The Presidents: The Vietnam War Edition

[Nathan Madien]

volksmarschall: American policy in a nutshell.

You are correct. Korea's role in this timeline is twofold: keeping the Communists at bay in Soviet-held Manchuria and being an economic marketplace for the United States (Americans can make more money with a United Korea than with a divided one).

Leviathan07: Thank you very much for the input, Leviathan07.

I went back to the previous update and revised my coverage of Japan's postwar recovery with your information in mind. It probably sounds more realistic now.

Germany in this timeline actually comes out better after the war. America's rapid advance into that country overran cities and transportation lines, reducing the damage they historically took from Allied bombing raids. Because Germany surrenders in July 1944, she is able to avoid certain devastation like the bombing of Dresden. The lack of a postwar divison and no Morganthau Plan definitely helps Germany.

I agree that China will lead the way economically for Asia - probably starting in the 1970s or so - and the US trying real hard to maintain influence.

Good point about US investors being interested in China regardless of how the US Government feels. I will incorporate that point.

Andreios II: You are certainly right about the US forgiving Kai-Shek. It probably won't be until after the Generalissimo's death that relations between the US and China will improve.

The Korean Communists have been stamped out because of Syngman Rhee's brutal anti-Communist policies. The People's Republic of China is being led by a Soviet puppet ruler (Mao Zedong was executed after the war on Stalin's personal orders because Communist China AI decided to declare war on the Soviet Union after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in May 1945). In fact, it was nomonhan (forgive me if I mispelled his name) who suggested that I kill Mao off.

c0d5579: Kim Il-Sung was a victim of Rhee's crackdown during the postwar period. It's one of the reasons why Stevenson isn't too keen on Rhee. Sure Korea is America's ally, but do you really want to be associated with a bloody-hand dictator?*

*Of course, this is the USA we're talking about.

 

[Nathan Madien]

The next update is a rather short one. Originally, it was going to be the beginning of my update on Vietnam. However, as I was writing about Vietnam circa 1951-1953, the beginning stuck out at me like a sore thumb. So I decided to hack it off the Vietnam update and make it a free-standing update that will lead into Vietnam. Since my Vietnam update as it exists is getting pretty long, I will probably saw that into two parts.
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Flexible Response
In the spring of 1953, the Stevenson Administration rolled out a major cornerstone of their Cold War policy: the Flexible Response Doctrine. According to the doctrine, the United States would focus on achieving mutual deterrence against the Soviets at strategic, tactical, and conventional levels. By doing so, the United States would have options open to her in response to aggression across the spectrum of warfare. Continuing improvements in communication and transportation meant American forces could exert striking power anywhere in the world efficiently, quickly, and flexibly. As Commander-in-Chief, Stevenson loved having multiple options available to him so he could apply the appropriate amount of force to get the job done without risking escalation. It also meant the President could more easily sidestep the option of using nuclear weapons when other methods of deterrence were available. Of course, if push came to shove and it was necessary to do so, Stevenson would order nuclear-tipped Atlas-D strikes against the enemy.

The first test of Flexible Response would be in Vietnam. What had started out as a colonial rebellion for the French had transformed into a Cold War battlefront between the Soviet Union and the United States. What Stevenson inherited from Dewey was a war between France and the Viet Minh Communist guerrillas…a war that was going badly for the former.
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Historically, Eisenhower's approach to deterrence was the Massive Retaliation Doctrine. Ahistorically, Stevenson goes down the JFK route and develops the Flexible Response Doctrine earlier.

 

[c0d5579]

Sounds a lot like STRAC.

 

[Nathan Madien]

c0d5579: It really does. Thanks for the article.

Assuming I can pull myself away from Election Night Coverage, I plan to have an Vietnam update up tonight. It's mostly filling in the coverage gap between July 1951 and May 1953 (where we will see Stevenson's initial response to Vietnam).

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

Are the French going to be foolish enough to go into a valley dominated by enemy-held hills?

Ah... the intrigue...

 

[c0d5579]

Are the French going to be foolish enough to go into a valley dominated by enemy-held hills?

Ah... the intrigue...

In their defense, they were trying for what Slim did at Imphal. Not their fault their approach route required them to go through the enemy's kill zone, or that the VC weren't the IJA, weren't at the end of their tether, and didn't have anywhere else to go. There wasn't really a good way to that battlefield, which begs the question: Why fight there?

