The Recollections of the RT HON Anthony Eden MP

[Duke of Adamski]

The Reflections of the RT Hon, Anthony Eden MP
HOI3 SF I.C.E


January 1936
I Take Office

I confess I was much gladdened to be reappointed as His Majesties Foreign Secretary by the order of the Prime Minister at the beginning of this month; it was, and indeed remains, the task I believe myself to be most suited for out of all the cabinet positions I have held. I would go as far as to say this position shall be the greatest thing I shall do with my life, it shall be what I am remembered for.

Speaking of how I am remembered I have begun these brief records as a manner of recording my activities on the diplomatic scene, I must confess that these notes are intended to form the backbone of my memoirs when I do finally leave office. I believe that my recollections of my time in office will be of great interest to historians and also for the general public.

In some manners my elevation to this exalted position owes to the misfortune of a colleague of mine, Sir Samuel Hoare, who must surely rank as one of the briefest holders of this office in the last century. He is an honourable man and I am certain that he has nothing but the best interests of this country at heart and he must be forever thought of kindly for his role in arranging the kindertransport. But the pact he made with M Laval, that could not go unchallenged; to surrender such territories, which rightly belong to the Emperor of Abysinnia, to that despicable gangster Mussolini, for that he had to go. I was sad for him, but at the same time I was glad for myself. Some might call that selfish and rank ambition, but I view it in a more detached manner, I am able to serve my country by the assumption of my office and that in itself is surely a good thing.

I inherited an international crisis from my predecessor, the root cause of his fall from grace was still underway; I speak of course in regards the Italian invasion of Abysinnia. I have long argued that Italy is a great threat to Britain and the peace of the world. A mere glance at a map highlights this; Italy, by nature of her geographic position, sits astride the very highway by which the mass of our trade is conducted. I speak of course of the Suez-Gibraltar trade route across the Mediterranean. It is and always shall be a fundamental political lodestone of mine that the Suez Canal must remain open and that it must remain British. The semi-autonomous nature of Egypt aside, the Canal zone must forever stay within British hands.

Abyssinia itself however is a complicated issue for Britain, as a nation it has not been the best of neighbours, bordering as it does a great number of our African possessions. There had been a history of Abyssian raids into Kenya during the nineteen twenties and early nineteen thirties, these incidents had been compiled and presented to parliament in Command Paper 3217; I can recall its publication, some of the more firebrand members had insisted that sanctions be imposed upon Abyssinia and reparations exacted, such blustering had come to nothing however, Britain had no will to engage in an imperial adventure in darkest Africa. I should like to think that had I held high office at the time I would have been more resolute, but I do not truly believe that I would have been. The higher I have risen in government the more I understand the constraint that Britain’s circumstances have put upon our options.

Having barely settled into my new office I was forced to begin to formulate an effective response to Italy’s continued aggression. It was not going to be easy and time was of the essence.

 

[Duke of Adamski]

January 1936
The Anglo-Italian background to the Abyssinian Crisis.

Up until the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, relations between Great Britain and Italy had been cordial, we had been allied with one another during the Great War, we had cooperated before on issues of international dispute. Indeed in 1925 Austen Chamberlain and Mussolini had came to an agreement over their countries respective interests in Abyssinia; Italy had contracts for railway construction and Britain was much involved in the development of the Lake T’ana region. In return the British undertook to recognise western Abyssinia as an exclusive economic zone for Italy. This agreement was seen with considerable mistrust in France, a nation never wholly convinced of the British commitment to Europe.

I was in the Foreign Office at the time of this earlier agreement, as PPS to Austen Chamberlain, as a part of the government, even at such a low level, I was obliged to support the government’s position. But I was not then, nor am I now, convinced of the goodwill of Mussolini; I recalled only too well Andrew Bonar Law’s comments back in 1922 when Mussolini came to power, “Look at that man’s eyes, you will hear more of him later.” I knew that Italy was a threat to Britain, for all that she had been cooperating prior to the invasion of Abyssinia. Consequently the Italian attack did not change my opinion of the Mediterranean situation as it did many of my colleagues rather it merely confirmed my earlier convictions.

