’s army in its northwards retreat. According to ancient sources, Decius gathered his army at Oescus, one of the main fortified military bases along the Danube. Abritus is located to the east of Oescus, and considerably to the east of Philippopolis. In order for Cniva’s army to reach Abritus from Philippopolis, he could’ve chosen three paths:
    From Philippopolis to Serdica, and then north, crossing the Balkan range and then taking the Roman road that ran parallel along the northern side of the Balkan range.

    From Philippopolis directly north, crossing just to the west of Mons Haemus and then taking the same road as the first route in the eastern direction towards Nicopolis as Istrum:

    Cniva_Retreat_01.jpg


    The same way they’d come to Philippopolis, via Colonia Augusta Traiana Beroe and Nicopolis ad Istrum:

    Cniva_Retreat_02.jpg


    Or finally, by making a wide detour to the east using the Roman road that led from Philippopolis to Mesembria on the Black Sea coast, then northwards to Marcianopolis, and then they would join the same road as the three other routes, but this time in a westwards direction:

    Cniva_Retreat_03.jpg


    In my opinion, the third alternative is the likeliest one, because the other three would’ve allowed Decius, if he had gathered his army at Oescus, to intercept Cniva’s force sooner. This was probably what Decius intended; to attack Cniva as soon as he emerged from the Balkan passes, as Cniva had done to him. Instead, the Gothic leader described a wide arc avoiding the mountains and entered Lower Moesia from the southeast, and then moved to the west and northwest, along the Roman road Marcianopolis-Abritus-Sexagenia Prista, where he could cross the Danube. This is the only logical explanation for the battle happening so far to the east of Oescus, unless Decius had allowed Cniva’s columns to pass right under his nose in central Moesia without doing anything.

    The Gothic army would’ve been moving slowly, encumbered as it was by booty and captives, and this would’ve given Decius the opportunity, as soon as he realized what was happening, to move his army to the area of Abritus and to wait for the Goths there. This would accord with Radoslavova’s team assertion that the Roman army was encamped at Poleto for some time before the battle. But in my opinion, looking at the battle site (which looks like a sure identification, with little room for doubt), and especially to Radoslavova’s statement that the Roman army had time to march there to cut the Goths’ retreat and build and encampment by the Roman road, then the description of the battle as transmitted by the Strategikon (an ambush in marshland), makes little sense to me, or at least becomes quite puzzling. This makes the loss of the full text of the Skythica even more regrettable.

    Of twelve ancient sources, only two say explicitly that Decius was ambushed (the Strategikon, which is the one which provides the most detailed account, and Zosimus, which although provides a shorter account, agrees with the Strategikon), but the rest of them say nothing about an ambush. Four of them mention that Decius fell “in a swamp” (Ammianus Marcellinus, Strategikon, Leo Grammaticus and Zosimus) and the rest don’t mention any swamp. Zosimus attributes Decius’ death to treachery from Trebonianus Gallus, but the remaining sources say nothing of the sort. Dryanovets is located on a very flat stretch of land, crossed by the Beli Lom river; which runs on a northwest direction, with the ancient Roman road (now a Bulgarian country road) running parallel to it on its western side. Immediately to the northwest of the Beli Lom, a flat plateau rises quite abruptly, and this topography must cause the formation of swampy marshes along the Beli Lom valley especially in rainy seasons, both due to the water carried by the river itself and by the runoff of the waters from the plateau. But the battle probably took part in July or August, which is according to numismatic evidence the earliest date for Herennius Etruscus’ appointment as augustus.

    The Poleto locality is located 1,5 km south of Dryanovets, while the place of the battlefield is located immediately southeast of the village. It’s located in terrain higher than the river valley to the north and west, and the fort located near it must’ve provided an excellent survey point from which the road could be controlled. Given that the Romans had total control over the battlefield, and that they had been there encamped for a while and so they must’ve grown familiar with the environs, it seems quite surprising that the Goths would’ve been able to set up an ambush, on lower terrain than the Roman camp (the battlefield is visible from it) and to the rearguard of the Roman camp if the Goths were advancing from the southeast. That would’ve required almost ninja skills on the part of the Goths; the terrain of the valley is flat, and easily visible from both sides of the valley, and in Roman times it was studded with agrarian settlements, so probably it was cleared, cultivated land with little or no forest cover. The more I think about it, the most surprising it seems that the Goths managed to set up an ambush. On the contrary, it would’ve been the Romans who would’ve been best suited to ambush the Goths.

    Abritus_Battlefield_01.jpg

    View of the battlefield from "Poleto", site of the Roman encampment, looking to the east/southeast. The Beli Lom river runs on the background, at the feet of the wooded slopes of the plateau that can be seen behind the battlefield.

    If there was an ambush, then the incompetence of Decius and his commanders must’ve been criminal, but the well-chosen site of the encampment to cut the Goths’ retreat suggests at least some level of military skill. The battle took place just to the south of Dryanovets, near the Roman camp; the most logical thing is to suppose that the Romans, who couldn’t have missed the large Gothic column, full of captives and wagons, moving slowly along the road, would have been able to form immediately in battle order across the road and cut the Goths’ path. We should also imagine that the slow-moving, cumbersome Gothic force must’ve been constantly shadowed by Roman scouts, and that they had been moving across Roman land and bypassing Roman fortified cities the last of which would’ve been nearby Abritus; and thus Decius and his commanders would’ve had lots of intelligence to work with and anticipate the Gothic movements.

    But Zosimus and the Strategikon, the only two sources who offer some details about the battle, say specifically that it was Cniva who ambushed Decius. I’ve already posted the account from the Strategikon, so I will post here Zosimus’ account:
    But Decius, marching against them, was not only victorious in every battle, but recovered the spoils they had taken, and endeavored to cut off their retreat to their own country, intending to destroy them all, to prevent their ever again, making a similar incursion. For this purpose he posted Gallus on the bank of the Tanais (Note: the Danube) with a competent force, and led in person the remainder of his army against the enemy. This expedition exceeded to his utmost wish; but Gallus, who was disposed to innovation, sent agents to the Barbarians, requesting their concurrence in a conspiracy against Decius. To this they gave a willing assent, and Gallus retained his post on the bank of the Tanais, but the Barbarians divided themselves into three battalions, the first of which posted itself behind a marsh. Decius having destroyed a considerable number of the first battalion, the second advanced, which he likewise defeated, and discovered part of the third, which lay near the marsh. Gallus sent intelligence to him, that he might march against them across the fen. Proceeding therefore incautiously in an unknown place, he and his army became entangled in the mire, and under that disadvantage were so assailed by the missiles of the Barbarians, that not one of them escaped with life. Thus ended the life of the excellent emperor Decius.
    Zosimus is considered by scholars to have been a mediocre and uninspired historian; his New History is mostly a “cut and paste” exercise from earlier authors to drive forth his agenda; that the adoption of Christianity had led to the decadence of the empire. Scholars have detected that the copied verbatim whole passages of Herodian, and there’s reason to think that he did the same with Dexippus; the only part where probably Zosimus added something of his own accord is the account of Trebonianus Gallus’ supposed treachery (which is considered as unfounded by most scholars).

    If this is what truly happened and considering Radoslavova’s careful reconstruction of the battlefield and its environs, then Decius and his officers acted like complete fools, because they managed to get ambushed in a place where it should have been them doing the ambushing.
     
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    19. THE AFTERMATH OF ABRITUS.
  • 19. THE AFTERMATH OF ABRITUS.

    The list of disasters of the Gothic War does not end here. In 2013, the numismatist Alexander Bursche published a paper in number 173 of The Numismatic Chronicle of the Royal Numismatic Society in London. In his paper, Bursche remarks the fact that gold coins minted by emperors Gordian III, Philippus Arabs and Decius have been found in surprising amounts scattered across a wide area in eastern Europe, far away from the borders of the Roman empire.

    The oldest of these coin finds date to the XVII, XVIII and XIX centuries and they ended up in several European collections; due to the date of their finding, it’s impossible to know their exact provenance and the circumstances in which they were found. From the II World War onwards, these findings have been better documented, and the results are impressive, with most of these aurei belonging to the short reign of Decius (less than two years). Most of these aurei were deliberately quartered and pierced before being buried, and the ones for which their exact geographic provenance is known have been found at cemeteries related to the Wielbark and Przeworsk cultures, in Ukraine (Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kursk), Volhynia, Podolia, Podlasie, Greater and Lesser Poland and eastern Pomerania. Of all the III century CE Roman gold coins found in Ukraine, 30% belong to the short reign of Decius.

    Even more aurei of these three emperors, also pierced and quartered, are dispersed in several European collections; although the exact spots where they were found are unknown, all them came to their present emplacements from Polish collections, and were most probably found in the southeastern territories of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris (11 coins), the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna (9 coins), the Adolf von Rauch collection (12 coins), the Ossoliński National Institute in Wrocław (8 coins), the National Historical Museum of Ukraine in Kiev (20 coins), the National Museum in Copenhagen (12 coins), the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg (11 coins).

    This concentration of aurei in this area of continental barbaricum, and limited to so narrow a timeframe, is quite extraordinary; there are no comparable examples. In contrast to other areas, in the territories associated to the Wielbark culture, out of 37 III century aurei whose finding circumstances are well documented, as many as 34 (92%) are issues from the time of Gordian III, Philip the Arab and Decius whose combined years of reign cover less than 13 years. This marked over-representation of gold coins from the time of Decius and his immediate predecessors among the third century aurei recorded in the Gothic environment cannot be fortuitous, and Bursche hypothesizes that its cause must’ve been Decius’ defeat at Abritus.

    Bursche has built his hypothesis on the studies carried out at other Roman-“barbarian” battlefields, i.e. Kalkriese and Harzhorn in Germany. These archaeological digs have revealed that while on campaign both Roman officers and soldiers were well-supplied with money, both in silver and gold coinage. According to Bursche, gold and silver coins would have been regarded as useful in emergencies. Roman soldiers setting out on a long march to war would have derived some feeling of security from having silver and gold coins on them, whether from their regular pay (pecunia, usually paid in silver) or from donativa (extraordinary payments, usually made in gold). Thus, in the short time period that interests us these losses could only have happened as the consequence of a setback suffered by the Roman army when the soldiers buried part of their property, perhaps even on the battlefield, hoping to survive and recover it later, or when it was captured by the barbarians and used later in burial deposits in their home lands.

    Several ancient sources describe the battle as a complete disaster in which most of the Roman army was annihilated, and so it’s conceivable that a large part of the funds carried by Roman soldiers and officers to the battle were captured by the victorious Goths. Bursche makes the interesting point that in several cases of amounts of five aurei found together in a single deposit, like for example the one found at at Shchuchyn in Belarus, the fact that they are found in gourps of five could suggest that we’re dealing with plunder taken directly from Roman soldiers fallen on the battlefield, as this was an amount usually issued as donativum.

    Bursche though goes further that that and hypothesizes that, since the emperor himself was killed at Abritus, his own financial resources fell into the hands of the Goths, perhaps even the entire treasury which would have accompanied the emperor when he left Rome on a distant campaign in what were very uncertain times. The progress of the war up to that moment had been erratic as we have seen in previous posts. Thus, Bursche concludes that Decius would have needed a large amount of precious metal with him, to make, as circumstances required, a subsidy or ransom to the barbarians, and especially to issue donativa to the soldiers after the expected victory or the success of the whole campaign. In the prevailing unstable political situation, it would make no sense to leave any money in Rome and it may have appeared to Decius much safer to keep it under his care, and that of the army, complete with the praetorian guard which probably accompanied him. To avoid carrying too much weight over long distances the best solution would have been to transport the money in the form of aurei which had the highest nominal and real value and were at the time the coins most often used in the donativa.

    The known amount of the donativa issued to common legionaries during the III century was between five and twenty aurei; for officers it would have been higher. The groups of mid-third century aurei and antoniniani recorded in the region of Abritus seem to point that Decius could have rewarded his soldiers for earlier successes by issuing donativa in aurei and also have paid them regular stipendia in antoniniani.

    So, Bursche thinks that it’s quite likely that Decius was left only with the reserves by the time of the battle, to be issued to his soldiers as donativa after the final victory over the Goths. His portable treasury must have consisted of at least a few hundred thousand aurei and may have included gold ingots (and perhaps a mobile mint), adding up to over a ton in weight, possibly even several tons. As noted earlier this is because the emperor probably had with him the entire financial resources of Rome.

    According to Bursche, if we consider the evident dominance of aurei struck in the time of Decius among finds in the Gothic homeland originating from numerous recent discoveries by metal detectors, often the same issues as those discovered around Abritus, the argument that the imperial treasury was captured by the Goths becomes convincing. Bursche notes also that these finds, regardless of how well their context is known to us, must represent only an infinitesimal fraction of the true numbers involved.

    What in Burches’s eyes gives credibility to his hypothesis that so many aurei minted in the time of Decius and his immediate predecessors fell into “barbarian” hands as spoils of war is suggested by the way in which they were treated back home by the Gothic warriors, presumably those who had participated in the campaign in Lower Moesia: the coins were chopped and deposited, in the same way as weapons taken from a fallen enemy were deposited in the lakes and bogs of Jutland and northern Germany. In two cases, those of Stara Wieś and Ulów, the chopped coins were buried in a sacred space, a grave field; regrettably, the archaeological context of all the other finds is unknown. It is quite possible that chopped fragments of aurei are much more common but are either missed by metal detectorists because of their small size or not recognized for what they are.

    Bursche also notes the fact the chopped aurei from Stara Wieś and Berdyshev had been pierced earlier which suggests that at least for a short time they had been used as pendants or as armor ornament. The uncirculated condition of the coin fragments from Stara Wieś, Berdyshev and Ulów indicates that they were chopped, and presumably deposited, not long after minting. Thus, a situation could be imagined in which the coins were pierced when the Gothic troops were still in the South, soon after the capture of the imperial treasury, its contents presumably shared out among the men according to merit shown in battle, as had been done some fifty years earlier with the denarii and the equipment which ended up in the lake at Illerup (Jutland).

    02.gif

    Pierced aureus of Decius, Odessa Numismatics Museum.

    To Bursche, that the holes were made in a hurry is indicated by the fact that some are too close to the coin’s edge and caused a break, making it necessary to make another hole. Then the aurei were used as pendants or dress accessories, or to decorate weapons and horse trappings while the troops were making their way back North, which would have taken many weeks; finally, they were chopped or burnt and used as a sacrifice when the war bands came back home.

    There is an additional argument to support Bursche’s assumption that Decius took with him the entire treasury, especially the gold, in the form of coins and ingots. After Decius’ death, the defeated Danubian army hailed as augustus Trebonianus Gallus, the governor of Lower Moesia who at least had managed not to be defeated by the Goths. But in the meantime, Decius’ youngest son the caesar Hostilian was still alive in Rome. Trebonianus Gallus hurried to Rome, and there he raised Hostilian to the rank of joint augustus, while he appointed his own son Volusianus as caesar. Neither Trebonianus Gallus nor Hostilian issued any new aurei celebrating their rise to the purple, something that was very rare; Bursche suggests that the reason for this could have been the loss of so much gold at Abritus.

    The hypothetical capture of the Roman imperial treasury by the Goths may help explain the deepening fiscal crisis and progressive devaluations of the aureus observed during the latter half of the third century. The average weight of Trebonianus Gallus’ aurei is much lower than that of the aurei from the reign of Decius. In the times of Valerian and Gallienus there was also a sharp drop in the gold content of aurei, possibly still a consequence of the defeat at Abritus.

    Trebonianus Gallus’ short reign has been described by a modern historian as “a succession of disasters”. He also enjoyed a very bad reputation among ancient writers, who criticized him ferociously for his supposed inactivity and general uselessness as an emperor. And to top it all, many of those chroniclers accused him of having been on league with Cniva and having betrayed Decius to the Goths (the most vocal amongst them is Zosimus).

    treb004.jpg

    Aureus of Trebonianus Gallus. On the reverse, CONCORDIA AVGG.

    That Trebonianus Gallus was not a traitor is now the consensus among scholars, because he was raised to the purple by the Danubian army which had been just soundly defeated with many losses by these same Goths. If the soldiers and officers had suspected him to be a traitor at the time, they would have lynched him, not made him augustus. Another hint that he had been loyal to Decius is the fact that he made Hostilian his colleague as augustus when he had no need to do so, and that as we will see he kept employing Valerian in high responsibility posts, when Valerian had been Decius’ main supporter in the Senate. But soon after the start of his reign, rumors began to circulate (probably fabricated by political enemies or aspirants to the purple) about his supposed treason, and shortly they became commonplace and were duly written down as truthful by Graeco-Roman authors.

    Sestertius_Hostilian-s2771.jpg

    Sestertius of Hostilian as augustus. On the reverse, SECVRITAS AVGG, a message of reassurance directed by the imperial propaganda to a population that was starting to fear for the future of the empire.

    And the fact is that Trebonianus Gallus had received an empire in an almost desperate situation. Its most powerful armed force, the Danube army, had been soundly defeated and humiliated, and a large part of the Balkan provinces had been laid waste. Abritus had been a sound humiliation for Rome: an army almost destroyed (after previous defeats) and two Roman augusti slain in the fight against “barbarians”, something that had never happened before. Probably, as the news of Abritus spread amongst Rome’s neighbors, they became an encouragement for other enemies to try their lot against the wounded and weakened giant. We should add to this Bursche’s hypothesis about the capture of the imperial gold reserve by the Goths (which apart from the damage that it did to an already bankrupt Roman state, would have acted as a call for other “barbarians” to try their luck), and if that was not enough, in 251 CE the Plague of Cyprian had reached Rome, where it was wreaking havoc.

    Trebonianus Gallus returned to a capital ravaged by the pestilence, and his first priority seems to have been to try to organize public help to at least try to alleviate the worst effects (mass graves, etc.). Also, before leaving the Danube his first act as augustus had been to make peace with the Goths and agree to resume the payment of “subsidies” to them. This act seems to have been extremely unpopular amongst the army and populace of the Danubian provinces (the ones who had raised him to the purple), who felt deeply betrayed by Trebonianus Gallus, who was now subsidizing the very same enemies who had killed their comrades or looted their lands and cities.

    But the hugest blow from outside the borders during Trebonianus Gallus’ short reign was not to come from the north, but from the east, by the Sasanian armies of Šābuhr I.
     
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    20.1. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE PRELIMINARIES.
  • 20.1. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE PRELIMINARIES.


    The ŠKZ was carved out during the last decade of Šābuhr I’s long reign (240-273 CE), and it’s the basic source to reconstruct it. Until now I’ve quoted several passages of this long inscription that refer to Šābuhr’s father Ardaxšir I, but now I’m going to look at its two initial passages, where Šābuhr I presented himself, and the territories over which he ruled by the time when the inscription was carved out. The ŠKZ begins thus:
    I, the Mazdayasnian Lord Šābuhr, king of kings of Iranians and non-Iranians, who is of the seed of the gods, son of the Mazdayasnian Lord Ardaxšir, king of kings of the Iranians, who is of the seed of the gods, grandson of the Lord Pābag, king, am the ruler of Ērānšahr.
    These opening lines already show several significant differences in relation to the royal inscriptions of his father Ardaxšir I in rock reliefs or coin legends. Firstly, while Ardaxšir was just “king of kings of the Iranians”, Šābuhr I called himself “king of kings of the Iranians and non-Iranians” (in Middle Persian, šāhān šāh ērān ud anērān). This is an important ideological innovation. For ancient Iranians, the concepts Zoroastrian/Mazdayasnian and Aryan/Iranian were inextricably linked. One could not be an Iranian without being Zoroastrian, and vice versa. But with the adoption of this new title, Šābuhr I made an important point: within his domains there were not only Iranians/Zoroastrians, but also non-Iranians/non-Zoroastrians as well, and he was the king of all them; this also offered ideological coverage for potential annexations of non-Iranian lands.

    But this arose an important question: if within his kingdom there were Iranians (ērān) and non-Iranians (anērān), it followed that there were Iranian and non-Iranian lands within it, which were inhabited by these two groups respectively. There are two accounts of which lands were Iranian and which were non-Iranian, which point to a disagreement between Šābuhr I (who had a more “secular” understanding of the concept of ērān) and the Zoroastrian clergy represented in the inscriptions of the mowbedān mowbed Kirdēr thirty years later, where he gave a different list of Iranian territories, reflecting that the priesthood retained an strictly religious understanding of the concept of ērān. Šābuhr I reserved the qualification of ērān for the territories that belonged to the Roman empire and which he’d raided during his campaigns: Syria and Anatolia. But Kirdēr included also the Caucasus and Armenia as lands inhabited by the anērān (curiously, Kirdēr included Mesopotamia and Khuzestan within the Iranian lands of the empire).

    Šābuhr I took this terminology from the Avesta, and it had a markedly religious connotation; while he (as his father had done) tried to manipulate it for his own political designs, the mowbedān resisted stubbornly what they saw as the perversion of Zoroastrian tradition. The concept of ērān was indeed centuries older, and had appeared in the Younger Avesta as anairya, where it denoted the "Turanians”. These Turanians of anērān, apparently the traditional enemies of the Avestan-speaking peoples, appear in Zoroastrian cosmogony and cosmology as the evil dwellers of the sixteen lands created by Angra Mainyu (the Younger Avestan name for the Zoroastrian hypostasis of the "destructive spirit", which would become Ahriman in Middle Persian) which lay beyond the world river that encircled the sixteen lands created by Ahura Mazda. So, in Zoroastrian religion the concept of anērān was ideologically charged, as it was not a neutral term to name a non-Zoroastrian, but an enemy of the Good Religion and its followers the Aryans/Ērān/Iranians.

    The other important innovation in these first lines of the ŠKZ is the apparition of the term Ērānšahr. This Middle Persian term means “kingdom” or “dominion” of the Ērān/Aryans/Iranians. Here Šābuhr I was borrowing again terminology from the Avesta, for this Middle Persian term is the thinly veiled translation into Middle Persian of the Younger Avestan expression Airyanəm Vaējah, which linguists translate loosely as “expanse of the Aryans” or “land of the Aryans”. This mythical land was the first one among the sixteen lands created within the world river that encircled the lands created by Ahura Mazda. This of course was a device to link his kingdom directly with the mythical home of the Aryan tribe, and with the cradle of the Zoroastrian religion, implicitly claiming a “sacred” status for it.

    Both concepts would have a long-lasting life, for all Sasanian kings would title themselves king of kings of Iranians and non-Iranians, and Ērānšahr would become the official name of the Sasanian empire until the Muslim conquest. This was an important development in itself, as we don’t know what name did the Arsacids give to their empire, if they indeed used a definite term for it. That contrasts sharply with the Roman case: res publica romanorum or imperium romanorum were well-established names that revealed that the Romans had a clear concept of their state that transcended the rule of a single individual or dynasty. After Šābuhr I, the Iranians would also have a similar nomenclature, and this reflects that from its second ruler the new Sasanian dynasty was developing a clear concept of statehood for which we lack previous traces in Iranian tradition.

    After this opening passage, the ŠKZ lists the lands which were under the rule of Šābuhr I in the last decade of his reign:
    And I hold under my protection these lands: Pārs, Pahlav (Parthia), Xūzestān, Mēšān (Mesene), Āsūrestān (Mesopotamia), Nodšēragān (Adiabene), Arbayestān (northern Mesopotania), Ādurbādagān (Azerbaijan), Armin (Armenia), Viruzān (Georgia), Segān (Mingrelia), Arrān (in the Caucasus), Balāsagān (in the Caucasus) until forward to the Kap mountains (the Caucasus range) and the Alans’ Gate, and all the Parišxvār mountain chain (the Alburz), Māy (Media), Gurgān, Marv, Harēv (Areia/Aryana), Abaršahr (the northern part of the modern Iranian province of Khorasan), Kirmān, Sagestān (Sakastan/Sistan), Tūrestān (lower Indus valley, roughly corresponding to modern Sindh), Makurān (Makrān), Pāradān (in Balochistan), Hindustān (India), and the Kušānshahr until forward to Pašakbur (Puruṣapura, modern Peshawar), and up to Kāš (Kāshgar), Sughd (Sogdiana), and Cācestān (Tashkent), and on the other side of the sea the Mazūnšahr (Oman). And we have given [to a city] the name Pērōzšābuhr (Mishike, probably modern Anbār), and we have given the name Ohrmazdardaxšir [to another city]. And these many lands, land rulers and district governors, all have become tributary and subject to us
    .
    The list is impressive, and it lists many territories that no sources claim to have been under control of his father Ardaxšir I. The first thing that can be noticed from this list is that, while the territorial gains of Šābuhr I in the west were important (Armenia, and the southern Caucasian kingdoms), they were quite modest compared with the ones listed in the ŠKZ to the east of the Iranian plateau. The regions listed in the ŠKZ amount to a total annexation by Šābuhr I of the remains of the Kushan empire. On the north, he listed all the territories under Kushan control in central Asia, including all of Sogdiana beyond the Oxus and even past the Pamir into the Tarim basin in what’s now Xinjiang (Kashgar). And to the south, he lists all the territories between the Iranian plateau and the Indus river, and adds the generic term Hindustān without further specification, implying that his dominion extended perhaps beyond the Indus.

    This was a spectacular territorial expansion, which the Sasanian empire was never able to repeat. The Kushan kings continued to reign, which is implied by numismatic evidence, which shows an uninterrupted line of Kushan kings, but after Kanishka II, who ruled in 225–245 CE, his successors were confined to northern India, and it becomes increasingly difficult for scholars to reconstruct their chronologies; his immediate successors were Vasishka and Kanishka III. The validity of Šābuhr I’s claims in the ŠKZ was questioned for a long time by scholars, until in 2002 a newly discovered rock relief in northeastern Afghanistan was brought to the attention of archaeologists. This is the rock relief at Rag-e Bibi. It’s located near Surkh Kotal, a major Kushan complex in eastern Afghanistan. Although the relief had been badly damaged by the passing of time and by Taliban iconoclasm, the team of French archaeologist who studied it dated it surely to the reign of Šābuhr I, for its similarities in style with other rock reliefs by this Sasanian kings. The relief shows a mounted king (most probably Šābuhr I himself) hunting a rhinoceros (a royal sport in Indian tradition); while five standing figures can be seen in the background.

    Rag-e-Bibi.jpg

    The badly damaged Sasanian relief at Rag-e Bibi, in northeastern Afghanistan.

    The French team that examined the relief dated it to the 260s CE and judged that the attendants of Šābuhr I were dressed in Kushan costumes, and were shown not as conquered enemies, but as loyal servants of the Sasanian king. The location of this rock relief was carefully chosen. It’s located near the archaeological complex at Surkh Kotal, which was excavated by a French archaeological mission in the 1960s, and the digs revealed a monumental complex of huge temples and a multitude of inscription by the Kushan kings, as well as statues of the kings. Archaeologists believe that Surkh Kotal was a cultic complex closely linked to the Kushan dynasty, and it contained the burial place of two of the Great Kushans (Kanishka the Great and Huvishka), and so by placing a monumental relief of himself there Šābuhr I wanted to show himself as the vanquisher of the Kushans and also as their continuator. Surkh Kotal lies in the southeastern tip of Bactria, where the major land route leading from Bactria to Kabul (and from Kabul to Peshawar and India) began its crossing of the Hindukush; it was thus a very busy road, and the relief of Šābuhr I is placed precisely a few kilometers southeast of Surkh Kotal, directly visible from the road.

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    Location of Surkh Kotal within ancient Bactria/Tokharistan.

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    The terraces of the temple of Surkh Kotal when they were first excavated in the 1960s.


    The relief is considered by many scholars as evidence that Šābuhr I did indeed conquer Kushan lands as far as the Indus. There were no rhinoceros then in Bactria, but they could still be found in the Indus river valley; hunting them was traditionally reserved to Indian royalty. The symbolical value is also obvious; by showing Šābuhr I in the act of hunting a rhinoceros, which was often used (as the elephant) as a symbol for India, the Sasanian king was shown as the conqueror of India. The depiction of the standing figures dressed in Kushan costume and in a dignified position (as well as the incorporation of style traits of Gandharan art in the relief) also hints to a respect towards local sensibilities and costumes, which was reflected in the policies of Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I of establishing a subordinate king for the former Kushan territories with the title of kušanšah, as I wrote in a previous post.

    The northern conquests are much more difficult to attest. It’s sure that under Kanishka the Great Kushan rule included the oasis of Kashgar in the Tarim basin, but it’s not known if by the first half of the third century CE the oasis was still under Kushan rule. There is no archaeological or numismatic evidence to verify Šābuhr I’s claims north of the Oxus, and much less as far north and east as Tashkent and Kashgar. The most that scholars are willing to accept is that, as the Sasanian conquests in Bactria, Kabulistan and Gandhara split the Kushan empire in two parts and Kushan rule is only attested as having continued in northern India, these northern territories reverted to the rule of local authorities who came under the more or less effective vassalage of Šābuhr I. But as I said, to this date there’s no sure evidence for Sasanian rule north of Marv.

    When did Šābuhr I add these conquests to his sprawling empire? Unless he was willing to fight in two fronts (which was a circumstance as feared by the Iranians as by the Romans), Šābuhr I must’ve conquered them when he was not at war against Rome. That doesn’t leave much time. He ruled between 240 and 273 CE. Between 240 and 244 CE he was at war against Gordian III, and between 252 and 260 CE he was again at war against the Romans. That leaves only the periods of 244-252 CE and 260-273 CE free for his eastern expansion. Given that Šābuhr I is shown at Ardaxšir I’s victory relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah as being a fully grown man at the battle of Hormizdgan, that means that he was at least 18 years old by 224 CE, and that he was born around 206 CE. By 260 CE he must’ve been 54 years old, a bit old for campaigning but perhaps with still some years ahead of him. On the other side, there’s the 244-252 CE period, although the last two years of this time period seem to have been employed in intriguing and campaigning in Armenia and the Caucasus.

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    Maximum extent of the Sasanian empire under Šābuhr I, according to the ŠKZ.

    Although in the ŠKZ and all the preserved rock reliefs of Šābuhr I (except for the one at Rag-e Bibi) the accomplishments of Šābuhr I that are publicized more heavily are his victories over the Romans, the eastern conquests were from an economic, territorial and demographic point of view much more important than his western conquests. Bactria, the valleys of central Afghanistan, Kabulistan, Gandhara and the Indus valley were very rich, urbanized and heavily populated and urbanized territories; control over them must’ve translated into a massive increase of the resources available to the Sasanian šāhānšāh. And if Šābuhr I also exerted some kind of control (as the ŠKZ attests) over Transoxiana as far away as Tashkent and Kashgar, this meant that he became by far the most powerful monarch in Eurasia after the collapse of the Han dynasty in China and the Kushan dynasty in central Asia and northern India.

    Control over Transoxiana (which was also a heavily urbanized land) meant that he controlled more than half of the land extent of the Silk Road, which translated into massive tax income. And we should add to it another consideration. As the Romans resented the fact that the main land route of the Silk Road crossed Arsacid territory, a new branch was opened that bypassed it. This branch had been opened with collaboration from the Kushans (who benefitted from it as much as from the land route that crossed the Iranian plateau). This alternative route branched out from the main land route at the Pamir, and descended to the Indus valley through Kashmir; and reached the ports at the mouth of the Indus, where Roman traders from Egypt could purchase the items they desired and carry them by sea to the ports on the Egyptian Red Sea coast (mainly Berenike), and from there by land and river to Alexandria, where they could be redistributed across the entire Roman empire.

    The conquest of the Indus valley by Šābuhr I closed this route off, and this could have inflicted another blow to the Roman fiscus. Some modern scholars hypothesize that customs over the eastern trade (both by land and sea) could have amounted up to one third of the revenues of the Roman state, anything that affected the eastern trade would have been of vital importance to Rome.

    As I wrote in a previous post, only a late source (Zonaras) seems to imply that Philip the Arab broke the peace that he bought after the convoluted end of Gordian III’s expedition. The most probable course of events is that he kept himself faithful to the terms of the peace treaty; he’d managed to retain Roman Mesopotamia (the Nisibis mint kept issuing coins in Philip’s name and his brother Priscus was named in inscriptions as praeses Mesopotamiae -equestrian governor of Mesopotamia-) and he hoped that this would be enough to save face. Apart from the humiliation for Roman arms and the indemnity paid to Šābuhr I, the real concession that Philip had to made was the formal renunciation to Roman interference in Armenian affairs. It was an important concession, because since the times of Nero the Romans enjoyed the privilege (acknowledged by the Arsacids) of being able to confirm or refuse any new Armenian king. Plus, since Ardaxšir I’s rise to power in Iran, the Arsacid dynasty of Armenia had become a staunch, and extremely useful and loyal, ally of Rome. Philip’s concession was the equivalent of throwing Rome’s Armenian allies to the wolves, and it’s quite noteworthy that Šābuhr I did not manage to conquer Armenia and have its Arsacid king killed until 252 CE (or 251 CE according to some scholars). But still, Philip would have probably thought in the circumstances of 244 CE that such a concession was purely nominal and had little real value and could be broken whenever it suited Rome.

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    Relief of Šābuhr I at Naqš-e Rajab (near Persepolis) celebrating his victory in 244 CE against Gordian III.

    As I also wrote in a previous post, the annexation of Armenia into Ērānšahr was a strategic disaster for Rome, and quite probably the successors of Philip the Arab intended to overturn the terms of his “shameful” peace treaty as soon as possible. In this sense, Ilkka Syvänne made the insightful observation that the adoption by Decius of the name of “Trajan” as part of his full name as augustus could have hinted at eastern ambitions. Trajan had first conquered Dacia and secured the Balkans before embarking in his greatest enterprise, the conquest of the Arsacid empire. And perhaps Decius had a similar progression in mind, but he never managed to succeed in the first part of such a grandiose plan.

    If Šābuhr I’s conquest of Armenia took place in 251-252 CE, then it happened at the worst possible moment for Rome, which raises the question if the news of the disastrous defeat of Decius at the hands of the Goths did not cause Šābuhr I to launch a full-scale effort against Armenia with the complete assurance that the Romans would be unable to intervene. They did not intervene directly, but the decision of accepting the Arsacid Armenian prince Trdat as a refugee within the empire under Roman protection, which was probably taken by Trebonianus Gallus, was immediately seen by Šābuhr I as a breach of the terms of the peace treaty of 244 CE.

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    Fragment of a bronze statue of Trebonianus Gallus, Archaeological Museum of Florence, Italy.

    The decision by Trebonianus Gallus could not have been taken in a worse moment in time had he tried. The Iranians were unencumbered by wars on other fronts, and after the annexation of Armenia they had won access of an additional large pool of manpower, especially of elite heavy cavalry. And now, the Sasanian-Roman border extended from the Caucasus to the Syrian desert, so Sasanian attacks menaced not only Mesopotamia and Syria, but Cappadocia and Pontus too. With Armenia under Sasanian control, Roman Mesopotamia was now encircled by Sasanian territory on three sides and was virtually indefensible, the Plague of Cyprian was ravaging the empire, the imperial fiscus was bankrupt and the Roman army of the East was on its own, because after the disastrous Gothic war it could hardly expect reinforcements from the battered Danubian legions.
     
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    20.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE DISASTROUS REIGN OF TREBONIANUS GALLUS.
  • 20.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE DISASTROUS REIGN OF TREBONIANUS GALLUS.

    The events that surround the second campaign of Šābuhr I against the Roman empire are the darkest part of the already dark years of the mid-III century CE regarding written sources. The expedition of Gordian III was already badly and confusedly attested in sources, but in contrast with the events of 252-253 CE, it’s generously covered by ancient sources. Only two contemporary sources even acknowledge the facts: the ŠKZ and the extremely confusing Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle. Inevitably, this means that for these events modern scholars have had to resort to speculation to an extreme degree, usually not needed in the case of conflicts between the Sasanians and Rome.

    We know of two contemporary Greek authors of the III century CE who wrote about the Roman-Sasanian wars of their time, but their works have been lost in their entirety. The first one is Nikostratos of Trapezos, briefly mentioned by the VI century CE author Evagrius Scholasticus in his Ecclesiastical History; Nikostratos’ work would have covered the events of the period 244-260 CE (just the time period that interests us), and quite puzzlingly it corresponds exactly with the missing gap in the Historia Augusta. The other author is Philostratos of Athens, a contemporary and relative of Dexippus, who wrote a history of the wars against Šābuhr I between 252/253-260, and perhaps a history of the Palmyrene war under Aurelian. Philostratos’ existence (and some very short passages of his work) are quoted by the VI century author John Malalas and the IX century author George Syncellus. The short quotation of Philostratos’ work by Malalas is important, because it confirms the accuracy of events told in the ŠKZ. Dexippus of Athens also wrote (in a brief way) about this war in his second historical work (also lost), which was a historical chronicle that stretched from the beginnings of Greek civilization to the year 260 CE. All the other references in major Greek and Latin ancient or medieval sources are derived from Dexippus, Nikostratos or Philostratos, or from local Antiochene lore (as in the case of the Antiochene authors Ammianus Marcellinus, John Malalas and Evagrius Scholasticus). The only independent surviving sources contemporary to the events are the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, and the ŠKZ.

    SKZ_01.jpg

    The graves of the Achaemenid kings carved in stone at Naqš-e Rostam near Persepolis and Istakhr. The tower on the left part of the picture is the Ka'ba-ye Zartosht, an Achaemenid bulding whose purpose is still unknown, and onto which Šābuhr I had his inscription carved. On the bottom right part of the image you can also see one of Šābuhr I's triumphal reliefs.

    The ŠKZ is quite a straightforward source, and the only “little” caveat that scholars need to remember when using it is that it was royal Sasanian propaganda, and that it intended in no way to be a historical work. But the other source, the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, is an extremely confusing and puzzling document. The current consensus is that it was written by a Jew in a verse format that merged both Graeco-Roman oracular tradition and Jewish prophetical tradition, using extremely complex and obscure allegories. Scholars also agree that this anonymous author was not only a contemporary of the events, but also probably an eyewitness, native of Syria or Palestine. What scholars don’t agree about is the purpose of this strange document (if it had one) but it’s the only contemporary source for these events, and from a person who saw it unfold before his eyes.

    The problem of using such unreliable sources is quite evident: by following them, scholars have proposed three different dates for Šābuhr I’s second campaign against the Roman empire (as Šābuhr I himself named it in the ŠKZ):
    • The campaign season of 256 CE, a dating that was majority in the past (based in the year when Dura Europos was destroyed by Šābuhr I’s army), but now few authorities defend it.
    • The campaign season of 253 CE, which is now the dating defended by most scholars; it was first proposed by M.Rostovzeff and among its current defenders there’s the German historian Udo Hartmann.
    • And finally, some scholars propose the campaign season of 252 CE, its main defender is the American historian David S. Potter. The irony is that both Potter and Hartmann have come to defend different dates (and very different chains of events) by following the same sources, especially the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle (Potter wrote quite an extensive study about it, Prophecy and History).
    Due to this utter disagreement between scholars about the developments in the East and their dating, I will expose first the events in the European provinces of the Roman empire before writing in some extent about the two opposed theories about Šābuhr I’s second campaign in the Roman east.

    As we saw in a previous post, before leaving the Danube Trebonianus Gallus had signed an unpopular peace treaty with the Goths; in which he allowed them to leave the empire with all of their loot and prisoners, and to resume the payment of “subsidies” to them , in exchange for a renovation of the treaty that Gordian III or Tullius Menophilus had signed with them, in which the Goths for their part accepted not to attack the empire and to provide troops for the Roman army. As the French scholar Michel Christol proposed in a 1980 paper, this was probably due not only to the recent defeat of the Danube army against the Goths, but also to the desire of Trebonianus Gallus and the governing elite of the empire to shift the focus of military action to the East against the Sasanians; and for this Trebonianus Gallus needed to renew the treaty with the Goths: this gave him peace in the Danube and the possibility to draw troops from there and send them to the East, and of recruiting Gothic contingents for use against the Sasanians.

    Trebonianus Gallus was the scion of an Italian senatorial family which was based in Perusia (modern Perugia, in central Italy), and so he was a man of impeccable aristocratic pedigree who seems to have possessed the traditionalist frame of mind associated to such origins. As such, he seems to have shared the same opinions regarding internal and exterior politics as his predecessor Decius and the latter’s right-hand man, the Italian senator Valerian. After the Gothic débacle, Trebonianus Gallus probably decided to proceed anyway with what could have been the second part of Decius’ grand strategy and organize a new expedition to the East concentrating all the available resources there, just like in the good old times. But what neither Trebonianus Gallus nor his senatorial colleagues realized was that the times when Rome could decide where and when to attack were long gone. The correlation of forces had shifted against Rome, and now the empire was on the defensive. The only concession that Trebonianus Gallus and his associates were willing to make to this new reality was their decision to renew the treaty with the Goths, something that Decius had refused to accept. This became painfully clear in the 252-253 CE campaign of Šābuhr I.

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    Loss of silver content of the antoninianus suring the period 200-270 CE; table extracted from Kyle Harper's book "The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease and the End of an Empire".

    Numismatic studies have showed that after 248 CE, the silver content of the antoninianus began a precipitous descent. Kyle Harper linked this quickened devaluation to the effects of the Plague of Cyprian, to which we should add the increased military spending, the payment of tributes to both the Goths and Sasanians and disasters like the one at Abritus. To the devaluation of the silver coinage, we should add under Trebonianus Gallus a decrease of the weight of the aureus, with which extraordinary donativa to the troops were made; the aurei of Gallus weighed on average 3,9 g, while between Nero and Caracalla they’d weighed 7,5 g and 6,55 g after Caracalla’s reign.

    Ancient authors like Eutropius, Aurelius Victor and Zosimus wrote very severely about the reign of Trebonianus Gallus and judging from the indirect account that can be found in the letters, treaties and sermons of bishop Cyprian of Carthage, his reign was the moment when a general feeling of hopelessness began to pervade the whole empire, even the lower strata of society in a province sheltered from invasions like Africa. Still in 251 CE, Cyprian appears in his writings as the voice of reason and hope in the middle of Decius’ persecution, making a great effort against the spread of millenarianism among his flock. But in 252-253 CE, under Trebonianus Gallus and with Decius’ persecution finished, the general tone of his writings changes radically. He’s won over by inquietude, he questions himself about the future of the world and spreads the most pessimistic reports about the immediate future: he’s awaiting the imminent coming of the Antichrist and the calamities that will challenge his flock before the Last Judgement. The best example of this sharp change in Cyprian’s attitude is his sermon De Mortalitate, where we see clearly that the immediate cause for this hopelessness is the spread of the horrific epidemic known as the Plague of Cyprian; it was during Trebonianus Gallus’ reign that it spread wide and far across the Mediterranean basin. In this sermon, the Roman empire is not anymore for Cyprian an obstacle for the end of times; its situation is so hopeless that its floundering seems to be impending and Christians must await the coming of novissima tempora.

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    Silver antoninianus of Trebonianus Gallus. On the reverse, the image of the god Apollo the Healer with the legend APOLL SALVTARI.

    In the governing circles of the empire, the main reason for misgiving must’ve been the external situation, and the fear that Rome was not able anymore to maintain its imperium. Trebonianus Gallus seems to have acted as well as he could considering his traditionalist background and the circumstances he found himself in. On 24 June 251 CE, Decius was deified by the Senate (another hint against the rumors that painted him as a traitor to Decius) but after July (or November, according to some sources) of that same year Hostilian, Decius’ youngest son and Trebonianus Gallus’ joint augustus disappeared from scene, probably a victim of the Plague of Cyprian, although rumors spread immediately that Trebonianus Gallus had murdered him. Immediately, Trebonianus Gallus raised his own son the caesar Gaius Vibius Afinius Gallus Vendumnianus Volusianus to the rank of augustus. He also ceased to apply Decius’ edict on sacrifices, a wise decision given that in its current the situation the last thing that the empire needed was to create unnecessary problems.