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

To cut the communication lines with Laos and to stablish a base from which to harass the Vietminh. In the end, it was a big mess.

 

[c0d5579]

Yes, but why fight there? I know why they were operating in the area, it just seems that piece of ground was a bad choice no matter what.

 

[Davout]

Hacking off thumbs? Slicing updates in half? I think someone had a little too much candy at Halloween.

Nice prelude though. Send in the military advisers....

 

[Nathan Madien]

Kurt_Steiner: I guess we will find out.

c0d5579: That's a good question.

Kurt_Steiner: A big mess that would lead to an even bigger mess for the Americans.

c0d5579: Reminds me of George Washington deciding to fight the British over Brooklyn even though the British Navy controlled New York Harbor with impunity. Washington very easily could have been trapped in what logically was a bad place to fight.

Davout: I can't help it. I am a sucker for quick snacks.

There are already advisers on the ground in Vietnam.

 

[Nathan Madien]

Assuming I can pull myself away from Election Night Coverage, I plan to have an Vietnam update up tonight. It's mostly filling in the coverage gap between July 1951 and May 1953 (where we will see Stevenson's initial response to Vietnam).

Good news, everyone. I was able to pull myself away from rooting for G.O.P. gains tonight long enough to throw up part one of my two-parter Vietnam update.
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Returning to Vietnam
To return to Vietnam, we need to turn the clock back to July 1951. At that time, the Viet Minh (led by General Giap) started to vigorously go after isolated French bases in Northern Vietnam. The first target of this strategy was the garrison at Lai Khe – which fell without much difficulty. Encouraged by the victory, Giap next went after Cao Bang on October 25th.

Unlike Lai Khe, Cao Bang was heavily defended by 4,000 troops. Expecting victory, Giap instead watched as his forces were repulsed. Unfazed, the Viet Minh proceeded to put Cao Bang under a long siege. To ratchet up the pressure against the garrison, they attacked nearby Dong Khe on February 15th, 1952. This particular hedgehog was located near Highway Route 4 – in the Tonkin province – and overlooked the Nationalist Chinese border through which the Viet Minh were receiving supplies via the Yunnan Road. After suffering through two days of concentrated artillery fire, Dong Khe surrendered on February 18th. For Giap, the victory achieved the desired effect: cut off, Cao Bang threw up the white flag and was occupied on March 3rd.

After Cao Bang was captured, Lang Son was next. Home to 4,000 French Foreign Legion troops, Lang Son seemed like another formidable force. However, Giap’s successes had rattled the French – who now questioned employing the hedgehog strategy in the Tonkin province. Rather than risk another battle and lose more men in the process, the French High Command in Indochina made the decision on March 17th to abandon Lang Son and withdraw that force south to the safety of the Red River Delta. It would be a harrowing experience for the French Foreign Legion, who was constantly ambushed by the enemy as they retreated south. Of the 4,000 men who left Lang Son, only seven hundred would make it to their destination.

With Lang Son in their hands, the Viet Minh had effectively seized full control over Route 4 – guaranteeing that they would be able to obtain their supplies from the Soviets and Red Chinese with no opposition from the French. As for the French, not only did they lose Route 4 in early 1952 but they also lost their Commander-in-Chief as well. On January 11th, while Cao Bang was under siege, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny succumbed to cancer at the age of sixty-two. His successor in the field would be General Raoul Salan, who described himself as being “one foolish Frenchman”.

A cautious man, Salan felt it was a mistake to garrison isolated hedgehogs that were ripe for ambush. Conceding the Tonkin province to Ho Chi Minh, the new Commander decided on conducting a hold-the-line strategy. He ordered the construction of a fortified line stretching from Hanoi to the port of Haiphong. The purpose of the “Salan Line” was to pin down the Viet Minh by forcing them to assault this barricade head-on. On June 13th, Giap tested Salan by directing 20,000 of his men to attack Vinh Yen (located twenty miles northwest of Hanoi). Facing 6,000 Foreign Legion troops, Vinh Yen should have been overwhelmed. Instead, caught advancing across open ground, Giap’s forces were mowed down by concentrated artillery and machine gun fire. Suffering a rare defeat, Giap lost 6,000 killed, 8,000 wounded, and 500 captured.