Italy had been an active member of the international community ever since the conclusion of the Great War, she had involved herself in the settlements of 1919 and even the rise to power of the Fascists in 1922 had not outwardly changed her stance. At Locarno she had pledged, along with Great Britain to guarantee the frontiers of Belgium, France and Germany and had been active in discussions during the 1920’s in relation to disarmament. Most critically for our international position Italy was opposed to any form of union between Germany and Austria, fearful as she was of possible German revisionist designs on the South Tyrol. This made her a powerful friend and possible ally in containing German ambitions and could be used as an effective counter to help rehabilitate Germany into the international scene. But I was always suspicious of Italy’s good neighbour act; in 1923 Italy had invaded the Greek island of Corfu in response to the assassination of Italian personnel, for which Mussolini blamed the Greek government, this crisis was averted and Italy forced to back down by the swift offices of the British fleet. I believe that this incident convinced Mussolini that it was important to appear to cooperate with Britain if Italy were to achieve its objectives in the Mediterranean.

However this cooperation on the part of Italy concealed rising imperialistic attitudes within Italian foreign policy. Italy had received Fiume from Yugoslavia in 1924 and her imperial posturing in the Balkans continued throughout the 1920’s as Albania, through Italian sponsorship of Ahmed Zog, fell increasingly under Italian control, and also by the way that Mussolini financially supported minority groups within Yugoslavia. Further afield the Italian desire to revise the 1919 peace settlements was evidenced by a treaty of friendship signed in 1927 with Hungary and by the funding of right wing organisations in Germany.

The coming to power of the Nazi’s in Germany. along with the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934 and the declaration of a German air force in 1935 caused much consternation in Italy and was I believe integral to the Italian decision to meet with representatives of Britain and France at Stresa during 1935. I personally, though Undersecretary of State for League of Nations affairs at the time, was unable to attend the conference, I had been sent on a trip to Moscow and after a traumatic flight back from Russia was obliged to take a week’s recuperation for the sake of my health. Nevertheless I kept myself appraised of the happenings at Stresa, where all three powers committed themselves to opposing any further breaches of the Versailles settlement. I was supportive of such a commitment but concerned also that charges of hypocrisy could be levelled against the British government, we had ourselves in 1935 signed a Naval limitation agreement with the Germans restricting the German fleet to thirty five percent of our own, an action which had irritated the French, and I believe convinced the Italians that we were concerned about the resurgence of Germany.

It was this conviction that Britain and France were so alarmed with the rise of Germany that we would do anything to maintain the support of Italy that convinced them that an invasion of Abyssinia would be feasible and if not supported by the western allies then at least tacitly endorsed through inaction and token protest. In the months before I took office this belief had seemed justified, the Hoare-Laval pact had merely reinforced this view in Rome. Conscious of the precedent which inaction would set I resolved to address the Italian invasion forcefully and resolutely to exercise the rights of Abyssinia to exist and to send the message that violent hostility had no place in the conduct of international affairs. I recalled the witticism of King George V when he had heard of the Hoare-Laval pact and the dismissal of Sir Samuel, “no more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoare’s to Paris” I was resolved to ensure that such a craven agreement could never again come from the British foreign office.

 

[Duke of Adamski]

January 1936
Britain responds,

The urgency with which we must act was reinforced to me on the 7th of January when Italy succeeded in bullying the Yugoslav government into signing a treaty of military access for the Italian armed forces. This was of great alarm for me personally but also, and perhaps more so, the government of Greece. I received a telegram early on the 8th from my counterpart in the Greek government expressing their concerns about this Italian move, and reiterating their worries about the Italian presence within Albania. I responded that he should be reassured of British goodwill and general commitment to the status quo in the Mediterranean and reminded him of the successful thwarting of Italian designs in 1923.

At the House there was a heated session, as was to be expected in the wake of the Hoare-Laval negotiations, I was charged to defend the government’s attitude towards Italian aggression and I robustly defended the government’s position over the course of 1935, we had been following the established League of Nations procedures for dealing with aggression. I reminded the House that the issue of Abyssinia had occupied His Majesties Government for almost a year. That the hour of decision had come I did not deny, when pressed to deliver a timetable and outline of action I declined to comment, such decisions should be made in private and after careful consideration of the facts and the situation on the ground, such decisions should not be forced upon a government by the pressures of parliamentary opinion, members who have the passion and the commitment to the nation, of that there can be no doubt, but who do not have all the information available to them.

As I was speaking I received a note from Mr Churchill, he lambasted the governments record on Abyssinia and urged us to strong action, though he cautioned that the British armed forces were in no way strong enough to mount a full scale war. I took his point and minuted a reply to Mr Churchill, I respected Winston’s parliamentary oratory and I admired his passion, the way he would throw himself whole heartedly into a cause that he believed in even when it was not in his best interests to do so. But he was often wrong and in this case his concerns about the military were creditable but as it had been Winston as Chancellor who had instituted the Ten Year Rule that had in no small part led to the inadequacies of the armed forces.