    As I wrote before, the army of the lower Danube and the populace of the border Danubian provinces and Thrace had felt deeply betrayed by Trebonianus Gallus’ peace treaty with the Goths, and now the emperor was to suffer the fruits of this resentment. One of the commanders of the Danubian army was an equestrian of African origin (born in Girba, the Latin name for the island of Djerba according to the Epitome de Caesaribus) called Marcus Aemilius Aemilianus. His exact area of command is attested very confusedly in the ancient sources: John of Antioch, Simeon the Logothete, Leo Grammaticus and Zonaras wrote that he commanded in Moesia, while Zosimus wrote that he was in command in Pannonia. As we will see, a command in Moesia was the most probable option; and that his command was a general one that covered several provinces (like it had been the custom in Decius’ time) seems also quite probable, so perhaps his command could have covered from Pannonia to Moesia.

    Latin sources are almost unanimously hostile to Aemilianus (he was not a senator and is described in several sources as “being in disagreement with the Senate”), while most Greek sources are sympathetic towards him; this probably reflects a division in opinion which appeared already in the III century. Zosimus is clearly supportive of him:
    Meanwhile, the Scythians who had taken over the whole of Europe quite unhindered now crossed into Asia and plundered as far as Cappadocia, Pessinus, and Ephesus. Aemilianus, commander of the Pannonian legions, did his best to encourage his troops, who did not dare resist the successful barbarians, and reminded them of their Roman honor. He then made a surprise attack on the barbarians in the district and killed most of them. Next he crossed over into the enemy territory, destroyed every obstruction and, contrary to every expectation, freed Rome's subjects from their tormentors. For this he was chosen emperor.
    In other words, the Goths (or at least part of the Goths, or perhaps their allies) broke the 251 CE treaty and attacked the empire again. Zosimus’ text implies that the Pontic Goths and their allies began their seaborne attacks against the coast of Asia Minor and the Balkans at this point (which is disputed by some scholars, who postpone the start of such attacks until 255 CE); and if Aemilianus was able to attack and beat them (or at least a group or groups of them) then they had perhaps also crossed again the Danube into Moesia. For the Greek-speaking inhabitants of these parts of the empire, this was a mortal danger that threatened their lives, families and livelihoods, and so Zosimus (who wrote in Constantinople) represents the voice of the Greek population of these areas, who cared about the defense of their country, and not much about the defense of other parts of the empire. In this we see a growing (and lethal for the empire in the long term) trend: the growing localism, with separate parts of the empire caring only about their own defense, ignoring the priorities of the empire as a whole and so being willing to raise to the purple whatever military commander who promised to defend their lands.

    Zonaras offers a slightly different account. He explicitly says that the Gothic attack was due to their complaints that they had not received the amounts promised by the 251 CE treat. It’s unclear if these charges were true (and is they were, if they were Aemilianus’ own initiative or Trebonianus Gallus’ orders) or simply an attempt by the Goths to extort more wealth from the Romans. And then, according to Zonaras, Aemilianus made a promise to his men:
    A certain Aemilianus, a Libyan man, commander of the army of Moesia, promised that he would give to the soldiers all that had been given to the Scythians, if they would engage in war with the barbarians. Catching the Scythians by suprise, they killed all but a few and collected much booty from them, overrunning their territory. Afterwards, Aemilianus, having become haughty in his success, canvassed the soldiers under him. They proclaimed him emperor of the Romans.
    So, Aemilianus basically tried (and succeeded) in bribing his soldiers with the promise of the booty they could gain from the Goths, and which possibly was the very same tribute the Romans were paying them.

    The anonymous XIII century Chronological Survey, often identified as the work of Theodore Scutariotes, states that:
    And a certain Aemilianus, being in command of Paeonians, emboldening the troops under him and having attacked the barbarians there, destroyed many, and was recognized sovereign by the troops there.
    Jordanes in the Getica (following Cassiodorus) represents the Latin tradition, and is much more hostile towards Aemilianus:
    At this time the Goths frequently ravaged Moesia, through the neglect of the Emperors. When a certain Aemilianus saw that they were free to do this, and that they could not be dislodged by anyone without great cost to the republic, he thought that he too might be able to achieve fame and fortune. So he seized the rule in Moesia and, taking all the soldiers he could gather, began to plunder cities and people. In the next few months, while an armed host was being gathered against him, he wrought no small harm to the state.
    So, according to the Getica, Aemilianus bribed his men by allowing them to loot the Roman provinces.

    One way or another, Aemilianus managed to be acclaimed as augustus by the Danubian armies, probably in July 253 CE. He then put together an army formed probably by vexillationes and auxiliary units from the Danubian border (and so, weakening again the border which was under threat) and marched towards Rome at top speed. The fact that he fought the Goths makes very probable that he commanded the Moesian legions, but his unimpeded march against Rome following the Balkan roads means that probably he was also in control of the Pannonian legions, which did not intercept his advance upon Italy.

    The expeditionary force must’ve been small and Aemilianus seems to have relied on speed, he preferred to advance against Trebonianus Gallus with a small army before the emperor could call to his help troops from other parts of the empire. Given that Aemilianus’ reign lasted for three months (four according to some sources), the march from the Balkans to Italy must’ve been a very quick one; when Trebonianus Gallus received news of the usurpation attempt and Aemilianus’ approach, he sent a message to Valerian in Raetia asking him to come to his help, but despite the fact that Valerian was nearer to Rome than Aemilianus, the latter beat him to the mark. Another hint that Aemilianus must’ve commanded a small and highly mobile force is the fact that Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus did not hesitate to march against him with the Roman garrison; which means that most probably they had numerical superiority and felt confident enough. The two armies met at Interamna (modern Terni) on the Via Flaminia in central Italy, where Trebonianus Gallus was defeated and he and he and his son were murdered by their own men, probably in August 253 CE.

    Coin_Aemilianus_Vict_Aug.jpg

    Antoninianus of Aemilianus; on the reverse, VICTORIA AVG.

    The Senate acknowledged Aemilianus as augustus and the new emperor acted in a conciliatory way towards the conscript fathers; he declared his intention to fight both Goths and “Persians” and that he was only the general of the Senate. But his reign was to be short-lived, because the following month (September 253 CE) Valerian’s army reached central Italy. Aemilianus left Rome and fought a battle against Valerian’s army on the Via Flaminia near Spoletum (modern Spoleto); there Aemilianus was murdered by his own men in the suitably called Bridge of the Sanguinarii.

    These events had to be partially connected with events in the East, which I will approach later, but there’s the possibility that the discontent among the Danube army was due to a decision taken by Trebonianus Gallus to send part of its effectives to deal with the Sasanian onslaught in the East while the Danube was suffering Gothic raids. This was another sign of the growing localism that affected the empire, and a consequence of Septimius Severus’ decision to give marriage rights to the soldiers; they were now deeply rooted in the society of the provinces of their main bases where they had wives and children and were extremely reluctant to leave their homelands unguarded if they thought that there was a risk of a foreign attack. At this moment, either the Goths attacked breaking the treaty, or Trebonianus Gallus was forced to cut the subsidies or Aemilianus, who was general commander in the Balkans, chose deliberately to provoke them into attacking; either way he scored a victory (which after Decius’ disastrous war must’ve caused an impression) and the soldiers and provincials acclaimed him as augustus. In my opinion, the usurpation was probably planned by Aemilianus who deftly planned the act, who exploited the discontent that reigned in the Balkan provinces in military and civilian circles against the emperor.

    What’s less clear is Valerian’s role in Aemilianus’ short-lived usurpation. In 252 or by early 253 CE, Trebonianus Gallus had sent Valerian (the old right-hand man of Decius) to gather an army north of the Alps. The French scholar Michel Christol noted in a 1980 paper that most probably Valerian’s real mission was to organize an expeditionary force with vexillationes from the legions and auxiliary units from the Rhine and upper Danube borders in preparation for an expedition to the East, and this has become ever since shared by many scholars. Christol noted that Aurelius Victor had written that at the moment of Trebonianus Gallus’ death Valerian commanded an army assembled in Raetia ob instans bellum (“because of the imminent war”). Given that the first coins of Valerian as augustus minted at Viminacium boast of a victoria germanica, it’s probable that the preparations for an eastern campaign included also preventive attacks against the empire’s northern neighbors (the Alamanni in this case if the army had been assembled in Raetia), as had been done before the expeditions of Caracalla and Gordian III (Severus Alexander did not take this precaution and suffered the consequences). The real question though is that if Valerian’s army was stationed in Raetia (and thus perfectly located to intercept Aemilianus’ advance into Italy), why did he not arrive into scene until it was too late?

    Coin_Valerian_Vict_Germ.jpg

    Antoninianus of Valerian; on the reverse VICTORIA GERMANICA.

    Udo Hartmann proposed as an explanation for this that Valerian could’ve been campaigning against the Alamanni (Raetia would be the ideal launching place for such a campaign) and that Aemilian’s march caught him and his army still in barbaricum and so unable to retreat quickly enough to cut his advance; that would also explain the victoria germanica coins. Upon receiving news of the death of Trebonianus Gallus, he would have refused to acknowledge Aemilian as himself clearly outranked him in lineage, rank and prestige and was commanding an army which had no reason to follow Aemilianus (as they came from areas free from Gothic raids), so he allowed his troops to acclaim him as augustus. Unlike Aemilianus, which is described in several ancient sources as a parvenu with very discreet origins, Valerian belonged to a senatorial Italian family, and had been married (he’s recently become a widower) to a woman called Egnatia Mariniana, who belonged to the distinguished Etrurian senatorial family of the Egnatii. He’d been consul at least once, governor of several provinces and had an extensive administrative, political and military experience (he was most probably involved already in the revolt of the Gordiani in 238 CE).
     
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    20.3. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE BATTLE OF BARBALISSOS.
  • 20.3. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE BATTLE OF BARBALISSOS.

    Let’s look now at events in the East, which are much less clear than the ones in Europe. As I said before, the exact chronology of Šābuhr I’s second campaign is hopelessly unclear, other than the events seem to have taken place wholly during Trebonianus Gallus’ short reign (summer 251 – August 253 CE). The first act of the play was the Sasanian seizure of Armenia, which probably happened during Decius’ Gothic war or immediately after it, taking advantage of Roman troubles at the Danube. If that was the case, then the decision of granting asylum to the Armenian prince Trdat was either one of Decius’ last decisions or one of Trebonianus Gallus’ first ones. Both would have been probably well aware that such a decision was a breach of the 244 CE treaty and would mean war against Šābuhr I.

    This decision was taken at a disastrously bad moment for Rome, but probably any Roman leader would have done the same. The fate of Armenia was just too important to just concede victory to Šābuhr I. Armenia was the piece that gave an edge to any of both empires in the Middle East, and Rome had controlled it for two centuries. Allowing Šābuhr I to just take it with impunity was simply unacceptable; and we should remember what happened to Maximinus Thrax for ignoring Ardaxšir I’s conquest of Roman Mesopotamia, which had lesser strategic importance than Armenia. Rome had to react, but as the events that followed would show, the empire was just not able anymore to concentrate overwhelming forces in a single front when it suited it like it had been able to do since Augustus’ times. Now, it was Rome’s enemies who would set the pace of events, and the Romans would be forced to react to them as well as they could.

    In his influential 1980 paper, Christol noted a telling sign that Trebonianus Gallus was preparing himself for war against the Sasanians. After 244 CE, the mint of Antioch had been issuing large amounts of billon tetradrachms (many eastern cities issued their own coinage), a production that was maintained under Philip (perhaps the only sign that could point towards a continuation of military operations in the East under this emperor) and Decius. The billon tetradrachm was the local equivalent of the Roman billon coin of the period, the antoninianus. Under Trebonianus Gallus, the issuing of tetradrachms ceased abruptly and was substituted by an equally massive production of regular antoniniani, the coin with which soldiers’ stipendia were paid, hinting at an upcoming military campaign in the East which would have included western troops which would have been used to being paid in antoniniani, the same had happened during Gordian III’s eastern campaign. The only difference is that under Gordian III a large amount of antoniniani had been minted at Rome and transported to the East, while under Trebonianus Gallus and his successors the mint at Antioch seems to have been in charge for the totality of the money supply. Another telling sign is that one of the main legends in the reverse of the antoniniani that were being massively issued by the mint of Antioch at the time read ADVENTUS AVGG, thus proclaiming the imminent arrival of the two augusti (Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus) in the East.

    Coin_Treb_Adventus_Aug.jpg

    Antoninianus of Trebonianus Gallus; on the reverse, ADVENTUS AVG.

    As we’ve seen in the cases of Severus Alexander and Gordian III, launching an eastern expedition would have been a cumbersome affair, and it usually took an emperor between one and two years of preparations and marches before he reached the East with reinforcements from the West. And if there was something that Trebonianus Gallus probably did not have, it was time.

    Either in the last months of Decius’ reign or during the first months of Trebonianus Gallus’ one, there had been some local trouble in Antioch of the kind that in normal circumstances should have never gone beyond a mere local anecdote, but these were not normal circumstances. It sounds like the plot of a bad movie, but several ancient sources corroborate the tale. First, the SHA (in the chapter Triginta Tyranni):
    This man (Myriades), rich and well-born, fled from his father Cyriades when, by his excesses and profligate ways, he had become a burden to the righteous old man, and after robbing him of a great part of his gold and an enormous amount of silver he departed to the Persians. Thereupon he joined King Sapor and became his ally, and after urging him to make war on the Romans, he brought first Odomastes and then Sapor himself into the Roman dominions; and also by capturing Antioch and Caesarea he won for himself the name of Caesar. Then, when he had been hailed Augustus, after he had caused all the Orient to tremble in terror at his strength or his daring, and when, moreover, he had slain his father (which some historians deny), he himself, at the time that Valerian was on his way to the Persian War, was put to death by the treachery of his followers. Nor has anything more that seems worthy of mention been committed to history about this man, who has obtained a place in letters solely by reason of his famous flight, his act of parricide, his cruel tyranny, and his boundless excesses.
    John Malalas, (an Antiochene author from the VI century CE, quoting the III century author Philostratos of Athens and local traditions from his native city):
    Under this emperor (i.e. Valerian), one of the magistrates of Antioch the Great by the name of Mariades was expelled from the city council (boule) at the contrivance of the entire council and citizen body. He was found wanting in his administration of the chariot races, for whenever he was leader of the faction, he did not purchase horses but kept for his own benefit the public funds destined for the circus. He departed for Persia and offered to betray Antioch the Great, his own native city, to Shapur the king. This Shapur, the king of the Persians, came with a large force through the limes of Chalcis and occupied and devastated the whole of Syria. He captured Antioch the Great in the evening and plundered it, tormented it and set it on fire. Antioch then was in her three hundred and fourteenth year (=AD 265/6?). However, he decapitated the magistrate (i.e. Mariades) for his betrayal of his native city.
    Another source is the VI century CE East Roman author Peter the Patrician (a high-ranking member of the administration of Justinian I):
    When the king of the Persians came before Antioch with Mariadnes (i.e. Mariades), he encamped some twenty stadia (from the city). The respectable classes fled the city but the majority of the populace remained: partly because they were well disposed towards Mariadnes and partly because they were glad of any revolution; such as is customary with ignorant people.
    What modern scholars have managed to put together from this garbled mess is that a man named Kyriades or Mariades, a rich and respected member of the Antiochian elite, was expelled from the city’s boule (governing assembly) either for embezzling public funds or for robbing his family, or both. This should have been the end of the affair, but this Kyriades/Mariades crossed into Ērānšahr and offered his help to Šābuhr I, who was planning an attack against the Romans and accepted the offered help gladly; judging by all the sources he acted moved by hatred and revenge against his native city although the SHA (beware the source) state that he also tried to usurp the purple with Šābuhr I’s help (who could have found this an useful distraction in his war against the Romans). The SHA also offer an important detail that scholars consider probably true: he names an “Odomastes”, whom modern scholars identify as none other than Hormizd-Ardaxšir, Šābuhr I’s heir presumptive and who had just been appointed as Great King of Armenia by his father.

    Antioch_01.jpg

    Reconstructed computer view of ancient Antioch, as seen from the wall of the island on the Orontes, looking towards Mons Silpius, the mountains that dominated the city on its southern side.

    The tale of Mareades is absent from the ŠKZ, but its historicity is confirmed by his mentioned in the only surviving Graeco-Roman contemporary source, the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle. Due to its importance, I’ll quote here at length the whole passage dealing with the Sasanian invasion and the events that immediately preceded it:
    (107) And after him there shall rule powerfully
    O'er fertile Rome another great-souled lord
    Versed in war, coming from the Dacians
    And numbering three hundred; he shall have
    Also the letter of the number four,
    And many shall be slay, and then the king
    Shall all his brothers and his friends destroy
    Even while the kings are cut off, and straightway
    Shall there be fights and pillagings and murders
    Suddenly on the older king's account.


    (117) Then, when a wily man shall summoned come
    A robber and a Roman not well known
    From Syria appearing, he by guile
    Into a race of Cappadocian men
    Shall drive through and, besieging, shall press hard,
    Insatiate of war. And then for thee,
    Tyana and Mazaka, there shall be
    A capture; thou shalt be enslaved and put
    Upon thy neck again a fearful yoke.
    Arid Syria shall mourn for men destroyed
    And then Selenian goddess shall not guard
    Her holy city. But when he by flight
    From Syria shall before the Romans come,
    And shall pass over the Euphrates' streams,
    No longer like the Romans, but like fierce
    Dart-shooting Persians, then, fulfilling fate,
    Down shall the ruler of the Italians fall
    In the ranks smitten by the gleaming iron;
    And close upon him shall his children perish.
    But when another king of Rome shall reign,
    Then also to the Romans there shall come
    Unstable nations, on the walls of Rome
    Destructive Ares with his bastard son;


    (140) Then also shall be famines, pestilence,
    And mighty thunderbolts, and dreadful wars,
    And anarchy in cities suddenly;
    And the Syrians shall perish fearfully;
    For there shall come upon them the great wrath
    Of the Most High and straightway an uprising
    of the industrious Persians, and mixed up
    With Persians shall the Syrians destroy
    The Romans, but by the divine decree
    They shall not make a conquest of their laws.
    Alas, how many with their goods shall flee
    Front the East unto men of other tongues
    Alas, the dark blood of how many men
    The land shall drink! For that shall be a time
    In which the living uttering o'er the dead
    A blessing shall by word of mouth pronounce
    Death beautiful and death shall flee from them.

    (157) And now for thee, O wretched Syria,
    I weep in sorrow; for to thee shall come
    A dreadful blow from arrow-shooting men,
    Which thou didst never think would come to thee.
    Also the fugitive of Rome shall come
    Bearing a great spear, Crossing on his way
    Euphrates with his many myriads,
    And he shall burn thee, and dispose all things
    In a bad way. O wretched Antioch,
    And thee a city they shall never call,
    When by thy lack of prudence thou shalt fall
    Under the spears; and stripping off all things
    And making naked he shall leave thee thus
    Coverless, houseless; and when anyone
    Sees he shall of a sudden weep for thee.

    (172) And thou shalt be, O Hierapolis,
    A triumph, also thou, Berœa; weep
    At Chalcis over lately wounded sons.
    Alas, how many by the steep high mount
    Of Casius shall dwell and by Amanus
    How many, and how many Lycus laves,
    And Marsyas as many and Pyramus
    The silver-eddying; for even to the bounds
    Of Asia they shall treasure up their spoils,
    Make cities naked, and bear idols off
    (182) And cast down temples on much-nourishing earth.
    It reads like utter gibberish, and the fact is that the text is so dense with allegories and metaphors related to Jewish scripture and Graeco-Roman mythology and historical lore in its attempted imitation of oracular speeches that after more than a century of heated debate scholars are still in disagreement about the events it “prophesized” (the original text was written in Greek).

    I’ll summarize now the reconstruction of events by the German scholar Udo Hartmann, which align with the prevailing view amongst scholars, and then I’ll expose the differing version defended by David S. Potter, who has devoted a long book to analyze the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle.

    According to Hartmann, the war began in 252 CE with a Sasanian invasion of Roman Mesopotamia and a Roman counterattack, presumably to avoid the Sasanian capture of Nisibis (as described by al-Tabari and Eutychius). Most probably Nisibis fell at this time, because its mint ceased issuing Roman coins abruptly around this time. And the next year, it would be Šābuhr I’s turn to invade the Roman empire.

    Hartmann construes the verses 117-130 as a description of Iotapianus’ rebellion, and according to him the verses 131-134 describe the death of Decius and his son in campaign against the Goths. From the verse 135 onwards, the “Sibyll” writes about the eastern events that happened during Trebonianus Gallus; short reign, in which is a long mourning of the destruction of Syria by the Sasanian army. Verses 142-148 attest to “Syrians” collaborating with “Persians” against “Romans”. According to Hartmann, this is a reference to the fugitive Antiochene leader Mareades.

    He reconstructs the original name as “Mareades” from among all the variants transmitted in the sources. Hartmann notes that “Mareades” is the Hellenization of the Syriac common name “Mareas”. According to him, this man must’ve been a rich citizen of Antioch, and he must’ve served as a member of the city assembly (the boule), and would have been elected in 252 CE by the boule to be in charge of financing the chariot races at the circus, one of the acts of evergetism that the members of local governments were expected to provide to theirs fellow citizens at their own expense. This was a potentially ruinous commission (several cases of ruined local magistrates are known from across the empire due to similar obligations), and Hartmann thinks that this was probably the case for Mareades. Due to his failure at financing the chariot races, he was expelled from the boule (probably he was elected for this “honor” deliberately by political enemies who wanted to see him ruined), and he left Antioch and went to Ērānšahr to offer his services to Šābuhr I, then at war against Rome, perhaps taking with him funds that the boule of Antioch considered to be public funds (the money destined for the races) and Mareades considered to be his own money.

    Mareades is described by ancient sources as having accompanied Šābuhr I in his invasion, and most scholars consider verses 142-148 to corroborate this. According to several sources, Mareades had a following in Antioch, and Hartmann thinks that these supporters would have been important for the fall of the city in Šābuhr I’s hands.

    According to Hartmann, the invasion was launched by Šābuhr in the spring of 253 CE. About the chosen route there’s consensus among scholars; Šābuhr achieved strategical surprise by ignoring the western Mesopotamian cities (Carrhae and Edessa) still in Roman hands: he advanced by a completely unexpected route and aimed his attack directly against northern Syria (the Roman province of Syria Coele) with its capital Antioch, which was the main city and military center of the Roman East.

    The route chosen was the Euphrates route, so often used by the Romans in their eastern attacks. But while for the Romans it made sense (as it allowed for the shipping of supplies downstream), this would be not possible for a Sasanian army advancing north against the current’s flow. It was probably the last thing that the Romans would have expected Šābuhr I to do. Taking this route implies several things:
    • First, that Šābuhr I had a comfortable numerical superiority over the Romans, for such an advance would leave several Roman and Palmyrene fortified outposts (Anatha, Dura Europos, Circesium and others) in his rearguard which would have needed several strong enough Sasanian detachments left behind to surround and blockade them. And he would also have needed to guard his vulnerable left flank and rearguard against surprise Palmyrene attacks. This suggests the mobilization of a large army from all the corners of his vast empire, and such a mobilization would’ve needed to be planned in advance, if forces from eastern Iran, central Asia, Afghanistan and perhaps further away had to be ready on time (in the IV century, Ammianus Marcellinus attested the presence of contingents from Kušanšahr and Kidarite central Asian nomads in Šābuhr II’s army during one of his Mesopotamian campaigns). Such forces would have needed to cross the Iranian plateau and the Zagros passes and meet with Šābuhr I’s royal army near Ctesiphon. Given the inhospitable weather in the Iranian plateau and the Zagros (not to speak of central Asia and Afghanistan) in winter, it’s unlikely that such a force could have been ready very early in the campaign season.
    • Second, that the Sasanian king must’ve had some sort of logistical preparations ready to feed such a large force and carry the supplies upstream.
    • Third, that this bold move put the Romans on the strategical defensive, but it did not rend them unable to respond. The Romans had shorter communication lines and an excellent road and supply system that would have allowed them to concentrate their forces quickly when Šābuhr I’s intentions became evident. What they lost though was the sheltering screen provided by the fortified cities of northern Mesopotamia, and as we shall see soon, by the Euphrates river itself.
    • Fourth, that Šābuhr I’s advance can’t have been very fast; he was moving with a large army, had to carry his supplies upstream and there’s evidence that he carried with him infantry forces and a siege train. This was not a large-scale cavalry raid, but a combined-arms invasion army well equipped and prepared. Again, this implies that the Romans must’ve had enough time to prepare themselves and gather their forces.
    • Fifth, that Šābuhr I advanced along the right bank of the Euphrates, with the Syrian desert to his left. Advancing along the other bank would have prevented the danger of Palmyrene attacks from the desert, but it would have meant that the Roman army could have blocked any attempts to cross the river. Or worse still, it could have trapped the Sasanian army with its back to the river during the crossing, forcing it to fight a frontal battle without being able to use its cavalry advantage to full effect, like it happened to Šābuhr II at Singara (a narrowly avoided disaster) and at the catastrophic Sasanian defeat at Qadisiyyah against the Rashidun army in 637 CE.
    The possibility that Šābuhr I must’ve enjoyed a numerical advantage and that he advanced along the Euphrates’ right bank is reinforced by the place where the decisive encounter took place: the Syrian town of Barbalissos (modern Balis), a small town located on the Euphrates’ western bank, where the river’s great western bend reaches the point closest to the Mediterranean coast (about 200 km).

    253_Campaign_01.jpg

    Hypothetical advance of Šābuhr I's army along the western bank of the Ephrates river. Anatha was the first Palmyrene fortress on the river, and Doura (Dura Europos) was the first Roman fortress. As you can see, Barbalissos is already dangerously close to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast.

    This was a defensive battle for the Romans, because they gathered their army in a place from which they could try to block Šābuhr I’s advance to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. The scarcity of sources is such that only the ŠKZ even names the battle of Barbalissos: this name or even the fact that there was a battle is completely absent from Greek and Latin sources. It’s the same situation as with Mishike, but as with this last battle some historians are still skeptical about the veracity of the ŠKZ’s depiction of events, there’s consensus that the battle of Barbalissos really happened and ended with a crushing Roman defeat, by the simple fact that some surviving Greek and Latin sources confirm the tale of the ŠKZ about the devastation of Syria and the destruction of Antioch by Šābuhr I’s army; this could only have happened if the Roman army of the East had been severely beaten (or if it had banished into thin air).

    Barbalissos is today an abandoned ruin; in ancient times it was a small town inhabited by an Aramaic-speaking population and emperor Justinian I surrounded it with strong fortifications, whose ruins are still visible. Archaeological digs have been done at this site, and scholars believe that in the III century the town was not fortified. Today it lays partially submerged under the waters of the Assad lake (a dam on the Euphrates built in modern times). The surrounding country is slightly hilly, but other than that it has no major obstacles to major troop movements (rivers, ravines, mountains, etc.). In other words, this was perfect terrain for cavalry, which did not bode well for the Romans; as Barbalissos lacked fortifications, the only strong point to which the Roman army could retreat in case of retreat would have been their camp, if they had fortified it.

    Barbalissos_View_01.jpg

    View of the environs of Barbalissos in modern times; in the background the waters of Lake Assad.

    But the major unanswered questions about the battle of Barbalissos don’t end with the nature and disposition of the battlefield; we don’t know who commanded the Roman army and how many men were involved on both sides. The ŠKZ says that at Barbalissos the Sasanian king “annihilated” a Roman army of 60,000 men. This number is usually considered an exaggeration, but given the number of men available to the Romans in the East and the fact that probably they had plenty of time to concentrate their forces, in my opinion the number is perfectly plausible (they were even operating very near their main supply bases, and in a fertile and populous countryside, with plenty of supplies and water available).

    In his book The army of Severus Alexander, Bernard Michael O’Hanlon gives hypothetical numbers for the numbers of men garrisoned in each province at the end of the last Severan emperor in 235 CE; these numbers are still probably valid for 253 CE. O’Hanlon follows Hyginus for the strength numbers of each unit but considers that units would have probably at all times been at least 10% short of their paper-strength. The list is based primarily on epigraphic source, those units whose presence in the eastern provinces is unsure are marked with a question mark.
    • Full legion: 5,000 men (including 120 cavalrymen)
    • Auxiliary cohors (also called cohors quingenaria): 480 infantrymen.
    • Auxiliary cohors milliaria: 800 infantrymen.
    • Auxiliary cohors equitata (quingenaria): 480 infantrymen and 120 cavalrymen.
    • Auxiliary cohors milliaria equitata: 800 infantrymen and 240 cavalrymen.
    • Auxiliary ala (quingenaria): 480 cavalrymen.
    • Auxiliary ala milliaria: 720 cavalrymen (a very rare unit, only 6 are attested for the whole empire).
    For the eastern provinces, the list of units given by O’Hanlon for the end of Severus Alexander’s reign is:

    Cappadocia: c. 19,000 infantrymen and 2,800 cavalrymen, broken down as:
    • Legio XV Apollinaris.
    • Legio XII Fulminata.
    • Ala II Ulpia Auriana.
    • Ala I Augusta Gemina Colonorum.
    • Ala II Gallorum.
    • Ala I Ulpia Dacorum.
    • Cohors Apuleia. C. R. (for Civites Romanorum, a title which became redundant after the Constitutio Antoniniana)
    • Cohors Bosporiana Milliaria.
    • Cohors Milliaria Equitata C. R. (?).
    • Cohors I Apamenorum Sagittariorum.
    • Cohors I Claudia Equitata.
    • Cohors I Germanorum Milliaria Equitata.
    • Cohors I Lepidiana Equitata C. R.
    • Cohors I Germanorum.
    • Cohors II Claudia (?).
    • Cohors II Hispanorum (?).
    • Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata.
    • Cohors IV Raetorum.
    Mesopotamia: c. 8,000 infantrymen (minimum) and 1,500 cavalrymen (minimum), broken down as:
    • Legio I Parthica.
    • Legio III Parthica.
    • Ala Britannica.
    • Ala Nova Firma Catafractaria Milliaria.
    • Cohors I Ascalonitarum Felix Sagittaria.
    • Cohors I Flavia Chalcidenorum.
    • Cohors II Equestris.
    • Cohors III Augusta Thracum.
    • Cohors VI I(turaeorum).
    • Cohors IX Maurorum.
    Syria Coele: c. 20,000 infantrymen (O’Hanlon does not give the total number of cavalrymen, but if we add the strength of the units listed below, they add up to c. 6,300 cavalrymen), broken down as:
    • Legio IV Scythica.
    • Legio XVI Flavia Firma.
    • Ala Thracum Herculiana Milliaria (?).
    • Ala I Praetoria C. R.
    • Ala I Ulpia Dromedariorum Milliaria (?).
    • Ala I Ulpia Singularium (?).
    • Ala II Flavia Agrippiana (?).
    • Ala III Thracum (?).
    • Cohors I Ascalonitanorum Sagittaria Equitata (?).
    • Cohors I Augusta Pannoniorum.
    • Cohors I Claudia Sugambrorum (?).
    • Cohors I Flavia Chalcidenorum Sagittaria Equitata.
    • Cohors I Lucensium Equitata (?).
    • Cohors I Ulpia Dacorum.
    • Cohors I Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata (?).
    • Cohors I Ulpia Sagittaria Equitata (?).
    • Cohors II Dacorum Equitata (?).
    • Cohors II Equitum.
    • Cohors II Classica Sagittaria (?).
    • Cohors II Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
    • Cohors II Ulpia Equitata C. R.
    • Cohors II Ulpia Paphlagonum Milliaria Equitata.
    • Cohors III Augusta Thracum Equitata (?).
    • Cohors III Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
    • Cohors III Ulpia Paphlagonum Equitata (?).
    • Cohors IV Lucensium Equitata (?).
    • Cohors IV Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
    • Cohors V Chalcidenorum Equitata (?).
    • Cohors V Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata (?).
    • Cohors VII Gallorum.
    • Cohors XII Palestinorum Milliaria.
    • Cohors XX Palmyrenorum Sagittaria Equitata Milliaria.
    Syria Phoenicia: c. 10,000 infantrymen and 750 cavalrymen (here O’Hanlon makes an assumption that most of its auxiliary units must’ve been dropped from the record, for the list below doesn’t add up to the total above), broken down as:
    • Legio III Gallica.
    • Ala Vocontiorum.
    • Cohors I Flavia (Chalcidenorum) C. R. Equitata.
    • Cohors II Ulpia Galatarum.
    Syria Palaestina: c. 18,500 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen, broken down as:
    • Legio X Fretensis.
    • Legio VI Ferrata.
    • Ala Anton(iniana?) Gallorum (?).
    • Ala Gallorum et Thracum Ant(onin)iana (?).
    • Ala VII Phrygum (?).
    • Cohors I Damascenorum (?).
    • Cohors I Flavia C. R. Equitata.
    • Cohors I Montanorum (?).
    • Cohors I Sebastena Milliaria (?).
    • Cohors I Thracum Milliaria (?).
    • Cohors I Ulpia Galatarum.
    • Cohors II Ulpia Galatarum (?).
    • Cohors IV Bracar(augustanorum) (?).
    • Cohors IV Breucorum (?).
    • Cohors IV Palestinorum.
    • Cohors IV Ulpia Petraeorum (?).
    • Cohors V Gemina C. R. (?).
    • Cohors VI Ulpia Petraeorum (?).
    • Numerus Maurorum (Moorish mercenaries from North Africa under Roman pay, led by their own officers and organized according to their custom, such units are impossible to quantify. Most probably, they were cavalrymen).
    Arabia: c. 9,500 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen, broken down as:
    • Legio III Cyrenaica.
    • Ala Celerum.
    • Ala Dromedariorum.
    • Ala Veterana Gaetulorum.
    • Ala VI Hispanorum.
    • Cohors I Augusta Thracum Equitata.
    • Cohors I Hispanorum.
    • Cohors I Thacum Milliaria.
    • Cohors I Thebaeorum.
    • Cohors III Alpinorum.
    • Cohors V Afrorum Severiana.
    • Cohors VI Hispanorum.
    • Cohors VIII Voluntariorum.
    • Gothi Gentiles (Gothic mercenaries under Roman pay, it’s probable that they were cavalrymen).
    Egypt: c. 10,850 infantrymen and 2,500 cavalrymen.
    • Legio II Traiana Fortis.
    • Ala Apriana.
    • Ala Augusta (Syriaca) (?).
    • Ala Gallorum Veterana.
    • Ala Herculanea.
    • Ala I Thracum Mauretana (?).
    • Ala II Ulpia Afrorum.
    • Cohors Scutata. C. R.
    • Cohors I Apamenorum Equitata.
    • Cohors I Augusta Lusitanorum.
    • Cohors I Augusta Pannoniorum.
    • Cohors I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum Equitata.
    • Cohors I Flavia Cilicum Equitata.
    • Cohors I Pannoniorum.
    • Cohors I Ulpia Afrorum (?).
    • Cohors II Hispanorum (?).
    • Cohors II Ituraeorum.
    • Cohors II Thebaeorum (?).
    • Cohors II Thracum.
    • Cohors III Cilicum.
    • Cohors III Galatarum.
    • Cohors III Ituraeorum.
    • Numerus Palmyrenorum (Palmyrene mercenaries under Roman pay, it’s almost sure that they were cavalrymen).
    The grand total for the eastern Roman army according to O’Hanlon adds up to 113,700 men, including infantry and cavalry, which in my opinion means that a force of 60,000 men for the Roman army at Barbalissos is perfectly plausible. There are some commentaries to be made about the subject though (apart from the obvious fact that 18 years had passed since the death of Severus Alexander):
    • The Romans would have also have had access to a considerable number of Palmyrene allied cavalry. Apart from the city’s own army, the Arabic rulers of Palmyra controlled most nomadic Arabic tribes in the Syrian and Arabic deserts, deep into Arabia.
    • The different provinces would’ve contributed unevenly to the army. The army of Syria Coele would’ve been deployed almost in its entirety (as the battle was held within the province, which was the main target of the Sasanian attack). The army of Mesopotamia would’ve been in bad shape, as the province had been the target of a Sasanian attack the previous campaign season, which probably ended with the fall of Nisibis, and leaving such an exposed province ungarrisoned would have been unadvisable, so most probably most of it stayed in Mesopotamia east of the Euphrates. The other provincial armies would have contributed, but without leaving their own provinces unprotected, especially Cappadocia which now bordered Sasanian Armenia, and Egypt, a perpetually unstable province that was economically vital for Rome and just couldn’t be left unguarded.
    • Apart from the two legions stationed in Syria Coele, which probably would have been deployed complete into the battlefield, the other legions would have been represented by vexillationes, as had been increasingly common since the II century CE. Apart from the unwillingness to leave provinces ungarrisoned, the legion had evolved into an administrative an organizational unit for the Roman army, and it was important to keep its basic structure in place in order to train new recruits; hence the unwillingness to risk having whole legions destroyed in battle by the Roman leadership.
    • The cavalry forces listed above add up to 17,850 cavalrymen, which is 15% of the whole eastern Roman army. This number is in line with scholarly studies about Roman army deployment under Hadrian: about 20% of the total army strength was cavalry, and most of it was concentrated in the West and Africa west of Egypt. Surprisingly, this deployment stood the same under Severus Alexander, despite the growing threat from Arsacid and Sasanian cavalry-based armies. It’s probable that the Romans had previously made good for this weakness in the East through the use of allied cavalry (Armenians, Osrhoenians, Hatrenes, Palmyrenes, etc.). But by 253 CE only Palmyra remained as a Roman ally.
    • The Roman army of the East seems to have received some reinforcements from the West, in small numbers but including significant units. In the mid-1980s a Belgian archaeological mission excavated the remains of the Syrian city of Apamea, and it discovered some interesting inscriptions. Apamea surrounded itself with a strong walled circuit in the late III century, and as elsewhere in the empire these walls were built in a hurry, re-using materials from cemeteries, ancient funerary monuments, etc. One of the towers of the wall (tower XV) was located relatively near to a ravine, and other side of the ravine there were the remains of the legionary camp of Legio II Parthica, which built it during Caracalla’s eastern expedition and re-occupied it again during Severus Alexander’s eastern campaign. But the camp seems to have been used by other Roman units when it was not being occupied by Legio II Parthica (whose permanent base was located at Alba near Rome). The ravine between the camp and the city of Apamea seems to have been used by Roman soldiers as a graveyard for their deceased comrades, and when tower XV was built, most of the gravestones of this military cemetery were used for as building material for this tower. The Belgian archaeological team disassembled the remains of the tower, and discovered a considerable number of gravestones, most of them of soldiers of Legio II Parthica which have helped considerably in the study of the Roman military in the Severan era. But apart from these tombstones, the Belgian team also discovered the gravestone of a certain Aurelius Bassus, a decurion of the Ala I Ulpia Contariorum, who’d died on 21 April 252 CE. The leader of the archaeological team, Jean-Charles Balty, reported on his paper about the digs that this is one of ten similar epigraphic inscriptions coming from Apamea that evidence the presence of cavalry units which had come from other parts of the empire in 252 CE (the Ala I Ulpia Contariorum was usually based in Pannonia). The presence of these units, and the facts that they all are cavalry units, its linked by Balty explicitly to the campaign that ended with the battle of Barbalissos.
    The second great unknown issue is that of the identity of the Roman commander. Each provincial army was led by the provincial governor, and in order to gather an army including forces from several provinces it was necessary for the emperor himself to be present, or to appoint a really trustable commander (considering the long list of usurpations at the time, this was obviously a very delicate issue). Well, we ignore completely who this commander might have been. If according to Hartmann and most scholars the battle happened in the summer of 253 CE, then Trebonianus Gallus and his son Volusianus couldn’t have been present, as they were in Italy fighting against, and perishing under Aemilianus’ attack according to ancient sources. And Valerian was in Raetia, or in Alamannic territory. Who was in command of the eastern armies? There’s not a single source that offers an answer or even a hint at this key issue. David S. Potter proposes an alternative chronology for events and hypothesizes that the battle could’ve happened in the campaign season of 252 CE, which could have meant that perhaps Volusianus could have led the Roman army. It’s a risky proposition, based on his interpretation of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, the tombstones of the auxiliary cavalrymen from Apamea (some of whose deaths are dated to the year of the joint consulship of Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus, which happened from January 252 CE to January 253 CE), and the antoniniani issued by the mint of Antioch with legend ADVENTUS AVGG on their reverse, which he thinks must’ve responded to a real arrival of one of the two augusti in Syria. As I said it’s a risky hypothesis as it’s not backed by any documentary source, and Potter’s dating is not supported by most scholars. I’ll return to this issue later.

    Barbalissos_View_02.jpg

    Satellite image of the environs of Barbalissos in modern times (Google Maps).

    If the battle took place in the environs of Barbalissos, unless the Romans had prepared field works to strengthen their position (as they were fighting a defensive battle), they were at a clear disadvantage. They would’ve been facing south, and the most logical thing would’ve been to anchor their left flank on the Euphrates’ riverbank. But unless they had built fixed defenses, that left their right flank dangerously exposed; as Barbalissos was not fortified, in case of defeat the town would have not been a viable refuge, which means that again, unless the Romans had built a fortified camp, in case of defeat they would’ve been exposed to a pursuit by an enemy which was superior in cavalry; and that was a potential recipe for disaster (it was just what destroyed Crassus’ army after Carrhae, for it suffered most of its losses during the retreat and not during the battle itself).

    As I wrote before, Šābuhr I’s army possibly had superiority in numbers, but I should make a precision here. In theory, both Romans and Sasanians could mobilize armies of more than 100,000 men and the eastern expeditions of Septimius Severus, Caracalla, Severus Alexander and Gordian III had involved numbers far larger than that. But it’s highly improbable that they concentrated at a single place such large armies. Ancient sources give lower numbers for single armies, which in the most extreme cases oscillated between 60,000 and 80,000 men tops, which seems to have been the absolute maximum number, probably due to logistical issues. For the Sasanian empire in the VI century CE, the maximum attested number of forces in Mesopotamia happened under Xusrō I, when two armies operated simultaneously; one of 70,000 men and another of 20,000 men. If the Roman army numbered 60,000 men then Šābuhr I’s army must’ve oscillated between that amount and 70,000-80,000 men maximum, especially considering that he would’ve been forced to leave many detachments behind him to block bypassed Roman fortresses and towns and protect his supply lines. Possibly he enjoyed numerical superiority, but not an overwhelming one.

    With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to say that the Romans should’ve chosen another place to fight, but by this point of time the Roman command had probably lost its nerves. Barbalissos is located 260 km upstream from the southernmost Roman outpost on the Euphrates (Dura Europos) and 380 km upstream from Anatha, the southernmost Palmyrene outpost located on an island in the Euphrates. At Barbalissos, the Sasanian army had left the Syrian desert behind and could turn west from the river and advance along the Roman road to Chalcis (120 km from Barbalissos) across fertile countryside, from where it could’ve menaced Antioch to the west, Apamea and southern Syria to the south and Beroia and the rich and populous region of Cyrrhestica to the north. Barbalissos was the last spot where the Romans could stop Šābuhr I’s army with minimal damage to the rich Roman provinces of Syria Coele and Syria Phoenicia. Probably the Roman commanders felt that this was their last opportunity to avoid an unmitigated disaster.

    A feature of Arsacid and Sasanian armies that differentiated them starkly from Roman ones is their dependence of a reduced number of elite fighters, the noble asvārān that came from the ranks of the wuzurgān and the āzādagān /āzādān. This heavy cavalry was a formidable fighting force, formed by men who were professional warriors, expensively equipped and who trained for war since childhood. Due to their very expensive equipment and life-long training, massive losses amongst their ranks were impossible to replace on a short amount of time and had serious (possibly even destabilizing) social effects, because the asvārān were not only soldiers, but the very governing elite of the empire. Also, because of the strict social order of Iranian society, belonging to the asvārān was strictly reserved to the wuzurgān and āzādān; other social groups were banned from joining its ranks, even if they had the economic resources to pay for the equipment and horse.

    Asvaran_01.jpg

    Asvaran_03.jpg

    British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad wearing the arms and armour of a III century CE Partho-Sasanian heavy cavalryman. The helmet is based on the famous Dura Europos helmet.

    These elite noble asvārān were formidable multi-purpose fighters, and Persian and Arab chroniclers have left ample testimony of their fighting abilities. But what surfaces from all these testimonies is how small their numbers were: as a young man, Šābuhr II led a force of 1,000 elite asvārān deep into Arabia which smashed all opposition in front of them, Bahrām V Gūr defeated soundly the Hephtalites with a force of 5,000 elite asvārān, and Bahrām Čōbīn defeated the Turks with a force of 7,000 asvārān. But despite their effectiveness and flamboyancy, the dependence over such forces was a serious weakness for the Arsacid and Sasanian empires. Huge losses among the asvārān were just unacceptable: they were a blow to the Iranian social fabric, and as they affected the dangerous Iranian nobility they could lead to discontent amongst the wuzurgān, always a very bad development for any Iranian king. Some scholars have suggested that the changes in the composition and tactics of Sasanian armies were partly due to this fact, as the extensive use of asvārān charges by Arsacid armies against Roman infantry would’ve been very costly for this elite force.

    Now, the armies of Šābuhr I employed also infantry of three types: payghan soldiers (peasants conscripted into the army as cannon fodder, servants and sappers), mercenary units made of specific ethnic groups (traditionally Gilanis, Daylamites and other tribal groups within the Iranian plateau, but now also probably forces recruited in the Caucasus, Kušanšahr and even India) and especially the elite infantry archers, specialized in area shooting to which the massed ranks of Roman infantry were particularly vulnerable. To this, one should add the extensive use of mercenary and allied cavalry: nomadic Iranian tribes, Armenians, Iberians, Albanians, Kushans, Central Asian tribes, etc. And perhaps for the first time, also elephants (we know that Šābuhr I employed them, but we don’t know if they were present at Barbalissos) and a sizeable siege train (a giant battering ram employed against the gates of Antioch by Šābuhr I’s army was still surviving in the IV century and was reported by Ammianus Marcellinus).

    Asvaran_02.jpg

    Detailed view of the equipment worn by reenactor Nadeem Ahmad in the above picture.

    Although much more heterogeneous and less cohesive than the Roman army, such an army was much more flexible in its tactical possibilities and if led by a competent commander (which Šābuhr I certainly was) against a cowered or incompetently led Roman army, it had good odds at succeeding in a field battle.

    Barbalissos was according to the ŠKZ an unabated disaster for the Roman army, which was mostly annihilated. Due to this, to the numbers involved and to the devastation of one of the richest areas of the Roman empire, Barbalissos was a far worse defeat that Abritus, and ranks in the same league as Cannae, Arausio or Carrhae in the list of Roman military disasters. Scholars agree that in this instance the ŠKZ’s account is entirely believable, for both Greek and Latin sources and archaeology confirm that Syria was utterly devastated by a foreign invasion at this time, including some cities which held legionary garrisons, which hints that said legions had been all but wiped out at the disaster. In my opinion, a disaster of such magnitude could have unfolded in two possible ways:
    • If the Romans fought (as I wrote above) with a linear deployment and their left flank anchored on the Euphrates, Sasanian cavalry could have bypassed their exposed right flank and then proceeded to surround the army; after being surrounded the Roman army would’ve been massacred, but such a battle would’ve come at a high cost to the Sasanian army for the Romans would’ve fought to the last man in a closed formation, which was their strongest battle ability.
    • Another possibility is that the Roman army broke ranks and fled at a given point in the battle, and in the open countryside around Barbalissos with no fortresses nearby this would have led to the Roman army being massacred by the pursuing Sasanian cavalry (just like it had happened to Crassus’ army).
    Both possibilities would have led to the virtual annihilation of the Roman army, with the second one being cheaper in manpower losses to Šābuhr I.

    Now, I’ll address briefly the alternative reconstruction of events proposed by David S. Potter. He construes verses 117-130 of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle as referring to Mareades, the Antiochene magistrate (and not to Iotapianus, like Hartmann supports) and implying that somehow this Mareades would have gathered an armed following and led an armed campaign (or acts of banditry) in Cappadocia. This is solely based on Potter’s interpretation of the aforementioned passage of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, and according to Potter the failure of this campaign would have led to Mareades’ flight to Sasanian territory. The key difference though is chronological: Potter dates Šābuhr I’s offensive to the summer of 252 CE, based on Antiochene antoniniani (with their ADVENTUS AVGG legends), the order of events in the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle and Zosimus (both mention the Sasanian raids before Aemilianus’ usurpation) and the tombstones for Apamea; in this chronology he’s supported by Jean-Charles Balty, who also places the Sasanian invasion in 252 CE, although to other scholars it’s doubtful if a bunch of gravestones is enough evidence, for these stones don’t even describe how did these cavalrymen die, they could’ve died in a skirmish, due to an epidemic or to other causes, and not necessarily fighting against Šābuhr I’s great invasion.

    And then there’s the issue of linking these events with the ones that were taking place in Europe. If the Roman disaster at Barbalissos happened in 252 CE, then it would’ve been a further reason for the success of Aemilianus’ revolt; but it would be strange that the German and Raetian armies would have been still willing to support Trebonianus Gallus if his military reputation had been so utterly humiliated (on another side, it’s worth remembering that the Italian army that accompanied him promptly changed sides at Interamna and sided with Aemilianus).

    On the other side, if the invasion took place in 253 CE, then the situation changes, because the battle of Barbalissos would’ve happened almost simultaneously to Aemilianus’ usurpation, meaning that the Roman eastern army would’ve been left to its own devices while there was yet another Roman civil war in Europe.

    Another factor are the resumed Gothic raids, some of which (the ones by land across the Danube) were repelled by Aemilianus. If these raids were unprovoked and undertaken by the Goths as a breach of the 251 CE treaty, and happened in late 252 CE or early 253 CE (just before Aemilianus’ revolt), they could have been an opportunistic reaction by the Goths to the news of the new Roman disaster in the East (just like Abritus would have been an encouragement to Šābuhr I). In my opinion, this could lend further support to Potter’s thesis.
     
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    20.4. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE RAVAGING OF SYRIA AND THE FIRST CAPTURE OF ANTIOCH.
  • 20.4. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE RAVAGING OF SYRIA AND THE FIRST CAPTURE OF ANTIOCH.

    With half of the Roman army of the East destroyed, now the šahanšah had free way to unleash his army onto Syria and loot, burn and devastate this rich and populous province. And this is just what he did. According to the ŠKZ:
    And āsūriyā xšahr (Syria) the environs of āsūriyā xšahr we all burned with fire, ruined and plundered. And on this one occasion we took of the Roman Empire forts and towns: The town of Anat (Anatha) with surroundings; Birt-Arūpān (perhaps a fortified Roman town at modern Tabous or Qreiye on the Euphrates) with surroundings; Birt-Aspōragān (probably the fortified Roman town of Zenobia on the Euphrates) with surroundings; the town of Šūrā (Sura) with surroundings; the town of Bēbališ (Barbalissos) with surroundings; the town of Mambōg (Hierapolis) with surroundings; the town of Halab (Beroia, modern Aleppo) with surroundings; the town of Kennešrā (Chalcis, modern Qinnasrīn) with surroundings; the town of Apamiyā (Apamea) with surroundings; the town of Refaniyos (Raphanaea, modern Rafaniyya) with surroundings; the town of Zūma (Zeugma) with surroundings; the town of Urnā (Urima) with surroundings; the town of Gindaros with surroundings; the town of Armenāz (Armenaza) with surroundings; the town of Selōkiyā (probably Seleucia at the Zeugma) with surroundings; the town of Andiyok (Antioch, modern Anṭākiya) with surroundings; the town of Kirros with surroundings; another town of Selōkiyā (probably Seleucia Pieria) with surroundings; the town of Aleksandriyā (Alexandria ad Issum, modern Alexandretta)) with surroundings; the town of Nēkpolis (Nicopolis, modern Iṣlāḥiye) with surroundings; the town of Sinzar (Larissa, modern Šaijar) with surroundings; the town of Hamāt (Epiphania/Amathe, Ḥamā) with surroundings; the town of Ariston (Arethusa, modern Rastan) with surroundings; the town of Dikhor with surroundings; the town of Dūrā (Dura, modern Ṣaliḥīye) with surroundings; the town of Dolox (Dolikhe modern Dülük) with surroundings; the town of Korkusyā (Circesium) with surroundings; the town of Germaniyos (Germanicea, modern Kahramanmaraş) with surroundings; the town of Batnān (Batna) with surroundings; the town of Xānar (Khanar) with surroundings; and in Cappadocia: the town of Sātal (Satala) with surroundings; the town of Domān (Domana) with surroundings; the town of Artangilyā (Artangil) with surroundings; the town of Sūš (Souisa) with surroundings; the town of Suvid (Sinda) with surroundings; the town of Frāt (Phreata) with surroundings – a total of 37 towns with surroundings.
    The list of destroyed cities is hair-raising and encompassed three of the richest provinces of the Roman empire: Syria Coele, Syria Phoenicia and Cappadocia. This utter devastation by the armies of Šābuhr I can only have been achieved by dispersing his army into smaller columns after their victory at Barbalissos which would have then spread far and wide across the Roman East trying to devastate as much territory and seize as much plunder as possible.

    Judging by the list of cities razed by the Sasanian army (which is confirmed by the fragments of Philostratos of Athens transmitted by John Malalas and by the works of later Antiochene authors) and the wide area they covered, they would have met with practically no resistance at least for several months after the battle, allowing them total freedom of movements and the possibility of setting up sieges if necessary. As I wrote before, several of the cities listed were legionary bases, and so their destruction by the Sasanians implies that their legions were either wiped out at Barbalissos or their remnants fled when faced with the advancing Sasanian forces:
    • Zeugma in Syria Coele was the main base for Legio IV Scythica.
    • Sura in Syria Coele was the main base for Legio XVI Flavia Firma.
    • Satala in Cappadocia was the main base for Legio XV Apollinaris.
    As for the rest of the cities listed, they include all the major cities in Syria Coele (Beroia, Chalcis, Apamea) as well as Antioch, the third (or fourth) largest metropolis in the Roman empire, and the main base for communications, trade, minting, and administration in the Roman east. Syria Phoenicia seems to have escaped relatively unscathed; as for Cilicia the Sasanian attacks seem to have stopped short from the Cilician plan where its greatest cities were located, and as for Cappadocia, only some cities on its eastern part were plundered, leaving its main cities unscathed. But Syria Coele was utterly devastated.

    From the list of cities in the SKZ, scholars have tried to put together the advance routes of the several Sasanian detachments. One or two detachments led by Šābuhr I himself seem to have burned their path across northern Syria converging on Antioch, while a second column wheeled towards southern Syria and the limits with Syria Phoenicia and a third column wheeled north into northern Syria east of the Taurus and perhaps even into Cappadocia, although the attacks into Cappadocia could also have been undertaken directly from Sasanian Armenia. Apart from Šābuhr I himself, we know nothing about the other leaders of the Sasanian army. Probably one of its must commanders must’ve been Šābuhr I’s son and heir, the Great King of Armenia Hormizd-Ardaxšir, and other commanders could have been the hazārbed or hazāruft Pābag and the argbed (commander of the cavalry) Pērōz, who are both listed in the ŠKZ.

    The first towns/cities listed in the SKZ are all fortified towns on the Euphrates river, which Šābuhr I must’ve been at the very least invested and besieged in his invasion path; they are named in south- to north order, as the Sasanians would’ve encountered them in their advance: Anatha, Birtha Arupan, Birtha Aspuragan/Zenobia (birtha means “castle” in Aramaic), Sura and Barbalissos. After Barbalissos, the first city listed is Hierapolis, 50 km north of Barbalissos; probably at this point a first Sasanian force split from the main army and headed north while the main body turned towards the southwest towards Beroia (modern Aleppo), 60 km to the southwest of Hierapolis along a Roman road. Probably at Beroia the Sasanian forces again split into a contingent heading south and another heading directly west towards the Mediterranean coast.

    The northern column probably marched from Hierapolis to Zeugma following the Roman road on the Euphrates’ western bank (a distance around 50 km), and from here it could have kept its advance north along the Euphrates to Seleucia on the Euphrates (around 40 km upstream); this force probably was also the one which took Doliche (with its important sanctuary to Iupiter Dolichenus), located some 40 km to the west of Zeugma and Germanikeia (near the provincial limit with Cilicia, almost 70 km to the northwest of Doliche at the feet of the Taurus mountains). The location of the towns of Batna and Khanar is still disputed. This northern arm was also probably responsible for the pillaging of the important city of Cyrrus and the small town of Nicopolis, very near the limit with Cilicia.

    image_2307_1e-_Zeugma-_Mosaics.jpg

    gaziantep-zeugma-mosaic.jpg



    The ancient city of Zeugma was an important commercial hub apart from being a military base. It controlled the main ford on the Euphrates on this rea, which also happened to be the one nearest to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. Modern excavations of the site (today partially submerged under the waters of the Euphrates due to a modern dam) have revealed a worth of ancient mosaics of exceptionally high quality, probably the best ones surviving from anywhere in the Roman world.

    The attack into Cappadocia must’ve been launched directly from Sasanian-controlled Armenia, because Satala is located far to the north, around 240 km from Germanikeia. Domana was a small town located about 10 km north of Satala; the location of the remaining Cappadocian towns and cities named in the SKZ is still unknown.

    As for the central branch (or branches) of the Sasanian invasion that branched off at Beroia, it struck directly towards Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. Gindaros was a small town located at the very door of the Antioch plain, about 40 km from Beroia while Armenaza is the modern village of Biret Armanāz in northern Syria, almost halfway between Beroia (Aleppo) and Antioch), directly on the main Roman road from Beroia to Antioch, just where the hills leave way to the plain of Antioch. This is the reason why some scholars propose a two-winged Sasanian attack convergin on Antioch, as Gindaros and Armenaza are two separated entry ways into the plain, separated about 30 km from each other. The main pass along thus Roman road into the plain of Antioch can be blocked by relatively reduced forces at Immae (place of several battles in history), so a second attack further north must’ve been a security measure by Šābuhr I to avoid being bottled up in the pass by any kind of improvised defense the Romans could’ve been still able to put up. Antioch stood just 25 km to the west of Immae, and its taking by Šābuhr I was the crowning achievement of his campaign. It’s also here where the role of the “traitor” Mareades again comes to the fore.

    According to ancient authors, Antioch ranked third in the hierarchy of great metropolis of the Roman empire. Little remains today above the surface of the ancient city, and archaeological surveys are hampered by the fact that the place is now occupied by the modern Turkish town of Anṭākiya. The first serious archaeological prospects were carried out in the 1930s and 1940s by American archaeologists and brought to the light a series of spectacular mosaics that have underlined just how rich and prosperous the ancient city must’ve been.

    Antioch was a rich and populous city, although demographic estimates vary wildly between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. It was also extensively fortified with a powerful wall that for once had real military purpose and was not a glorified urban limit like in many Roman cities. But the city also had important weaknesses if faced by a determined attacker.

    BMAdinner_Overview_Sm.jpg


    Roman mosaic from the III century CE, found during excavations at the so-called House of the Psyches in the Daphne suburb of Antioch, which was the quarter of the city where the magnificent residences of the city's upper classes stood. Archaeological digs at the site have yielded many more rich mosaics, which are today preserved in Turkey and the USA.

    The location of the city was quite particular. Antioch was built n a narrow stretch of land between the Orontes river and the steep sides of the Silpius Mons. Its north-eastern side was protected by the river Orontes, which acted as a deep moat in front of the massive wall; the main buildings of the city like the stadium and the ancient palace of the Seleucid kings were located on an inland in the Orontes (which has disappeared in modern times); the island was fully surrounded by high stone walls and was the most securely protected part of the city. Several bridges united it with the rest of the city; the streets that ran along these bridges had to pierce the city walls both in the island and in the other side of the river, as the walls ran all along the river banks in both cases. On the north-east and south-west stood the only sides of the city really open to an approaching army, on relatively narrow stretches of land which allowed only for cramped attack frontages. Then there was the long south-eastern flank which limited with Silpius Mons. Here Hellenistic and Roman military engineers found themselves in a tight spot, because although a large force with siege equipment could not escalate its rugged sides, a light infantry force could easily climb it and attack the city with the advantage of height (especially dangerous in the case of Arsacid and Sasanian bowmen). So, the walls had to be lengthened to encompass the highest ridges of Mount Silpius that dominated the city from the south-east.

    Tyche_Antioch_Vatican_Inv2672.jpg


    The most venerated divinity of Antioch was the Tyche of the city (the personification of its Good Fortune). Its cult statue stood (made by Eutychides of Sicyon around 300 BCE) at the city's main temple, the Tycheion, and was celebrated as a masterpiece in Antiquity, with many copies circulating around the Mediterranean. This Roman copy in marble is preserved today in the Vatican Museums. In 253 CE though, the Tyche of Antioch failed to protect the city.

    The result was a city formidably walled and very well protected, but with some key weaknesses. Firstly, the perimeter of the walls was absurdly long: it was even longer than the Aurelian walls of Rome, which were already considered impossible to defend in case of siege. More than half of the space enclosed within these walls (which was again larger than that of Rome itself within the Aurelian walls) was empty space, consisting on the rugged sides of Mount Silpius. En revanche, there were several fresh water springs within the walls on the mountainside, so unlike Rome Antioch would never be in danger of running out of drinkable fresh water in case of a siege. But food was an altogether different matter. Like Rome, Antioch was built at some distance from the sea and was linked to it by a small river which was not navigable by seafaring ships. The Antiochene equivalent to Ostia was the city of Seleucia in Pieria, 20 km downstream the Orontes on the seacoast, where seafaring ships unloaded their cargoes which were then loaded into smaller boats which then ascended the stream of the Orontes to Antioch’s river port.

    This meant that any attacker who managed to close off the Orontes downstream from Antioch effectively cut the city off from the sea. And the Orontes is not a wide river; it can be closed off easily just by placing bowmen on both banks, something that the Sasanians had in abundance. And if that was not enough, among the list of cities conquered by Šābuhr I in the SKZ appear both Seleucia in Pieria and Alexandria ad Issum (modern Alexandretta), another near seaport.

    Unless it had a strong garrison, the long walls of Antioch were untenable in front of a complete encirclement and there’s no evidence that the Romans managed to slip any forces into the city; in normal circumstances Antioch was garrisoned only by the tiny personal guard of the governor of Syria Coele, which would’ve been hardly able to cover even the island on the Orontes.

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    Restitution of Roman Antioch by the French archaeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin. The walls stretching to cover the slopes of Mount Silpius can be seen, as well as the island on the Orontes.

    But according to Udo Hartmann and his interpretation of ancient reports (mainly the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, Peter the Patrician, John Malalas, Libanius, Evagrius and Ammianus Marcellinus) Šābuhr I did not even need to fight to take the city. Like Alexandria, Antioch was a city periodically wrecked by urban infighting and all sorts of disturbances. The episode of Mareades was just one amongst many, but in this occasion the defeated city decurion decided to turn to the Sasanians for help. Šābuhr I’s victory at Barbalissos offered the rancorous Mareades a gilded opportunity to extract revenge upon the rivals who had him expelled from the city.

    According to Hartmann, the Sasanian army just encamped in front of the city’s walls and let Mareades do his job. An extant fragment by Peter the Patrician describes how in these circumstances, the “wise ones” (meaning the rich members of the city elite who had opposed Mareades) fled the city (meaning that it was not fully encircled) while the “unwise ones” (whom he identifies with the rabble of the city) opened the gates to Mareades and Šābuhr I. The result was that the Sasanian army looted the city and set fire to it. The sources contradict each other about Mareades’ fate; some say he was executed by Šābuhr I when he was no longer useful, but Hartmann believes he returned to Ērānšahr with his new lord and took part in the last campaign of Šābuhr I against the Romans.

    As for the southern column of the Sasanian army, its path can be easily reconstructed from the list of cities looted in the SKZ. From Beroia it followed the Roman road south, looting and burning all towns and cities in their wake: the large and rich cities of Chalcis ad Belum (20 km south of Beroia) and Apamea (around 70 km south of Chalcis). From there, they kept advancing south towards Emesa (probably their next major objective) burning in their way the small towns of Larissa and Arethusa. But at Emesa they were encountered a local militia which put up an unexpected resistance, led by a local priest (probably the great priest of El Gabal, the local god of Emesa which had been venerated by Elagabalus) called Sampsigeramus (according to John Malalas) or Uranius Antoninus (according to Zosimus). There’s a lot of confusion at this point because it’s not clear if Zosimus confused him with another Uranius Antoninus who already led a usurpation attempt in the area under Severus Alexander. Apparently, this priest’s hurriedly organized militia was able to defeat and beat the Sasanian army back, thus sparing Emesa from destruction; some later writers go even further even saying that Sampsigeramus killed personally the Sasanian king Šābuhr I (a blatant falsehood, as Šābuhr I died in 273 CE).

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    Remains of the main colonnaded street in Apamea.

    Probably, what happened was just a minor skirmish, and the local Sasanian commander, already loaded with booty and captives did not want to run any risks, so he turned back and began the long trek home. By all accounts, this was the only difficulty the Sasanians met during their pillaging raids in Syria and they were able to go back to Ērānšahr with all their booty and captives completely undisturbed.

    But the episode at Emesa had its inevitable sequel: the Emesene priest proclaimed himself emperor and struck coins under the name L. Iulius Aurelius Sulpicius Severus Uranius Antoninus, adding to the growing political chaos within the Roman empire.

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    Bronze coin of L. Iulius Aurelius Sulpicius Severus Uranius Antoninus. On the reverse, the temple of Emesa with the rock (betylus) that was venerated as the god El Gabal.
     
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    21.1. VALERIAN´S REIGN. THE PROMISING BEGINNINGS.
  • 21.1. VALERIAN´S REIGN. THE PROMISING BEGINNINGS.

    The reigns of Valerian and his son Gallienus mark a decisive point not only for the crisis of the III century, but also for Roman history as a whole. Valerian and Gallienus were the last emperors in the old style of the Principate: they were cultivated members of the senatorial elite, and of old aristocratic senatorial stock. They would be the last emperors of senatorial stock, and the last ones to have followed the old republican cursus honorum for senators, alternating military and civilian posts.

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    Aureus of Valerian, issued shortly after his rise to the purple.

    The change was so radical that after Gallienus’reign it’s impossible to find a single senator in command of an army, thus breaking a tradition that had originated at the beginnings of the Roman Republic. The SHA even state that Gallienus issued a decree expressly forbiding senators from commanding armies, but modern scholars are highly skeptical about this point, because of the unreliability of the HA for this timeframe and the total absence of similar accounts in all the other surviving ancient sources. But be as it might have been, the fact is that after Gallienus’reign, the Roman army would be commanded exclusively by professional officers and thus it was instituted de facto the separation between military and civilian posts that later Diocletian would fix by law and which would become characteristic of the late Roman empire.

    Their reign also marks the deepest point of the III century political crisis of the Roman empire: for the first time in history a Roman augustus was captured alive by the enemy, all the borders (Rhine, Danube and Euphrates) broke down unter enemy pressure, usurpations became commonplace and the empire fractured into three separated parts; for a decade there was no more a united Roman empire, but three distinct entities. It was also during this time that the devaluation of Roman bullion coinage hit rock bottom; by the start of Aurelian’s reign the antoninianus had a silver content under 4%. Yet it was also in this period when the first radical measures were introduced that would finally lead to a restoration of Roman power.

    In September/October 253 CE, the senator Publius Licinius Valerianus entered Rome after the death of the former emperor Aemilianus having been acclaimed augustus by the troops of the Rhine and the upper Danube; the Senate confirmed and legitimized the troops’ choice, after which he took the full name Imperator Caesar Publius Licinius Valerianus pius felix invictus augustus pontifex maximus pater patriae proconsul.

    He was not a young man: he’d been born in the 190s, and so he must’ve been between 53 and 63 years old at the moment of his rise to the purple. All the ancient sources are unanimous in underlying the nobility of his lineage. Scholars have been unable to track with certainty his lineage, but the nomen Licinius would imply his membership to the gens Licinia, an ancient clan attested since the IV century BCE which had attained senatorial rank under Augustus. He’d been married in a first marriage with Egnatia Mariniana, a member of the influential senatorial family of the Egnatii, who were based in Etruria. Egnatia Mariana died probably in 253 at the latest, and from this marriage was born a son (around 218 CE), who was named Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus, who by 253 CE was an adult man; he married a woman named Cornelia Salonina (also named in ancient sources with the Greek name Chrysogone, probably of another senatorial lineage of Greek stock based in western Anatolia, probably in Bythinia). From this marriage were born three children: the eldest Publius Licinius Cornelius Valerianus (short: Valerian Iunior), the middle one Publius Licinius Cornelius Saloninus Valerianus (short: Saloninus) and the youngest Licinius Egnatius Marinianus (short: Marinianus).

    gallienus_altes_museum.220x0-is-pid11029.jpg

    Marble bust of Gallienus as a young man, shortly after his proclamation as joint augustus with his father.
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    Bullion antoninianus of Valerian the Younger (still as caesar); on the reverse the legend PIETAS AVGG, emphasizing the attachment of the ruling augusti of the new Licinian dynasty to the traditional devotion due to the Roman gods.

    Valerian had remarried after the death of Egnatia Mariniana, and had taken as his second wife a woman named Cornelia Gallonia, with whom he had another male child, also confusingly named Publius Licinius Valerianus, who was Gallienus half brother but was kept carefully apart from power positions by both his father and brother.

    By 253 CE, Valerian had been already consul once (suffect consul, as he does not appear in the fasti consulares which listed ordinary consuls) and had behind him a long public career, both in the army and in the civil administration of the empire. Gallienus on the other hand had not yet attained his first consulship. Both he and his father seem to have been deeply cultivated individuals; the Egyptian grammar Lollianus praised their paideia, and on his maternal side Gallienus had for ancestors several noteworthy men of letters (he was probably even related to the imperial biographer and consul Marius Maximus). Gallienus in particular kept an interest in letters and philosophy for all his life, and he became the patron of the neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus in Rome.

    Antoninianus_Saloninus.jpg

    Bullion antoninianus of Saloninus as nobilissimus caesar, On the reverse, again the legend PIETAS AVGG.

    The first months of Valerian’s reign were characterized by the extreme degree of energy with which the new emperor applied himself to bring some order into the chaotic situation in the empire. And the first measure was taken very quickly: on October 22, 253 CE Gallienus was raised to the rank of co-augustus with his father. In itself this was nothing new, other III century emperors had done the same. But what was completely unusual was the degree to which Valerian led the sharing of the imperial power with his son. For starters, he conceded on Gallienus exactly the same titles he had (and for the first time in Roman history there were two pontifices maximi), the only subtle hint in imperial titulature of Valerian’s precedence was the fact that he always kept one consulship more than his son. This was completely unheard of, as until then co-augusti had usually been children or young adults kept in a position of clear subordination towards the elder augustus. But this was not the most revolutionary of his measures, because he went a step further: he divided the empire into separate geographical areas of resposibility for each augustus: Valerian would rule and defend the East, while Gallienus would take care of the West. In this unprecedented step, Valerian clearly anticipated the measures taken by Diocletian and the formation of the Tetrarchy.

    It's also significant that Valerian had Gallienus proclaimed as augustus by the Senate, and not by the army (which duly followed and gave him the acclamatio as emperor). With this step, Valerian manifested his respect for the Senate and managed to win many sympathies within its ranks. It's also important that the army apparently did not resent Valerian for taking this step, this is a clear sign that despite his senatorial aristocratic background he was respected amongst professional soldiers.

    The existence of three male heirs for Gallienus also helped to secure the position of the new augusti in power, because they immediately made clear their dynastical ambitions, with the deification of the deceased mother of Gallienus, Egnatia Mariniana. Valerian also used the support of the powerful clan of the Egnatii to further consolidate the family’s position in Rome in light of the imminent departure of both augusti to the menaced borders of the empire, and so he appointed his brother-in-law (Gallienus’uncle, the bother of his deceased first wife) L.Egnatius Victor Lollianus as Praefectus Urbis in their absence.

    The first foreign menace they dealt with was the encroachment of Berber tribes in Numidia and Mauretania; Legio III Augusta (abolished by Gordian III) was restored (perhaps the step had been taken during the last months of Trebonianus Gallus’ reign), and a series of commanders with authority over the military forces garrisoned in the three African provinces of Mauretania, Numidia and Africa Proconsularis managed to get the situation under control between 253 an 256 CE.

    As was customary, the two augusti inaugurated the new consular year of 254 CE by assuming both ordinary consulships for that year (the second one for Valerian, the first one in Gallienus’case) on January 1st. By early spring of the same year, as soon as the roads became practicable, Valerian began his long trip to the East taking with him a large army, via the great military route across the Balkans and Anatolia. His presence in Antioch is surely attested for January 18, 255 CE (according to the epigraphical remains of a dated letter sent by the emperor to the citizens of the city of Philadelphia in Lydia), so he probably entered the ruined eastern metropolis towards the very end of 254 CE.

    His army must have included vexillationes from the Rhine and upper Danube armies, which weakened dangerously the defence of these areas which until now had been relatively secure, and jeopardized especially the defence of the exposed limes between the middle Rhine and the Danube along the border of the Agri Decumates. The situation in these areas had become dangerous even before Valerian took these troops out from the border defenses: there’s archaeological evidence for violent raids and widespread destruction in Raetia during Trebonianus Gallus’ reign, probably the doing of the Alamanni, and probably Valerian had been engaged in a punitive campaign against them during Aemilianus’march against Italy. But if Valerian wanted to restore quickly the situation in the East, he had little choice: half of the eastern army had been wiped out, and the Danubian army had been weakened by Decius’defeat against the Goths and the substraction of troops from the border by Aemilianus for his march on Italy.

    grece-athenae-athene-jc-golvin.jpg

    Restitution of Roman Athens in the II century CE, by the French archeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin.

    In this sense, the march of Valerian’s army across the Balkans seems to have served to stabilize temporarily the situation in these provinces. According to German scholars Andreas Goltz and Udo Hartmann, by the start of 254 CE new “Skythian” war bands had crossed the Danube (taking advantadge of the weakening of the border defenses by Aemilianus’ rebellion) and had advanced as far south as Thessalonica, which they besieged unsuccessfully. As a consequence, a wave of panic seems to have seized mainland Greece: Athens began rebuilding and reinforcing its walls, the pass of the Thermopylae was fortified and a wall was erected across the isthmus of Corinth to protect the Peloponnese. It can’t have been much more than a temporary relief, but as Goltz and Hartmann point out, it’s noteworthy that the following year the Goths switched to sea raids and abandoned (for a while) land attacks against the Balkan provinces. Valerian’s activities also must have served to support his son’s efforts, as Gallienus’ first task was to campaign in the middle Danube against unspecified Germans and Sarmatians.

    That the two augusti undertook a massive military effort to try to stabilize and strengthen the beleaguered empire is made clear by another telling clue: the production of antoniniani intensified spectacularly under them, and their devaluation also accelerated accordingly.
     
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    21.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S RETREAT.
  • 21.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S RETREAT.

    When Valerian reached the east, he found that the armies of the Sasanian king had already left Roman territory. His first task in the East then must’ve been first to restore order and then to try to rebuild the middle Euphrates defenses which had been so thoroughly smashed by the Sasanian armies.

    As for restoring order, his first step must’ve been to dispose of Uranius Antoninus, who disappears from the historical record just around the time of Valerian’s arrival in the East. According to Hartmann and Goltz, Antioch must’ve been Valerian’s residence only for a short amount of time. After his adventure in the city, the Antiochene mint began issuing coins with the legends AETERNITATI AVGG, FORTVNA REDVX, PACATORI ORBIS and RESTITVT(or) GENER(i) HUMANI(s). But among these coins, there are no gold aurei, which is very strange for a mint where the augustus himself was present. Hartmann and Goltz propose instead that after a short stay in the city, Valerian moved his main base to Samosata on the Euphrates, whose mint began issuing coins with the same legends, but this time also including gold aurei.

    Hartmann and Goltz point out that Samosata offered several advantadges for Valerian’s main task of rebuilding the defenses of the Roman East: it lay on the Euphrates and so nearer to the border, but was not too exposed, as it was located immediately to the east of the protective screen offered by the western part of the Roman province of Mesopotamia which was still under Roman control with its two large fortified cities of Carrhae and Edessa; it was also situated relatively to the north, and so relatively safe from surprise attacks along the Euphrates as the one that the Sasanians had launched in 253 CE. This position also allowed Valerian a better access to the garrisons of Cappadocia, which had also been hit by the Sasanian offensive, thanks to the good communications offered by the Euphrates valley. Samosata also protected the main access into Cappadocia from the middle and lower Euphrates valley (via Melitene and Caesarea Mazaca), and so it could act as a blocking post in case of another major Sasanian offensive. Finally, it had been spared destruction during Šābuhr I’s invasion.

    Samosata_GE_Flooded.jpg

    The ancient city of Samosata lies today flooded under the waters of the Atatürk Dam in sountheastern Turkey.

    Quick communications to Anatolia were also important due to the Gothic threat in the Black Sea area; at this point in time first an unknown people called in Graeco-Roman sources as Borani began sea attacks across the Black Sea, which was soon followed by the Goths. Modern scholars are divided about the nature of the Borani; some consider it to be merely a designation for “northern peoples”in general (from Boreas, the north wind) while others consider them to have been a paople in their own right, probably a part of the Gothic confederacy. This was the result of yet another disastrous development for Rome in the political situation in continental Eurasia: from the I century CE, the Graeco-Scythian kingdom of Bosporus (based in Crimea) had been a Roman ally (Rome even kept a military presence in Crimea which allowed it to intervene swiftly in Bosporan politics). As a consequence of this, the naval defense of the Black Sea had been entrusted to the Bosporan fleet, and Rome kept only a small naval squadron based at Byzantium. By the 250s, the Goths and their allied peoples overwhelmed the Bosporan kingdom (it stopped minting coins) and modern scholars consider that one of the consequences of Gothic political control over the kingdom of Bosporus was that the Goths gained access to the Bosporan fleet. The Goths had no naval tradition or expertise, but the Bosporan did have it, together with a sizeable fleet, and both ships and sailors were now pressed into Gothic service, with disastrous consequences for Rome.

    Šābuhr I’s departure from Syria after his devastating invasion in 253 CE has puzzled historians ever since. Modern scholars think that occupation and conquest had not been the goal of the Sasanian king when he launched the campaign, but opinions are divided about what its main goal was:
    • A plundering campaign.
    • A preemptive strike against the Roman eastern army before the Roman emperor arrived with reinforcements from the West.
    In my own opinion, the second option seems more probable. As I wrote in previous posts, in 251 or 252 CE, Šābuhr I finally managed to conquer Armenia, and Trebonianus Gallus’ decison to give asylum to the fleeing Armenian prince Trdat in the Roman empire amounted to a declaration of war and a breach of the terms of the treaty signed in 244 CE. Given the course of previous conflicts, Šābuhr I probably knew what would be the Roman reaction: the emperor would gather reinforcements in the West and then launch an expeditio persica with the Roman massed armies (what Severus Alexander and Gordian III had done). The first stages of the war though were quite conventional, with the first campaign season (in 252 CE, according to the reconstruction of events by Udo Hartmann) the Sasanian king launched yet another attack against Roman Mesopotamia which was quite successful: the fall of Nisibis (a heavily fortified city) probably implied also the conquest of Singara (which would have been left completely isolated after it) and so the establishment of Sasnian control over the central and eastern parts of the Roman province of Mesopotamia. The usual thing to do would’ve been to launch a campaign the following year against the two great Roman fortified cities in western Mesopotamia (Carrhae and Edessa). But instead, Ŝābuhr I did something completely unexpected, that probably took the Romans by surprise. Why did Šābuhr I act in this way? Scholars propose several reasons for this:
    • Balty, Potter, Millar and Huttner point out that there are signs pointing to bedouin attacks against the Hauran area in the Roman province of Arabia just at this time. The Hauran was a rich area, and neglecting its defense would mean (apart from economic losses) a menace for Syria Phoenicia if the raiders went further west and reached the Bekaa valley, as well as for northern communications between northern Syria and Palestine and Egypt. Another serious implication of such bedouin attacks is that for unknown reasons, Palmyrene control over these tribes had slipped. This could in turn imply that the Palmyrenes would’ve been busy trying to restore their control over the tribes in the Syrian and north Arabian deserts when Šābuhr I launched its attack. That would explain also why the Sasanian army could advance without trouble upstream along the Euphrates’western shore, without fear of Palmyrene harassment. As pure speculation on my part, it could even be that these bedouin raids were not a mere coincidence, but that they had been planned and encouraged by the Sasanians. And going further on with this speculation, it could be said in this case that this was in fact the first part of a meticulously laid campaign plan by Šābuhr I.
    • The presence of Mareades in the Sasanian court would have given the Sasanian king good insider information not only about the situation in Antioch, but also about Roman defensive dispositions in the East.
    • The chaotic situation in the empire and the continued failure of Trebonianus Gallus to march to the east with reinforcements would have emboldened the Sasanian king, and would have made the idea of a preemptive strike increasingly tempting.
    As for Šābuhr I’s retreat and the lack of territorial conquests, probably the main cause was a structural one: the very nature of the Iranian state and its army. As I wrote in previous posts, the Sasanian army was a very different entity from Rome’s professional army. It was basically the assembly of the Iranian nobility under the leadership of their šāhānšāh, with the addition of the armed followers of each of the nobles and the king (who was probably seen as a primus inter pares by the wuzurgān) and the allied and vassal peoples. This military organization reflected closely the social and political fabric of the Iranian empire, and in this respect little had changed since Arsacid times, despite the continuous efforts by Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I to strengthen the crown.

    img_0060.jpg

    A group of Iranian wuzurgān ftom one of Šābuhr I’s triumphal reliefs. These were the men with whom any Iranian king had to deal carefully if he wanted to last in his post. Notice how every one of them bear a different motif or insignia on their hats; scholars think they must be some kind of “heraldic" sign, each one of them belonging to a different great family.

    This meant that in order to mount an offensive of the magnitude of the one launched in the campaign season of 253 CE, Šābuhr I would’ve needed to bargain with the Iranian nobility and gain them to his cause. The real reason for the aggressiveness and effectivity of the Sasanian empire during the reigns of its two first kings is that they were exceptionally able individuals who possessed the charisma as well as the military and political skills needed to gather the unruly Iranian nobility around their leadership. In this sense, Šābuhr I’s campaign of 253 CE was the first full scale Iranian invasion of the Roman Middle East since the early reign of Marcus Aurelius, almost a century ago, and that invasion although it had been very successful at the start, had ended in defeat.

    One thing was to gather the forces of the nobility and the subject kings for a defensive campaign (like against Severus Alexander and Gordian III), and another things was to launch an invasion that probably was seen by them as an outright aggression only for the king’s benefit , despite the fact that Šābuhr I had good reasons to launch it and that he was probably justified in describing it as a preemptive strike. But probably he had to work hard at selling that to the Iranian nobility, and despite all, the nobles probably set clear limits to their involvement: a short campaign, no lengthy sieges or actions that could cause heavy losses amongst their ranks, and no annexations (they would’ve had no intention to act as occupation forces for territories that probably would have become a royal domain, and anyway they couldn’t remain absent from their estates in Iran for long periods of time). If the king wanted annexations, he would’ve needed to garrison them himself with his own royal forces, and probably that was too much to ask from the relatively small amount of troops under Šābuhr I’s direct control.

    But apart from these issues, there’s yet another factor that could’ve played a part at least as important in the decision to retreat. There’s not a proper surviving Iranian written literary tradition until the VI century CE, but Iran enjoyed a very lively tradition of oral history through the work of the gosān, the traveling minstrels that composed many epic verse works that became a permanent fixture of Iranian culture. After the Islamic conquest of Iran, in the X-XII centuries this rich tradition was put in writing in New Persian by several authors, especially Ferdowsī, but also in lesser known works belonging to the Sistani cycle or epics, like the Garšaspnāma. These epic poems present an idealized version of the Iranian past, but based in real history. And they all show a shocking lack of concern and interest for events in the West. Alexander the Great is a relatively minor character in the Šāhnāma, and Ferdowsī devotes very little space to the Sasanian wars against Rome (as a matter of fact, to Ferdowsī, Alexander, the Seleucids and the Romans were all Rumi, inhabitants of Rum without further distinction). Even when dealing with the campaigns of Šābuhr I, Firdawsī conflates them with the campaigns of Šābuhr II against Constantius II and Julian, making an utter mess of it all. It’s true though that the traditions compiled in these works are mainly based in the traditions of eastern Iran (Sistan and Khorasan), but their utter lack of interest about the West is obvious. On the contrary, these traditions devote endless pages to the fights between Iran and Turan (the mythological term to describe the nomadic peoples of Central Asia) and show a constant fascination with India as a land of untold riches, mystery and learning (all Iranian heroes undertake in their youth a travel to India as a rite of passage before returning to Iran).

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    Alexander and the Brahman, a miniature from the great illustrated manuscript of the Šāhnāma composed for the Safavid Shah Tahmashp in the XVI Century.

    It’s also remarkable that absolutely all the great rock reliefs of Šābuhr I boasting about his victories against Rome have only been found in Pārs up to the current date, but there’s not a single one of them located outside this Iranian province. There are rock reliefs of Šābuhr I in other parts of his empire, but not a single one of them celebrates his triumphs against Rome.

    These clues seem to hint to a fact that might seem surprising to modern western readers, but it appears that the ancient Iranians of Arsacid and Sasanian Iran (at least those who mattered, the nobles who could pay the gosān to compose their stories) did not care too much about the Roman empire at all, especially in eastern Iran. And this was a real problem for Arsacid and Sasanian kings who wanted to rally their nobility against Rome, because Sistan and Khorasan (ancient Parthia) provided the best cavalry of the army (Ammianus Marcellinus was quite explicit about this). Probably, once they’d smashed the Roman army at Barbalissos and were loaded with the booty pillaged in Syria, most of the Iranian nobles in the army simply told their king that they were going back home, and that if that he wanted to stay that was his problem.