One member from the Labour benches, Herbert Morrison, inquired as to why the government had not imposed sanctions upon Italy on petroleum products, he argued strongly about the issue and I was impressed by his knowledge of the sanctions matter, Mr Morrison stated that an embargo on food would be unjustifiable but that sanction on oil would be reasonable. I responded that the application of sanctions by the League is governed by Article XVI of the League of Nations covenant and that personally I did not believe in the value of sanctions as a matter of deterrence, I argued that an embargo on oil would, however it was implemented, translate into an embargo on food by the fact, I stated that Italy’s procurement and distribution of foodstuffs relied on petroleum and that the nature of the Italian dictatorship ensured that the Fascist military would not be starved of oil rather it would be the civilian population who would be denied access to petroleum. I shortly afterwards made my closing statements and left the chamber.

Early on the morning of the 9th I was called to see the Prime Minister at Downing Street. Stanley Baldwin was a towering figure of the Conservative party and the National Government and I had great respect for him both as a political operator and as a man, but I was not convinced of his commitment to intervention. I do not mean that Mr Baldwin was a coward, he was certainly not that, but he was, although not a pacifist, a man dedicated to peace and the prevention of another war. He and I were much alike in this regard, I remembered all too well the deaths of the Great War, I had fought through the fields of France and seen many good men die; where we differed however was that he was committed to the prevention of war by means that were wholly peaceful whereas I was willing to risk war to preserve peace.

I had resolved that the best way to deal with Italian aggression was with the threat of force, to this end I had spoken at length the previous evening with Viscount Monsell, the First Lord, and he had agreed with me on the broad points of an interventionist response. Bolton said that it would be, in his opinion, possible to divert a substantial sized force of ships from the Channel and Reserve fleets without overly prejudicing the security of the British Isles. This fleet would then be despatched to Malta to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet, Lord Monsell estimated that this force would be ready within four days, as long as permission was forthcoming from the Prime Minister. I spoke also to James Thomas, the Colonial Secretary who, though a Labour man, until he had been expelled for joining the National Government, was not a committed pacifist. He believed that the Suez Canal should be closed to Italian shipping effective immediately and that the Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Backhouse should support this blockade from Port Said. Things had been stable in Palestine and Transjordan of late and he had spoken with Lord Lloyd the High Commisioner in Egypt and reported stability in that country also.

Reinforced by this support from these two colleagues I went to see the Prime Minister. Stanley greeted me cordially and asked me my opinions on the Abyssinian mess. I told him truthfully what I proposed, he listened carefully, enquired about the attitudes of France, who had been unwilling to commit to my plan, they believed firmly that sanctions would be sufficient to bring the Italians to heel. The Quai d’Orsay considered the threat from Germany to be such that the preservation of the Stresa front was worth any amount of appeasement of Italy.

“Am I to understand that you wish to commit large scale naval forces to the Mediterranean, that you wish to close the Suez Canal to Italian shipping and that an ultimatum should be sent to the Italian government informing them that if they do not withdraw all forces from Abyssinia by the time of the deadline then a state of war will exist between our two countries?”

“That is correct sir”

“Then do it Anthony, you have my support and agreement for it, but I hope you know what you are doing. If you don’t then this country could be at war within a week.”

I thanked the Prime Minister and arranged with the First Lord for the despatch of the fleet, he estimated that the fleet would be in position by the 17th of the month. I sent a telegram to General Quinan ordering him to close the canal on the 15th and returned to the foreign office to prepare the ultimatum document which I intended to deliver to the Italian ambassador on the morning of the 17th. It would state that if the Italian offensive did not cease and all Italian troops begin to withdraw by mid day on the 18th then Britain and Italy would be at war.

 

[Duke of Adamski]

January 1936
Eyeball to Eyeball over Abyssinia.

The delivery of the ultimatum to the Italian government came as something as a shock to them, I do not believe that it was in any way expected, nor do I believe that they had made allowances for intervention in their military planning, a good portion of their army was committed in Abyssinia and their navy and air force was tied up with supporting operations for that army. The possibility of war was never far from my mind on those tense days of the 17th and 18th January, I was not certain whether the Italians would back down or whether they would call our bluff; and bluff it was, other than the enhanced naval forces of the Mediterranean fleet Britain’s territories lay naked and vulnerable. The General Staff had been busying themselves since the despatch of the task force from Portsmouth with plans for the deployment of additional army and Royal Air Force units in North Africa, but they had commonly agreed that realistic reinforcement of Egypt, Kenya and the Sudan would not be possible until, at the earliest, the middle of February.