    The concentration of all of Šābuhr I’s victory reliefs in Pārs could (in my opinion) mean that by some reason victories against the Romans were deemed especially important by the Persians, but not by the inhabitants of other areas of Iran. To me, this could suggest that the Persians viewed Šābuhr I’s victories as some sort of vindication for the invasion of Alexander the Great. As I wrote earlier, in Firdawsī’s epic and in other surviving works, no difference is made between Greeks and Romans, and all are labelled as “Rumi”. For over a century, scholars have discussed if the early Sasanians really had some detailed historical memories about the Achaemenids. Strictly speaking, it’s been impossible to prove that they had any kind of historical records about them, which is not surprising given the generalized aversion amongst ancient Iranians to writing. But the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. For one, the Arsacids and Sasanians ruled over non-Iranian peoples which did keep written historical records; the most noteworthy amongst them are the Mesopotamians (Khodadad Rezakhani argued convincingly that the Arsacids assumed the ancient Achaemenid title of “king of kings” after their conquest of Babylon), Jews and Greeks (Seleucia on the Tigris remained a thriving Greek polis until its sacking by the armies of Lucius Verus). And then there’s the priestly Zoroastrian tradition preserved in the Middle Persian sacred literature, especially the Bundahišn and Denkārt, which refer specifically to the “accursed Alexander” and fulminate against him for extinguishing sacred fires, killing priests and desecrating holy places. Probably the early Sasanians had a foggy memory of the Achaemenids, but this memory would have included the fact that once the Persians had ruled a vast empire and that this empire and the ancient glory of Pārs had been destroyed by a Rumi. It’s also significant that the early Sasanians remained closely linked to the impressive ruins of Persepolis; its ruins are near enough to Istakhr that they can be seen standing on slightly high ground, and they chose the rock cliff at Naqš-e Rustām, where the Achaemenid kings had their tombs carved, to place their great triumphal rock carvings, and so they established a continuity between their rule and the ancient glories of their Persian homeland. But other regions of Iran seem to have been far less interested in such past glories.

    The Sasanian army probably retreated back towards Ērānšahr following again the same route along the Euphrates. Some graffiti in Pahlavi script found in the ruins of the palace of the Dux Ripae at Dura Europos have been dated by scholars to the winter of 253-254 CE, after which the city was reoccupied again by the Romans with Cohors XX Palmyrenorum being installed there again as garrison. The reoccupation of this important fortress in the middle Euphrates valley was probably part of Valerian’s efforts to rebuild the shattered Roman defenses along the middle Euphrates, and raises the question of which were Valerian’s plans for the restoration of the Roman eastern border defenses.

    Terentius2.jpg

    Fresco from Dura Europos dated to the first half of the III century CE, showing the commanding tribune of Cohors XX Palmyrenorum Iulius Terentius making a sacrifice to the gods.

    The Roman defensive system in the East was different from the one they put in place in their European borders. In northern Britain, as well as the Rhine and Danube, as well as in Dacia, the Romans put all their forces in the front line, with full legions occupying large fortified camps and smaller auxiliary units scattered in smaller forts and watchtowers along the whole border. This deployment was efficient to prevent small raiding war bands from slipping into the empire and pillaging the border provinces, but it implied a large scattering of Roman forces, which were thus extremely vulnerable to a concentrated attack by a massed enemy. The Roman practice of dispersing the command of forces amongst provincial governors for political reasons (wholly justified, as the events of the III century showed painfully) only helped to make things worse in this respect. To some degree, it could be said that there never was a single “Roman army” in the modern sense of the word, as there was no integrated chain of command comparable to that of modern armies. What existed were provincial armies, each one commanded by the provincial governor, who was under the direct command of the ruling augustus in Rome. This system worked relatively well in Europe for more than two centuries because Rome’s potential foes along these borders were politically divided and unable to put together significant forces.

    The problems began when these foes began to coalesce into larger political agglomerates with the potential of mobilizing thousands of warriors and so to put in the field armies large enough to wipe out Roman smaller forts and eventually even large legionary fortresses. The first warning in this sense was the large Marcomannic invasions of the 160s and 170s, but the long peaceful hiatus after Marcus Aurelius’ costly victory made the Romans confident enough in the soundness of their system until they were rudely waken up from their complacency by the Goths first in the late 230s and finally (in a most spectacular way) with the great invasion (or invasions) of the early 250s across the lower Danube.

    In Asia though the situation was different. Here the Romans bordered not a scattering of bickering, small tribal entities, but a powerful empire able to mobilize large armies and which had already managed to conquer most of the Roman Middle East between Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae and the arrival of the army of Ventidius Bassus who drove the Arsacid armies back across the Euphrates.

    Consequently the Roman approach to defense in the East was somewhat different than in the West. A completely linear defense was discarded, but they did not decide either for a “defense in depth” (this approach was not adopted until Diocletian’s reign); they opted instead for a mixed approach. Some legions were posted near the border (but rarely on the border, the only ones directly on the border were Legio IV Scythica at Zeugma and Legio XVI Flavia Firma at Sura. The remaining legions were posted further inside the empire, and the same applies for most auxiliary units. It’s also puzzling how the Romans dispensed with fortified cities; only Antioch and Jerusalem (before its sack by Titus in 70 CE) were seriously fortified; this was very convenient for reasons of internal politics (less danger of fortified cities being used as rebel bases), but exposed the Roman cities to catastrophic consequences if an Arsacid or Sasanian army managed to cross the border in strength. Fortified cities were deemed unnecessary in Europe, because “barbarian” war bands would have been rarely able to break across the border defenses, and because these small bands would have posed little danger to large cities, which could expect to be relatively safe. In the West, walls were more than anything symbolic constructions that defined the pomerium, the urban limit (like the Servian wall in Rome) and were little more than stone garden walls (they rarely exceeded a height of 4 meters), with some towers for decorative purposes and without even crenellations in many cases. But once again, things were quite different in the East.

    Here the Romans seemed unable to enact a coherent defensive system to the same degree they had done in the West. A continuous linear defense was obviously out of the question, but the Romans were unable to either put together a defense in depth or to concentrate their forces. As a matter of fact, the distribution of Roman forces in the East at the start of the reign of Septimius Severus was quite unbalanced. The long Cappadocian border was garrisoned by only two legions which were placed in widely separated locations (Satala in the north and Melitene in the south). Syria, which was the richest and most exposed province was garrisoned with three legions, two of them placed near the other directly on the Euphrates (at Sura and Zeugma) but the third one was posted again further to the south at Raphanaea. Syria Palaestina, which had no foreign borders, had a large garrison including two legions posted there permanently after Hadrian’s suppressing of the third Jewish rebellion. This was an internal security measure that could have made sense in 135 CE, but sixty years later it’s dubious that such a heavy military presence in the province was still required. Arabia, which was open to nomadic raids, had a relatively large garrison as well including again a full legion since the time of Trajan’s annexation of the province; it’s again dubious if such a large military presence was called for in the 190s.

    The logical step would have been to concentrate the troops in the north, in northern Syria and Cappadocia, and to at least try to unify command arrangements, but reasons of internal politics overruled such a possibility. Septimius Severus rearranged the eastern defenses, but he solved none of the existing problems, and in some cases he made them worse.

    By dividing Syria into two provinces (Syria Coele and Syria Phoenicia) he worsened the problem of dispersion of command, and while the annexation of northern Mesopotamia increased the defensive depth of Roman Syria, it achieved so at the expense of creating a province that was very exposed to enemy attacks and whose defense would be a nightmare (as Dio bitterly noted in his work). The new province was an open, arid expanse of steppe which had foreign borders on the north, east and south. The northern border was the most exposed, for it bordered the Tūr Abdīn mountains (Mons Izala in Antiquity); which were the first of the mountain ranges that bordered the Armenian plateau on its southern side. From these mountains, it’s easy control the movements in the whole north Mesopotamian plain and to launch undetected surprise attacks into it. Luckily for Rome, Septimius Severus’ victories had brought Armenia into the Roman sphere of influence, and the rise of Ardaxšir I to the Iranian throne brought the Arsacid kings of Armenia into a tight alliance with Rome. But once Šābuhr I conquered Armenia, Roman Mesopotamia became impossible to defend. The eastern border was less long and it bordered the Tigris river which was a major obstacle in itself if it had to be crossed in order to invade. The approach along its western bank was guarded by the legionary fortress of Singara, and from Singara to the Euphrates ran the province’s southern border, equally long as exposed although a bit less vulnerable than the other two. From Singara, the border ran on a straight east to west line along the southern slopes of the Jebel Sinjar, and when these mountains ended it followed in a southwestern direction the course of the Khabur river until it joined waters with the Euphrates at Circesium. The risk of attacks along this border was limited to bedouin raids because to the south of it there was only the arid expanse of the Mesopotamian desert, but here the Romans built a long series of small forts and watchtowers similar to what they had built in the west in order to shield the settled parts of the province from nomadic raids. The province was garrisoned by two legions, Legio I Parthica at Singara and Legio III Parthica at Nisibis, as well as numerous auxiliary units scattered all over mainly along the Khabur river and the Jebel Sinjar.

    Although these defensive arrangements had some logic, they were again utterly unsuited to the danger posed by the Iranian empires. The two legions were widely separated, with Singara being a particularly isolated and exposed location. Even Ammianus Marcellinus in the IV century CE noted so, when the defensive arrangements in the province had been much improved by Diocletian and a defense in depth had been adopted. The true defensive strength of the province lay in its three major fortified cities: Nisibis, Edessa and Carrhae. Especially Edessa boasted an impressive double circuit of walls and an a powerful citadel with commanding views over its environs. The three cities also enjoyed secure supplies of water in an arid environment, and proved able to withstand long sieges if they were properly garrisoned and commanded. Nisibis was the provincial capital, but it lay isolated in the middle of the province, far away from the border with Syria. It was less exposed than Singara, but in case of a major invasion its garrison could only be expected to hold on within the city walls and wait for reinforcements.

    Carrhae and Edessa were in a different situation. They were close enough to the Euphrates to be within easy reach of Roman reinforcements, and they were also close enough to each other so that both garrisons could support each other. These two cities, if properly defended, could act as a veritable protective shield in front of the Euphrates to delay Sasanian attacks while large enough relief armies were gathered to the west of the Euphrates.

    With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to say that the most logical defense arrangement for the Romans would have been to post the two Parthicae legions in these two cities, and garrison the rest of the province with auxiliary light forces. Instead, the two legions were posted in isolated forward positions that rendered them especially vulnerable to massed Sassanian attacks. After reconquering the province in 298 CE, Diocletian adopted a completely new approach to its defense, by filling it with new fortified towns and cities that acted as a protective ring around its capital Nisibis; and this arrangement worked admirably well in the long war between Constantius II and Šābuhr II.

    But if, after taking stock of the situation Valerian was trying to go back to the old arrangements (as the return of Cohors XX Palmyrenorum at Dura seems to suggest), then it seems as if he was not really willing to contemplate radical changes. There’s no sign though that Valerian ever managed to recover the parts of Mesopotamia which had been lost to Šābuhr I (basically, everything to the east of Carrhae and Edessa), but at least it seems that he managed to stabilize the volatile political situation in the eastern provinces and in the eastern armies, restoring somewhat of their shattered confidence. At least he managed to address the larger problem of the Roman defensive system (unity of command) by his continuous presence in the East; and that couldn’t have been achieved without the radical decision of splitting the empire into areas of responsibility with his son.

    It was also him who began relying heavily on the Palmyrene prince Septimius Odaenathus and trusting him with higher and higher responsibilities and commands. Palmyra was the only ally that Rome still had, and its help against the Sasanians was probably vital. According to Udo Hartmann, Odaenathus had been Ras of Palmyra (lord or prince, charged with defending the city) since the 240s, and had probably received the title from Gordian III. By the early 250s, Odaenathus and his close family had reached senatorial status. According to Peter the Patrician, after Šābuhr I’s devastating second campaign against the Romans and the destruction of the Palmyrene trading posts at Anatha and dura Europos, Odaenathus tried to enact a diplomatic approach to the Sasanian king, but when Šābuhr I reacted by having his gifts thrown into the Euphrates river, Odaenathus had no other option left but to throw his lot in with the Romans. Probably to ensure Odaenathus’ and Palmyra’s allegiance after this episode, Valerian awarded him with the title vir consularis; the highest social rank in the Roman empire. Odaenathus is referred as such in a 257-258 CE inscription from Tyre which also names him as governor of the province of Syria Phoenice, which would have given him command over all the Roman military forces within the province. By then, Odaenathus had become a Roman general as well as the prince of Palmyra and the leader of the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert.

    But new problems would soon start coming from unexpected quarters.
     
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    21.3. VALERIAN’S REIGN. THE APPEARANCE OF CONSOLIDATION AND THE ILLUSION OF STABILITY.
  • 21.3. VALERIAN’S REIGN. THE APPEARANCE OF CONSOLIDATION AND THE ILLUSION OF STABILITY.

    While Valerian was busy in the East trying to restore the shattered eastern defenses of Rome in the middle 250s CE, the Goths and their Borani allies began a new series of devastating sea raids against Rome’s Anatolian provinces. As I wrote in a previous post, they obtained the means to do so by their conquest of the Bosporan kingdom in the Crimea, which provided them with a large fleet manned by experienced sailors. Incredible as it could sound, Rome had no naval presence in the Black Sea (except for a very small squadron of light warships based at Byzantium), because until them it had been the navy of their vassal the Kingdom of Bosporus who had protected the Roman shores in this area. This would have disastrous consequences, because the Gothic naval raids would be able to even cross the straits of the Bosporus and Hellespont and enter the Aegean and the Mediterranean as far as the shores of Caria and Lycia. The Roman navy showed an extraordinary lack of ability to react to these raids, which can only be attributed to a conscious decision (or lack of reaction) by the ruling augusti to do nothing in this respect.

    The deployment of the Roman fleet had not changed since the time of Augustus except in some minor details. More than half of it (perhaps as much as three quarters of its seaworthy ships) were concentrated in Italy, in the two praetorian fleets at Ravenna and Misenum. These two fleets were commanded by two equestrian officers with the rank of praefecti, who were appointed directly by the emperor. Apart from these two large fleets, the Romans had smaller squadrons at Alexandria, Carthage, Byzantium, the English Channel and perhaps another based at Cyrenaica or Tripolitania (although the existence of this squadron is a matter of debate). And then there were the two river flotillas of the Rhine and Danube. This deployment was obviously designed with two main goals in mind:
    • To protect the grain fleets that carried the grain annona from Egypt and Africa into Italy.
    • To protect Italy and Rome from sea attacks and more importantly, to ensure that the central government had at any time total control over the fleet; in an empire which had an inner sea at its core this was of the utmost strategical importance, because it ensured that the government in Rome controlled the sea lanes which were the principal means of transportation of the Roman empire. We should only remember how the control over the two praetorian fleets of Ravenna and Misenum was key to the victory of the Senate against Maximinus Thrax in the civil war of 238 CE.
    But among these priorities, the protection of “peripheral” sea shores against piratical attacks did not appear anywhere (the function of the squadron at the English Channel was not to fight against Germanic piracy, but to ensure the continuity of communications between Britannia and Gaul, and if necessary to support Roman land offensives into western Germanic territory).

    According to Zosimus, in 255 CE a force of Borani landed near the city of Pityus in Colchis (in the southwestern Caucasus coastline, in present-day Georgia, then part of the Roman province of Pontus). They attacked the city, which was then successfully defended by its small garrison under the leadership of its commander Successianus. Again according to Zosimus, upon hearing of this success, Valerian recalled Successianus to Samosata and appointed him as his Praetorian Prefect; Successianus would serve loyally as Valerian’s praefectus praetorio until the end.

    But this decision by Valerian had its consequences: again according to Zosimus, the following year the Borani attacked Pityus again and this time they took the city and looted it. This defeat seems to have demoralized the Roman troops in the province of Pontus; assuming that there were many troops in the province to begin with, because usually in ”interior” provinces the Romans kept very small military forces (mostly to act in police duties). According to Zosimus, the fleet of the Borani then sailed westwards along the coast of Pontus until they reached the large city of Trebizond. Again according to Zosimus, the city was walled and had a substantial garrison, but when the Borani launched a surprise night attack against the walls the garrison panicked and fled, and the Borani captured and looted the city.

    Valerian seems to have done nothing to defend the population in Pontus, probably because Šābuhr I had launched a new wave of attacks against the Roman eastern border; in 256 CE with mixed results. The Sasanians besieged Circesium without success and besieged and took once again Dura Europos (which they razed to the ground after a dramatic siege, the town became an uninhabited ruin and its dwellers were deported into Ērānšahr, to be settled as colonists in royal lands or to be sold as slaves).

    The main attack though seems to have taken place in the traditional scenario of Roman-Sasanian conflicts in northern Mesopotamia, where according to Udo Hartmann and Andreas Goltz Valerian could have won a victory against the army of Šābuhr I; they speculate that perhaps the Sasanian king attacked once again the Roman-held cities of Carrhae and Edessa and Valerian reacted by massing his army and counterattacking with success. Their main proof for such assertion is that the following year the Roman mint of Antiochia issued coins with the legend VICTORIA PART(hica), and that local coins of Alexandria also boasted the Greek legend Nike (Victory). Obviously, this was far more important than defending some cities in northern Asia Minor and Valerian did not hesitate in abandoning their unlucky inhabitants to their fate.

    Valerian_Rest_Orient.jpg

    Antoninianus of Valerian; on the reverse, RESTITVTOR ORIENTIS.

    This victory seems to have given Valerian enough confidence that he’d finally secured the situation in the East that in the second half of 256 CE he left the East and returned to the West to meet with his son and grandsons and reinforce the image of unity of the imperial collegium (and his own position as senior augustus). Again this would not have been possible if he had not achieved some kind of success that allowed him to feel reasonably confident about leaving things secure in his absence, this reinforces Hartmann and Goltz’s hypothesis. His arrival into the West can be dated securely by an imperial rescript preserved in the Code of Justinian issued by Valerian and dated in the city of Rome on 10 October 256 CE. From Rome he then went to Gaul, where an epigraphic inscription attests to his presence in Colonia Ara Agrippinensis (Cologne) in August 257 CE.

    Colinia_Agrip.jpg

    Restitution of Colonia Ara Agrippinensis by the Freanch architect and archaeologist Jean-Claude Golvin.

    While his father was in the East, Gallienus had not had en easy time in the West. On departing to the East, Valerian had taken with him large numbers of troops from the European armies, especially from the two Germanias and Raetia, weakening critically the defenses in this area, which included one of the weakest stretches of border in the West, the limes germanicus that ran from near Bonna (modern Bonn in Lower Germany) to near Castra Regina (modern Regensburg) in Raetia. But between 254 and 256/257 CE, his attention seems to have been concentrated on the middle Danubian border; there are very few coins minted in the two Germanias and Raetia but there’s a large number of issues from the mint at Viminacium in Upper Moesia. Apparently his operations there were successful, because already in 254 CE he issued coins with the legend VICTORIA GERM(anica), followed in the following months and years by the legends VICTORIAE, GERMANICUS MAX (imus) and VICTORIA II GERM (anica). Probably the “Germans”against whom Gallienus fought were the Marcomanni, and it’s in this context that Hartmann and Goltz locate the notice given by Aurelius Victor that Gallienus allowed the defeated Marcomanni to settle in Roman soil and took as concubine one of the daughters of their king. Aurelius Victor wrote about this ceremony in an outraged way, and this is just one of the many sources that show open hostility to Gallienus, both Greek and Latin ones; although the Latin senatorial tradition was to remain implacably hostile to the memory of Gallienus until the end.

    thumb00888.jpg

    Antoninianus of Gallienus; on the reverse VICTORIA GERMANICA.

    After these successes Gallienus returned to Rome and his presence in this city is attested in September 257 CE, probably to wait for his father’s arrival. The reason for their meeting in the capital was that they wanted to celebrate a double triumph (Valerian’s successes in the East, and Gallienus’in the Danube) and take advantage of the festive and triumphal mood to further secure the future of the Licinian dynasty by raising Valerian the Younger to the rank of caesar. Still in Rome, on 1st January 257 CE, Valerian and Gallienus again took the joint consulship (Valerian’s third, Gallienus’ second) and the mint of Rome issued a series of coins with triumphalist legends like VIRTVS AVGG, VICTORIA PART (hica), VICTORIA GERMANICA, RESTITVTOR ORBIS and FELICITAS AVGG, as well as broadcasting the image of the new caesar.

    It was at this time, when the fortunes of the Licinian dynasty appeared brighter than ever, that the two augusti took a controversial decision. Scholars have discussed the issue for decades, but I tend to agree with Hartmann and Goltz that this decision was probably Valerian’s and that Gallienus mainly followed in order to preserve the image of familiar harmony and not rock the boat that they had fought so hard to keep afloat. They issued a decree that was basically a renewal of Decius’ decree on sacrifices and which although it was not specifically targeted against the Christians turned them into its main victims. According to the Acts of the Martyrs, the first effects took place in the summer of 257 CE, so the decree was probably issued at Rome in spring while the two augusti were still residing there.

    The summer of 257 CE saw also a renewal in the activities of the imperial family in the borders. Valerian the Younger was sent to the Danube (now that it had been apparently “pacified” by his father) with an encompassing command for the two Pannonias, the two Moesias and Dacia. As he was barely a teenager, his father and grandfather assigned him as a tutor (who was also probably to act as the real commander in the field) an experienced general named Ingenuus about whom practically nothing is known. Meanwhile, both augusti moved to Gaul and settled in Cologne in order to stabilize the situation in the Rhenish border where things had become critical.

    The degree of seriousness of the situation can be judged by two means: archaeological evidence and written sources. Archaeology shows that by this time the long limes germanicus, which had been under growing pressure since the time of Severus Alexander finally broke down and most of its forts and watchtowers were destroyed; the Agri Decumates were flooded by the Alamanni and the Roman military presence west and north of the Rhine and Danube practically ceased to exist. The Alamanni were by now known adversaries of the Romans, but they were joined further north by yet another new confederation of Germanic peoples (the Franci, or Franks) in what was yet another disastrous geopolitical development for Rome.

    Limes_Germ.jpg

    Map of the limes in Upper Germany and Raetia by the end of the II century CE.

    According to the IV century CE author Aurelius Victor the Franks crossed the lower Rhine in such numbers that the weakened Roman border garrisons were unable to stop them, and they raided deep and far into Gaul, even crossing the Pyrenées and reaching Hispania. The two augusti reacted by moving immediately into Gaul, where Gallienus apparently obtained some victories, and some coins were quickly issued with the legends GERMANICVS MAX(imus) V and RESTITVTOR GALLIARVM. But to which degree these were really decisive victories is another matter. Archaeological evidence confirms widespread destruction in Germania Superior and Germania Inferior, but further to the west and south the evidence is much more scattered and isolated; rather than layers of destruction what archaeology reveals for many cities in Gaul and Hispania at this time is a widespread and sudden fever for building new city walls, usually at top speed using whatever material were at hand: tombstones, and masonry from funerary monuments and even public buildings. What’s unsure is if this was a reaction to each city suffering a Frankish or Alamannic raid or simply the result of mass hysteria. Aurelius Victor wrote that Tarraco was sacked, but archaeological digs in the modern city show no signs of destruction by this time, but this did not stop nearby Barcino (modern Barcelona) from building a city wall that was totally out of proportion with the importance and size of the city: the pomerium of the town of Barcino had perhaps 1,000 inhabitants, but the wall that was built was the second tallest and strongest in the West after the Aurelian walls of Rome itself.

    But things were going to get much worse. By the spring of 258 CE Gallienus was still in Gaul and issuing again a new series of coins with the legend VICT(oria) GERMANICA which scholars are unsure if they can be taken at face value. But at this time devastating news reached him: his son Valerian the Younger (his presumptive heir) had died of natural causes in the Danube. This left the Danube under the overall command of Ingenuus without an imperial presence (always a risky situation) and Gallienus reacted by raising his second son Saloninus to the rank of caesar, although as he was still very young he did not send the boy to the Danube and instead retained him in Gaul at his side.

    While the situation in the West worsened by moments, Valerian returned to East, during the end of 257 CE or the start of 258 CE. Again, an imperial rescript preserved in the Code of Justinian attests to his presence in Antiochia in May 258 CE. Despite the worsening situation and the multiplication of foreign threats, Valerian did not abandon his religious policies, and in 258 CE (when he was probably already in the East) he issued a new edict, this time specifically targeted against Christians, who had showed themselves to be the most problematic ones with respect to the previous edict. This second edict targeted directly the hierarchies of the Christian Church (bishops, deacons and presbyters) and explicitly ordained death penalties in the case of refusal to sacrifice; Cyprian of Carthage was one amongst the many victims of this second edict. An interesting point in this edict is that it also ordered harsh punishments against Christian senators and members of the domus caesari (servants of the imperial household) which is a hint at the degree of expansion that the Christian religion had attained even at the top echelons of Roman society.

    This time the reason for Valerian’s return to the East doesn’t seem to have been just another wave of Sasanian attacks, but also the increasing scale and severity of Gothic sea raids. According to Zosimus, after seeing the rich booty obtained by their Borani allies, the Goths decided to follow their example and set to the sea in Bosporan ships but with much larger forces. Most alarmingly, the large Gothic fleet managed to cross the Bosporus and land its troops in the Bythinian coast of the sea of Marmara. This Gothic army then proceeded to systematically pillage, burn and destroy all the large and rich cities of Bythinia: Chalcedon, Nicomedia, Nicaea, Kios and Prusa while Cyzicus was spared because torrential rains had turned the Rhyndakos river into barrier that the Goths could not cross. Most alarmingly, and again according to Zosimus (following the lost account of Chrysogonos of Nicomedia) the Goths found ample help by disaffected elements of the civilian population, which eased their task of finding easy goals and weak spots in the defenses.

    Nicomedia_02.jpg

    Nicomedia_03.jpg

    Nicomedia_04.jpg

    Like Syria, Bythinia was one of the richest and more urbanized areas of the Roman empire, and it offered rich and easy pickings for the Goths. Of its many large cities, there are very few remans visible today as most of these cities have remained inhabited during the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, which has destroyed most archaeological remains. A great earthquake in 1999 cleared the way for archaeological surveys in the Çukurbağ district of İzmit (ancient Nicomedia) and they've brought to life interesting remains of Roman reliefs notable because they still preserve a sizeable part of their original polychromy. Archaeologists think on stylistical grounds that they were probably part of a monument raised in honour to the emperor Septimius Severus in the early III century CE.

    Presumably, this large Gothic raid happened when Valerian had already arrived in Antioch. Unwilling to leave the endangered border with the Sasanian empire, Valerian sent a certain officer named Felix with the order to at least secure the city of Byzantium and prevent the Gothic fleet from sailing back. But apparently this was not enough, and in 259 CE he marched in person with most of the eastern army into the north of Anatolia to stabilize the situation. But his reaction had come too late: the Goths had already left, with a rich booty and large amounts of captives, and his army accomplished nothing except becoming affected by an epidemic that was raging in this devastated region; some scholars think that it could be another recurrence of the Plague of Cyprian.

    Now that the Roman army and Valerian had departed and were distracted elsewhere (and in difficulties), Šābuhr I seized the opportunity and launched a new attack against Edessa and Carrhae in the spring of 260 CE. Upon receiving this alarming news, Valerian and his diseased army marched again rapidly south to meet this new attack.
     
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    21.4. VALERIAN’S REIGN. THE BATTLE OF EDESSA.
  • 21.4. VALERIAN’S REIGN. THE BATTLE OF EDESSA.

    The battle of Edessa, although quite better documented than the battle of Barbalissos, is yet another study in confusion and contradictions between sources. In this post I’ll follow mainly the narrative offered by the Italian scholar Omar Coloru in his short book L’imperatore prigionero: Valeriano, la Persia e la disfatta di Edessa. According to Coloru, Valerian’s army probable took winter quarters in Cappadocia when they were marching back towards Syria from Bithynia and Pontus; he puts forward this hypothesis on the basis of some traces held in ancient accounts and Christian tradition about some troubles (including perhaps an armed uprising by a rich landowner) that happeend around this time and that Coloru suggests that could’ve been caused by the presence of a large body of troops quartered in the province’s cities (the main focus of trouble seems to have been Caesarea Mazaca -the provincial capital- and Tyana).

    In the spring, Valerian’s army marched south crossing the Taurus mountains and arrived in northern Syria, where Valerian concentrated his forces on the western side of the Euphrates. The main Sasanian army was not far from there, right on the other side of the river besieging the two large fortified cities of Carrhae and Edessa (each of them located about 80 km east of the river). Coloru proposes that Valerian’s army probably concentrated around Zeugma, for it was the easiest point to cross the river in the immediate environs of the two cities under attack.

    Finally though, apparently after some hesitations (according to some of the sources, as we’ll see later) Valerian decided to cross the river and engage Šābuhr I’s army in open battle in the flat plains between Edessa and Carrhae (Coloru proposes Batnae as the exact location for the battle). The battlefield couldn’t have been less suited to the Romans and better suited to the Iranians if Šābuhr I himself had chosen it: a completely flat plain of steppe terrain with hard ground, without boulders, ravines, rivers or hills. It was the perfect terrain for cavalry, and it was in this very same place or very near it where three hundred years earlier the Arsacid general Surena had inflicted a crushing defeat on Crassus’ legions. Now, history was about to repeat himself (by the way, this spot of land was really accursed for the Romans, because again in the 290s the tetrarch Galerius suffered yet another crushing defeat against the army of the Sasanian šāhānšāh Narseh; I know of no other place with such a baneful history for Roman arms).

    bishapur_Sasanian_Cavalry.jpg

    Depiction of Sasanian cavalry at one of Šābuhr I 's triumphal rock reliefs at Bīšāpūr.

    About the battle itself, the sources offer a bedazzling array of contradictory accounts. Let’s begin with the Iranian account, according to the ŠKZ:

    In the third campaign, when we attacked Carrhae and Urhai (Edessa) and were besieging Carrhae and Edessa Valerian Caesar marched against us. He had with him a force of 70,000 from Germany, Raetia, Noricum, Dacia, Pannonia, Moesia, Istria, Spain, Africa (?), Thrace, Bithynia, Asia, Pamphylia, Isauria, Lycaonia, Galatia, Lycia, Cilicia, Cappadocia, Phrygia, Syria, Phoenicia, Judaea, Arabia, Mauritania, Germania, Rhodes (Lydia), Osrhoene and Mesopotamia.

    And beyond Carrhae and Edessa we had a great battle with Valerian Caesar. We made prisoner ourselves with our own hands Valerian Caesar and the others, chiefs of that army, the praetorian prefect, senators; we made all prisoners and deported them to Persis.

    As usual, Šābuhr I’s account is overly triumphalist (as befits a piece of royal propaganda) and emphasizes exclusively his own role in the event, even stating explicitly that he himself made Valerian prisoner “with our own hands”. Coloru dismisses the number of 70,000 men that the ŠKZ gives for Valerian’s army, but as I wrote in my post about Barbalissos, this number fits within what could have materially possible according to the Roman army in the East (for the complete reasoning, please see the aforementioned post); my only caveat is that perhaps Šābuhr I based his numbers on Roman units at full strength, which is dubious after their long trip into northern Asia Minor and back and the epidemic they’d possibly suffered there (according to Zosimus). It’s again interesting how (like in the case of Gordian III’s army) Šābuhr I gives a complete list of all the “exotic” (for an Iranian) origins of Valerian’s army. It’s clear that the contingents he originally took with him in 254 CE with him to the East from the two Germanias and Raetia were still with him, and that the army counted (like in the case of Gordian III’s army) with contingents of “barbarian” mercenaries, in this case Moors (probably as light cavalry) and Germanic warriors (notice the differentiation in the translation by N.Frye between “Germany” and “Germania”. Given that these lands are quoted in a logical geographical order (from west to east and from north to south, “Germany”refers to the Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germania while “Germania”refers most probably to Germanic peoples who lived beyond the Danube (most probably Goths).

    Bas_relief_nagsh-e-rostam_al.jpg

    Rock relief at Naqš-e Rostam depicting the triumph of Šābuhr I over two Roman emperors. Philip the Arab is beging on his knees while Šābuhr I holds Valerian prisoner grasping him by his wrists.

    Now let’s take a look at the western sources. As Coloru states, the most detailed and trustworthy source is (bizarrely enough) the XII century Byzantine chronicler John Zonaras. I think it’s interesting enough to quote the passage in its entirety, although it’s quite a long one:

    Furthermore, the Persians, when Shapur was their king, overran Syria, ravaged Cappadocia, and besieged Edessa. Valerian hesitated to engage with the enemy. But, learning that the soldiers in Edessa were making vigorous sorties against the barbarians, killing many of them and capturing vast quantities of booty, he gained new courage. He went forth with the forces at his disposal and engaged with the Persians. But they, being many times more numerous, surrounded the Romans; the greater number (of the Romans) fell, but some fled, and Valerian and his retinue were seized by the enemy and led away to Shapur. Now that he was master of the emperor, Shapur thought that he was in control of everything; and, cruel as he was before, he became much worse afterwards. Such was the manner in which Valerian was taken prisoner by the Persians, as recorded by some authors. But there are those who say that Valerian willingly went to the Persians because during his stay in Edessa his soldiers were beset by hunger. They then became seditious and sought to destroy their emperor. And he, in fear of the soldiers' insurrection, fled to Shapur so that he might not be killed by his own people. He surrendered (not only) himself to his enemy but, as far as it was in his power, the Roman army. The soldiers were not destroyed but learnt of his betrayal and fled, and (only) a few were lost. Whether the emperor was captured in war by the Persians or whether he willingly entrusted himself to them, he was treated dishonourably by Shapur. The Persians attacked the cities in complete freedom from fear, and took Antioch on the Orontes and Tarsus, the most notable of the cities in Cilicia, and Caesarea in Cappadocia. As they led away the multitude of prisoners they did not give them more than the minimum amount of food needed to sustain life, nor did they allow them a sufficient supply of water, but once a day their guards drove them to water like cattle. Caesarea had a large population (for four hundred thousand men are said to dwell in it) and they did not capture it, since the inhabitants nobly resisted the enemy and were commanded by a certain brave and intelligent Demosthenes, until a certain doctor was taken prisoner. He was unable to bear the torture inflicted upon him and revealed a certain site from which during the night the Persians made their entrance and destroyed everyone. But their general Demosthenes, although encircled by many Persians who were under orders to take him alive, mounted his horse and raised aloft an unsheathed sword. He forced his way into the midst of the enemy; and, striking down very many, he escaped successfully from the city.

    As Zonaras wrote at a point much removed in time from the events and clearly had access to several sources, he chose to list two of these traditions in his own account of events. First Zonaras writes that the Sasanian army initially attacked and besieged Carrhae and Edessa, while Valerian hesitated on the western bank of the Euphrates. What according to Zosimus’ account convinced him to cross the river and attack the army of Šābuhr I was the news that the besieged garrison at Edessa was conducting a vigorous defense and was inflicting many losses on their foes through sorties. This made Valerian confident enough that the Sasanian forces had been weakened in morale and/or numbers and he engaged them in battle. According to Zosimus’ text this was a major blunder, for Šābuhr I’s army was much larger than his own and proceeded to surround and defeat the Romans, taking many of them as prisoners, including Valerian. Then Zosimus presents the other tradition as if it was a different one, although it’s just really a variant of the previous one: while Valerian “was in Edessa” his soldiers were beset by hunger and mutinous, and so Valerian went willingly to Šābuhr I in order to save his own hide. The obvious question to this second tradition is how did Valerian become trapped in Edessa with his army. This could very well have been a result of his defeat on a field battle against the Sasanian army, which forced him and the survivors of his army to take refuge in the besieged city. Quite probably, the city had not enough foodstuffs stored for such a large force and hunger made its appearance, with the soldiers blaming Valerian (rightly or not) for their current predicament.

    Amongst the remaining western sources, the Epitome de Caesaribus, Eutropius, Festus, Orosius, Agathias and Evagrius Scholasticus all agree in general lines with the account of the ŠKZ, without adding further details. Evagrius account is particularly valuable, because he employed III century CE sources now lost to us, like Dexippus of Athens and Nikostratos of Trebizond.

    The Historia Augusta and Aurelius Victor both state that Valerian was captured by Šābuhr I by means of treachery. According to Aurelius Victor:

    For when his father (i.e. Valerian) was conducting an indecisive and long war in Mesopotamia, he was ambushed by a trick of the king of the Persians called Shapur and was ignominiously hacked to death in the sixth year of his reign while still vigorous for his old age.

    And according to the SHA (beware, it’s a long quote and full of all the usual sorts of fabricated letters and quotes that the SHA were so fond of):

    ... to Shapur, Velsolus, king of kings, `Did I but know for a certainty that the Romans could be wholly defeated, I should congratulate you on the victory of which you boast. But inasmuch as that nation, either through Fate or its own prowess, is all-powerful, look to it lest the fact that you have taken prisoner an aged emperor, and that indeed by guile, may turn out ill for yourself and your descendants. Consider what mighty nations the Romans have made their subjects instead of their enemies after they had often suffered defeat at their hands. We have heard, in fact, how the Gauls conquered them and burned that great city of theirs; it is a fact that the Gauls are now servants to the Romans. What of the Africans? Did they not conquer the Romans? It is a fact that they serve them now. Examples more remote and perhaps less important I will not cite. Mithridates of Pontus held all of Asia; it is a fact that he was vanquished and Asia now belongs to the Romans. If you ask my advice, make use of the opportunity for peace and give back Valerian to his people. I do indeed congratulate you on your good fortune, but only if you know how to use it aright.'

    Velenus, king of the Cadusii, wrote as follows: `I have received with gratitude my forces returned to me safe and sound. Yet I cannot wholly congratulate you that Valerian, prince of princes, is captured; I should congratulate you more, were he given back to his people. For the Romans are never more dangerous than when they are defeated. Act, therefore, as becomes a prudent man, and do not let Fortune, which has tricked many, kindle your pride. Valerian has an emperor for a son and a Caesar for a grandson, and what of the whole Roman world, which, to a man, will rise up against you? Give back Valerian, therefore, and make peace with the Romans, a peace which will benefit us as well, because of the tribes of Pontus.' Artavasdes, king of the Armenians, sent the following letter to Shapur: `I have, indeed, a share in your glory, but I fear that you have not so much conquered as sown the seeds of war. For Valerian is being sought back by his son, his grandson, and the generals of Rome, by all Gaul, all Africa, all Spain, all Italy, and by all the nations of Illyricum, the East, and Pontus, which are leagued with the Romans or subject to them. So, then, you have captured one old man but have made all the nations of the world your bitterest foes, and ours too, perhaps, for we have sent you aid; we are your neighbours, and we always suffer when you fight with each other.' The Bactrians, the Hiberians, the Albanians, and the Tauroscythians refused to receive Shapur's letters and wrote to the Roman commanders, promising aid for the liberation of Valerian from his captivity.

    The treachery and deviousness of easterners (of which the “Persians” were the quintessential example) was a topoi of Greek and Roman writers since the V century CE, and so it’s abundantly employed in these western sources. As it couldn’t be otherwise, Zosimus also jumped in this bandwagon, and offers a similar account with some minor variations:

    Valerian had by this time heard of the disturbances in Bithynia, but he dared not to confide the defence of it to any of his generals through distrust. He therefore sent Felix to Byzantium, and went in person from Antioch into Cappadocia, and he returned after he had done some injury to every city through which he passed. But the plague then attacked his troops, and destroyed most of them, at the time when Shapur made an attempt upon the east, and reduced most of it into subjection. In the meantime, Valerian became so weak that he despaired of ever recovering from the present sad state of affairs, and tried to conclude the war by a gift of money. Shapur, however, sent back empty-handed the envoys who were sent to him with that proposal, and demanded that the emperor come and speak with him in person concerning the affairs he wished to negotiate. Valerian most imprudently consented, and, going incautiously to Shapur with a small retinue to discuss the peace terms, was presently seized by the enemy, and so ended his days in the capacity of a slave among the Persians, to the disgrace of the Roman name in all future times.

    The important detail that appears in Zosimus’ account is that apparently Valerian’s army was afflicted by an epidemic. The surviving fragments of the lost work of the VI century CE Eastern Roman author Peter the Patrician also corroborate this version:

    Valerian, wary of the Persian attack when his army, particularly the Moors, was afflicted with the plague, amassed an immense amount of gold and sent ambassadors to Shapur, in the hope of bringing an end to the war through lavish gifts. Shapur heard about the plague and was greatly elated by Valerian's request. He kept the ambassadors waiting, then dismissed them without success in their mission and immediately set out in pursuit.

    Peter the Patrician adds an important bit of information, that the Moorish light cavalry had been badly hit by the plague; we know by the ŠKZ that Valerian’s army did include forces from North Africa, which were probably numeri of Berber light cavalry.

    Finally, there’s another group of western accounts that add an important twist to the story. They are all quite short, the longest one belonging to the IX century CE Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus:

    During their (i.e. Valerian and Gallienus) reign, Shapur, the king of the Persians, laid waste to Syria and captured Antioch and also ravaged Cappadocia. The Roman army was afflicted by famine in Edessa and as a result was in a mutinous mood. Valerian, thoroughly scared and pretending that he was going into another battle, surrendered himself to Shapur, the king of the Persians, and agreed to betray the main body of his forces. When the Romans got wind of this, they escaped with difficulty and some of them were killed. Shapur pursued them and captured the great Antioch, Tarsus in Cilicia and Caesarea in Cappadocia.

    The important detail in Syncellus’ account is that there were not one, but two battles. The first one in which the Romans were defeated and ended up being besieged in Edessa. And that after Valerian’s “betrayal”, the rest of his army fought a second battle to try to escape the Sasanian encirclement, which was a partial success. The accounts of Eutropius and Tabarī also corroborate that the battle and Valerian’s capture happened at different moments in time.

    Sapore_Gordiano_e_Filippo_-_rilievo_a_Bishapur_01.jpg

    Another triumphal rock relief of Šābuhr I, this time at Bīšāpūr, depicting his triumph over three Roman emperors. Gordian III is shown dead under the hooves of the king's horse, while Philip the Arab is begging on his knees and Valerian is held prisoner by his wrists.

    After taking into account all this mess of conflicting accounts, Coloru offers the following reconstruction of events, which I find quite reasonable: after an initial hesitation, upon hearing about the vigorous defense of Edessa by its Roman garrison, Valerian decided to cross the Euphrates to attack the besiegers. Both armies met probably near Batnae between Carrhae, Edessa and Euphrates. There, the Roman army suffered an enveloping maneuver by the army of Šābuhr I and was defeated, but it somehow managed to retreat into Edessa and take refuge behind its formidable fortifications; Valerian went along with the army. The went on for an indeterminate amount of time, with conditions growing increasingly dire for the besieged Romans. Edessa had enough foodstuffs to sustain a siege only for its normal garrison plus its usual inhabitants, but not for the extra mouths provided by Valerian’s defeated army. In addition, given the unsanitary conditions of a besieged city in the heat of the Mesopotamian summer crammed with so many men and beasts, an epidemic broke out which would have hit specially hard the light Moorish cavalry, which was a key element of Valerian’s army if he wanted to defeat the powerful Sasanian cavalry. As a result of this situation the trapped Roman troops began to adopt a mutinous attitude, and Valerian felt that his only way out of the mass was to try to negotiate a peace with the Sasanian king.

    Coloru notes how this situation has several parallels in the previous history of conflicts between the Romans and the Iranian empires: after his defeat at Carrhae Crassus was also forced to negotiate with Surena by his own soldiers who threatened his life if he refused to do so, and it’s quite possible that the death of Gordian III happened in similar circumstances after his defeat at Misikhe.