Throughout the 17th Italian planes menacingly patrolled the skies around Malta, and small warships cruised of the great harbour of Valetta; I believed that this was just posturing on the part of the Italians, an attempt to probe our resolve. I prayed that this was just posturing. While all these events of great import occurred in the great middle sea and while the fate of Africa hung in the balance, the French remained ominously silent, no new troops were raised on the Alpine frontiers, the great warships remained at anchor in Toulon.

Early in the afternoon on the 17th HMS Dunglass reported a large Italian fleet heading from Taranto making full steam towards the canal. She shadowed this fleet for a while before being driven off by an Italian battlecruiser, but before this she was able to observe that the Italians had put to sea a formidable force and was intent on using it to force the canal. Notice of the closure of the canal had been telegraphed to the Italian government two days earlier, I believe that this fleet had been prepared before our ultimatum was even sent. Admiral Backhouse communicated that the entire Mediterranean fleet had moved to the canal zone and was prepared to prevent the Italians from crossing to the Red Sea. I telegrammed the headquarters in Alexandria with instructions that Backhouse was not to open fire unless the Italians did first, or until after the ultimatum had expired and the proper diplomatic forms been observed.

The atmosphere at the foreign office was tense, and so too in the nation as a whole. The press were reporting anxiously on the progress of events, but, thankfully, they all largely supported our stand against Italy; this did much to sway public opinion behind our enterprise, which without we could not have continued. Mr Baldwin had made it clear from the beginning that public support was the sine qua non of this operation; he had also made it quite clear that if this all went wrong then I would have to resign immediately and that I was not to expect reemployment. Millions of lives hung in the balance, the fates of two great nations, yet I confess, to my shame, I cared still for my own fortunes, selfishly yearning to protect my own career. It is not something I was proud off, not a feeling that is appropriate in His Majesties Minister, but I felt it nonetheless and shameful as it was it remains a part of my history, a part of my character.

Through our embassies around the Balkans we received encouragement however, the Greek government was overjoyed at our stand and assured us that war was unlikely, assured us that the Italians would not fight a great power like Britain. I was not so certain, but my doubts I kept hidden, as best as I could.

That was the longest night of my life, the hours of darkest between the 17th and 18th, of that I am sure. I did not sleep more than an hour or so, and what rest I did have was haunted by dark dreams of shadowy ships riding across a bitter sea, of voices of lives cruelly cut short whose deliverance and damnation lay in my hands. When I awoke I was told that during the night Italian troops had crossed to Libya and were taking positions along the Egyptian border and that the fleet from Taranto sailed ever onwards.

That morning battered remorselessly onwards, the clock ever ticking towards the moment the bells would chime and thunder away at the end of peace. I was with the Prime Minister in Downing street as the deadline approached, we were working on drafts of our statements to parliament, we had made out two, one for each eventuality, but I recall by that time, around 11am, we were focusing more on the one announcing war. The last we had heard from Backhouse was that the fleets were insight and would be within engagement range at the stroke of midday. It gave me no pride, even as an Englishman, that this war, should it start, would be announced by a great naval battle the likes of which the Mediterranean had not known since Aboukir Bay.

We had resolved ourselves when a clerk burst in holding a telegram. The Italians had begun to withdraw from Abyssinia and had signed a ceasefire, the fleet had turned back to Taranto and the Italian government was making overtures for a conference to be held to arbitrate a peaceful settlement of Italo-Abyssinian frontiers in east Africa.

The time was 11.56. The Italians had backed down; war, a mere hairs breadth away had been averted at the last.

 

[Duke of Adamski]

I have some concerns about the style of this aar, should I be less detailed and relate the story more to the gameplay, or leave it largely at it is and merely marry the two styles together?

I appreciate your advice, I am fairly new to this whole aar thing

 

[Cybvep]

Not every AAR has to be a gameplay one... However, you should add some pictures in order to reduce the "wall of text" feeling

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

As told above, mixing images with text is something very recomendable to do, as

a) Will be more readable for some people.
b) Will attract more readers.
c) It will have a more "fashionable" look

For me it's fine as it is, but keep those points in mind, just in case

 

[Duke of Adamski]

thanks for the advice, the next update will have pictures!