    But knowing full well that the situation of the besieged Romans was becoming desperate, Šābuhr I refused to talk with Valerian’s embassy and demanded that the augustus himself came to ask for peace in person. Valerian had no other options left, and went to meet Šābuhr I, and during this meeting, in unknown circumstances Valerian and his entire entourage were taken prisoners by Šābuhr I.

    In broad lines, this reconstruction agrees both with the ŠKZ and with most Graeco-Roman sources. For the “Mazda-worshipping lord” Šābuhr I, writing a blatant lie in his great triumphal inscription would have been a delicate matter, but omissions and half-truths would’ve been another matter altogether, so probably, like with the account of his victory over Gordian III and Mishike sixteen years earlier, the šāhānšāh embellished things a bit without resorting to open lies. There was most probably a “great field battle” between his army and the Romans, in which Šābuhr I was victorious. And in according to Coloru’s reconstruction, the Sasanian king did take Valerian prisoner “with his own hand”, but the ŠKZ does to make explicit the exact circumstances in which this capture took place (it would have looked a bit bad for PR reasons, and so the text implies that Šābuhr I did the capture on his own heroically in the midst of the battle). And anyway, Šābuhr I probably reasoned that after all it was his victory in battle which had forced Valerian to come to ask him for peace terms, so what he was telling was “basically” the truth (again, a delicate matter for a Zoroastrian king).

    On the other side, most western authors did focus their accounts exclusively on the “treachery”of the “perfidious” easterners, trying to sidestep the fact that the Roman army had been beaten yet again by Šābuhr I in open battle. It’s important to notice how this refusal to accept reality and call things by their name is again the same attitude that can be found in the (scarce) western accounts of Gordian III’s campaign and Barbalissos.

    Cameo_Shapur_Valerian.jpg

    Cameo of Roman-Iranian facture preserved at the Cabinet des Medailles in Paris, depicting Valerian being captured in battle by Šābuhr I, "with his own hand". Notice how Šābuhr I doesn't even need to unsheath his sword to capture the hapless Roman emperor.

    The blow and impact of Valerian’s capture was enormous, and without precedents in Roman history. Neither Abrittus nor Barbalissos can compare; this was the first (and only) time in history that a Roman augustus was captured alive and paraded around like a living trophy by a foreign enemy (well, there’s also the case of Romanos IV Diogenes after Manzikert) and the impact of this news fell like a thunderclap all across the roman empire (and probably its neighbors as well). The only other event in ancient Roman history that can be compared to Valerian’s capture in its wholesale impact was the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410 CE; not even the Roman defeat at Adrianople came close.

    It also marked the absolute nadir of Roman fortunes in the III century, and the beginning of the darkest decade of the long III century “crisis”, that saw the separation of two large parts of the empire (the Gallic empire and the Palmyrene empire) and the almost definitive disintegration of Rome as a political entity. A reign that had begun with such high hopes and that for a short moment had looked like it had succeeded in stabilizing the empire and containing the foreign threats ended in absolute disaster and utter humiliation.

    Valerian’s capture at Edessa was a political catastrophe, but ironically from a purely military point of view, it was probably a lesser defeat than Barbalissos seven years earlier. Even the ŠKZ implies it, because this time it did not use to expression “annihilate” to refer to this battle, and used just the word “defeat”. Part of the Roman army of the East survived, as did some of Valerian’s high officials, and unlike in 253 CE, this time in his following invasion of the Roman eastern provinces the Sasanian king did encounter organized resistance by Roman military units.

    But nevertheless, Šābuhr I’s victory was again mind-blowing. Along with Valerian, the ŠKZ states that the Sasanian king captured the praetorian prefect as well as “chiefs of the army” and “senators”. The praetorian prefect was probably Successianus, but about the rest of military commanders and senators scholars have no clue about their identities.

    Valerian’s memory was tarnished forever for the dishonor he brought upon Rome by allowing himself to be captured alive, and most Graeco-Roman historical records fulminate against him for this reason, although there are some exceptions like Zosimus. And the reason why Zosimus did not criticize him too badly was the very same one why another (much larger) part of ancient chroniclers redoubled their criticism against Valerian: he had been a persecutor of Christians. Already in the early IV century CE, the Christian writer Lactantius wrote with glee about Valerian’s dishonor and his humiliating captivity in his work De mortibus persecutorum:

    Not long afterwards, Valerian also in a state of frenzy lifted his impious hands to assault God, and, even though his time was short, shed much righteous blood. But God punished him in a new and extraordinary manner, that it might be a lesson to future ages that the adversaries of Heaven always receive the just recompense of their iniquities. He was made prisoner by the Persians and lost not only that power which he had exercised without moderation, but also the liberty of which he had deprived others. He squandered the remainder of his days in the abject form of slavery: for whenever Shapur, the king of the Persians, who had made him prisoner, chose to get into the carriage or to mount on horseback, he commanded the Roman to stoop and present his back; then, placing his foot on the shoulders of Valerian, he said, with a smile of reproach, `This is true, and not what the Romans depicted on their tablets and walls.' Valerian lived for a considerable time under the well-merited insults of his conqueror; so that the Roman name remained long the scoff and derision of the barbarians: and this also was added to the severity of his punishment, that although he had an emperor for his son, he found no one to avenge his captivity and most abject and servile state; neither indeed was he ever demanded back. Afterward, when he had finished this shameful life under so great dishonour, he was flayed, and his skin, stripped from the flesh, was dyed with vermilion, and placed in the temple of the gods of the barbarians, that the remembrance of a triumph so signal might be perpetuated, and that this spectacle might always be exhibited to our ambassadors, as an admonition to the Romans, that, beholding the spoils of their captive emperor in a Persian temple, they should not place too great confidence in their own strength.

    The V century CE Christian writer Orosius wrote about Valerian’s captivity in similar terms in his Adversus paganos:

    For Valerian, as soon as he had seized the power, ordered the Christians to be forced by tortures into idolatry, the eighth emperor after Nero to do so. When they refused, he ordered them to be killed, and the blood of the saints was shed throughout the length and breadth of the Roman Empire. Valerian, the author of the abominable edict, the emperor of the Roman people, being immediately captured by Shapur, the king of the Persians, grew old among the Persians in the most humiliating slavery, for he was condemned to this menial service for as long as he lived, namely always by bending on the ground to raise the king as he was about to mount his horse, not by his hand but by his back.

    And the VI century CE East Roman author Agathias also implied that Valerian suffered terrible humiliations at the hands of Šābuhr I:

    Shapur was very wicked and bloodthirsty, quick to anger and cruelty and slow to mercy and forgiveness. Whether he had made use of this terrible punishment against others previously, I cannot be sure. But that he punished Valerian, the Roman emperor, in this way after taking him alive when he had made war on him and been defeated, many accounts testify. Indeed, the first rulers of Persia after the defeat of the Parthians, Artaxares and Shapur, were both wicked and abominable men, if indeed the one killed his own overlord and set up by force a usurper's rule, while the other initiated such a dreadful punishment and terrible defilement.

    Lactantius’ writing has caused rivers of ink to flow for the past two centuries amongst scholars. Some scholars think it’s merely Christian propaganda, while others see grounds for believing there’s some truth in it. What happened to Valerian after his capture? The ŠKZ is explicit: Valerian, his commanders, high officials and soldiers were all deported to Pārs, the homeland of the Sasanian dynasty. And both eastern accounts and archaeological evidence support this.

    The X century CE Chronicle of Seert (an Arabic chronicle using older materials written in Aramaic dating from Sasanian times) written in Iraq (and so within the old lands of the Sasanian empire) state that the deportees were mainly settled in royal estates in Asōrestān and Xūzestān (contradicting the ŠKZ), but this tradition is also supported by Tabarī, according to whom Valerian and the rest of prisoners were settled in one of the new cities founded by Šābuhr I, Wēh-Andiyok-Šābuhr (literally, “the better Antioch of Šābuhr”), which in a short time became corrupted into Gondēšāpur. Tabarī also adds that Šābuhr I ordered Valerian to organize the construction of an irrigation dam in the environs of Šūštar, which is know still today as “Caesar’s dam” by the local population (Band-e Qayṣar, on the Kārūn river). The technical skills of Roman soldiers and engineers were much appreciated by successive Sasanian kings and is possible they always settled them in undeveloped royal estates to take advantage of said skills.

    On another side, it’s also possible that according to the ŠKZ Valerian spent his captivity in Pārs; in this case the most likely place is the city founded by Šābuhr I as his capital city in his homeland (he did not use Ardaxšir-Xwarrah as his royal residence), the city of Wēh-Šābuhr (“Lord Šābuhr” in Middle Persian, which has become Bīšāpūr in New Persian). Here, Šābuhr I built a large complex with a palace and a temple to the goddess Anāhīd which shows clear signs of Roman influence.

    Sushtar_Bridge.jpg

    Remains of the dam's bridge known as Band-e Qayṣar (Caesar's dam) at Šūštar in Khuzestan.

    About the question of the treatment of Valerian during his captivity and after, I tend to agree with Coloru that there are enough grounds to believe that Lactantius’ account is not a mere fabrication born out of sectarian hatred. For starters, Firdawsī’s Šāh-nāmah states that king Šābuhr menaced Valerian with skinning him if he disobeyed his orders; afterwards he had his ears and nose cut and then he threw him into prison in chains. The story about Valerian’s mutilation is also found in Tabarī. In Achaemenid and Sasanian tradition, a man with deformities or a mutilated body could not be king (and the same was ready among the Romans, at least in Byzantine times, the story of Justinian II “Rhinotmetos” is conclusive enough). So, although it’s impossible to proof it one way or another, the story could have a firm basis in historical realities. The Epitome de Caesaribus adds the quite mysterious remark that after his capture Valerian was referred to as colobius. Linguistic research has come to the conclusion that this Latin words could be a direct transliteration of the Greek adjective kolobós, meaning “mutilated”.

    A similar thing happens with his alleged function as a footstool for Šābuhr I when the king wanted to mount his horse. The Seleucid king Demetrios II was exhibited in chains across the Arsacid empire after his defeat by Mihrdād II the Great in 138 BCE, and in 293 CE the Sasanian king Narseh inflicted a similar punishment against the nobleman Wahnam (he was exhibited across the empire chained and mounted on a donkey). It’s possible that Valerian suffered a similar fate and that Lactantius twisted it a bit to give it a Biblical flavor, as stated by Psalm 110,1:

    The Lord said unto my lord,
    Sit thou at my right hand,
    until I make thine enemies thy footstool.

    As for the skinning, it’s also probably true or at least with a strong basis in historical realities. A 2012 study by Robert Bolliger and Josef Wiesehöfer has brought into relief the continuity of skinning as a punishment among several near eastern and iranian dynasties across ancient times. It was a common punishment in Achaemenid times for very serious crimes (usurpation, rebellion, etc.), and in his Bīsotūn inscription Darius I stated that this was the punishment inflicted on the rebel Fravartiš (after being impaled) who had tried to become king of Media. This gruesome practice is first attested among the Assyrians, and most specifically under Sargon II, who executed a vassal king who had rebelled and then had the corpse skinned and the skin tanned in red color (the very same punishment described by Lactantius). In Sasanian times, the same fate was met by the prophet Mani under Bahrām I, by the Christian martyrs Barshebya and Simeon under Šābuhr II and by the army general Naxwaragān under Xusrō I (this time without the previous nicety of an execution, according to Agathias). Also, at least in the cases of Sargon II and Darius I, the skins of their defeated enemies were specially treated so that they would be preserved for a long time as a memory of what happened to rebels and usurpers.
     
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    22. THE AFTERMATH OF EDESSA. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND ONSLAUGHT AGAINST THE ROMAN EAST.
  • 22. THE AFTERMATH OF EDESSA. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND ONSLAUGHT AGAINST THE ROMAN EAST.

    The immediate aftermath of the battle of Edessa had two immediate consequences. The first one was that the victorious Sasanian army again crossed the Euphrates and pillaged the Roman eastern provinces to a much larger extent than it had done after Barbalissos. The second and for the Romans far more serious consequence was that it caused a political crisis in the Roman empire that almost led to its dissolution.

    We’ll deal first with the immediate consequences for the Roman eastern provinces and after that we’ll deal with the effects for the Roman empire at large. As usual, I’ll start with the version of the facts as stated in the ŠKZ:

    And Syria and Cilicia and Cappadocia were burned with fire, ruined and plundered.

    This time we seized from the Roman Empire: The town of Alexandria on the Issus (modern Alexandretta) with surroundings; the town of Samosata with surroundings, the town of Katabolos with surroundings; the town of Aegaea with surroundings; the town of Mopsuestia with surroundings; the town of Mallos with surroundings; the town of Adana with surroundings; the town of Tarsus with surroundings; the town of Augusta (Augustopolis) with surroundings; the town of ... with surroundings; the town of Zephyrion (modern Mersin) with surroundings; the town of Sebaste with surroundings; the town of Korykos (modern Kız Kalesi) with surroundings; the town of Anazarbus with surroundings; the town of Castabala with surroundings; the town of Neronias with surroundings; the town of Flavias with surroundings; the town of Nikopolis with surroundings; the town of Epiphania with surroundings; the town of Kelenderis (modern Aydıncık) with surroundings; the town of Anemurion with surroundings; the town of Selinus with surroundings; the town of Miyonpolis with surroundings; the town of Antioch with surroundings; the town of Seleucia (probably Seleucia in Pieria) with surroundings; the town of Dometiopolis with surroundings; the town of Tyana with surroundings; the town of Caesarea (Caesarea Mazaca, modern Kayseri) with surroundings; the town of Comana (modern Şar) with surroundings; the town of Kybistra with surroundings; the town of Sebasteia (modern Sivas) with surroundings; the town of Birtha with surroundings; the town of Rhakundia with surroundings; the town of Laranda (modern Karaman) with surroundings; the town of Iconium (modern Konya) with surroundings: altogether thirty-six towns with their surroundings.

    And people who are of the Roman Empire, non-Aryans, captive we deported. In Ērānšahr in Pārs, Parthia, Xūzestān, Āsūrestān, and in any other land where our own and our fathers’ and our grandfathers’ and our ancestors’ estates were, there we settled them.

    Again, a truly hair-rising list, and in this case with full corroboration by Graeco-Roman sources, much more than in the case of the aftermath of Barbalissos. This time, Syria Coele escaped relatively unscathed compared to seven years earlier (although Antioch was looted and burned a second time), but the main brunt of the Sasanian offensive was directed this time further north, against the Roman provinces in Asia Minor. Cappadocia and especially Cilicia were the main victims, but the Sasanian offensive reached further east, well into Lykaonia and even into Lycia and Pamphylia, the westernmost city in that list is Korykos on the southern Anatolian coast, which is located nearer to the Aegean sea than to Syria.

    Bishapur_I.jpg

    Detail from one of the triumphal rock reliefs of Šābuhr I at Bīšāpūr; looking at the figure standing on the left you can appreciate the long broadsword that was typical of early Sasanian cavalrymen. This was a heavy and contundent weapon, ideal for cavalry use. In the VI century CE it was abandoned in favor of lighter saber-like swords under Central Asian Turkic influence.

    In order to bring about so much devastation, the armies of Šābuhr I must’ve had to be divided into several columns in order to cover as much ground as possible. But contrary to what had happened in 253 CE, this time the Romans had reserves relatively untouched by the defeat at Edessa and leaders who were disposed to rally them and fight back, and the Sasanian forces ended up suffering several minor setbacks during their looting spree which eventually forced the šāhānšāh to regroup his armies, cut his losses and return to his homeland. It’s also important to note that according to at least one ancient source Šābuhr I did not manage to take Edessa, and so he had to cope all the time (especially during his retreat) with the actions of the important Roman garrison stationed there.

    The crossing of the Euphrates possibly happened at Zeugma, which was just 80 km west of Edessa and Carrhae and 40 km west of Batnae, which according to Coloru could’ve been the probable location of the battle. This time, the cities and towns destroyed by the armies of Šābuhr I are quoted in geographical order from east to west and from south to north, and so it’s more difficult to reconstruct the advance of the several Sasanian columns. But possibly, at Zeugma the army split in two, with one group heading north and looting Samosata while the other (probably under the command of the king of kings himself) again headed towards Antioch. According to Andreas Golz and Udo Hartmann, probably Mareades accompanied him again as he’d done in 253 CE. This time, the trick of having Mareades’ supporters open the doors from inside the city would not have worked (it’s hard to imagine the Antiochenes being very enthusiastic about repeating the experience of seven years earlier) and Šābuhr I would’ve been aware of that, so that if the city had to be besieged, the most logical thing would’ve been to take first at least its port of Seleucia in Pieria, and perhaps Alexandria ad Issum as well. According to several bits and snips of local Antiochene tradition which have arrived to us through the works of Libanius, Ammianus Marcellinus, John Malalas and Evagrius, this time the Sasanian forces stormed the city by surprise, thanks to the (for the Antiochenes) unfortunate fact that their walls were so absurdly long. According to a vividly written fragment by the IV century CE Antiochene author Ammianus Marcellinus, the Sasanian soldiers appeared suddenly descending from the steep slopes of the Silpius Mons while a good part of the population of Antioch was in the theater watching a play. The theater was built with its cavea excavated on the slopes of the mountain, and it was one of the actors on stage who first saw the approaching Sasanian soldiers (who presumably had infiltrated through some unguarded sector of the wall in the higher part of the mountain) and alerted the public, who began to flee as Sasanian arrows began to rain over them. This is the fragment of Ammianus’ Res Gestae where this story can be found:

    For it happened one day at Antioch, when the city was in perfect tranquillity, a comic actor being on the stage with his wife, acting some common scene from daily life, while the people were delighted with his acting, his wife suddenly exclaimed: `Am I dreaming or are the Persians here?' The audience immediately turned round and then fled in every direction while trying to avoid the missiles which were showered upon them. The city was burnt and a number of her citizens killed, who, as is usual in time of peace, were strolling about carelessly, and all the places in the neighborhood were burnt and laid waste. The enemy, loaded down with plunder, returned without loss to their own country after having burnt Mareades who had wickedly guided the Persians to the destruction of his fellow citizens. This event took place in the time of Gallienus.

    Possibly this very column then continued along the coast to the northwest and entered the fertile and populous Cilician plain, where they proceeded to loot and burn all its great cities: Tarsus, Anazarbus, Mopsuestia, Neronias, Dometiopolis ... and then continued further east, one along the coast which kept advancing until it reached the city of Korykos in Pamphylia (the westernmost location quoted in the ŠKZ), while another probably headed north into Lykaonia and looted the important city of Iconium. As for the column that raided Samosata, either it rejoined the main army or it continued north and entered Cappadocia. Here it could have joined forces with the column that attacked Iconium, and these forces managed to take and destroy the provincial capital of Caesarea Mazaca and the important city of Tyana.

    Caesarea_01.jpg

    The ancient Roman city of Caesarea Mazaca lies under the modern Turkish city of Kayseri; which is still today like in ancient times dominated by the imposing mass of the volcanic Mount Erciyes (Mons Argaeus in Antiquity).

    Via_Sebaste_03.jpg

    The Via Sebaste was built during Augustus' reign and runs along southern Anatolia from Lycia to Cilicia, and it would have been one of the main routes followed by the invading Sasanian forces.

    While the armies of Šābuhr I were engaged in this orgy of destruction, the remaining Roman defenders were rallying their forces for a counterattack against the increasingly dispersed Sasanian columns. That not all the main officers of Valerian’s high command were captured at the disaster of Edessa is made clear by ancient sources. According to a fragment by the anonymous continuator of Dio Cassius (that some scholars identify with Peter the Patrician), on the western bank of the Euphrates had remained a certain Fulvius Macrianus, who was probably either the rationalis of Valerian (secretary in charge of financial affairs) or the praefectus anonnae in charge of supplies for the eastern army, or both. According to this fragment, Šābuhr I allowed Valerian to send an envoy to Macrianus to ask for ransom, but Macrianus refused to help:

    Macrinus (sic) then was Count of the (Sacred) Largesse and (Prefect) of the annona (i.e. in charge of supplies) and because he was disabled in one foot, he took no part in the battle but was expecting the troops at Samosata and received them. Shapur then sent Cledonius, who was the ab admissionibus (i.e. the person who introduced the judges to the emperor) of Valerian, to urge him (i.e. Macrianus) to come to his emperor. However, he declined to go, saying: `Is anyone so insane that he would willingly become a slave and prisoner of war instead of being a free man? Furthermore, those who are ordering me to go from here are not my masters since one of them is an enemy and the other who is not master of himself (i.e. a prisoner) can in no way be our master.' He also urged Cledonius to remain and not to return. However, he said that he would not betray the trust of one who was his sovereign. On his return he was incarcerated with the prisoners of war.

    Macrianus appears also in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History at the start of Valerian’s persecution as Prefect of Egypt (equestrian governor), and as a staunch supporter of Valerian’s religious policies. Probably due to this and to his administrative experience as governor of Egypt Valerian put him in charge of the key office of ensuring the supplying and payment of his armies. Macrianus was thus a civilian official, not a military commander, but he controlled the military purse, which in the power void that followed Valerian’s capture turned him into a very powerful figure. He was probably acknowledged as commander by the remaining Roman military commanders in northern Syria and Asia Minor, especially by Callistus, who managed to rally the Roman defenders in Anatolia and obtained some victories against the scattered Sasanian forces there (in some sources this commander is called Ballista, which some scholars consider that could have been his nickname among the soldiers, with Callistus being his real name). And the consequences were the usual ones: the Roman forces in this theater acclaimed Macrianus’ two sons (Titus Fulvius Iunius Macrianus, aka Macrianus the Younger, and Titus Fulvius Junius Quietus) as augusti. According to the ancient sources, Macrianus himself could not fill the post of augustus because he had a deformed leg.

    Macrianus_01.jpg

    Aureus of Titus Fulvius Iunius Macrianus (Macrianus the Younger). On the reverse, VICTORIA AVGG.

    This unexpected resistance came as an unwelcome surprise to Šābuhr I. It’s been usually considered by scholars that this second invasion of the Roman empire by the Sasanian king was just a looting raid like the first one butt Andreas Golz and Udo Hartmann hypothesize that maybe this time Šābuhr I harbored (at least for a brief time) some notions of territorial conquest. They base their hypothesis on two aspects that appear in ancient sources. The first one is that according to their reconstruction of events the Sasanian king brought again Mareades with him, but that this time he installed him as governor or viceroy in Antioch (which would explain why in some sources he is named with the honorific name Kyriades, from the Greek kyriós, meaning “lord”). The second (and in my opinion much more substantial) hint is the rock inscription of the mowbed Kirdēr (aka Kartir, Kertir or Karder) at Naqš-e Rajab in Pārs abbreviated as KKZ. Kirdēr was probably the most important and influential Zoroastrian priest in Sasanian history. In this inscription (dating probably to the 280s) he boasted of his long career and successes; although the zenith of his power (according to the KKZ) happened under Šābuhr I’s successors Bahrām I and especially Bahrām II, his rise began already under Šābuhr I. This is somewhat suspicious because in the ŠKZ Šābuhr I gave an exhaustive list of the members of his court and Kirdēr doesn’t appear in it. Another suspicious fact is that according to many ancient sources Šābuhr I protected the prophet Mani, and in the KKZ Kirdēr proclaims himself as Mani’s enemy and as instrumental to his execution under Bahrām I. But anyway according to the KKZ Kirdēr accompanied Šābuhr I during this second invasion and he was entrusted with the task of protecting the “Zoroastrian” believers in the conquered territories and to bring to them the “correct” Zoroastrian doctrine and practice as it was understood in Sasanian Iran at the time:

    And from the first, I, Kirdēr, underwent much toil and trouble for the yazads and the rulers, and for my own soul's sake. And I caused many fires and priestly colleges to flourish in Iran, and also in non-Iranian lands. There were fires and priests in the non-Iranian lands which were reached by the armies of the King of kings. The provincial capital of Antioch and the province of Syria, and Cilicia, and the districts dependent on Cilicia; the provincial capital of Caesarea and the province of Cappadocia, and the districts dependent on Cappadocia, up to Pontus, and the province of Armenia, and Georgia and Albania and Balasagan, up to the `Gate of the Alans' - these were plundered and burnt and laid waste by Šābuhr, King of kings, with his armies. There too, at the command of the King of kings, I reduced to order the priests and fires which were in those lands. And I did not allow harm to be done them, or captives made. And whoever had thus been made captive, him indeed I took and sent back to his own land. And I made the Mazda-worshipping religion and its good priests esteemed and honoured in the land.

    Kirder_01.jpg

    The rock relief of the priest Kirdēr at Naqš-e Rajab, with the insciption in Middle Persian known as KKZ.

    What does this mean? If the antiquity of Zoroastrianism has to be guessed by the oldest extant texts belonging to this religion, then the origins of Zoroastrianism can be dated at around 1000 BCE or earlier, which according to linguistic research is the estimated age in which the Gathas of Zoroaster (the oldest part of the Avesta) were composed. Thus, by the III century CE Zoroastrian tradition was already more than 1,200 years old. And most importantly, scholars agree that it would be improper to talk about a unified “Zoroastrian religion” during this time. What existed was a very diverse continuum of religious traditions that mixed very ancient Aryan polytheistic religion with Zoroastrian cultic practices. These traditions knew a great expansion under the Achaemenid empire, in which the Zoroastrian tradition was adopted by Indo-European peoples who were not of cultural Aryan stock: the Armenians and the peoples of Anatolia. These peoples became thus Iranicized in their religion and culture (hence the use of Iranian names as “Mithridates” or “Ariobarzanes” among Anatolian kings in Pontus or Cappadocia) but not in language.

    When first the Macedonians and later the Romans annexed these lands, a new cultural layer was superimposed onto the two existing ones (the original indigenous one and the Iranian one) which became the new culture of the elites, but Iranian cultural and religious practices persisted amongst the common people, including cultic practices that revolved around the Aryan pantheon (the cult of the Roman Mithra originated in Asia Minor) and the worship of sacred fires.

    The situation in Iran in Arsacid times had been somewhat similar, but here already some Arsacid kings in the second half of the I century CE had started religious “reforms” in order to “return” the popular religion to what they (and the priests that supported them) deemed to be the “pure and original” teachings of Zoroaster. With the rise of the House of Sāsān to the throne of Iran though, this idea of religious reform took a new impulse, due to the very active role that Ardaxšir I took in religious affairs, and to the extensive manipulation that the first Sasanian king did of the Zoroastrian religious tradition to suit his own political goals.

    Šābuhr I seems to have continued with this trend of manipulating religion to suit his political agenda, but with an added twist: on one side he seems to have supported the “Zoroastrian reformation” led by the new hierarchical structure of mowbedān put in place by his father, but he also began toying with the idea of instituting a new, radical version of a “reformed Zoroastrianism” which is as he probably saw the teachings of Mani. Rivers of ink have poured over the question of Šābuhr I’s protection of Mani, but one thing seems clear: this king never embraced wholly the teachings of Mani, even if Mani even accompanied Šābuhr I in some of his military expeditions, as stated in the polemical text by Alexander of Lycopolis Contra Manichaei opiniones disputando:

    Manichaeus himself is said to have lived during the reign of Valerian and to have accompanied Shapur the Persian king during his military campaigns...

    If Šābuhr I harbored ideas of territorial annexations in the Roman East, then that would explain why did he direct his offensive towards Asia Minor, which is where “Zoroastrian” communities could be found, and this would lend credence to Kirdēr’s assertion that he was charged by the King of kings with the task of promoting “proper Zoroastrianism” among the inhabitants of these regions. Notice that, true to Zoroastrian tradition, he said nothing about proselytizing but about spreading the “true teachings” of the “Mazdean religion” among those who already followed it (more or less).

    But the Roman resistance put a quick end to Šābuhr I’s ambitions. The dispersed Sasanian columns in the southern coast of Asia Minor became easy prey for the reorganized Roman forces led by Callistus/Ballista, who used the greater mobility provided by the Roman navy to surprise the isolated Sasanian columns. According to the IX century CE Byzantine chronicler George Syncellus:

    The Persians became dispersed here and there by their greed (for booty). They were on the point of capturing Pompeiopolis on the coast, having laid waste much of Lykaonia, when Callistus (=Ballista) came upon them unawares with ships and a Roman force consisting of men who in their flight had chosen him as their leader. He captured the harem of Shapur with much wealth. Returning with his fleet to Sebaste and Corycus, he wiped out a force of three thousand Persians. Shapur was greatly distressed by this and he withdrew in haste and in fear, and Valerian sojourned among the Persians until the end of his life.

    And in another fragment by the XII century CE Byzantine chronicler John Zonaras:

    While the situation so favoured the Persians, they spread out over all the east subject to Rome and plundered it without fear. The Romans, however, in their flight appointed as their general one Callistus, so it is said. He saw that the Persians were spread out and attacking the lands without a thought for anyone facing up to them. He launched a sudden attack on them and completed a very great slaughter of the barbarians, and he captured Shapur's concubines together with great wealth. Shapur was greatly pained by this and hastily turned to home, taking Valerian with him. Valerian ended his life in Persia, being reviled and mocked as a prisoner. But Callistus was not the only one then to triumph over the Persians, but also a Palmyrene called Odaenathus made an alliance with the Romans and destroyed many of the Persians. As they retreated, he attacked them along the Euphrates. Gallienus, in return for his generalship, appointed him as dux orientis. Amongst those who fell in the Persian army and were being stripped of their arms there are said to have been found women also, dressed and armed like men, and that such women were also taken alive by the Romans. And during his retreat Shapur came to a deep gorge, through which it was impossible for his baggage animals to pass. He ordered the prisoners to be killed and thrown into the gorge, so that when its depth was filled up with the bodies of the corpses, his baggage animals might make their way across. And in this way he is reported to have crossed the gorge.

    Notice again the topoi of the easterners’ cruelty (the Sasanian king filling the gorge with corpses). In here appears also another factor that precipitated Šābuhr I’s retreat and which was probably much more dangerous than the resistance offered by the Macriani and Callistus: the activities of the Ras of Palmyra and vir consularis Septimius Odaenathus. This was the hour of Odaenathus, the moment when he really came to be the ultimate authority in the Roman Near East.

    Meanwhile, in the West Gallienus was in a desperate situation. The defense of the East had crumbled again in a most spectacular way and his father had suffered the ultimate humiliation of being captured alive by the Sasanian king. This was an unprecedented blow to Roman prestige, and it obliterated in a moment all the political capital, credibility and goodwill that the Licinian dynasty had accumulated during the previous seven years. An usurpation attempt had already risen in the East under the Macriani, but as the news of the disaster of Edessa travelled west, several other commanders launched their own usurpation attempts all during the very same year of 260 CE. The exact sequence of events is very confused because there’s contradictions in the ancient sources; I will follow here the reconstructed sequence of events proposed by Udo Hartmann and Andreas Golz.

    Gallienus_01.jpg

    Gallienus had the longest reign of any of the emperors between Caracalla and Diocletian (253-268 CE). This bust is dated at the start of his reign, in it the artist portrayed a serene young man in the elegant and idealized Hellenistic classicizing style which had been typical of imperial portraits since the age of Augustus.

    Gallienus_02.jpg

    This other bust is dated towards the end of his reign. In it the artist depicted a mature man weighed down by the difficulties and troubles of his reign. Gone is also the Hellenistic style of the previous decade; this portrait announces what will be the Roman art of Late Antiquity, with its departure from the naturalism of the Classical tradition.

    As we saw, the capture of Valerian happened probably during the spring or early summer of 260 CE. Last we saw, Gallienus was in Gaul, trying (and failing) to repeal the raids of the Franks and part of the Alamanni. He had his command post in Colonia Agrippina and he had with him his second son Saloninus. But in 260 CE, alarming news reached him: the upper Rhenish-upper Danubian limes had collapsed finally in 259-260 CE after years of sustained pressure by the Alamanni. This catastrophic development must’ve happened either slightly earlier or roughly at the same time as Valerian’s capture. The Alamanni had overrun the Agri Decumates, and together with the Iuthungi (probably a member or a spin-off of the Alamanni confederation, this is the first time that they appear in historical records) they crossed the Alps and entered northern Italy. Their advance was marked by the destruction of the city of Aventicum (modern Avenches) and they probably kept advancing south through the Allgäu in western Switzerland. By the summer of 260 CE, while the Alamanni devastated the north Italian plain, the Iuthungi advanced further south, besieged Ravenna without success and in Rome itself the Senate had to organize an improvised defense with the Urban cohorts, gladiators and armed members of the populace in order to fend off some of the boldest war bands of the Iuthungi. The situation was so alarming that Gallienus had to leave Gaul in a hurry taking part of the army with him and head towards northern Italy. There, he was able to defeat the Alamanni at the battle of Mediolanum that very summer and recover part of the booty and prisoners (it must’ve been an important victory, because the Alamanni stayed quiet for a decade after it), but he was unable to prevent that the Iuthungi crossed the Alpine passes loaded with loot and great numbers of captives to return to their lands. The Iuthungi were intercepted north of the Alps by the army of Raetia supported by the local militia, commanded by the provincial governor M. Simplicinius Genialis, who by this time had joined an usurpation against Gallienus. This victory was recorded in a votive altar built in the provincial capital of Raetia Augusta Vindelicorum (modern Augsburg) in which the battle against the Iuthungi is dated to the 24-25 July 260 CE, and in 253it the victorious Romans recorded the recovery of much booty and the liberation of “thousands” of Italian captives.

    Mediolanum.jpg

    Reconstruction of Mediolanum (modern Milan) in the IV century CE. Mediolanum was one of the very few cities in the Roman West which grew in the course of the III century CE. Thanks to its strategic position, Gallienus chose it as the main base for his comitatus and as his main residence after Rome. After Gallienus, the city never lost its newly found strategic significance, and under the Tetrarchy it became one of the capitals of the Roman empire. Ink drawing by the Italian artist Francesco Corni.

    In the Balkans the general Ingenuus, who had been the tutor of Valerian the Younger and who probably held the command of the whole Danube border was acclaimed as augustus at an uncertain date; some ancient sources date this revolt to 258 CE, but Hartmann and Golz link it without hesitation to the devastating impact of the news from the East. Probably, the whole Danubian army followed him. Gallienus reacted swiftly and decisively. He couldn’t leave northern Italy due to the Germanic danger and to the alarming new set of events that were happening in Gaul, so Gallienus entrusted part of his army to the cavalry commander Aureolus (who had a brilliant career ahead of him) who defeated Ingenuus decisively at Mursa by the late summer of 260 CE; the usurper was then murdered by his own guardsmen (probably in an attempt to endear themselves to the victors). But in the wake of the end of Ingenuus’ failed revolt, a new usurper arose in the Danube: the senatorial legate of Upper Pannonia P. C(assius?) Regalianus, who had been probably one of Ingenuus supporters and fearing retribution tried to launch a coup of his own. Once again, Gallienus acted swiftly, and his army, probably with him in command this time defeated Regalianus and besieged him in Sirmium. The revolt was finally crushed by the fall of 260 CE or at the end of this very same year at the latest. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation, the Roxolani Sarmatians and the Germanic Quadi crossed the middle Danube and devastated the Pannonian provinces while the Romans were busy fighting civil wars.

    Regalianus.jpg

    Antoninianus of P. c. Regalianus.

    Given the catastrophic situation, Gallienus had deemed too risky to leave Gaul without imperial presence, and so he left his son Saloninus (still a child) at Cologne under the care of a tutor named Silvanus. As main commander of the Rhine army, he left Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus, who quickly proved himself disloyal to Gallienus. Apparently, Postumus had some success in dealing with the Frankish raiders, and recovered a sizable amount of booty from them, which he then intended to distribute among his men. But then Silvanus (perhaps in a misjudged attempt at establishing his own authority and also that of Saloninus’) ordered Postumus that the booty should be handed over to them. Postumus reacted by addressing his men and telling them that Silvanus and Saloninus wanted to deprive them of the booty that they had legitimately won with their sweat and blood, and the result was inevitable: the soldiers acclaimed Postumus as augustus and murdered Silvanus and Saloninus. He was acknowledged as such by the provinces in Gaul, Hispania and Britannia as well as Raetia, and proceeded to form a separate “Gallic Empire” that separated from the Roman empire, with its own consuls and magistracies.

    Saloninus.jpg

    Antoninianus of Saloninus.

    Postumus.jpg

    Antoninianus of Marcus Cassianius Latinius Postumus.

    But Gallienus’ situation was so desperate that he could not even contemplate avenging his son or recovering the lost western provinces. He had dealt with the Alamanni and two usurpers in the Balkans but there were still the Macriani left, who had formed an army led by Macrianus the Elder and Macrianus the Younger and crossed into Europe with the intention of marching against Italy (Quietus and Callistus remained in the East). The two sons of Macrianus had been raised to the purple in the late summer of 260 CE; the whole East acknowledged them. In Egyptian papyri they’re referred to as augusti between August 260 CE and October 261 CE (except in Alexandria, where coins were minted again naming Gallienus as augustus in the summer of 261 CE). By the early summer of 261 CE, the army of the Macriani had reached the Balkans, where parts of the Danubian army which had supported first Ingenuus and later Regalianus joined them. They met in battle against Gallienus’ field army led by Gallienus’ generals Aureolus and Domitianus in a disputed location; ancient sources differ between Illyricum and Pannonia. On the basis of the gravestones of two centurions from Legio VIII Augusta found at Sirmium, Hartmann and Golz propose the environs of Serdica (modern Sofia in Bulgaria) as the place for the battle. During the battle, most of the army pf the Macriani changed sides, and the two Macriani were either killed during the battle or executed shortly afterwards.

    And there was still one more usurpation in the Balkans in this year: a certain Valens with the surname Thessalonicus revolted in Macedonia (perhaps he was one of the commanders of the army of the Macriani) as attested by the SHA, the Epitome de Caesaribus and Ammianus Marcellinus.

    Aureolus was the first of a series of brilliant Illyrian commanders of very humble social origins that were promoted by Gallienus and who became the trusted commanders of his comitatus (the field army that Gallienus based at Mediolanum as a rapid reaction force), grouped together in the elite cavalry unit called Protectores, which became sort of a select gathering of talented officers; anybody who entered the Protectores could hope to raise to command legions and whole armies in a near future. Other members of this group were the future emperors Claudius Gothicus, Aurelian and probably also Probus, who were all exceptionally gifted generals; these were the men who would change for the better the fortunes of Roman arms.

    Under this circumstances, it was impossible for Gallienus to do absolutely anything in the eastern theater, and so he did the only thing that could be done: he appointed Septimius Odaenathus as dux romanorum (thus appointing him as commander of all the Roman forces in the area) in the late summer of 260 CE. Odaenathus quickly attacked Quietus and Callistus (who had been probably been raised to the rank of Praetorian Prefect by the Macriani), who were besieged in Emesa. The Emesenes finally executed Quietus while Callistus was handed over to Odaenathus, who had him executed in November 261. After this victory, Gallienus appointed Odaenathus as corrector totius Orientis, an unprecedented title that turned him into the de facto supreme Roman civilian and military leader in the East (as a sort of viceroy, enjoying perhaps a status similar to the one that Priscus had enjoyed under Philip the Arab). This was obviously a desperate measure, because he was basically handing over command of the Roman East to a foreigner (a Romanized Arab dynast) who had his own base of power independent of Gallienus’ mandate (the kingdom of Palmyra and his control of most Arabian tribes in the Syrian and North Arabian deserts). The emperor knew perfectly well that Odaenathus was the new ultimate authority in the Roman East, and that he was basically de facto independent from Gallienus; by appointing him as his viceroy Gallienus tried to cover this uncomfortable reality with a veneer of legality (at least Odaenathus seemed to be acting as a Roman official, in the name of Rome and under nominal command of Gallienus augustus). And luckily for him, he sort of succeeded, at least while Odaenathus was still alive.

    Odaenathus_01.jpg

    Bust of Septimus Odaenathus (Latinized version of his Arabic name Udhayna), Ras of Palmyra.

    But as in the Balkans, this usurpation still dragged for some time: the Praefect of Egypt L. Mussius Aemilianus had sided with the Macriani, but in the summer of 261 CE he hurried himself back to Gallienus’ side as soon as news of the defeat of the Macriani in the Balkans reached him. But probably fearing reprisals for his disloyalty, he revolted in the winter of 261-262 CE and cut the grain supplies to Rome and to Gallienus’ armies. This was though a minor revolt, as no coins have been found where Aemilianus proclaimed himself as augustus. By early 262 CE Gallienus sent to Alexandria by sea his general Aurelius Theodotus (probably yet another Illyrian officer of humble origins, as his name seems to suggest) who by July/September 262 CE appears named in papyri as Praefect of Egypt. According to the ancient sources, Aemilianus was captured alive and sent to Gallienus in Rome, who executed him.

    What’s surprising is that in the middle of all this chaos, Odaenathus still found the time and the resources to fight successfully against Šābuhr I, but all Graeco-Roman sources agree that he was very successful in his campaigns against the Sasanian king, although modern scholars are somewhat more skeptical about the alleged magnitude of his victories.

    The main point that needs to be made in this respect is that despite the resistance and counterattacks by the Macriani/Callistus and Odaenathus, Šābuhr I still managed to retire back to Ērānšāhr in good order, with his army mostly unscathed, with an enormous booty and the most revealing detail of it all: that he managed to herd back with him thousands of Roman captives on a long journey crossing some difficult terrain (bordering on desert in some cases) with success. The ŠKZ boasts that Šābuhr I carried on mass deportations of Roman captives from Anērān into his empire, where he settled them in royal lands and even founded several new cities expressly for them. Archaeology is clear in this respect, with clear remains of Roman workmanship in buildings, mosaics and other artifacts in Xuzēstān and Pārs, and this is corroborated not only by western sources but also by eastern ones like the Chronicle of Seert. A fragment of the lost chronicle of Petrus Patricius is quite revealing about the ease with which the Sasanian army was able to return home bypassing the still existing Roman garrisons in Mesopotamia:

    Shapur, the Persian king, crossed the Euphrates with his army [the soldiers] greeted each other and rejoiced that they had escaped the danger which had been repelled. He sent word to the soldiers in Edessa, promising to give them all the Syrian money he had with him, so that they would allow him to pass undisturbed and not choose a venture which would lead them to be subject to attack on both sides and bring him trouble and loss of speed. He said that he did not offer them these things out of fear but because he was eager to celebrate the festival in his own home and he did not want there to be any delay or any hold-up on his journey. The soldiers chose to take the money without risk and to permit him to pass.

    The festival that Petrus Patricius is referring to is probably the Iranian New Year (Nowruz), which usually falls on the spring equinox. This allows us to date the retreat of the Sasanian army to the winter of 260-261 CE, because if Šābuhr I wanted to be in is capital (in Ctesiphon or Bīšāpūr) by the environs of March 21, then he needed to have bypassed Edessa in late January at the very latest (loaded with captives and booty, the army would not have been able to move too quickly). In this context, what Odaenathus fought were probably harassing raids against the slow-moving and vulnerable Sasanian columns. The ancient source which is most exuberant in its praise for Odaenathus’ harassing of the retreating Sasanians is the HA, which is not exactly the most trustful of sources.

    Also, the chaotic situation in the Roman empire makes highly plausible that the Romans, who were too busy fighting among themselves, did not bother too much the Sasanian army during its retreat.

    But another thing altogether is that these sources all agree that later Odaenathus fought a campaign against the Sasanians in Mesopotamia with considerable success, and that this was probably the first victorious “Roman” counterattack against the Sasanian empire in a long time. By 262 CE, the situation within the empire had become somewhat more stabilized compared to what it was two years before. Now, the “only” problems were:
    • The secessionist Empire of Gaul led by Postumus.
    • A revolt by Memor, commander of the Moorish cavalry troops quartered in Egypt which was quickly suppressed by Gallienus’ governor Theodatus.
    • A major wave of social unrest in Sicily (a major slaves’ revolt, mass flight of the lands, and the formation of large gatherings of “brigands”).
    • A mutiny of the garrison of the strategic city of Byzantium in the summer of 262 CE, which had to be suppressed by Gallienus himself.
    • Another major Gothic invasion, according to the HA and the Getica, in which a large Gothic army led by the duces Gothorum Respa, Veduco and Thaurano crossed the lower Danube and marched across Lower Moesia and Thrace undisturbed, crossed the Straits on ships that had followed their path along the Black Sea coast and invaded Bithynia and Asia. The ease with which they were able to do this was probably connected to the mutiny of the Byzantium garrison. In the rich provinces of Bithynia and Asia, they looted and destroyed among many other towns and cities the major urban centers of Chalcedon, Ilium, Nicomedia and Ephesus, the largest and richest city in the whole province of Asia (and probably in the whole of Anatolia as well), where the Goths destroyed the great temple of Artemis, the Artemision, one of the wonders of the ancient world. Later the Goths dispersed into smaller war bands who raided deep inland into Lydia, Phrygia, Galatia and Cappadocia. And then the Goths could return home completely undisturbed following the very same route they’d used to invade the empire, taking with them an immense booty and large numbers of captives, amongst whom (according to the ecclesiastical historian Philostorgius) were many Christians, including the forebears of Wulfilas, who would be the apostle of the Goths in the IV century CE.
    Apart from these "minor troubles", all was quiet and calm, and so Odaenathus organized a large-scale attack against Sasanian territory, and in 262 CE he invaded Sasanian-held northern Mesopotamia and retook Nisibis (it's unclear if he really took it, and if managed to do it, if he was able to keep it), after which he turned south and invaded central Mesopotamia during the winter of 262-263 CE, managing to reach Ctesiphon and putting it under siege. The siege was unsuccessful, and by the summer of 263 CE he was back in Syria, where to add insult to injury he took the title rex regum, a direct insult to Šābuhr I. In the second half of 263 CE, Gallienus took the credit for “his general’s” victory, adopted the title Persicus Maximus and celebrated a formal triumph in Rome. But now Odaenathus was in the zenith of his ascendancy, and began to slip steadily from under Gallienus’ influence, which forecasted trouble for the future. Odaenathus’ attack during the autumn and winter must’ve been deftly planned in order to take Šābuhr I and his royal forces in Mesopotamia and Xuzēstān isolated from reinforcements from the Iranian plateau, exploiting one of the key weaknesses of the early Sasanian military system, the seasonality of its armies.

    Palmyra_01.jpg

    Restitution of Palmyra in the II century CE by the French archaeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin.

    Palmyra_02.jpg

    Restitution of the complex of the temple of the god Bel in Palmyra by the French archaeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin. Notice the eclectic mix of western and eastern styles in its design.


    Šābuhr I died in 270 CE in Bīšāpūr in Pārs after ruling for 30 years as king of kings of the Iranians and non-Iranians. If we take into account that in the great victory relief of Ardaxšir I at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah he appears as a grown man, and that at the investiture relief of Ardaxšir I at Naqš-e Rajab he appears already with his eldest son Bahrām I as a small child, he must’ve been 18-20 years old at the time. By 260 CE, Šābuhr I must’ve been about 60 years old and probably not in a good enough physical condition to keep leading his armies in person as he’d always done. After his return from his last invasion in 260 CE and the invasion of Odaenathus, the almost frantic pace of Sasanian aggression against the Roman empire that had characterized eastern politics since the accession of Ardaxšir I ceased completely, which was an immense relief for Rome. The Sasanians had been instrumental in bringing Rome down to its darkest decade in 260-270 CE (perhaps they’d been the most important amongst the external factors that brought Rome to the brink of the abyss), but now that Rome was struggling to survive, the Sasanians just disappeared from the scene. During this last decade of his reign, apart from fighting against the “Odaenathus’ scare”, the only activities that can be reconstructed for Šābuhr I in the historical record is the carving of his great propagandistic rock reliefs and inscriptions and the building of his town and palace at Bīšāpūr. It’s almost as if the old king spent his last ten years reliving his past glories and making sure that they were recorded for posterity.

    Shapur_i_02.jpg

    Šābuhr I has deservedly gone down in history as Šābuhr I the Great. In the picture, his colossal statue (6.70 meters tall) in the so-called "cave Šābuhr", located 6 km from Bīšāpūr in Pārs.

    It’s difficult to explain this sudden eclipse of the Sasanians, but I’d venture and say that it was a combination of factors. First of all, the most important factor was a biological one: by now Šābuhr I was an old man, and so he was just unable to sustain the same degree of activity that he’d done since he was his father’s appointed successor. Another factor could be that simply put Šābuhr I felt that the objectives that he and his father had set up for themselves in the West had been attained: the Sasanians were now in firm control of Armenia and most of northern Mesopotamia, which together formed a defensive barrier against Roman attacks into the Iranian plateau, and equally important the Arsacids had been expelled from Armenia. This second factor though depends upon the consideration (which is nowadays the consensus amongst scholars) that the supposed goals of Ardaxšir I as stated by Dio Cassius and Herodian (the restoration of the Achaemenid empire) were merely a bluff in front of the Roman emperor Severus Alexander. This also implies that on the whole the Sasanian policy in the West against Rome had been altogether mainly a defensive one: Ardaxšir I and his son had sought only to secure a “cordon sanitaire” against Rome and to remove the danger that the Arsacids of Armenia represented for the internal stability of the new Sasanian regime in Iran. This would agree with the relative restraint by these two Sasanian kings in their annexations in the West, compared with the sweeping conquests that they made in the East.

    And finally another factor could be a certain level of exhaustion: by 260 CE, the war against Rome had dragged on almost without cease (except for the 244-252 CE time frame) since 230 CE, and one key weakness of the ancient Iranian empires was the scarcity of their military manpower. Not only was Iran sparsely populated compared to the Roman Empire, but most importantly the Sasanians (as the Arsacids) depended to a disproportionate degree for their military successes on the small group of elite fighters represented by the Iranian nobility. Due to the Iranian social structure, this was a small, closed group which could only replenish its losses through generational replacement (although the kings could elevate commoners into the nobility, there are not many examples known of that, and given the attitudes and mores of the Iranian nobility, if the kings used this expedient on a massive scale, this would have caused serious trouble). Although the first two Sasanian kings had inflicted devastating defeats to Rome and had been a decisive factor in plunging their western foe into their deepest crisis in history, in the long run demographic and economic realities could not be ignored. And probably from an Iranian point of view, Rome in the decade of the 260s had ceased to be any serious danger, due to the internal chaos of the empire and the ongoing waves of invasions it was suffering from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths of the Danube.
     
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    23.1 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHY.
  • 23.1 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ECONOMY AND DEMOGRAPHY.

    The reign of Šābuhr I is characterized above all by the energetic continuation of the economic policies of his father Ardaxšir I. The main goal was to reinforce the position of the crown and the Sasanian dynasty in front of the Iranian nobility, formed by the šāhryārān (the vassal kings, members of the House of Sāsān), the wispuhrān (princes of royal blood) and the wuzurgān (the grandees, most of which stemmed from ancient Parthian families).

    With the benefit of hindsight, the Arsacid and Sasanian empires could be described as a “confederation” of noble clans which most unusually chose to allow themselves to be governed by kings forming a (more or less at times) unified policy between the III century BCE and the VII century CE. Such a policy would have collapsed eventually, but these Iranian empires (after all, the Sasanian empire was basically just a continuation of the Arsacid empire under another ruling dynasty) managed to perdure against all odds. The glue that kept them together was the custom, tradition or whatever we want to call it that was followed by the nobles which mandated that they were to be ruled by a single king, a tradition no doubt reinforced by the selfish realization on their part that they needed an arbiter to mediate in their internecine disputes and especially a supreme commander to lead them in war against foreign foes.

    The first two Sasanian kings fulfilled this role as commanders of the Iranian nobility in battle admirably well and probably also managed to avoid upsetting the nobles with their inner policies, because the reigns of Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I are remarkably free of the kind of internal conflicts that had wrecked so much the Arsacid empire during its last two and a half centuries. But this does not mean that these two kings were just content with letting the internal situation of their empire remain as it had been. They both began a series of long-term policies directed towards the strengthening of royal power without upsetting the traditional rights and status of the Iranian nobility.

    They strived to achieve this goal through the economic development of the royal domains, in order to increase their income as much as possible, so that they would be able to sustain a royal army as large as possible, thus reducing the dependence of Sasanian kings on the levies of the nobility in times of war (and of course, also to ensure their own personal security in case of nobiliary revolt. Later Islamic sources inform us that the upper crust of the nobility (the wuzurgān) were formed by seven great clans, each of whom was expected by law and custom to supply the king with a force of 10,000 men in case of war. Of course, the actual reliability of this information is dubious (the number seven is derived from Zoroastrian cosmogony, for example Darius I also had seven companions who founded seven great families, and Aršak I also had seven companions when he invaded the Iranian plateau), but scholars think that it gives a good idea of the magnitude of the forces that could be mobilized by the wuzurgān. Under the Arsacids and the early Sasanians, such a force dwarfed the royal army, which as I wrote in an earlier post has been estimated by Olbrycht to have been around 20,000 strong, with only 10,000 of them being the royal guard and being always available for the king. In other words, the effective armed strength of the king (not tied down in garrisons, etc.) was probably in the same order of magnitude of a single great clan. A general nobiliary revolt was thus a mortal danger for any Iranian king, because he simply could not cope with the forces that the united nobility could array against him.

    Glass_Bowl.jpg

    Glass making was one of the crafts that achieved a higher level of development in Sasanian Iran, and it probably began also during the reign of Šābuhr I.

    Luckily for them, very few (if any) of the Arsacid and Sasanian kings had to deal with such a scenario, because the wuzurgān were usually disunited and divided over internecine rivalries, so the kings (if they had a minimum of political ability) could always play one nobiliary clique against another. But still, the specter of a general uprising was always there and had to be treated very seriously. Even if not was a general uprising, just a partial one was well enough to plunge the empire into civil war; the Sasanians knew it very well because the rose to the throne of Iran exactly in this way, leading a great nobiliary uprising against the last Arsacid Great King of Iran.

    So, Šābuhr I and practically all his successors would follow the same policies that Ardaxšir I had inaugurated in this respect: slow strengthening of the resource base of the crown while at the same time avoiding at all costs to rock the boat of social hierarchy in Iran. The only king who would make a difference in this respect was Kawād I in the late V and early VI centuries CE, who through his support of the Mazdakite movement threatened to unhinge the social order in Iran from top to bottom. The tension between the Sasanian dynasty and the Iranian nobles was to be the main theme during the 400 years of history of this dynasty, and according to the scholar Parvaneh Pourshariati, the final downfall of the empire was caused to a large extent because the “social contract” between the nobility and the House of Sāsān broke down during the second half of the VI century CE.

    Just as his father had been, Šābuhr I was a great builder of cities, which were always located in royal estates, and helped to develop their economy. But in the case of Šābuhr I we are much better informed about the scale of his efforts in this respects: the cities he founded (or rather re-founded in most cases), the bridges, dams and irrigation schemes he had built, and how he achieved this: he had many more resources available than his father, thanks to his great victories against the Roman empire he won a large amount of wealth in precious metals, but also (another key difference from his father) he resorted to a custom that had a long history among near eastern dynasties: he deported large numbers of people from the Roman empire (Anērān) into his kingdom and settled them in royal domains, as stated unanimously by western sources, Syriac chronicles and by the ŠKZ:

    And people who are of the Roman Empire, from Anērān, captive we deported. In Ērānšahr in Pārs, Pahlav, Xūzestān, Āsūrestān, and in any other land where our own and our fathers’ and our grandfathers’ and our ancestors’ estates were, there we settled them.

    The legal status of these deported captives was probably that of royal slaves, for in the KKZ the expression wardag (war captive, slave) is used in reference to them. Iranian society (as all ancient societies) allowed slavery, although according to surviving legal (Mādayān ī hazār dādestān -The Book of a Thousand Judgements-), dating from the Sasanian era and religious Zoroastrian texts (book VIII of the Dēnkard, the Pahlavi Rivayat Accompanying the Dādestān ī Dēnīg, and the Ērbadestān) which were composed after the fall of the Sasanian empire, there were several categories of slaves and the legal rights of the owner with respect to a slave were restricted (in other words, there were certain acts that the law did not allow the master of a slave to do to his “possession”); in this respect the status of slaves was quite similar to the one that existed in the Late Roman empire.

    The captives were settled by Šābuhr I according to the ŠKZ in the provinces where there were royal domains, and he lists them: Pārs (Persia proper), Pahlav (Parthia, in northeastern Iran and southwestern Turkmenistan), Xūzestān (the modern Iranian province of Khuzestan) and Āsūrestān (lower Mesopotamia, in modern-day Iraq). These areas correspond exactly with the areas where Šābuhr I is known for sure to have built new cities or re-founded existing ones. The best known among them are:

    Pērōz-Šābūhr (literally meaning “victorious Šābuhr”), which is the name that Šābuhr I gave to the old city of Misiḵē where he defeated the army of Gordian III in 244 CE. The city was rebuilt on a much larger scale, with strong fortifications and was transformed into a primary military base (hence its other name Anbār, which means “granary” in Middle Persian). It was captured by the army of Julian in 363 CE, and Ammianus Marcellinus described it as a very strong fortress which was surrounded by double brick walls with towers coated with bitumen at the level of the moat drawn from the Euphrates. In the center stood a tall, circular citadel where the Romans found large quantities of weapons and provisions. The garrison amounted to 2,500 men. The city was called by Ammianus as Pirisabora, and it was known to Babylonian Jews as Pumbedita, one of the main centers of rabbinic Judaism in Mesopotamia, famous for its rabbinic academy. The city remained prosperous until the IX-X centuries in which it began a slow decline; by the XIV century only ruins remained, which can be seen today five km to the northwest of the modern city of Fallujah in Iraq.

    Peroz_Shapur_01.jpg

    A drought in 2009 caused the waters of the Euphrates in Iraq to drop enough to allow some ancient remains to resurface that scholars believe belong to the ancient Sasanian city of Pērōz-Šābūhr .

    Gondēšāpur is perhaps the most famous among the cities founded by Šābuhr I. It was located in Khuzestan, on the banks of the Siāh Manṣur river. Together with Karḵa, Susa, and Šuštar it was one of the four main cities of Xūzestān, a province to which the early Sasanians devoted extensive attention and investments, turning it into the second richest area of the empire after lower Mesopotamia. During Sasanian rule, rice and sugar cultivation were introduced into this area (for which they developed extensive irrigation systems) from India. These were cash crops which were exported all over the empire and abroad, and together with a flourishing textile industry helped fill the coffers of the Sasanian kings with taxes. The etymology of the name Gondēšāpur is much disputed. Some argue that it was founded over an already existing Aramaic settlement called Bēṯ Lapaṭ (which remained for centuries the Aramaic name for the city), while archaeological digs have failed to reveal pre-Sasanian remains. The name Gondēšāpur could be a contraction of Gund-dēz-i Shābūr (“Šābuhr’s fortress”) or Weh-Andiyok-Shābūr (“the better Antioch of Šābuhr”), with the latter option being the most probable. The Islamic author Ḥamza Eṣfahāni described it as a rectangular city built following a regular grid, and archaeological excavations conducted in the 1930s and 1960s confirmed it, which strongly resembles the array of a Roman military fort (due to the constant plowing of the land, today practically nothing remains of ancient Gondēšāpur at ground level). But the fortifications of the city were quite meager, which seems to discard any function as a military base. These facts support strongly the local tradition (reflected in Islamic sources) that Gondēšāpur was in fact the final settling place of the captives made by Šābuhr I in the Roman East, including military men (who probably were made responsible for the building of the settlement). The city flourished and prospered for four centuries but began a steady decline after the Muslim conquest until its final abandonment in the X-XI centuries. Along with its artisanal and agricultural wealth, Gondēšāpur was famous for its intellectual production; especially during the VI century CE, when under Xusrō I it housed many pagan and “heretical” Roman exiles which translated a substantial amount of Greek texts (especially dealing with medicine, astronomy and mathematics) into Middle Persian. According to Islamic authors, this same king also invited Indian “wise men” to settle in Gondēšāpur, where important Indian texts were translated from Sanskrit into Middle Persian.

    Another of the cities founded by Šābuhr I which was destined to enjoy a bright future was Nēv-Šābuhr (literally, “excellent is Šābuhr”, which has transformed into Nīšāpūr in New Persian). The city was founded as the new administrative center of the northeastern province of Abaršahr (located in Parthia, and later in late Sasanian and Islamic Khorasan), probably as a more suitable center for the defense of this exposed stretch of border between the Kopet Dagh mountains and the westernmost part of the Afghan mountains, which was the main avenue of invasion into the Iranian plateau for Central Asian nomads than the older fortified city of Tūs. Apart from its military function, the city was suitably located to act as the entryway of the great caravan route that came from Sogdiana and China (the so-called “Silk Route”), to control the important mines of turquoise located nearby, and it was also placed nearby to the great Zoroastrian sanctuary of Ādur Burzēn-Mihr, which would become in later times one of the three Great Fires of Iran. The city flourished during Sasanian times (by the V century CE it had a Nestorian bishop) but its golden era was to come in Islamic times, between the X century CE and the Mongol invasion, when Nīšāpūr became one of the great four cities of Khorasan and one of the main metropolis of the Islamic world. This golden era ended in 1221, when Genghis Khan’s armies razed the city to the ground, but the city recovered somewhat and has retained a regional importance to this day.

    Nishapur_Revand.jpg

    The Revand valley near Nishapur, where scholars think that perhaps once stood the great Zoroastrian sanctuary of Ādur Burzēn-Mihr.

    Nishapur_Mines_01.png

    The turquoise mines of Nishapur are still in exploitation today, and historically have been the source of the blue pigment used in the bright blue tiles that adorned Iranian mosques, madrasahs and palaces during the Middle Ages and later.


    Bay-Šābuhr in Pārs (literally meaning “Lord Šābuhr”) was built by Šābuhr I as his own residence in the home province of his dynasty, to fulfill the same role that the city of Ardaxšir-Xwarrah had played during his father’s reign. The name was soon contracted and became Bīšāpūr in New Persian. Bīšāpūr became quickly one of the most important cities in Pārs (with a population of up to 50,000 people); later some of the successors of Šābuhr I would also spend lengths of time there. The city was probably finished in 266 CE, at least it seems to appear so by the bilingual inscription (in Middle Persian and Parthian) found in a commemorative monument in its ruins. Bīšāpūr was built further west than Eṣṭaḵr and Ardaxšir-Xwarrah (which stand in the geographical center of Pārs), on a road that led from Eṣṭaḵr to Šūštar in Xūzestān. The city followed a rectangular plan with a regular grid of streets that could again suggest Roman influence; according to local tradition and the writings of Islamic authors Bīšāpūr was the place where Valerian was confined, along with many of his defeated soldiers. The most important area of the ancient city is (according to the archaeological digs of the 1930s and 1960s) was occupied by the royal complex, which included a palace (with mosaic floors which again show a strong Roman influence) and a subterranean structure linked by a channel to the nearby river, which scholars believe could have been a temple to the goddess of the waters Anāhīd, who was also a deity closely linked to the Sasanian dynasty. Following the practice of his father, Šābuhr I chose the nearby river gorge of Tang-e Čowgān to carve four great rock reliefs (referred to as Bishapur I, II, III and VII) depicting his victories against the Roman Empire. These reliefs grew progressively more ambitious as his reign advanced and the latest of them (Bishapur III) is a vast composition (again showing certain Roman influences in its sculptures) depicting Šābuhr I in triumph over Gordian III, Philip the Arab and Valerian, surrounded by his victorious armies and tribute bearers in an arrangement reminiscent of the Achaemenid reliefs at Persepolis. In a cave near there Šābuhr I also had a colossal statue of himself carved out of a natural stalactite which has survived to this day. The city remained prosperous until the Muslim conquest, when it began a slow but steady decline that ended with its abandonment in the X century CE.

    Bishapur_03.jpg

    Aerial view of the remains of the royal complex at Bīšāpūr.

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    This underground structure is though by archaeologists to have been a temple dedicated to the goddess of the waters Anāhīd.

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    Decorative stucco panel recovered from the ruins of Šābuhr I's palace at Bīšāpūr. The Sasanians inherited the craft of decorating their palaces and temples with stuccoes from the Arsacids, and developed it to new heights; this tradition would later be taken up by medieval Muslims which carried it over across the whole Islamic world.


    The city of Šūštar in Khuzestan was also greatly enlarged by Šābuhr I. Šūštar is situated by the Karun river, the third longest river in Iran, and was the place selected by Šābuhr I to build its largest known (to this date) irrigation development project, which is still functional to this day. The Šūštar Historical Hydraulic System is today an Unesco World Heritage Site, and encompasses a vast array of canals, subterranean qanats, two major dams and water mills. The key part of the system was the dam-bridges (rather a weir than a proper dam) of Band-e Kaysar and the smaller one of Band-i Mizan; local tradition, as recorded by Islamic authors, attributes its building to Roman captives, and archaeology seems to confirm this. The dams are built with masonry blocks put in place with lime mortar and filled with mortar and rubble, a technique alien to local tradition, but which is typically Roman. Also, the combination of dam and bridge that can be seem in these two dams has no precedents in Iran, but is well attested in the Roman empire. The enterprise was immense and must have involved an extremely large workforce during a period stretching from three to seven years. Things were made more complicated by the fact that Šūštar lies on a rocky plateau, and so excavation was difficult at many points. Still, the objectives of Šābuhr I were ambitious: the project would allow to irrigate a flat area around Šūštar of around 150,000 Ha.

    Band-e_Kaysar_01.jpg

    The remains of the Band-e Kaysar dam and bridge near Šūštar in Khuzestan.

    Sustar_Mills_01.jpg

    One of the parts of the complex water system built at Šūštar; at this place several qanats brought water to run mills and other small artisanal activities (weavers, dyers, etc.).

    To build the dam, first a canal had to be dug to divert the whole flow of the Karun river; the channel known as Ab-i Gargar collected the waters of the Karun river upstream from the place where the dam had to be built and rejoined the old riverbed 50 km downstream, past the city of Šūštar. Then, on the old riverbed, the building of the dam began. Its layout was not straight, but followed a winding path in order that the foundations could be built over a solid strata of sandstone. The dam itself was not too high and it worked rather as a weir than as a proper dam, as it would have allowed water to overflow (the rise of the water level has been estimated to have been of around 3-4 meters overall, which would have been enough to irrigate the surrounding lands during the dry season) but was very thick (9-10 meters) as it had to accommodate a bridge over it. The bridge itself ran all along the 500 meter-long dam and it was formed by forty main arches that supported a roadway. The arches stood over extremely solid piers, 5-6.4 meters wide; their upstream side was built with a pointed form to act as cutwaters; these cutwaters were built following Roman practice, with large cut masonry blocks hold together with iron clamps, and an interior filled with a mix of mortar and rubble. The riverbed upstream in front of the cutwaters was paved with large stone slabs in order to prevent the river current from eroding the foundations.

    Once the dam was completed, the river stream was allowed to flow again along its natural course, although part of it was still diverted through the Ab-i Gargar canal. The city of Šūštar thus became located on an “island” between the two streams of water; this artificial “island” was known in later times as Mianāb (meaning “paradise”) and was completely covered with orchards. The water collected in the dams was conducted across the plain of Šūštar by a network of underground qanats that, apart from carrying water for agriculture also served to provide motor force to a series of mills located along their length. The city was also provided with strong fortifications that withstood the passing of time until the Safavid era.

    Not far from there, also on the banks of the Karun river Šābuhr I founded (or re-built) the city of Hormozd-Ardaxšir (there’s some confusion in Islamic authors about it, as some of them attribute its foundation to Ardaxšir I) which stood on the site of the modern Iranian city of Ahvāz. Šābuhr I probably named it in honor of his favorite son and heir, the Great King of Armenia Hormozd-Ardaxšir. Little is known about this city, except that as according to Islamic authors the city (in a pattern followed in several other settlements in the Arsacid and Sasanian empires) was divided in two parts: a civilian city which became the main commercial center of Xūzestān, while the other part (on the other side of the river and strongly fortified) was the “royal city” with military and administrative functions. The city became prosperous and survived the Islamic conquest (although the Muslim conquerors destroyed the “royal city”).

    Dezful_Bridge_01.jpg

    The Dezful bridge over the Karun river in Khuzestan, also built during Šābuhr I's reign. Part of it has been rebuilt in concrete, but it's the oldest functioning bridge in Iran.

    Another city founded by Šābuhr I was Šābuhrkhast, which is today the modern Iranian city of Khorramabad in Loristan in southwestern Iran, on the southern Zagros. Some scholars believe that in this same place stood once the ancient Elamite city of Khaydalu, destroyed by the Assyrians in the VII century BCE. Šābuhrkhast was built around a massive citadel known in ancient times as Dež-e Šābuhr-Khwāst (Šābuhr’s castle) and is known today as Falak-ol-Aflak castle. It’s still intact and it has fulfilled its original military function until the XIX century; it’s one of the best surviving examples of Sasanian military architecture. The city stood on a crossroads that connected Bīšāpūr with Ctesiphon and the cities built by Šābuhr I in Xūzestān, as well as with Hamadan and northern Iran, and near it Šābuhr I built the longest bridge built in Iran in ancient times, known still today as “Shapuri Bridge”, 312 meters long and 11 meters high. It had originally 28 arches, of which only 5 stand still intact.

    Falak_Ol_Aflak_01.jpg

    Today, the old Sasanian citadel (known today as the Falak-ol-Aflak castle) still dominates the Iranian city of Khorramabad.

    Shapuri_Bridge_01.jpg

    Remains of Shapuri Bridge near Khorramabad.

    The mass deportations from the Roman empire had also the unexpected consequence of importing great numbers of Christians into Ērānšāhr, and Xūzestān became quickly a region with a Christian majority by the IV century CE. This would cause problems later when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire, but until the reign of Šābuhr II there’s no record of persecution against Christians apart from the statement of the priest Kirdēr at the KKZ. There were already important Jewish, Gnostic and Christian communities in Mesopotamia before Šābuhr I’s reign, but his mass deportations helped to increase the numbers of Christians, which by the following century had become numerous and well established in Mesopotamia and Khuzestan.

    In stark contrast with what was happening in the Roman empire, Šābuhr I kept the Sasanian silver coin, the drahm, at a high level of purity (well over 90%), a level that was preserved by all his successors during the 400 years of Sasanian rule. This was the result of a healthy trade balance and an increased economic activity (the arsacid drahm stood at a considerably lesser purity level during the rule of the last Arsacid kings) as well as the military conquests in the East and the Caucasus, which allowed Šābuhr I:
    • Control over the branch of the Silk Road that had crossed the Pamir, entered India through the Kashmir valley and following the course of the Indus river had been used by the Romans and Kushans to bypass Arsacid territory. Now, Roman sea traders from Egypt had lost this ability to bypass Sasanian tolls.
    • Control over the northernmost branch of the Silk Road, which crossed the Central Asian steppe north of Iran and reached the Caucasus to enter Roman territory through Armenia and the Pontus. Now, the Sasanians controlled Armenia and the Caucasian kingdoms of Albania and Iberia, and so they enjoyed total control over all the possible branches of the western part of the Silk Road.
    • Control over the large silver mines of the Panjšir valley in Bactria (northern Afghanistan). These mines were put under royal control and were extremely important in order to allow the Sasanians to keep the silver content of the drahm high and stable.
    The conquests of Šābuhr I must’ve also supposed a considerable increase in the total population of the Sasanian empire, as some of these areas were heavily populated. Armenia and Bactria (which were annexed for sure) were populous lands, and if further annexations were conducted south of the Hindu Kush, then the increases in population (and in taxable subjects) must’ve been higher still. But the lack of sources and evidence about the eastern conquests of the two first Sasanian kings makes it very difficult to offer any data as secure as those available for western Iran. In the case of Bactria some scholars believe that the Sasanian conquest caused a drop in population and the amount of cultivated land; but as I wrote in a previous post there’s uncertainty even about which of the two first Sasanian kings actually conquered Bactria and turned it into the new province of Tokārestān, which was to be the core of the new sub-kingdom of Kušānšāhr.
     
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    23.2 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. THE SOCIETY OF ĒRĀNŠĀHR.
  • 23.2 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. THE SOCIETY OF ĒRĀNŠĀHR.

    Quite a lot is known about the society of late antique Iran during the late century of Sasanian rule, but it’s unclear how much of this knowledge is applicable to early Sasanian Iran. By the VI century CE, Sasanian society was so hierarchically complex that in Middle Persian and early Islamic sources more than 600 different social ranks can be detected, which has caused an immense amount of confusion among scholars. By this time, the inflation of administrative, military and nobiliary titles had also reached such levels that East Roman and Islamic sources are routinely confused by them and mix titles, names and family names when referring to individuals. It’s highly unlikely that during the reigns of Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I the situation was already so extreme in this respect, but it’s probably under them when the trend began towards an ever-increasing degree of elaboration of social hierarchies.

    I’ll try to describe here in broad strokes what could have been the situation in the III century CE and which titles and ranks can be reasonably placed in this timeframe without falling in anachronisms. This is made more difficult by the fact that all the remaining sources date from the last century of Sasanian rule, or were written after the fall of the Sasanian empire. This also includes the Zoroastrian Pahlavi Books, which are the Dēnkard (written in the X century in Middle Persian) and the Bundahišn, which is dated (very tentatively) in the VIII-IX centuries. The other later sources were written by Islamic authors in New Persian or Arabic during the IX-XI centuries.

    The source of Iranian law under the Sasanians was the Zoroastrian tradition, which encompassed all the aspects of life (in a following post I’ll deal with the thorny issues of what was exactly understood as the “proper” Zoroastrian tradition and who got to determine it). As Ohrmazd had established order out of chaos and battled for the triumph of order in the cosmos, so the king had to battle and fight chaos in order to bring order in earth. Order made possible the well-being of the people, and order could only be ensured by the proper dispensation of justice by the king. If the king was unjust, then society would be thrown into chaos (this is a concept deeply enshrined in Iranian tradition, and which appears once and again in that epic compilation of Iranian national legends and traditions that is the Šāh-nāmah of Ferdowsī). And if society and its order was thrown into disorder, it was incumbent to the king to bring back order in society. And by this, what was understood was an orderly class division, which the extant sources defend vehemently.

    The concept of social order was synonymous in Sasanian times with that of class division. According to what can be discerned from the Dēnkard and Bundahišn this class division was extraordinarily rigid, but scholars are unsure if this was so in reality in Sasanian times or if this is just a theoretical abstraction put together by Zoroastrian priests that never got to be really applied in full. According to these legal principles, Sasanian society was divided into four classes (pēšag), which were (in order of precedence):
    • The priests (āsrōnān).
    • The warriors (arteštārān).
    • The husbandmen (wāstaryōšān) and farmers (dahigān).
    • The artisans and traders (hutuxšān), which were treated by Zoroastrian law as an estate separated from the other three and as being somewhat like a class of outcasts.
    In turn, each of these classes/estates were subdivided into different ranks. The priests were divided into:
    • The chief priests (mowbedān).
    • Priests attending the fires (hērbedān).
    • Expert theologians (dastūrān).
    • Judges (dādwarān).
    • Learned priests (radān).
    Surviving Middle Persian texts like the Hērbedestān provide even more titles and functions, which attests to the high degree of specialization and the ubiquity of the priestly estate in all the fields of Sasanian public life. As can be seen from the above list, judges were chosen among them, because the law was based on Zoroastrian religion and custom. In a similar way to what would later happen in the Islamic world with religious minorities, non-Zoroastrians were allowed their own judges and to use their own law for internal affairs, but in criminal cases or in cases where a Zoroastrian believer was involved, the case had to be ruled by a dādwar from among the Zoroastrian priesthood. They also acted as councilors (andarzbed) and, according to epigraphic remains, there were also councilor-priests (mowān andarzbed) who enjoyed the status of important functionaries. Another important priestly office quoted in extant sources was the Priest of Ohrmazd (ohrmazd mowbed); but please keep always in mind that scholars are not sure of when each of these titles appeared (or disappeared), which were their exact functions and if said functions varied over time. By the fifth century CE each class of priests had its own chief and there’s evidence for two of them, the chief of the mowbedān known as mowbedān mowbed (for this post, the first attested appointee is Kirdēr in the late III century CE, according to the KKZ), and for the teacher-priests attending the fires, the hērbedān hērbed.

    Bahram_Fire_Temple.jpg

    Remains of the Bahram Fire temple near Rayy, Iran.

    Priests were trained in seminaries where religious scripture and prayers were learned and memorized and theological matters were discussed under supervision. These religious schools included the mowestāns and hērbedestāns. In certain sources a title also appears which seems to have been the highest position among the priests which may be translated as “Zoroaster-like” (zarduxšttom). The zarduxšttom’s residence is not clear but he certainly had to remain in the empire and not venture out if the surviving Middle Persian sources are to be believed.

    The term which covered the religious body as a whole was dēnbarān, “those who were concerned with learning and culture” (frahang). The performance of correct ritual ceremonies (Sasanian Zoroastrianism was a religion which revolved around the correct performance of sacred rituals, above all the Yasna, which included the daily recitation by the priests -by memory alone- of its 72-part text which included the Gathas of Zoroaster) brought about the success of the warriors against the enemy and of the farmers for better cultivation of the land and salvation for the masses.

    Thus, not only the priests’ guidance, but also their actions, made certain the well-being of the society. The Middle Persian text known as the Dādestān ī Mēnōg ī Xrad (the Book of a Thousand Judgements) spells out the functions of the priest and the activities in which a priest should not partake. These include the usual expectations from a priest of any religion:

    to uphold the religion, worshipping the deities, passing judgments in religious and ritual matters based on past testaments, directing people to do well, and to show the way to heaven and to invoke the fear of hell.

    Not all priests were of course working in the state apparatus or were part of the Zoroastrian state church; some were either denounced or simply seen as heretic (a process that probably began with Kirdēr). The priests not only functioned in the religious and the legal apparatus, but also in the economic sphere as well. They were in charge of overlooking the taxes which were to be collected for the state as is evidenced by the appearance of their signature in the form of signet rings on bullae or on ostracae. In one instance a priest was condemned for cheating or lying on a question of jurisdictions between several priestly courts. The hērbedān also functioned as teachers of the religious hymns and rituals for the people, and their religious focal points were probably the fire-temples (ātaxš kadag) which were present in every village, town and city and whose remains can still be found today scattered across the Iranian countryside and which are known commonly as Chahar Taq. The fire-temples were frequented not only by those who wanted to say their prayer before the sacred fire or listen to the hērbed, but also in time of hunger and thirst people would seek the fire-temples for relief.

    The estate of the warriors (artēštārān) composed the second estate of the society and its function was to protect the empire and its subjects from external foes. This estate was formed essentially by the nobility, the supposed role of the warriors was to protect the empire, and to deal with people with gentility and keep their oath. Obviously, this was a very diverse estate, which included the sub-kings members of the House of Sāsān (šahrdārān), members of the royal house without a kingly title (wispuhrān), grandees (wuzurgān), lesser nobility (āzādān) and the gentry (dehgān). A further subdivision which was parallel to the former one was that between cavalrymen (asvārān) and infantrymen (paygān). Due to the military traditions of the Iranians, cavalrymen enjoyed a much higher status than infantrymen, and the fact that the warriors had to pay for their own equipment ensured that the prestigious ranks of the asvārān were filled with the upper classes of the nobility and their immediate retainers.

    Sasanian_Bowl.jpg

    Portrait of a nobleman at the center of a golden phial bowl, dated to the III-IV centuries CE.

    Just as the clergy had to attend seminaries, the soldiers were also to be trained in the military sciences and manuals of military warfare which were in existence and whose remnants are present in the artēštārestān in the Dēnkard. The alliance between the priests and the warriors was of paramount importance since the idea of Ērānšāhr, which had manifested itself under the Sasanians as a set territory ruled by the warrior aristocracy, conceptually had been developed and revived by the priests. This alliance was very important in the survival of the state at the beginning of the Sasanian empire, and it became part of the idyllic axiom of the Zoroastrian religion, where religion and the state were seen as two pillars which were inseparable from each other (the reality proved to be much different from this theoretical vision, though).

    All the major offices in the army (spāh) were filled by the nobility (as under the Arsacids and as until the fall of the Sasanian empire). Although later Middle Persian and Islamic sources give very detailed list of military posts, almost none of them can be dated with any certainty to the times of Šābuhr I. The major titles which are quoted in the ŠKZ for high-ranking members of Šābuhr I’s court are (by order of precedence):
    • Šābuhr, the bidaxš; this was a very high-ranking title which scholars translate roughly as “viceroy” or “king’s lieutenant”. If we take it for what it seems its literal meaning, this was a vice-king who was to act as second to the king and fulfill his role in his absence.
    • Pābag, the hazāruft (or hazārbēd); literally “the commander of the thousand”. Scholars believe that he was originally the commander of the royal guard, and by extension of the whole royal “private” army as well.
    • Pērōz, the aspbēd (chief of cavalry); it was an office inherited from Arsacid times (when the aspbēd had been the second in command of the army after the king).
    These are the only army command posts that can be securely dated to the reign of Šābuhr I. A new development in the Sasanian army under Šābuhr I was the appearance of a corps of war elephants (pīl-bānān), which would remain an important element of the spāh until the Muslim conquest. The Islamic author Tabarī wrote that Šābuhr I used these animals to raze the city of Hatra after conquering it. Most probably, the addition of elephants to the Sasanian army (the Arsacids had never used them) was a result of Šābuhr I’s conquests in the East against the Kushans. For the reign of Šābuhr I a sophisticated approach to siege warfare is also attested by the spectacular finds at Dura Europos, where it became clear that the Sasanian army had become equal to the Roman one in this field, with the use of mines, ramps and even poisonous gas. According to the IV century CE author Ammianus Marcellinus, the only field where the Romans retained a technical advantage was in artillery.

    Sasanian_seal_01.png

    Sasanian royalty, nobles, priests and scribes used personal ring seals . This drawing by the Belgian numismatist Ryka Gyselen depicts the personal seal of Weh-dēn-Šābuhr Ērānanbaragbed, a member of the nobility and a high functionary (the Ērānanbaragbed was in command of the overall supply of the whole Sasanian military).

    The third estate consisted of the husbandmen (wāstaryōšān), and farmers (dahigān), whose function was to till the land and keep the empire prosperous, and were represented by a chief of husbandmen (wāstaryōšān sālār). They were producers of the foodstuffs as well as the tax base for the empire and as a result the land under cultivation was surveyed by the government and taxes exacted from it, although probably this was only true for the lands under direct royal control. Land cultivation was a pious act according to the Zoroastrian religion and letting it sit idle a sin. The function of the farmers was “farming and bringing cultivation and as much as possible, bringing ease and prosperity.”

    The fourth estate was treated somewhat separately by Zoroastrian law. They were the traders and artisans (hutuxšān). Based on the structure and the differentiating language in extant Middle Persian texts, an uneasiness by the priests towards the artisans/merchants can be perceived. In chapter 30 of the Dādestān ī Mēnōg ī Xrad, the author discusses the function of the first three estates, and while the priests, warriors, and husbandmen/peasants are treated under this chapter the artisans are treated in a separate section in chapter 31. The language and the length employed in specifying the function of this estate reflects the negative view of the Zoroastrian priesthood regarding the artisan class:

    (They) should not undertake a task with which they are not familiar, and perform well and with concentration those tasks which they know. Ask for fair wages, because if someone does not know a task and performs that task, it is possible for him to ruin it or leave it unfinished, and that man himself is satisfied it would be a sin for him.

    The negative tone of this passage when compared with that of the previous chapter dealing with the first three estates shows that when Zoroastrian priests began to codify laws in regard to social matters, the artisans/merchants were placed at the very bottom. This dim view of the artisans or the merchant class is especially important in the face of the large number of artisans/merchants in the Sasanian empire in Late Antiquity. This negative view probably contributed to the reduction of the involvement of Zoroastrian believers in these tasks which were left to religious minorities. It also appears that the government was never involved in opening economic markets or actively engaged in business, but rather private individuals were to be the major proponents of trade. The government was only to assure the upkeep and safety of the roads and to exact toll road taxes.

    This also reflects a deep incongruence (almost a “schizophrenic” attitude) on behalf of Sasanian kings. On one side, they were deeply tied to Zoroastrianism, its core beliefs and its priesthood and traditions (which we should remember were also those of the very class they represented and which ruled the empire, the Iranian nobility). They took pains in showing themselves as stout supporters of the Good Religion: in his rock inscriptions, Šābuhr I called himself “the Mazdayasnian (or Mazda-whorshipping) Majesty”, boasted about his foundation of many sacred fires and his protection of the Zoroastrian priesthood and in the reverse of his coins a fire altar is always shown. But on the other hand he built a large number of new towns and cities which were centers of trade and artisan activity, and filled them with non-Zoroastrian deportees. As we will see in a later post, Šābuhr I is a somewhat special case, but all his successors including those who were much more unwavering supporters of Zoroastrianism (like Šābuhr II) kept exactly the same politics in this respect, which has led to perplexity among historians. Because what is true is that in the long run the proliferation of new cities and the growing urbanization of the Iranian plateau contributed to the undermining of the archaic social order which was based in the old Iranian pre-Iron Age traditions of which Zoroastrianism was their religious reflection. Already under Šābuhr I, this tension began to surface with the king’s protection of Mani, which probably raised great outrage among the ranks of the āsrōnān.

    The ranks of the merchants and artisans in the older cities (like Ctesiphon or Susa) and in the new ones, either outside or inside the Iranian plateau, were filled by Jews, Christians, Manicheans, Mandaeans, Buddhists and several other assorted minorities, whose members were usually also not ethnical Iranians, but rather Semitic Arameans or Arabs in the west and Sogdians in the east, and this in turn only served to entrench more the mistrust of the Zoroastrian priesthood over them. This may be a reason why Islam spread rapidly when it was introduced to the Iranian plateau, because it was business-friendly. After all the Prophet Muhammad, a merchant himself, lived in Mecca, an important trading city, and he was well aware of the importance of the merchant class in society.

    Royal workshops were controlled by the state to hold up the standards in the making of such commodities as the silver dishes used as propaganda instruments and the production of glass and other goods for the nobility. Roman and Mesopotamian skilled workers were among this group which used Roman techniques in artistic production. The cities where these foreign laborers were established and those who worked in the royal workshops (probably under the status of royal slaves captured in war) were kept under close watch. A guild Master (Kārragbed) was in charge of the production and the workers. All four estates were overseen by a pēšag sālār which according to legal texts was the chief of the estates and ensured the maintenance of the proper social order.

    Of course, this division was what is reflected in Zoroastrian religious and legal texts which as I’ve said before are dated in some cases to three centuries after the fall of the Sasanian empire. If we were to believe them, a poor Zoroastrian peasant would be privileged by law with respect to, let’s say a rich Christian Aramean merchant ... which sounds quite improbable.

    As the complexity of the Sasanian state grew, the number of professional bureaucrats grew accordingly. Although they never formed an estate according to the archaic class system of Zoroastrian law, bureaucrats belonged to an “informal” social class of scribes (dibīrān). It’s perhaps symptomatic of the deep conservatism of Iranian society that it still needed a class os scribes when professional scribes had all but disappeared from other settled cultures both to the east and west of the Iranian plateau. This was due to the archaic writing system that was employed in Arsacid and Sasanian times: the Pahlavi scripts which were used to write the Parthian and Middle Persian languages.

    The Pahlavi script is first attested in coins issued by king Aršak I, the founder of the Arsacid dynasty. The word for “Parthian” in the Parthian language is “Pahlavi”, and hence the name with which these scripts are known. It’s a script derived from the imperial Aramaic script which was a modification of the Aramaic alphabet used under the Achaemenids to write down the several Iranian languages (of which the best attested under the Achaemenids is Old Persian). The main types of Pahlavi scripts are:
    • Inscriptional Parthian, used by the arsacid kings in their monumental inscriptions.
    • Inscriptional Pahlavi, used by the Sasanian kings in their great rock inscriptions like the ŠKZ.
    • Psalter Pahlavi, whose name is derived from the so-called "Pahlavi Psalter", a VI-VII century CE translation of a Syriac book of psalms; its use was peculiar to the Nestorian Church of the East which flourished across the Sasanian empire under Sasanian rule.
    • Book Pahlavi, which was the most common form of the script and the one which is better known, as all the surviving Zoroastrian religious literature that has survived in Middle Persian was written using this script, which was kept in use by the Zoroastrian clergy well after the Islamization of the Iranian plateau.
    It’s a common mistake to refer to the language spoken by the Sasanian kings which became the official language of the Sasanian empire as “Pahlavi”. The correct name for the language is Middle Persian (Pārsīg), the use of the term “Pahlavi” to refer to it was a development of the early medieval era, when “Pahlavi” became the term to refer to the older form of Persian to which the remaining Zoroastrians still clung to, in opposition to the new language “Farsi” (known in linguistics as New Persian). The most distinctive trait of Pahlavi scripts is that, although they were originally based on an alphabetical writing system, they were not alphabetical scripts.

    Pahlavi_Psalter_01.png

    A folio of the Pahlavi Psalter.

    The most puzzling characteristic of Pahlavi scripts was the use of logograms (known as huzvārishn in Middle Persian): many common words, including even pronouns, particles, numerals, and auxiliaries, were spelled according to their Aramaic equivalents, but were to be read as Iranian words, which sounded completely different to their Aramaic counterparts. For example, the word for "dog" was written as ⟨KLBʼ⟩ (Aramaic kalbā) but pronounced sag (the Persian word for “dog”); and the word for "bread" would be written as Aramaic ⟨LḤMʼ⟩ (laḥmā) but understood as the sign for Persian nān (notice also how, following the custom of Semitic alphabets, the system included no vowels). And the “fun” did not end here: a logogram could also be followed by letters expressing parts of the Persian word phonetically, for example ⟨ʼB-tr⟩ for pitar "father". Grammatical endings were usually also written phonetically (but as in Persian, not as in Aramaic). A logogram did not necessarily originate from the lexical form of the word in Aramaic, it could also come from a declined or conjugated Aramaic form. For example, "you" (singular) was spelt ⟨LK⟩ (Aramaic "to you", including the preposition l-). A word could be written phonetically even when a logogram for it existed (pitar could be ⟨ʼB-tr⟩ or ⟨pytr⟩), but logograms were nevertheless used very frequently in texts.

    Ashem_Vohu.jpg

    This is the oldest surviving manuscript of a sacred Zoroastrian text. containing the Ashem Vohu, a part of the Yasna. It's dated to the X century and it was found in Dunhuang in Xinjiang, it's written in the Sogdian language using the Avestan script.

    The convergence in form of many of the characters of Book Pahlavi causes a high degree of ambiguity in most Pahlavi writing which can only be solved by the context. Some mergers are restricted to particular groups of words or individual spellings. Further ambiguity is added by the fact that even outside of ligatures, the boundaries between letters are not clear, and many letters look identical to combinations of other letters. As an example, one may take the fact that the name of God, Ohrmazd, could equally be read (and, in Pārs, often was read) Anhoma. The system was so open to confusion that when the priests finally decided to write the Avesta down, they developed a specifically unambiguous fully alphabetical system for it, the Avestan alphabet. The insistence of the peoples of the Iranian plateau in keeping this cumbersome and complex script is puzzling considering that their eastern and western neighbors, as well as some communities within the empire used alphabetic scripts: Sogdian and Bactrian (both Iranian languages), Sanskrit, Aramaic (main language in Mesopotamia and Khuzestan), Arabic, Armenian, Greek and Latin all used alphabetical scripts.

    The complexity of Book Pahlavi and the great number of languages that were spoken within the vast Sasanian empire made scribes indispensable for Sasanian kings. They performed a variety of functions and needed to have several skills. Some scribes accompanied the Sasanian army and were in its service (dibīr-spāh and gund-dibīr) while other scribes were in the employment of the local provincial kings. Royal scribes were also responsible for ordering the writing of the imperial inscriptions, and then written drafts were translated into Greek, Arabic, Sanskrit and other languages. Some had to be bilingual for translating and writing in other languages and probably some were drawn from Rome, Arabia and other regions. The scribes have left us seals which demonstrate their rank and the region they covered, from simple dibīr to the chief scribe (dibīrbed). At schools (dibīrstān), the dibīrān were expected to be able to learn different forms of handwriting, such as calligraphic script (xūb-nibēg), shorthand script (rag-nibēg), subtle knowledge (bārīk-dānišn), and to develop nimble fingers (kāmgār-angust). Apparently they were expected to have knowledge of different scripts employed for writing which included the religious script (dēn-dibīrīh), that is., the Avestan script which was invented in the Sasanian period (which was not a Pahlavi script) and a “comprehensive script” (wīš-dibīrīh) whose nature and function is unclear. Islamic sources state that it was used for physiognomy, divination and other "unorthodox" purposes. A third script, known as turned or cursive script (gaštag-dibīrīh) was used for recording contracts and other legal documents, medicine and philosophy; and there even existed a “secret script” (rāz-dibīrīh) was for such affairs as secret correspondence among kings. A sixth script was used for letters (nāmag-dibīrīh), and the seventh was the common script (hām-dibīrīh). The dibīrān were to draft letters (nāmag) and correspondence (frawardag) and a specimen of a manual of style about the manner in which one should write for different purposes and occasions has survived to our days.

    The ranks of the dibīrān included also the accountants (āmār-dibīrān) who used a specific script known as šahr-āmār-dibīrīh. The court accountant (kadag-āmār-dibīr) used the kadag-āmār-dibīrīh, the treasury accountants (ganj-āmār-dibīrān) used the ganj-āmār-dibīrīh script, and the accountant of the royal stables (āxwar-āmār-dibīr) used the (āxwar-āmār-dibīrīh) script. There were also accountants employed by the fire-temples, (ātaxšān-āmār-dibīrān) who used the ātaxšān-āmār-dibīrīh script. The accountants of the pious foundations (ruwānagān-āmār-dibīrān) used the ruwānagān-dibīrīh script. Royal tax collectors sent to the provinces of the empire were known as šahr-dibīr. Judicial decisions were written down by legal scribes (dād-dibīrān) who used the dād-dibīrīh script. Documents or contracts drawn up by these scribes in relation to legal matters were taken from a known legal phraseology and then signed with wax and seal (gil ud nāmag), and copies were kept in separate archives (nāmag-miyān). They also had to keep a record of the minutes in tribunals of inquiry. These legal scribes were probably drawn from the clergy as they had to deal with Zoroastrian law. There were several kinds of contracts and documents which included royal decrees (dibīpādixšāykard), treaties (pādixšīr), certificates of divorce (hilišn-nāmag), manumission certificates (āzād-nāmag), and title deeds for the transfer of property for pious purposes (pādixšīr), ordeal warrants (uzdād-nāmag) as well as an ordeal document (yazišn-nāmag) drawn up for the guilty. In relation to the holy scripture, the copiers of the scripture (dēn-dibīrān) used the dēn-dibīrīh to write down sacred texts (including the Avesta). The head of the scribes like any other profession held the title with the suffix “master” (-bed), thus dibīrbed. The scribes had an increasingly important presence in the Sasanian court across its 400-year history and with the coming of the Arabs, they were to stay and render their services to the Caliphate.

    What one can surmise from this overly complicated (and probably incomplete) list (which I’ve extracted from Touraj Daryaee’s book Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire) is that although Sasanian society was highly bureaucratized and made ample use of written texts, the writing system of Middle Persian was, by its very nature, reserved for the use of a handful of professional scribes who only complicated matters further by multiplying the variants of script in use. Still today scholars have troubles trying to read many Pahlavi texts, and the rendition of Middle Persian words into Latin script is notably inconsistent (Shapur, Shapuhr, Šābuhr, Šāpuhr, etc.) mainly because scholars can’t agree about the exact reading and pronunciation of many words. The result of this was that literacy only became relatively commonplace among merchants and artisans in the cities but not in Pahlavi script, but in Aramaic, Sogdian, Manichean, and other alphabetic scripts that were much easier to master.
     
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    23.3 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. RELIGION AND ŠĀBUHR I’S PLACE IN IRAN’S “NATIONAL TRADITION”.
  • 23.3 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. RELIGION AND ŠĀBUHR I’S PLACE IN IRAN’S “NATIONAL TRADITION”.

    In this post I will address one of the most “controversial” aspects of Šābuhr I’s reign: his religious policy, and how this was probably the reason that Šābuhr I became almost shunned from Iranian “national tradition”, as reflected in Firdawsī’s great epic the Šāh-nāmah. But first, I will try to explain two important points: what’s the “Iranian national tradition” and what kind of religion was Zoroastrianism, because I think that these are two concepts that are either completely unknown or misunderstood by a modern western public.

    Today, Iran is a state in the modern sense, the Islamic Republic of Iran. But since Sasanian times and perhaps earlier the peoples living on the Iranian plateau have shared a collective identity framed around a series of myths whose origins predate the intrusion of the Aryan peoples into Central Asia and their division into Iranians and Indo-Aryans. These legendary myths and tales became intermingled with Zoroastrian sacred tradition to the point where it became impossible to distinguish between “Aryan secular lore” and “Zoroastrian doctrine”, they became just intricately mixed common tradition. This tradition in time became so deeply entrenched that even the Islamic conquest, which made tabula rasa with the preexisting religions, cultural traditions and even languages of the Late Antique Middle East, could wipe it out. Out of all the peoples conquered by the first wave of Islamic conquests, Iranians were the only ones who did not only avoid becoming completely acculturated, but they managed in a time frame of three centuries to impose their own language (New Persian) as the prestige language of the Islamic world between Egypt and India, and to “colonize” the state structures and courtly life of the Abbasid Caliphate with their own practices and customs which dated back to Sasanian times.

    This “resurgence” of Iranian (or, in Islamic medieval terms, “Persianate”) culture is signaled by the great milestone of Firdawsī’s monumental epic poem, the Šāh-nāmah (the Book of Kings) which he wrote during the late X and early XI centuries CE in Khorasan, first for the Samanid court and finally for the Turkish Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni. Firdawsī himself was the scion of a family of landed gentry, the old Sasanian dehgānān, which bemoaned in his epic the loss of the ancient greatness of Iran. In his magnum opus, Firdawsī recovered and recycled all the old Iranian tradition and reissued it again under a now acceptable monotheistic, Islamic garb. Although some scholars have pretended to see Zoroastrian elements in Firdawsī’s epic, he was a Muslim and his work is permeated by Islamic monotheism. But at the same time, he went as far as to even provide an “alternative” history of the Creation of the world which does not accord with the Quran and Abrahamic tradition at all; and which is totally Irano-centric and reuses all the ancient Aryan myths, combined with tales originated from the minstrels (gosān) of the Arsacid era and historical written works from the Sasanian era, especially the now lost Xwadāy-Nāmag (the Book of Lords), written during the VI or early VII century at the Sasanian court.

    Thus, Firdawsī’s epic draws from three sources for its narrative:
    • Ancient “Aryan” myths which are even pre-Zoroastrian in origin, and which were eventually co-opted into Zoroastrian cosmogony, but which also survived as oral myths and traditions among the populace at large.
    • The large and ancient corpus of Iranian epic stories, which was composed in Arsacid times by traveling minstrels (the gosān) in Pahlavi and mostly in eastern Iran, and which survived again at popular level by means of oral tradition (probably still being told by professional storytellers).
    • The “official history” of the Sasanian dynasty, as compiled in the Xwadāy-Nāmag. This book was probably first written under Khusrō I in the VI century CE and revised for the last time under the last Sasanian king Yazdgerd III in the VII century CE. This was a propagandistic work written in Middle Persian in the milieu of the Sasanian royal court and it’s been lost. But early Islamic authors often used it and mentioned its existence; it was translated into Arabic in the first half of the VIII century CE by the Iranian convert to Islam Ibn al-Muqaffa, and this translation was used by several later authors who wrote both in Arabic and New Persian as their main source about pre-Islamic Iranian history.
    Parallel to this “Islamized” tradition, there is another tradition, which after the Muslim conquest of Iran grew ever less relevant and which has only arrived to our days in a partial form, in the Pahlavi Books that form the religious supplement to the Zoroastrian Avesta. This is the Zoroastrian tradition, which is especially valuable because it had its origins among the Zoroastrian priesthood of Sasanian times and was independent from the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition; in this sense it offers the only example of an alternative storyline of the Sasanian dynasty independent of the propagandistic efforts of the Sasanian kings (the Zoroastrian priesthood was probably the only organization strong and independent enough in Sasanian Iran to achieve such a feat). And it’s obviously not impartial either, because it transmits the views and opinions of the Zoroastrian priesthood. Another important characteristic of this tradition is that while the Xwadāy-Nāmag was written during Khusrō I’s reign probably using oral traditions, the priestly tradition preserves bits and fragments which are much older than that, and probably using written sources contemporary to the facts.

    The surprising fact is that Šābuhr I “the Great” is almost ignored in the Šāh-nāmah, where Firdawsī basically describes him as “Ardaxšīr I’s son” and then proceeds to conflate him with Šābuhr II (actually basically Firdawsī tells a fanciful biography of Šābuhr II and attributes to him several of the victories achieved by Šābuhr I, who basically disappears from the work). And the Šāh-nāmah’s diffident attitude is reflected in the Dēnkard and Bundahišn, in what is an even more surprising lack of enthusiasm about the figure of this king, because as I wrote before, Zoroastrian priests had direct access to written sources dating back to the III century CE (the Zoroastrian tradition never makes the mistake of conflating two different kings in one like Firdawsī does, a clear sign that the priests managed more reliable sources).

    This coincidence is surprising to say the least, considering the great successes of Šābuhr I’s reign, but the fact is that the title “the Great” was given to this king by modern historiography, not by the Iranian tradition. What did Šābuhr I do in order to deserve this cool treatment in Sasanian historiography (almost like a damnatio memoriae)? The answer lies probably in his religious policies: Šābuhr I protected Mani, one of the two great heresiarchs of Sasanian history (together with Mazdak) and the mowbedān never forgave him for this.

    In order to understand the relationship that probably developed between Šābuhr I, Mani and the mowbedān, I think that first it’s necessary to try to summarize the nature of Sasanian Zoroastrianism and especially of early Sasanian Zoroastrianism, which is no easy task. I’ll try to be as brief as possible but I’m afraid that in order to be able to make some sense this will have to be a bit long. Rather than entering into a description of Zoroastrianism, its doctrines and practices, I’ll try to put together a summary history of the evolution of Zoroastrianism until the times of Šābuhr I.

    Scholarly study of Zoroastrianism has seen a considerable upheaval in the last thirty years. Ever since the XVIII century, when the Avesta was first translated into French and English, western scholars have approached Zoroastrianism as if it were yet another Abrahamic, monotheistic religion, centered around a doctrine expressed in a revealed Holy Scripture of divinely inspired origins. But recent studies during the last three decades have altered significantly this vision. For my summary I will follow the opinions of Harvard professor Prods Oktor Skjærvø in his book The Spirit of Zoroastrianism and his paper The Videvdad: its Ritual-Mythical Significance, included in The Age of the Parthians, part of The Idea of Iran series, edited by Vesta Sarkosh Curtis.

    Zoroastrianism is a very ancient religious tradition, although only in later times did it become a single “religion” as we would understand it in western terms by analogy with Islam or Christianity. Its religious literature is written in several languages: Old Avestan, Young Avestan, Middle Persian, Farsi and Gujarati.

    Bazeh_Khur_Khorasan.jpg

    Remains of the fire temple of Bazeh Khur in Khorasan, dating to the late Arsacid era.

    Of this literature, the sacred scripture proper is the Avesta, which is divided into Old and Young Avesta, written respectively in Old and Young Avestan. As Skjærvø remarks, the Avesta is not a holy scripture in the Abrahamic sense. For starters, of all the manuscripts of the Avesta that existed among the Zoroastrians before the XIX century, there’s not a single example of a comprehensive volume that included all the sacred texts. They were always partial compilations, and their textual transmission can’t be traced further back than 1000 CE. So, rather than imagining the Avesta as a holy book, it would be more accurate to think of it as a “holy tradition”, formed by a wide variety of texts which were composed in very different periods of time.

    Secondly, as Skjærvø notes, the sacred texts of the Avesta came into light as oral literature, and survived for a very long time as an oral tradition; they were written down in the (especially created for the task) Avestan script during the V century CE, or perhaps even later.

    For reconstructing and understanding the history of Zoroastrianism, linguistics and literary studies are fundamental, as there’s very little remaining evidence available outside the texts themselves. Today it’s widely acknowledged among scholars that the oldest part of the Avesta (the Old Avesta) was composed in the late second millennium BCE, between 1500 and 1000 BCE, somewhere in Central Asia. Scholars have arrived to this conclusion because Old Avestan is a language very similar to the language of the Rigveda, and so it must have appeared roughly at a similar point in time. Old Avestan is an eastern Iranian language (like Sogdian, Bactrian, Pashto or Yaghnobi), and by the timeframe of the composition of the Avesta, Iranian tribes had probably not yet entered the Iranian plateau from Central Asia; the oldest references to Iranian peoples in the plateau come from Assyrian royal records of the IX century BCE, which refer to Medes and Persians; other tribes/peoples entered the plateau late, between this date and the VI-V centuries BCE.

    The Old Avesta is formed by the five Gāthās and the Yasna Haptanghāiti which are recited in the Yasna, the main Zoroastrian ritual. The Gāthās have been considered traditionally to be the work of Zarathustra himself, but current scholars disagree with this tradition; as Skjærvø notes in his translation of the Gāthās, in them Zarathustra “talks” sometimes in the first person, but most times he’s addressed to in the second person, or referred to in the third person. As Skjærvø notes, the Gāthās are very complex works of poetry, but unless the syntax, grammar and vocabulary of the text is coerced to the extreme (as has been the habit of scholars for the last two centuries), the very text of the Gāthās leaves little doubt that Zarathustra is not their author, but as Skjærvø points out, a mythical figure, probably the first poet-sacrificer of the Aryan legend/tradition, who is invoked by the author or authors of the text.

    Recitation of Yasna 28 (beginning of the Ahunuvaiti Gāthā).

    This means that the Gāthās are apocryphal texts, probably the work of several authors in their origin, and which were later “reworked” even more during their oral transmission. But it should be remembered that according to modern Zoroastrian tradition (and it was probably also so in Sasanian times), they were dictated by Ahura Mazdā to Zarathustra himself. While the Gāthās are hymns in verse, the Yasna Haptanghāiti is a collection of seven hymns in prose; they make no reference to Zarathustra, but they contain valuable references to the religious world of the Aryan people in which the Zoroastrian tradition appeared.

    The Old Avestan texts were transmitted orally for centuries, and during the first centuries it was probably deemed permissible (perhaps even expected to) that the priest/poet/sacrificer who recited them embellished them and added his own personal touches during the ritual reciting of the text. But at one given point in time, the text became “crystallized” (as it’s called in the theory of oral literature), and no further changes were allowed. Skjærvø correlates this development with the moment in time when Old Avestan had become a dead language and was no longer properly understood, and so in fear of twisting its meaning or committing blasphemy, the priests no longer allowed themselves the slightest change, and the Old Avestan texts began to be recited by memory without fully understanding them, and the transmission between each generation of priests became also a matter of strict phonetic memorization. Skjærvø offers a date around 1000 BCE for the crystallization of Old Avestan texts, based on the estimated date when according to linguistics Old Avestan evolved into Young Avestan.

    The Young Avesta is quite longer than the Old Avesta. The texts that form it are dated by Skjærvø between 1000 BCE and 500 BCE. It includes:
    • The twenty-one Yašts, hymns to divinities or divinized concepts.
    • The Vendidad, a collection of rituals and practices to “keep the demons (Avestan daēwa) away”.
    • The Visperad, which rather than a text on its own is a collection of passages that are used in substitution of the usual Yasna passages when the Yasna is turned into a Visperad ritual.
    • Several other texts or text collections of minor importance, like the Siroza or the Gahs.
    What I wrote above about the “crystallization” of the Old Avestan texts also applies to the Young Avestan ones. Skjærvø considers that by 500 BCE (around the times of Darius I) the Young Avestan corpus also became fixed in form.

    Recitation of the Bahrām yašt (Yašt 14) in honor of Verethragna.

    Traditional Zoroastrianism was a religion centered around ritual; the main function of the Avestan texts was (and still is) to be recited in the daily Yasna ritual, which takes place every day at sunrise. The Yasna ritual consists in the recitation of a long series of 72 parts drawn from the Old and Young Avesta. The five Gāthās, the Yasna Haptanghāiti and the Yašts are included in their entirety. The Yasna ritual is a ritual whose function is to reproduce the new day after a period of darkness. It is to be timed so that the recital of Yasna 62, the hymn to the fire, coincides with sunrise. In the Old Iranian cosmological scheme, its function was to help place Ahura Mazdā back in command of the universe.

    This process involved the ritual recreation of a microcosmic version of the macrocosm. It was in turn patterned on the myth of the primordial creation of the world. The Yasna text therefore takes its participants through this recreation process. It begins with the reconstruction and re-ordering of all the elements in the worlds of thought and of living beings. In the Yasna, this re-ordering process is followed by the story of Zarathustra’s birth from the haoma ritual and several other texts containing important elements of the primordial sacrifice performed by Ahura Mazdā at the beginning of the living world. It culminates in the preparation and offering of the haoma drink, at which point, presumably, Zarathustra is reborn in the persona of the sacrificer and proceeds to recite his Gāthās. According to Zoroastrian tradition, these are the holy texts that Zarathustra received from Ahura Mazdā, who had recited them in the beginning in order to cast down the Evil One and which Zarathustra in turn recites with the same effect. The recitation of the holy texts comes to an end with the prayer to Airiiaman, the god of peace and healing.

    The Yasna then continues with a hymn to the great martial deity, Sraoša, who battles and overcomes the powers of darkness. There follow hymns to the fire and the heavenly waters, signifying the rebirth of the sun and the new day. The Yasna ritual is therefore a re-ordering ritual, which, when successful, will help Ahura Mazdā re-engender the ordered cosmos, characterized by sunlight, life, and fertility. It complements Ahura Mazdā’s efforts in the world of thought, where he fights the evil powers together with his divine helpers. Of these divine helpers, one of the most important is Sraoša, who, with his fearless club, is the opponent assigned to Wrath with the bloody club. Wrath, in fact, is probably the mythical embodiment of the night sky and the principal representative of the powers of darkness. At sunset, Wrath smites Ahura Mazdā’s creation and bathes it in blood, but he is in turn himself struck down and bled by Sraoša (so important was Sraoša to ancient Iranians that he was coopted into the Islamic array of angels in heaven). The other crucial helper is Airiiaman, god of peace and healing. The result of the Yasna ritual is thus the re-ordering and rebirth of the cosmos.

    Daily life was also regulated by endless practices and rituals norms intended to avoid the daēwas, and civilian law was also written along the lines of Zoroastrian religious laws, with priests acting as judges.

    As after 500 BCE (according to Skjærvø) Avestan was a dead language, Zoroastrian priests found themselves in need of some kind of commentaries or exegetical tradition to help them understand the full (or “correct”) meaning of the Avestan texts. These commentaries are known as Zand. With the exception of the Yašts, all Avestan text have their accompanying Zand. This practice began already in Young Avestan times, as there remain three Zand written in Young Avestan about Old Avestan texts. There were Zands composed in all the Iranian languages spoken by the ancient Iranian peoples, but only the Middle Persian ones have survived, and are thus considered “the” Zand.

    By the first centuries of the Islamic era, a large corpus of oral traditions had been accumulated, which was referred to in Middle Persian as the Tradition (dēn). Even after writing became common, oral tradition was considered superior, and Zoroastrian authors more often referred to what is “said in the Tradition” than to what is “written”.

    I’ll try now to give a (very general) idea of what were the precepts of ancient Zoroastrianism (which are not the same as the ones followed by modern Parsis, which have changed and adapted their faith considerably since the XIX century to adapt it to the modern world). In my attempt I will follow closely the description offered by Prods Oktor Skjærvø in his (highly recommendable) book The Spirit of Zoroastrianism.

    The Avesta describes a universe divided between the worlds of gods and living beings and caught up in a battle between good and evil. The world of gods, that “of thought” can only be apprehended by thought, while this world, that “of living beings” or the world “with bones”, is conceived and born as a living being. The two worlds (Avestan ahu) oscillate between the states of good and evil, light and darkness, health and sickness, life and death and so on. In this dualistic scenario, all things in the universe, including gods and men, belong in one or the other camp in the conflict. The return to the state of light and life will happen when, strengthened by the sacrifices offered by humans, Ahura Mazdā regains command of the universe, the good deities overcome the evil ones, and the universe is healed and reborn. The origins of good and evil are two Spirits (Avestan manyu “mental impulse, inspiration”), depicted as “twin sleeps” (sleeping things), presumably twin fetuses embodying contrasting and irreconcilable potentials for good and evil. When these two Spirits “come together” (in battle), the next existence will be determined. At that point, all beings, including the gods, must declare for good or evil by choosing either Order or Chaos, as must every Mazdean believer by uttering the Frawarānē as stated in Yasna 10.16:

    I belong to the sustainer of Order, not to the one possessed by the Lie, and that will be so until in the end, when the victory between the two spirits comes about.

    The good Spirit is “Life-giving” (Avestan spenta manyu), a characteristic of all good entities in the world of thought. The underlying idea is “swelling,” that is, with the juices of fertility and fecundity. Thus, in the Old Avesta, the purpose of the battle is to revitalize the world by making it fraša “juicy”. The other spirit is angra, which according to Skjærvø’s translation may originally have meant “dark, black” in the Gāthās, but Angra Mainyu was already being rendered as “Evil Spirit” in the young Avestan texts. In the Young Avesta, the other world is thought of as controlled by one or the other spirit and is called “that of the Spirits” (Avestan manyawa).

    Ahura Mazdā’s first world was an ordered world, where everything was in its proper place. The principle of the cosmic order was Avestan aša (or erta, cognate of Old Indic rta, as used in the Rigveda), translated by Skjærvø as “order”, and whose literal meaning would probably be “something (harmoniously) fitted together.” It was produced by Ahura Mazdā’s though, and its visible form is the day-lit sky with the sun. The opposing principle is the cosmic deception or Lie (drug, druj), which deceives men and gods as to the true nature of the universe, making them think the wicked are good. Those on the side of Order are called “sustainers of Order,” those on the side of the Lie “possessed by the Lie”.

    Cosmos and chaos are also represented by Good Thought as the sunlit day sky, contrasted with Wrath as the dark, sunless night sky, in which the deities of the good creation are seen as stars battling against darkness. The pair aša/drug clearly continues for Skjærvø the old Indo-European concept of cosmos and chaos. In Iranian tradition , the original state of the universe before Ahura Mazdā ordered it was darkness, implicit in the statement that Ahura Mazdā caused the spaces to be suffused by light. Chaos was a subversion of Ahura Mazdā’s cosmos, caused by the supremacy of the powers of evil when strengthened by the sacrifices of those opposed to Ahura Mazdā, including evil poets and sacrificers (the Gathic kawi and karpan). At the end of time, aša will “have bones,” and the cosmos will be permanently ruled by aša.

    The supreme deity in the Avesta is Ahura Mazdā, literally, “the All-knowing (ruling) Lord”, where according to Skjærvø maz-dāh is an adjective meaning approximately “he who places (everything) in his mind”). In the Gāthās, the two epithets are still independent words, while, in the Young Avesta, Ahura Mazdā had become a single name, and it is doubtful whether the original meaning was still known. By the Achaemenid period, the name was one word, Ahuramazdā, which in turn became Middle Persian Ohrmazd, Hormazd, and similar. Ahura Mazdā ordered the cosmos and upholds the cosmic Order, and he is the benevolent ruler of the ordered cosmos. He is said to be the father of several gods: in the Gāthās, Good Thought, Order, and Ārmaiti–Humility; in the Young Avesta, all the Life-giving Immortals, as well as several other deities. His abode is the House of Song (garō-dmāna, garō-nmāna). Ahura Mazdā also sees to it that his fellow deities, who are all needed for victory over the forces of darkness and the good functioning of the cosmos, receive their share of sacrifices and praise; by sacrificing to them himself, he provides Zarathustra with the model for humans to do likewise.

    According to the Young Avesta, Ahura Mazdā had brought to life the Life-giving Immortals (Avestan ameša spentas) through his primordial sacrifice, which were:
    • Good (Best) Thought (Avestan vohu manah, Middle Persian wahuman, wahman).
    • Best Order (aša vahišta, Middle Persian ašwahišt, ardwahišt, urdwahišt).
    • Well-deserved Command (khšathra uuairiya, Middle Persian khšahrewar, šahrewar).
    • Life-giving Humility (spentā ārmaiti, Middle Persian spandarmad).
    • Wholeness (haurwatāt, Middle Persian hordad)
    • Undyingness (amertatāt, amertāt, Middle Persian amurdad),
    The Old and Young Avesta also name a long list of gods who inhabit the world of thought and fight alongside Ahura Mazdā in his cosmic struggle, some of them are:
    • Airyaman was the god of healing and harmonious unions, already named in the Gāthās.
    • Already mentioned in the Old Avesta, in the Young Avesta Sraoša, “with the defiant mace,” was a warrior god, whose main function was to destroy evil gods and other harmful beings, especially Wrath (aēshma), who according to Avestan cosmogony smashes the sun with his “bloody mace” every day and bathes the sky in blood. The hymn to Sraoša (Yasna 56–57) is therefore recited just before sunrise to invigorate him for the showdown with the powers of darkness. Sraoša was also the first sacrificer and the first to recite the Gāthās in the world of thought (Yasna 57.8), and, according to later tradition, he will preside over the punishment for sins in the hereafter.
    • Aši (also Ašiš Wanghwi “good Aši”, Middle Persian Ard, Ahlišwang, Ašišwang) was Sraoša’s female companion and was goddess of “the sending off,” presumably of the rewards. She was Mithra's charioteer and also, apparently, that of Zarathustra in his fight with the Evil Spirit.
    • Mithra (Avestan Miθra, Middle Persian Mihr), whose name is distantly related to the English word “mutual”, was the overseer of obligations inherent in deals and contracts between gods and men, and men and men. He is not explicitly named in the Old Avesta. He was invoked by warriors before battle to make him strike fear into the hearts of those who break peace treaties. He would never sleep, had an inordinately large number of eyes and ears, and was able to survey vast areas like a shepherd, as implied by his epithet “having wide pastures”. He dwelt in a house built by Ahura Mazdā and the Life-giving Immortals on the top of Mount Harā, the mountain in the middle of the earth (around which heaven turns), which is unsullied by evil. At dawn, he would go forth from there in front of the sun to clear its path. He was identified with the morning star, Aphrodite (Venus), according to Herodotus.
    • Rašnu, “the straightener,” was the god of everything straight, including straight (not crooked) behavior and spinning and weaving. According to the Pahlavi books, he was one of the judges in the beyond. A related deity with unclear function was Rectitude (Arštāt).
    • Ardwī Sūrā Anāhitā (Middle Persian Anāhīd) was a female deity identified with the heavenly river, probably the Milky Way. Her hymn was Yašt 5. She was named by her epithets “lofty, rich in life-giving strength, unattached” (or “unsullied”).
    • Tištriya (Middle Persian Tištar) was the Iranian name of the star Sirius, who fought drought personified as the demon Apaoša, and the Witch of Bad Seasons, as well as the “witches” who fall from heaven (shooting stars). In his hymn (Yašt 8) his battle with Apaoša to release the waters is described, in which he is aided by the star Satawāesa.
    • Verethragna (Middle Persian Warahrān, Wahrām, Bahrām) was the victorious warrior god and one of Mithra's companions; his hymn is Yašt 14. He had ten different shapes, all powerful males: the impetuous wind, a bull, a white horse, a rutting camel, an aggressive male boar, a youth of fifteen, etc.
    • Wāyu (Old Indic Vāyu, Middle Persian Wāy) was originally according to Skjærvø, the god of the wind that blows through the space between heaven and earth, and appears in the Avesta as the god of the intermediate space, through which the souls of the dead must travel. Wāyu was therefore associated with inflexible destiny and had both a good and a bad side.
    • Haoma (Middle Persian Hōm) was the deity of the sacrificial drink haoma. The hymn in praise of Haoma is recited during the preparations for the pressing of the haoma plant (Indic soma), which occurs at Yasna 27. The identity of the original plant is still disputed, but may have changed throughout the history of the Iranian and Indo-Aryan tribes. Today, haoma is made from the ephedra plant.
    • The Fire (Avestan Ātar, Middle Persian Ādur) was the heavenly fire, the sun, son of Ahura Mazdā, but also inherent in the ritual fires.
    Anahid_01.jpg

    Sasanian silver vessel depicting Anāhīd.

    Avestan daēwa (Old Persian daiva), unlike Old Indic deva (cognate of Latin deus), no longer referred to good gods. According to the Gāthās, the daēwas lost their divine status when they were deceived and made the wrong choice. Thus, the Old Indic devas Indra, Sharva, and the twin Nāsatyas are the same as the Young Avestan daēwas Indar, Sāuru, and Nānghaithya, who tried in vain to kill Zarathustra according to Videvdad 19. The ruler of the world of darkness is the Dark Spirit, Angra Manyu (Middle Persian Ahrimen), a name that, like Ahura Mazdā, became fixed in the Young Avesta, when the original meaning of the name had probably been lost and was rendered as the “Evil Spirit”, and later in the Pahlavi Books, as “Foul Spirit”.

    I don’t know if I’ve succeeded, but I hope that this gives an idea of what was the general situation of religion in “greater Iran” in early Sasanian times. Rather than a unified religion, what existed was a diverse, variable tradition which to the minds of III century CE Iranians was of untold antiquity and went back to the origins of time, shrouded in the mists of time. It had no written scripture, and its daily practice was dominated by ritual and was completely under control of the priesthood, which was not in itself a unified organization with a clear hierarchy. But this (rather amorphous) religious tradition was so intimately intertwined with Iranian culture that it was impossible to distinguish between “secular” and “religious” within it. The first Iranian dynasty that identified itself openly with Zoroastrian religious principles were the Achaemenids, but after their fall Zoroastrianism survived in the Iranian plateau with little Hellenic influence. That’s remarkable, because Hellenism made a much greater impact in the western part of the Middle East and in “Eastern Iran” (borrowing the term used by Khodadad Rezakhani to refer to the lands in southern and central Asia that are or were inhabited by Iranian peoples to the east of the Iranian plateau and which correspond roughly to the lands between the Indus and Syr Darya rivers). Great Hellenistic cities and kingdoms were established in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Arachosia or Gandhara, but although Alexander and the Seleucids founded Macedonian and Greek settlements in the Iranian plateau, their cultural influence was very short-lived, and as can be deduced from the extant Zoroastrian literature, its priesthood kept an extremely negative view of Alexander and his successors.

    Bactrian_Zoroastrian.jpg

    Painted clay sculpture depicting probably a Zoroastrian priest, found in ancient Bactria and dated to the II-I centuries BCE.

    When Ardaxšīr I became first king of Pārs, he inaugurated at once an ideological campaign to identify himself and his family with Zoroastrian tradition; his first coins as king of Pārs already show a sacred fire (atāš) in the reverse. This manipulation of the Zoroastrian tradition to suit dynastic interests began probably with his father Pābag, who according to Tabarī was “custodian” of the prestigious temple of Anāhīd at Staḵr, which strongly implies he was a priest himself (later Byzantine authors also described Ardaxšīr I as a magus, as Greeks and Romans called Zoroastrian priests). Apart from his coinage, we have also his rock reliefs, in which he is shown being invested as king by Ohrmazd himself, and shockingly he’s depicted in a symmetrical way as the supreme deity, with the same height and garb; only little details like the lifted left hands in front of their mouths identify Ardaxšīr I and his followers as humans showing respect to the gods. Another significant detail is that Ardaxšīr I already described himself as coming “from the seed of the gods”, a practice that already existed in the coinage of the previous kings of Pārs and which was one of the few detectable influences of Hellenistic custom amongst Iranian royalty.

    Keeping in mind that Ardaxšīr I was an extremely ambitious, shrewd and probably unscrupulous character, it’s possible that it was under his reign when Sasanian kings began to meddle in religious affairs. The problem is that there’s no contemporary evidence for any kind of reform of the Zoroastrian religion under Ardaxšīr I and his son. It would probably suit their personalities, but the only extant evidence hinting at that is the Letter of Tansar, which is dated to the VI century CE, under the reign of Khusro I. Scholars seem to agree that the extant document seems to have been based on a genuine III century letter written by Tansar, apparently the Zoroastrian high priest under Ardaxšīr I, to a certain Gušnāsp of Tabaristan, one of the vassal kings under the last Arsacid king Ardawān V. This original missive was apparently written not long after Ardaxšīr I had overthrown Ardawān, and Tansar seems to have been responding to charges raised against Ardaxšīr I, and Gušnāsp’s delay in accepting Ardaxšir I’s suzerainty. Amongst those charges there’s the accusation that Ardaxšīr I "had taken away fires from the fire-temples, extinguished them and blotted them out." To this, Tansar replied that it was the "kings of the peoples (the vassal kings under the Arsacids)” who began the practice of dynastic fires, an "innovation" unauthorized by “the kings of old”.

    The content of the Letter of Tansar would agree quite well with the Sasanian policy (already apparent under Ardaxšīr I) of eroding the autonomy of local kings in order to turn their vassal kingdoms into provinces or substitute them for members of the House of Sāsān. The mention of “dynastic fires” is quite significant because Ardaxšir I himself inaugurated the practice of lighting a regnal fire for each Sasanian king (the regnal years of Sasanian kings were counted from the day their regnal fire was lit; for example the “age twenty of the fire of Šabuhr”), and he clearly wanted to prevent any other kings within the empire to have their own dynastic fires, under the pretext that this was an “innovation” (the ultimate anathema for the ultra-conservative Zoroastrians); in this way he reinforced the sacral status of the House of Sāsān and deprived potential competitors from this powerful ideological tool. And if we are to believe the contents of the Letter of Tansar, Ardaxšir I did not hesitate at extinguishing by force those sacred fires that did not suit him.

    This “Tansar” could be the same person as a certain “Tosar” which is named in the Dēnkard in relation to the religious policies of Ardaxšīr I:

    His Majesty, Ardaxšir, the King of Kings, son of Pābag, acting on the just judgment of Tosar, demanded that all those scattered teachings to be brought to the court. Tosar assumed command; he selected those which were trustworthy, and left the rest out of the canon. And thus he decreed: From now only those are true expositions which are based on the Mazdean religion, for now there is no lack of information and knowledge concerning them.

    This passage may suggest that Ardaxšir I, who was from a priestly family, was not well versed in the religion that was to become the official religion of the empire, so that a priest by the name of Tosar/Tansar was chosen as the religious authority. A guess could also be made that Ardaxšir I and his family were knowledgeable about the cult of Anāhīd but not about the Mazdean tradition as a whole. We can find the name of “Tosar” mentioned in the ŠKZ although curiously as the father of a member of the court of Ardaxšir I. This part of the Dēnkard also gives us another clue which is also corroborated by other sources, which is that Ardaxšir I´s religious views were not accepted by all the Zoroastrians in the empire. First the text states that there was scattered information on the Zoroastrian doctrine which may mean that there were different beliefs or understandings of Zoroastrianism. Consequently, Tosar was employed to systematize the doctrine of Zoroastrianism based on the surviving texts, documents and the oral tradition carried by the “reliable” priests.

    Touraj Daryaee draws an interesting parallelism between this development in Iran and the contemporary process amongst Christian communities, where a gradual process of ¨canonization¨ of its sacred texts was also taking place to form the New Testament corpus as we known it today.

    It could even be said that the religion that Ardaxšīr I proclaimed to be the official religion of the empire was a deviation from the traditions of Zoroastrianism, hence a heresy. That is, the version of the Zoroastrian religion he proclaimed as “orthodoxy” did not appear to have been accepted by all. This new tradition which the Sasanians “invented” was adopted by the Sasanian state and priests and Zoroastrian believers were made to conform to it. In a sense, we should not speak about “orthodoxy,” because it probably did not exist at all in the Zoroastrian tradition. In the Letter of Tansar, the king of Tabaristan accuses him of being a heretic and bringing innovations into the tradition. And Ardaxšīr I has to respond through Tosar/Tansar that while this was partly true (in the case I quoted above he refused the charge) innovations had to take place in order to bring unity to the “nation” and the “religion.” The portion of the Zoroastrian clergy who supported Ardaxšīr I had to further support his claim via supernatural means, such as claiming that his arrival was predicted.

    The problem of what was “true” Zoroastrianism or orthodoxy would not be solved until after the fall of the empire, although the Sasanians and the priests attached to the dynasty would have liked to be able to portray a picture of religious solidarity. This tension in religious affairs was further aggravated by the meddling of several Sasanian kings in religious affairs, especially Šābuhr I, Yazdgird I and Kawād I.

    Still, Ardaxšīr I enjoys a better record in the Pahlavi books than his son, although some reservations among the priesthood against him are still detectable. On one side, Ardaxšīr I is praised for his support of the priesthood, but there’s an unease about some of his measures (the Zoroastrian reluctance to change can be perceived) as well as a certain contempt about his supposedly lowly familiar origins.

    But with his son and successor Šābuhr I there’s a clear change (or perhaps rather than change, an evolution) of Ardaxšir I’s religious policies. But still today scholars don’t agree about why Šābuhr I chose to follow this path. To summarize it, his religious policy was a model in schizophrenia: on one side, in his coins, inscriptions and rock reliefs he followed the same lines of his father, called himself “the Mazda-whorshipping Majesty” and boasted about his promotion of the priesthood and the number of sacred fires he had established, but on the other side he protected Mani, welcomed him into his court (according to some western sources, Mani even accompanied him in some campaigns) and allowed him to preach his new religion with complete freedom. Šābuhr I also not only gave complete religious freedom to all religions within the empire, but according to the Babylonian Talmud he was a friend of the renowned Talmudic scholar Samuel of Nehardea.

    Tolerating other faiths was not a problem with the mowbedān, even befriending their leaders (Babylonian Jews had a long story of peaceful coexistence under Achaemenid and Arsacid rule). But protecting a new self-appointed “prophet” who to the eyes of the mowbedān twisted and polluted the message of the Good Religion, and allowing him to preach undisturbed and even to gain converts among Zoroastrian Iranians was beyond the pale. In the early V century, Yazdgird I “the Sinner” was murdered for much less, and it was probably only Šābuhr I’s charisma and aura of invincibility (in ancient Iranian terms, his farr) which allowed him to do this without retribution. Still, he probably had to walk a tightrope to achieve this, and his promotion of the clergy and his lavish dotations on sacred fires was probably the price that he had to pay for this; it’s also during the later part of his reign that the priest Kirdēr, Mani’s nemesis, began his rise.

    Mani, the founder of Manicheism, was born in 216 CE in Mesopotamia near Ctesiphon, then under Arsacid rule, and was executed by order of the Sasanian šāhānšāh Bahrām I at Gundešapur in 274 CE. The main source for his biography is the so-called Cologne Mani Codex (henceforth, CMC), a Greek manuscript found in 1969 in Upper Egypt and kept at the University of Cologne. It’s dated to ca. 400 CE. All the remaining accounts of his life are either hagiographic or legendary (the most detailed of them is the one written by the X century CE Islamic author Ibn al-Nadīm), or are anti-Manichean polemics written by Christian or Islamic authors.

    CMC.jpg

    Remains of the Cologne Mani Codex.

    Mani was born near Ctesiphon in Mesopotamia; the only secure fact about his origins are that his father was a certain Pattī, (Pattikios according to the CMC, according to the Kitāb al-Fihrist by Ibn al-Nadīm was a native of Ecbatana and thus an Iranian), and a member of the Judeo-Christian sect of the Elchasaites (a splinter group of the larger Gnostic Ebionites). Some sources also claim that Mani’s mother was of noble Parthian lineage, but the fact is that in none of the surviving Manichean texts did Mani boast of noble ancestry (or even of Iranian ancestry). First at age 12 and later at age 24, Mani had visionary experiences that led him to abandon the Elchasaite community and begin preaching his own religious message. In 240-41 CE, Mani travelled to the Kušan lands (which could mean anywhere in Afghanistan, Pakistan or northwestern India) and there he became familiar with the teachings of Buddhism and Hinduism. In 242 CE, he returned to Mesopotamia and managed to be accepted into the court of Šābuhr I; he enjoyed the favor of this king and also that of his successor Hormizd I, but the following Sasanian king Bahrām I ordered his execution (or “martyrdom” as it is described in Manichean texts); according to al-Biruni he met a gruesome death and his skin and head were displayed over the main gate of Gundešapur as a warning to his followers, many of whom were persecuted by Bahrām I and his son and successor Bahrām II. In the KKZ, the priest Kirdēr publicly boasts of having been the main responsible for Mani’s conviction and for the bloody persecution of his followers; given the very public way in which he displayed this “achievement”, scholars think there’s little reason to doubt about its truth.

    Mani was a great traveller and a prolific writer; according to the sources he wrote (and illustrated also, the sources also claim that he was an accomplished painter and graphical artist) five main books explaining his doctrine; four of them are written in Aramaic and one in Middle Persian. None of them have survived complete, only of some of them have some fragments arrived to our time:
    • The Fundamental Epistle, originally written in Aramaic, quoted at length (in Latin) by Augustine of Hippo (who had been a Manichaean before converting to Christianity).
    • The Living Gospel, also in Aramaic of which some fragments survive in the Cologne Mani Codex, in some manuscripts from Turfan in Xinjiang and in some Coptic fragments from Fayyum.
    • The Aržang (a Parthian word meaning "worthy") which, written and illustrated by Mani also in Aramaic. It was unique in that it contained numerous pictures designed to portray the events in the Manichaean description of the creation and history of the world. This book has been lost in its entirety, but due to the beauty of its illustrations some copies survived for a long time; one is attested in the library of the Sultan of Ghazni in 1092 CE.
    • The Dō bun ī Šābuhragān (The two principles, [dedicated] to [King] Šābuhr” was written by Mani in Middle Persian and dedicated to Šābuhr I as an explanation of the principles of the Manichean faith to the king with the intention of convincing him to convert, but Šābuhr I never took the step. Fragments in the original Middle Persian have been discovered at Turfan, and some quotes from it have also survived in al-Biruni’s work.
    Manicheism is a dualistic faith, but that’s where the similarities between it and Zoroastrianism begin and end. The Manichean faith is a perfect example of a syncretic religion, in which elements from Gnostic Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism were combined.

    The main source to reconstruct Mani’s life without hagiographic or legendary additions is the CMC, and the same happens (to a lesser degree) with his teachings. He was brought up by his father in an enclosed sectarian environment of Elchasaites, a Judeo-Christian Gnostic sect whose teachings are today mostly unknown to scholars; whatever is known about them has arrived to us through the denunciations of Christian authors like Hippolytus of Rome, Eusebius of Caesarea or Epiphanius of Salamis. At age 12, Mani had some kind of mystical or visionary experience which was received unfavorably by the leadership of the Elchasaite community; when this experience repeated itself at age 24, Mani either was expelled from or voluntarily left the community in order to preach the message that had been revealed to him in those visions. According to the CMC, these experiences consisted in Mani being visited by his Twin Spirit, who revealed “the truth” to him. This doctrine included not only the teachings of the legendary prophet Elchasai (the alleged founder of his native sect), but also borrowings from Pauline Christian theology, Gnosticism at large, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, which imply quite a detailed knowledge by Mani of these religious traditions; how Mani came into such an extensive and detailed knowledge of his contemporary religions is one of the main mysteries of Mani’s life (of course, according to the CMC, his Twin Spirit just revealed everything to him).

    Mani left the Elchasaite community accompanied by two disciples (he was also shortly after joined by his father) and went to nearby Ctesiphon to start his preaching; according to the chronologies given by the CMC and other ancient sources, this happen almost at the same time (18-19 April 240 CE) as Šābuhr I was crowned as šāhānšāh (12 April 240 CE). When Mani began his preaching, he had obviously thought out a completely developed, complicated theological and cosmological doctrine, the rules of a system of distinct morals for the perfect (the priests of Manicheism) and the lay people respectively, clear ideas about the organization of his followers in a hierarchically structured church, and a concept of how to evangelize mankind in an effective way. These teachings remained stable under the disappearance of Manicheism as a living religion; to the scholar W. Henning (writing in 1936) that’s quite a remarkable achievement, as:

    (Mani was) always lavish with details. Unfortunately he frequently failed to notice that the details he produced on the spur of the moment did not square with his teachings of the day before. His picture of the world is a case in point. Minute circumstances are absurdly elaborated, but the whole is utter confusion. One saving quality is Mani’s consciousness of his shortcomings: to make his cosmological views clear he published a volume of drawings and paintings (...)

    Scholar Werner Sundermann puts its more succinctly in his 2009 article about Mani in Encyclopaedia Iranica:

    Much more than a logically trained, systematic thinker, Mani was a fanciful artist hounded by ever-new ideas and inspirations.

    Mani’s new doctrine also claimed to be a kind of perfected form of almost all existing religions. That was so because Mani regarded his religion as the real, unadulterated essence of what, for their time and for their land, Zarathustra, the Buddha, Christ, and also the prophets of the Old Testament before Abraham had once preached, and what had later been misunderstood or misrepresented by their disciples. This way, Manichean missionary propaganda could outwardly adapt itself to the terms and concepts of other religions to the point of sheer mimicry. Mani himself was the first to introduce this practice. He gave his theology and cosmology a seemingly Zoroastrian appearance, so much so that even modern scholars were misled into assuming it to be an “heresy” of Zoroastrianism. While at the same time, Christian authors considered it a Christian heresy, the Abbasid caliphs considered it an Islamic heresy, and the Tang emperor Xuanzong forbid any Chinese to convert into the Manichean faith because it “confused” the people under the false garb of Buddhism.

    In Mani’s own missionary journeys and the all the following Manichean missions, the most successful method of propagating the Manichean gospel was to approach the rulers of a given territory first, to win their support and their permission to teach their subjects or even to convert them. Examples known from Mani’s life are (all come from Manichean literature, so their veracity is suspect): the spectacular conversion of the “Tūrān-šāh” as the highlight of Mani’s journey to India between 240 and 242 CE, the (probably legendary) conversion of the brother of Šābuhr I, the Mēšān-šāh; the winning over of Pērōz, another brother of Šābuhr I, who allegedly introduced Mani to his brother, and the conversion of an anonymous king and his princes “far from Ctesiphon”. There’s also repeated mention of a certain Havzā, king of Waruzān (either Georgia or a Central Asian principality near Balkh).

    The most important success was gained, however, when Mani presented himself at the court of King Šābuhr I. This happened possibly, according to a heavily damaged passage of the CMC restored and interpreted by its editors, in 241/242 CE, shortly after the death of King Ardaxšīr I. It was perhaps on this occasion that Mani submitted to the king his book Dō bun ī Šābuhragān in which he gave a description in the Middle Persian language of his cosmogony and eschatology, his prophetic message, and personal career. A trustworthy surviving Parthian hagiographic fragment makes it clear that Mani did not succeed in converting the king. But he did win his favor to such a degree that he was authorized to propagate the new faith in the Iranian empire. Another favor that Mani could and did not refuse followed Mani’s successful self-presentation: for some years he was taken into the kings retinue (komitaton in Greek), which means that he had to perform court service (according to the Coptic Kephalaia found in Egypt), probably in the capacity of a doctor, because of his alleged knowledge in matters of medicine (he’s called in ancient sources the “doctor from Babel”) and astrology.

    As a member of the Sasanian court, Mani had to reduce his commitment to the Manichean community, which raised complaints amongst his disciples. Finally, Šābuhr I gave him leave from the court, and he resumed his full-time commitment to the community. According to the Manichean sources, Mani was provided with letters of safe passage by the king himself, his brother Pērōz and the chief secretary Ohrmizd. According to the Kephalaia, during this period of his life Mani travelled constantly:

    (I spent) many years in Persia, in the country of the Parthians, up to Adiabene, and the borders of the provinces of the kingdom of the Romans.

    Why did Šābuhr I protect Mani? Some scholars have for a long time speculated with the theory that maybe Šābuhr I wanted to make Manicheism the unifying religion of his empire, able to attract Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and Buddhists alike, but scholar Werner Sundermann considers this unlikely. First, Šābuhr I never converted, and second he thinks that there are signs that perhaps during his last years Šābuhr I began the persecution of Manicheism; that would also align itself quite nicely with the rise of Kerdīr during the last decade of his reign and with the firm adherence to the Mazdean religion that he made in the ŠKZ, which is also dated to the last decade of his reign. Sundermann provides as an evidence for his thesis an assertion of the Manichean 226th Coptic Psalm:

    From the day of the great persecution to the day of the cross (Mani’s execution) there are six years.

    That must have happened in Šābuhr I’s last years, in 268 CE if Mani died in 274 CE or in 271 CE if 277 CE was the year of his death. However that may be, after Šābuhr I’s death in 272 CE Mani did win the favor of his son and successor king Hormazd I. That is unanimously attested in the Manichean literature. This gave Mani and his church a last period of peaceful development; a short one, because Hormazd I died in 273 CE.

    Manichean doctrine is extremely complex and convoluted, but Mani (whatever his capacities as an orderly and rigorous thinker may have been) came up with ingenious means to broadcast it. On one side, his fame as a painter survived well into the Islamic era (he is even named in the Šāh-nāmah as “Mani the Painter”); the example and repute of their founder encouraged subsequent Manichean preachers and clerics to exceed as calligraphers and illuminators of manuscripts (although evidently for Mani artistic achievement was not an end in itself, but merely a means to propagate the gnosis). He also came up with another innovation: he began using the Aramaic Palmyrene script to write Iranian languages (Parthian and Middle Persian, for which he used the court dialect): with the addition of some additional characters for phonetic sounds that did not exist in Aramaic, this resulted in a much most straightforward script system than the awkward Pahlavi script; this Manichean script saw great success and expanded to the eastern limits of the Iranian linguistic area (Bactria and Sogdiana) and even beyond, for it was eventually used to write Old Turkic and Uyghur.

    manichaeism02.jpg

    Fragment from an illuminated Manichean manuscript from Turfan in Xinkiang, depicting probabaly a meal of Elects.

    Another innovation of great consequence for the Manichean church, one that proved its deep insight into a foreign religion, was the identification of the deities and demons of the Manichean doctrine with matching Zoroastrian counterparts. This outward “iranization” of Mani’s theology and demonology became the methodological pattern of the not completely identical Parthian and Sogdian systems and must have facilitated access to the complicated Manichean system into the Iranian plateau and Central Asia. One can only imagine the reaction of the mowbedān and hērbedān when they realized this.

    Manicheism is the only world religion that has gone completely extinct (its last real believers date from China in the XVI century). Manicheism itself claimed the universal validity of its truth. Mani regarded his doctrine not as the religion of a region, a state, or a chosen people, but as the completion of the preceding great religions of Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism. It incorporated traditions of those and many other religions and doctrines. A comprehensive but partially destroyed Coptic version of Mani’s speech on the ten superiorities of his religion is given in the Kephalaia. The French scholar Henri-Charles Puech described it in 1949 as a “religion de charactère essentiellement missionnaire” and more so than any other religion, Islam included, “une religion du livre”, a “religion of the Book”.

    Manicheism promised the redemption of the human soul from the bonds of its corporeal existence in the transcendent World of Light through wisdom (Greek gnosis), and so it aspired to convince the human mind instead of demanding unquestioning acceptance. Manicheism demandes that from Gnosis good deeds should follow which would contribute to the redemption, not only of one’s own soul, but also of the “World Soul”. It implied a strictly ascetic lifestyle of the elect (the Manichean priests) and the support for the elect by the auditors through almsgiving and a general confession and atonement of sins.

    The heart and core of the Manichean doctrine is its extremely original, convoluted (not to say confusing) and complex cosmogony. The cosmogony starts with a description of the primeval existence of the two worlds of divine Light and demonic Darkness limiting each other directly without any void space in between (according to Ibn al-Nadīm). The superiority of the World of Light lies in its blissful, self-sufficient harmony; its weakness is its peaceful nature, which makes it unprepared for any conflict. The World of Darkness is related, in contrast, to anarchic, chaotic strife and sexuality, and destructive concupiscence in every respect (Manicheism had an extremely negative attitude towards the material world, and towards sexuality as sex was the way in which the material flesh perpetuated itself). The activities of the World of Darkness are neutralized so long as they are ignorantly directed against themselves. But the time comes when they discover by chance the existence of the World of Light, which now becomes their object of desire. Their whole aggressive force is turned against the completely unprotected World of Light. The attack of the demonic hosts is averted only by the self-sacrifice of the highest god, the Father of Greatness, in the person of his son, the First Man.

    The First Man advances towards the enemy, suffers defeat, looses consciousness, and his five sons, the Light Elements, are swallowed up by the greedy demons. But this apparent triumph of the demons turns out to be a hollow victory. It was in the end rather, the First Man’s victory through self-sacrifice. The devoured Light Elements have a poisonous effect on the demons. They paralyze their aggressive force and give the World of Light time to develop militant protective counter-measures against the demonic attack.

    Therefore, under the constraint of the demonic menace, the World of Light changes its character, and becomes a mighty warlike power. The warlike aspect of the World of Light is represented by its Second Evocation, the third deity of which, the Spirit of Life, liberates the First Man, but cannot immediately liberate his sons. He builds instead this world from the corpses of slain demons to serve as a prison for the still living demons and as a grandiose mechanism for the liberation of the swallowed and dismembered particles of the Light Elements which from now on, and as the subject of permanent liberation, appear as the suffering World Soul (also called the Living Soul or the Living Self).

    It is a result of the encounter of the call of the Spirit of Life and the answer (or the hearing) of the First Man that a new deity comes into being, the Enthymesis of Life, the desire of the imprisoned divine entities to be redeemed (and of the redeeming gods to regain their lost relatives). The Enthymesis of Life is the counterpart of the Enthymesis of Death, the eternal, powerful principle of greed that inspires the whole demonic world as ataktos kinēsis “disorderly motion” according to Alexander of Lykopolis (author of an influential work against Manicheism).

    The creation of the world marks the beginning of cosmogony in its proper sense. Although the world is made of demonic substance and is, as such, of an evil nature (plants and animals in particular), it is the work of a divine demiurge and it fulfills the functions of making the liberation of the World Soul possible and of keeping the still active demons imprisoned. The redemption of the World Soul is the main object of cosmic history (human world history included). The result of the cosmic history, however, is predetermined by the pre-cosmic events, the sacrifice of the First Man and the defeat of the demons at the hands of the Spirit of Life and the Mother of Life, even if the demons are not yet made powerless and even if the final divine victory will not be a perfect one.

    The creation of the world; the Macrocosm provokes the demonic counter-creation of the first human couple and their descendents: the Microcosm. The Enthymesis of Death herself, in the form of the demonic couple of Ašaqlūn and Nebrō’ēl, procreates Adam and Eve as the best possible prisons of the Light substance of the World Soul. Therefore, according to Mani’s doctrine it is humankind that is a demonic creation, rather than the world as such.

    manichean_art_fig_5.jpg

    Another manuscript fragment found in Turfan, written in Manichean script.

    The cosmic work of the successive, step by step, liberation of the World Soul is the task of the deities of the Third Evocation who act under the guidance of the Third Messenger, mainly in the macrocosmic sphere, and under Jesus the Splendor who is mostly concerned with the liberation of the human souls. In fact, Jesus and his emanation, the Light-Nous, find the means to enlighten men through divine Gnosis, to deprive their demonic ruler, the Spirituality of the Body, of power and to imprison it in the corporeal limbs. This Spirituality, or in Mani’s Pauline terminology, the Old Man, is then replaced by the New Man as the personality of the enlightened and righteously acting religious person. This is described in great detail in the Sermon on the Light-Nous. But not only were Jesus and his helpers successful in rescuing the souls of many men, they even managed to transform some persons (the elect) soul and body, to instruments of the material liberation of the light substance in plants through their digestive system (I’m not making this up, I swear). Thus, thanks to the superior aptitude of the divine beings, man, the most sophisticated creature of the demonic world, can be made the most effective instrument of the redemption of the World Soul.

    Jesus the Splendor himself proclaims the divine truth to Adam, converts him and makes him the first human prophet. A chain of prophets, inspired by the Light-Nous, follows one by one and at different places, renewing the divine message that is exactly the same as what Mani later espoused. Their number and their sequence change in our sources, but the most prominent ones between Adam and Mani are Zoroaster, the Buddha, and Jesus of Nazareth. Unfortunately, none of the forerunners of Mani took sufficient care to have his message preserved in written form and in authorized texts, so that their disciples misunderstood their masters in many ways and their detractors produced their own falsifications in the name of the same masters. Therefore Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Christianity, let alone Judaism, can no longer claim to teach the eternal verities (note the similarity of this claim with the one in the Quran accusing Jews and Christians of having corrupted the Scriptures). And it is only Mani, the prophet at the end of time, who avoided the faults of his forerunners, and his message, composed in five or seven canonical books and the traditions of reliable disciples, are, and remain, the ultimate truth.

    The acceptance of the Manichean doctrine was the first step to salvation. But it necessarily entailed a submission to the rules of Manichean ethics. Their raison d’être followed from the events of the cosmogony. For example, the commandment “that we eat no flesh” followed from the assumption that animals were the abortions of celestial she-demons and therefore rich in greed-arousing substance (likewise it was forbidden the consumption of alcoholic drinks). Likewise, the commandment “that we do not kill” implied that any living being, but also the earth, the water and the stars in the skies contain particles of the vulnerable World Soul, so that to kill an animal, to cut a plant, to walk on the earth, to take a bath, etc. was a violation of the Living Soul.

    It is obvious that morals like these are impracticable. This dilemma was solved to a certain degree by the introduction of a double set of ethical demands: strict commandments (or rather prohibitions) for a small elite of “perfect” or “elect” people and ten less demanding commandments for the greater community of the devout lay-people. The elect were submitted to five rigorous commandments which confined their lives to the duties of hearing and reading the instructive sermons and scriptures, singing hymns, offering prayers, attending the services and above all the sacramental communal meals, teaching and preaching the gospel of truth to brethren and lay-people, doing missionary work, etc. They were submitted to a strict vegetarian regime and forbidden to drink alcoholic drinks and eat meat, to earn their own livelihood (except for acts of financial business), or practice any sexual activities.

    But living a holy life affected more than the elect’s personal salvation. It made his body, and his digestive system in particular, a miraculous instrument for liberating the light particles of the World Soul that were imprisoned in melons, cucumbers, grapes, water, fruit juice, etc. By eating those fruits the elect set free the light particles from the material massa damnata and let them ascend to the New Paradise of Light in their hymns of praise, their prayers (and, as Augustine of Hippo derisively wrote, their belches [ructatibus]). This happened in their sacramental meals, regularly held whenever fasting was not incumbent. If we call the communal meal of the elect a kind of Eucharist, it is just the opposite of the Christian ceremony. It does not mediate God’s redemption of the believers through Christ’s sacrifice, it affects the redemption of the suffering divine World Soul through the redeeming force of holy men. In this way the elect gain a super-human rank, and it is doubtlessly in this function that they were addressed as “gods”.

    The lay-people were exempt from the rigorous obligations and restrictions of the elect. For them a catalogue of ten moderate commandments (according to Ibn al-Nadīm) was valid. Their main obligation, however, reflected in the commandment not to be miserly and to follow frequently sermons and parables, was to give alms, but only to the elect people (according to Augustine of Hippo). To give alms meant feeding, clothing, and housing the elect, ordaining one of their children for the service of the elect, and if those hearers belonged to the ruling or upper class “helpers” to give them protection.

    I don’t know if this makes much sense, but my goal was to offer an overall view of Zoroastrianism and Manicheism, so as to make evident how deeply different, even opposed, both religions are. For starters, Zoroastrianism has absolutely nothing of the loathing of Manicheism towards the material world; on the contrary Ahura Mazdā needs the active help of men, in words, thoughts and deeds, to obtain his final triumph over Angra Mainyu, and so Zoroastrianism rejects any kind of monasticism or asceticism. Dualism in Zoroastrianism works only at the level of the “world of Thought” while Manichean dualism considers most of the material world an evil creation. The cosmogonies of both religions are completely different, and so are their ethics (Zoroastrianism includes warrior deities) and their forms of worship; the core importance of rituals in Zoroastrianism has no equivalents in Manicheism.
     
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    23.4 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ŠĀBUHR I’S COURT, FAMILY AND SUCCESSION.
  • 23.4 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ŠĀBUHR I’S COURT, FAMILY AND SUCCESSION.

    The essential (and practically only) source about the family and court of Šābuhr I is again the ŠKZ. This document is a long rock inscription which can be divided in the following blocks (some of which have been already covered in this thread as one of the main sources to reconstruct Sasanian political history during the III century):
    • Presentation of Šābuhr I, his ancestry and titles.
    • A long and detailed description of his deeds and military victories against the Roman empire.
    • The announcement that, as he was the one that the gods had chosen to protect, he would establish there, at Naqš-e Rostam several sacred fires (six in total, for himself, his wife and three of his sons) to honor the gods and for the well-being of their souls.
    • Following this announcement, Šābuhr I establishes the deed of settlement, by which these sacred fires will be endowed with 1,000 lambs. And next, the king announces which sacrifices will be compulsory according to this deed of settlement.
    • First, for the soul of Šābuhr I himself.
    • Secondly comes a list of people mixing living and deceased members of Šābuhr I’s family, and then courtiers. Presumably, these were people particularly important to Šābuhr I or of whom he was particularly fond.
    • Thirdly comes a brief list of people who lived “under the rule of Pābag the king”.
    • Fourthly comes a long list of people who lived “under the rule of Ardaxšīr the king of kings”.
    • And a very long list of people who lived “under the rule of under the rule of Šābuhr, king of kings”.
    • The inscription closes itself with yet another invocation to the gods, and the signature of the scribe (“This is my handwriting, Hormazd, the scribe, son of Šērag, the scribe”).
    These lists of courtiers and relatives are the main source for historians who want to reconstruct the families and courts of the first two Sasanian kings. And in the case of Šābuhr I, it’s quite interesting that some of the people appear listed three times: in the list of founded fires, in the first list of people for whom sacrifices must be made, and in the final, “general” list of the courtiers of his court.

    IMG_0131.jpg

    Triumphal rock relief known as "Bishapur III" showing Šābuhr I surrounded by his army and courtiers.

    The first thing that can be noticed by comparing these three lists is that Šābuhr I had four male sons who were named kings over different parts of the empire, but that they are not named in the same order in all lists, and some are even omitted in some of them. Let’s see first the first list, that of sacred fires:

    And here also, by the inscription we have founded: One Fire, Khusrō-Šābuhr (“fair-famed is Šābuhr”) by name for our soul and to preserve our name; one Fire, Khusrō-Āduranāhīd by name, for the soul of our daughter Ādur-Anāhīd, queen of queens, and to preserve her name; one Fire, Khusrō-Ohrmazdardaxšīr by name, for the soul of our son Hormazd-Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia, and to preserve his name; another one Fire, Khusrō-Šābuhr by name, for the soul of our son Šābuhr, king of Mesān, and to preserve his name; one Fire, Khusrō-Narsē by name, for the soul of our son the Aryan, the Mazdayasnian Narsē, king of India, Sakestān and Turān to the seashore, and to preserve his name.

    Scholars consider that in this first list Šābuhr I named his progeny by the order of his affection towards them. First comes his daughter Ādur-Anāhīd, who was obviously not a candidate for succession; it’s interesting nevertheless that she carried the title “queen of queens”; that must imply that Šābuhr I was quite fond of her.

    Among his sons, Hormazd-Ardaxšīr comes the first. He enjoys also a very special title, that of Great King of Armenia (wuzurg šāh arminān). No other sub-king in the empire, not even if they were members of the House of Sāsān, enjoyed the title of “Great King”. Scholars suppose that it was created purposefully after the annexation of Armenia in order to remark the exceptional importance that this kingdom had for the Sasanians, and that because of its exceptionality Šābuhr I would have conceived it as the title to be carried by his heir apparent. As we have seen before, Hormazd-Ardaxšīr is also the only one amongst Šābuhr I’s sons whose participation in the campaigns of his father is attested in the sources. He would succeed his father as šāhān šāh as Hormazd I.

    The following one among Šābuhr I’s sons named in this first list is Šābuhr king of Mesān (mesān šāh). Little or nothing is known about him, except that according to (very dubious) Manichaean texts, he was converted by Mani to the Manichaean religion.

    The last of Šābuhr I’s sons to whom a fire is dedicated is Narsē; he must’ve been something of a special case too because he’s called “the Mazdayasnian Narsē”, which must’ve been a sign that he was seen as especially pious and attached to the Mazdean tradition. He also boasted an impressive array of titles, “king of India, Sakestān and Turān to the seashore” (šāh hind sagestān ud tūrestān). Traditionally, before the conquest of Armenia the title of king of Sakestān (or “king of the Sakas”) had also been viewed as a prerogative of the heir apparent. Eventually, twenty years after his father’s death Narsē would also rise to the throne of the Sasanian empire.

    Let’s look now though at the second list, which offer some puzzling revelations based on the order in which its members appear listed (scholars are quite sure that the order of precedence in inscriptions or other official documents was not something random, but that it followed a strict order dictated by social hierarchy or royal favor):

    Sāsān the lord; and Pābag the king; and Šābuhr the king, son of Pābag; and Ardaxšīr, king of kings; and Xvarrānzēm, queen of the kingdom; and Ādur-Anāhīd, queen of queens; and Dēnag, the queen; and Bahrām, king of Gēlān; and Šābuhr, king of Mesān; and Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia; and Narsē, king of Sakestān; and Šābuhrduxtag, queen of Sakestān; and Narsēduxt, queen of Sakestān; and Cašmag, the (royal) lady; and Pērōz, the (royal) prince; and Mirrōd, the lady, mother of king of kings Šābuhr; and Narsē, the prince; and Rōdduxt, the princess, daughter of Anōšag; and Varāzduxt, daughter of Xvarrānzēm; and Staxriyād, the queen; and Hormazdag, son of the king of Armenia, Hormazd; and Ōdābaxt, and Vahrām, and Šābuhr, and Pērōz, sons of the king of Mesene; and Šābuhrduxtag, daughter of the king of Mesene; Ohrmazdduxtag, daughter of the king of Sakestān –for their soul (each day) one lamb, one grīv and five handfuls of bread, and four pās of wine.

    This list is quite longer, and the first thing to be noted is that first of all Šābuhr I notes down his ancestors in chronological order: Sāsān, Pābag, Šābuhr (eldest brother of Ardaxšīr I) and finally Ardaxšīr I. The order of precedence of the three following names, queens Xvarrānzēm, Ādur-Anāhīd and Dēnag, is unclear. From the previous list we know that Ādur-Anāhīd was his daughter, and from the list of the relatives and courtiers of Ardaxšīr I we know that a certain Dēnag had been the mother of king Pābag (and so she was Šābuhr I’s great-grandmother) and that another Dēnag, who appears also listed in the list of Ardaxšīr I’s courtiers as “queen of queens” (bānbišnān bānbišn) and as “daughter of Pābag, the king”. According to some scholars (like P.Gignoux), she must’ve been Ardaxšīr I’s sister and also his wife (but not the mother of Šābuhr I), in an example of the type of consanguineous marriage favored by the Zoroastrian tradition and priesthood (xwēdōdah), but other scholars (like A.Maricq and J.Harmatta) believe that the title of “queen of queens” reflected social rank rather than family status, and that thus it was no indications that the bearer of the title was the wife of the ruling šāhān šāh.

    Thus, Dēnag as sister of Ardaxšīr I bore the title of “queen of queens” under her brother’s (and perhaps husband) rule, but later she lost it, and “dropped” in hierarchy to be listed after her grand-niece Ādur-Anāhīd, who wore the title under Šābuhr I. The same rationale and doubts applied to Dēnag stand also in Ādur-Anāhīd’s case: was she also his father’s wife? Nothing else is known about Xvarrānzēm and about the title she enjoyed (“queen of the kingdom”, šahr bānbišn).

    After these three queens, we find a surprise. The first man listed is a certain Bahrām, king of Gēlān. And scholars have been able to identify this Bahrām with none other than Bahrām I, who succeeded Hormazd I as šāhān šāh in 273 CE. He’s followed by the other three kings that we already saw in the previous list: Šābuhr, king of Mesān, Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia; and Narsē, king of Sakestān. Given that these three kings were Šābuhr I’s sons, it seems logical to assume that Bahrām, king of Gēlān was also a son of Šābuhr I. Scholaly consensus about the different order in this list for Šābuhr I’s sons in this second list is that in this one they appear listed by order of birth, while in the first list they were deliberately listed by Šābuhr I according to his preferences. This is further reinforced because Bahrām appears already depicted as a little child in the investiture relief of Ardaxšīr I at Naqš-e Rajab which is dated to shortly after 224 CE. Thus, by order of birth Bahrām was the first-born son, but he was clearly not his father’s favorite, to the point that Šābuhr I did not even include him in the list of people to whom sacred fires would be dedicated. Šābuhr, king of Mesān was the second-born son, Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia was the third-born son and Narsē, king of Sakestān was the youngest.

    Investiture-relief-of-_Ardashir-_I-_Naqsh-e-_Rajab1.jpg

    Investiture relief of Ardaxšīr I at Naqš-e Rajab. Šābuhr I stands behind his father to the left of the image, while the future Bahrām, king of Gēlān is the little child in the middle, which is depicted in front of an image of Hercules/Herakles/Verethragna, which is the Iranian warrior god after whom he was named (Avestan Verethragna became Bahrām in Middle Persian).

    Clearly, the order in which Šābuhr I’s sons appear listed in the first list is the order of preference which they held on their father’s eyes, and the third son Hormazd-Ardaxšīr was Šābuhr I was his favorite son. Therefore, he named him Great King of Armenia and invested him as his heir apparent, while the eldest son Bahrām was relegated into obscurity and provided only with the rather secondary title of king of Gēlān (a mountainous area in northern Iran in the Alborz mountains), which ranked clearly under the kingdoms held by his three other brothers. This decision of Šābuhr I was potentially problematic, but it seems that he was strong and respected enough as a king that it was enacted after his death, although the short reign of Hormazd-Ardaxšīr caused the problem to reappear just a year after his father’s decease.

    After these four kings, the remaining royal relatives are listed in strict hierarchical order: first the wives of te kings (in the same order of precedence as their husbands) and then their sons and daughters, also following the same order of precedence as their fathers (curiously, the kings have precedence over the queens, but sons and daughters are listed together). Immediately before this listing of grandsons and granddaughters of Šābuhr I there are though some characters named that probably include siblings, cousins and other relatives of Šābuhr I which in the hierarchy of the court ranked higher than his grandchildren. Two among these characters are worth mentioning. One is “Pērōz, the (royal) prince”, who could be the same Pērōz who appears in Manichaean sources as a brother of Šābuhr I and one of Mani’s followers and protectors. The other character is “Mirrōd, the lady, mother of king of kings Šābuhr”; this is the same “Lady Myrod” that appears in later Islamic sources as the mother of Šābuhr I. She is quite down in the list’s hierarchy despite being the king’s mother, which has led scholars to believe that she was probably a concubine of Ardaxšīr I and hot a royal spouse.

    Let’s look now at the third and final list of courtiers, which is much longer than the two previous lists:

    Those who live under the rule of Šābuhr, king of kings: Ardaxšīr, king of Nodšēragān (Adiabene); Ardaxšīr, king of Kirmān; Dēnag, queen of Mesene, protected by Šābuhr; Hamazāsp, king of Viruz (Georgia); Valāš, royal prince, son of Pābag; Sāsān, royal prince, who was maintained by the Kadōg family; Narsē, royal prince, son of Pērōz; Narsē, royal prince, son of Šābuhr; Šābuhr, the bidaxš (N. “viceroy” or” royal lieutenant”); Pābag, the hazāruft (N. “commander of the thousand”, commander of the royal guard and most senior military officer); Pērōz the aspbed (N. “chief of cavalry”, another senior military commander); Ardaxšīr of the family Varāz; Ardaxšīr of the family Sūrēn; Narsē, lord of Andēgān; Ardaxšīr of the family Kārin; Vehnām, the framadār (N. “governor”); Frīg, Satrap of Gundīšābuhr; Srīdō, son of Šāhmust; Ardaxšīr ardašēršnōm (N. “joy of Ardaxšīr”); Pākcihr tahmšābuhr (N. “Šābuhr’s valiant one”); Ardaxšīr, satrap of Gōmān; Cašmag nēvšābuhr (N. “Šābuhr’s brave one”); Vehnām šābuhršnōm (N. “joy of Šābuhr”); Tīrmihr, chief of the fortress of Šahrgird; Zīk, master of ceremonies; Ardavān, of Dumbāvand; Gundfarr avgān razmjōy (N. “who seeks combat”) and Pābag pērōzšābuhr (N. “victorious for Šābuhr”) son of Šambīd; Vārzan, satrap of Gay; Kirdesrō, the bidaxš; Pābag, son of Visfarr; Valāš, son of Seleucus (an interesting case, obviously an Iranized Greek); Yazdbād, counselor of ladies (N. counselor to the queens); Pābag, the safsērdār (N. “swordbearer”); Narsē, satrap of Rind; Tiyānag, satrap of Ahmadān; Gulbed, the peristagbed (N the “chief of services” or majordomo of the royal household); Jōymard son of Rastag; Ardaxšīr son of Vēfarr; Abursām-Šābuhr the darīgān sārdār (N. “chief of personnel of the court”); Narsē son of Barrag; Šābuhr son of Narsē; Narsē, the grastbed (N. “chief steward”); Hormazd the dibīrbed (N. the “chief scribe; Nādūg, the zēndānīg (the “prison governor”); Pābag, the darbed (N. the “master of the gate”); Pāsfal son of Pāsfal; Abdaxš son of Dizbed; Kirdēr, the hērbed (an old acquantaince in this thread); Rastag, satrap of Veh- Ardaxšīr; Ardaxšīr son of (the?) Bidaxš; Mihrxvāst, the treasurer; Šābuhr, the governor; Aštād of the family Mihrān, the fravardag dibīr (N. the “scribe of epistles”), from Ray; Sāsān, the šābestan (N. the “ward of the harem”, an eunuch), son of Sāsān; Virōy, the vāzārbed (N. the “supervisor of markets”, head of the market inspectorate); Ardaxšīr, satrap of Nērēz; Bagdād son of Vardbed; Kirdēr Ardavān; Zurvāndād son of Bandag; Gunnār son of Sāsān; Mānzag the eunuch; Sāsān, the judge; Vardān, son of Nāšpād; Gulag, the varāzbed (N. the “chief of boars”, probably a warden of the royal hunt lands); altogether, one lamb, one grīv and five handfuls of bread, and four pās of wine.

    This last list does not include any members of the royal family which had been already named in the second list. It does include though other sub-kings of the empire, some of whom we know were Šābuhr I’s brothers. This is the case of the first two kings listed, Ardaxšīr, king of Nodšēragān and Ardaxšīr, king of Kirmān. Hamazāsp, king of Viruz (ancient Iberia, modern Georgia) was not a member of the House of Sāsān, and so he’s listed in the last place among the kings. The list follows a strict order according to social hierarchy; first the šahrdārān (sub-kings), then the wispuhrān (members of the royal house without a kingly title), then the higher officials of the army and the civilian administration, then the wuzurgān (grandees), then the āzādān (lesser nobility) and then all the rest.

    So, after the šahrdārān quoted above, we have the wispuhrān listed: Valāš, Sāsān, Narsē son of Pērōz and Narsē son of Šābuhr. Then the list goes on with the upper members of the political and military apparatus: Šābuhr, the bidaxš, Pābag, the hazāruft (or hazārbed) and Pērōz the aspbed. It’s highly probable that these three gentlemen were also members of the wuzurgān.

    The list then continues with the wuzurgān; obviouly it doesn’t include all the wuzurgān of Iran, only those who were in the good graces of Šābuhr I; like under his father, the list includes members of the Sūrēn and Kārin clans. They are listed in this order:
    • Ardaxšīr of the family Varāz.
    • Ardaxšīr of the family Sūrēn.
    • Narsē, lord of Andēgān.
    • Ardaxšīr of the family Kārin.
    After them come all the lesser nobility and assorted functionaries of the court, in strict picking order. Towards the bottom we can find Kirdēr the hērbed, who obviously was not an important figure in the court at the time, but it’s worthy of notice that he’s the only priest listed.

    An important issue with these lists is that, as you can see, they’re quite exhaustive, but neither the one for the relatives and courtiers of Ardaxšīr I nor the three lists for the relatives and courtiers of Šābuhr I name a kušān šāh. In a previous post I wrote about the conquest of the Kushan empire by Ardaxšīr I and Šābuhr I and the discovery of coins minted in Marv bearing in Bactrian language and script the name of a certain Ardašaro Košano. The problem is that, as you can see, there’s no trace of him in the ŠKZ, or of any descendant. The first certain mention of a kušān šāh in a Sasanian document is in the Paikuli inscription of Narsē, dated to ca. 293 CE. This kušān šāh could be Pērōz 1 (Note: because the imperial Sasanians and the Kushano-Sasanians used the same names, there’s a useful convention of using Roman numbers for the imperial Sasanians and Arabic numbers for Kushano-Sasanian kings), who issued coins during the late III and early IV centuries CE in Balkh, Herat and Gandhāra. It’s still unclear which was the exact family relationship between this minor Sasanian branch and the main branch in Iran.

    As for the personality of Šābuhr I, little can be said about it from the surviving evidence. The Šāh-nāmah (which confuses and mixes the historical figures of Šābuhr I and Šābuhr II) gives a glittering report of this mythical Šābuhr as a mirror of human virtues to the point that it sounds quite fanciful; the main Islamic-era account by Tabarī (who at lest does not confuse both kings) offers a similar image. On the other side, most Graeco-Roman, western Syriac and Armenian sources paint him as a bloodthirsty barbarian. Both portraits are obviously little more than a caricature.

    He was not exactly a pacifist or a humanitarian about that much we can be sure. His own account of his two in invasions of Roman territory proudly state that his men looted, killed and pillaged everywhere they could, and that was standard behavior for armies in the III century. Some Armenian, Syriac and Greek accounts also paint a ghastly picture of the way the vast columns of Roman captives were driven by Šābuhr I’s soldiers “like cattle” back to Ērānšāhr, which again seems like standard behavior of his times (one just needs to look at the Aurelian column in Rome to see how Roman soldiers behaved in enemy territory). But getting such vast numbers of people back alive (at least enough of them to populate several entire cities and conduct large-scale public works) means that the deportation was at least well organized and that it was not just done for cruelty’s sake.

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    Rock inscription of Šābuhr I at Hājjiābad in Fārs.

    We can also be fairly sure that he was a boastful and prideful individual, judging by the inordinate amount of rock-reliefs and inscriptions he’s left behind. In several of them he’s shown as an accomplished fighter, and probably that’s more than simple propaganda. The Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah victory relief depicting the victory of the Sasanians at Hormozdgan shows bot Ardaxšīr I and Šābuhr I in battle garment and engaged in fight. Although it’s quite improbable that Ardaxšīr I killed the last Arsacid king Ardawān V with his own hands and that his son Šābuhr did the same with the latter’s “chief minister”, it’s quite probable that both men took part personally in battles in leading their men. Islamic sources depict Ardaxšīr I as an accomplished bowman, and as the inventor of the “Sasanian draw” that had not been used in Iran before him, and which favored a quicker delivery of arrows. Šābuhr I was also an accomplished bowman, and the fortuitous finding of an inscription at Hājjiābad in Fārs dated to the last decade of his reign offers us a glimpse that in his old age he was still an active man, capable of feats of archery:

    This is my bow shot (of) the Mazda-worshipping lord Šāpūr, king of kings of the Iranians and non-Iranians, whose lineage is from the gods, the son of Mazda-worshipping lord Ardaxšīr, king of kings of the Iranians, whose lineage is from the gods, grandson of the lord, king Pābag. And when we shot this arrow it was before the sovereigns, and the princes of the blood and the grandees and the nobility. And when we placed our foot on this rock, and we shot an arrow beyond that cairn, but that place where the arrow was thrown, there where the arrow fell, it was not that if the cairn was there, it would not be visible from the outside, thus, we ordered that the cairn be set further down, whoever may have a “good hand,” let them place their foot on this rock and let them shoot an arrow towards that cairn, then, whoever throws the arrow toward that cairn, they have a “good hand”.

    Obviously, we can’t judge today how far did Šābuhr I shoot that arrow, but clearly he judged the feat important enough that he had the inscription also repeated about a hundred km. northwest of the first, at Tang-e Borāq in an identical archeological context, on the rock of a grotto, and that he made clear that the feat had been achieved “before the sovereigns, and the princes of the blood and the grandees and the nobility”. It’s worth noting that no other Sasanian king has left a similar inscription boasting of an “athletic” achievement (or at least nothing similar has been found up to this date).

    Šābuhr I, šāhān šāh ērān ud anērān, died at Bīšāpūr in May 272 CE and was peacefully succeeded by the heir he had designated, the Great King of Armenia Hormazd-Ardaxšīr, who became the new king of kings of Iranians and non-Iranians as Hormazd I.

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    Silver drachm of Hormazd I (r. 272-273 CE).
     
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