Two months later, Giap tried again to break through the Salan Line. On August 23rd, he launched an attack against Mao Khe (located twenty miles north of Haiphong) using 11,000 men. Incredibly, the 400 French soldiers stationed at Mao Khe repulsed their much larger enemy in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Shell-shocked by napalm and gunfire from French naval ships, Giap abandoned his effort after losing 3,000 men.

This would be the story for the next few months. Every time Giap took on the Salan Line, he was thrown back with heavy losses. By mid-November, the Viet Minh had a grand total of 10,000 killed with little to show for it. As for Salan, he was ecstatic that his strategy appeared to be wearing down the enemy. However, whatever successes he was enjoying on the battlefield wasn’t translating into success on the home front. Paradoxically, good news from Vietnam was increasing domestic opposition to the war in France. To the average French citizen, it didn’t matter how many Viet Minh soldiers were being killed. The simple fact that French soldiers were sitting in fortifications slaughtering the Vietnamese was enough to outrage them. As far as the public was concerned, defending Vietnam wasn’t worth it when such efforts were eating up money that could be better spent elsewhere. Feeling the heat of public opposition, the French government urged Salan to go on the offensive. Salan refused and stuck to his strategy instead.

Having thrown his head against the wall with little progress, Giap knew he needed to change tactics. Realizing Salan was content to hang out in Hanoi and wait for the enemy to come to him, the commander of the Viet Minh resorted to the previous strategy of waging guerilla warfare. Swinging his forces around the Salan Line, Giap ambushed the enemy from the rear – cutting supply lines connecting Hanoi with the rest of Vietnam and making life rough for those stationed in defensive positions. The hit-and-run campaign against the Salan Line was raging in May 1953 when the Stevenson Administration turned its’ foreign policy attention towards the First Indochina War.

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

No matter how you look at Vietnam, the only sensible idea is to get the hell out of there ASAP, unless you nuke your enemy.

 

[Ciryandor]

I'll try to find the time to provide a backgrounder on the Philippines; but I'd like to have a short history on what happened in the country from 1900 onwards, so I can project trends and realities to what would likely happen here.

 

[Nathan Madien]

Kurt_Steiner: Using nukes in Vietnam?! You sir are a Goldwater extremist!

Ciryandor: The short history of the Philippines: the Spanish had it, we took it from them. The Japanese took it from us during World War Two, MacArthur got it back. After the war, the Philippines was granted full independence. Pretty much little difference from OTL.

 

[Nathan Madien]

Bonus Update

Having watched Tuesday's US Midterm Election, I have been inspired to do a special recap of Congressional elections that have unfolded in my Presidents universe. Starting with the 1942 Midterm Election, I changed the number of seats won in House and Senate races from the historical record to my ahistorical record.
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1942 Midterm Election
Occurrence: Wendell Willkie's Single Term (1941-1944)
House: Republicans picked up 50 seats
Senate: Republicans picked up 11 seats
House Composition Afterwards: 219 Democrats; 212 Republicans; 2 Progressives; 1 American Labor; 1 Farmer-Labor
Senate Composition Afterwards: 56 Democrats; 39 Republicans; 1 Progressive

1944 Presidential Election
Occurrence: Arthur Vandenberg's Single Term (1944-1945)
House: Republicans picked up 20 seats, giving them the House of Representatives
Senate: Republicans picked up 7 seats
House Composition Afterwards: 232 Republicans; 201 Democrats; 1 Progressive; 1 Labor
Senate Composition Afterwards: 50 Democrats; 45 Republicans; 1 Progressive

1946 Midterm Election
Occurrence: Thomas E. Dewey's First Term (1945-1949)
House: Republicans picked up 35 seats
Senate: Republicans picked up 14 seats, giving them the Senate
House Composition Afterwards: 267 Republicans; 167 Democrats; 1 Labor
Senate Composition Afterwards: 59 Republicans; 37 Democrats

1948 Presidential Election
Occurrence: Thomas E. Dewey's First Term (1945-1949)
House: Democrats picked up 12 seats
Senate: Democrats picked up 6 seats
House Composition Afterwards: 255 Republicans; 179 Democrats; 1 Labor
Senate Composition Afterwards: 53 Republicans; 43 Democrats

1950 Midterm Election
Occurrence: Thomas E. Dewey's Second Term (1949-1953)
House: Democrats picked up 56 seats, giving them the House of Representatives
Senate: Democrats picked up 8 seats, giving them the Senate
House Composition Afterwards: 235 Democrats; 199 Republicans; 1 Independent
Senate Composition Afterwards: 51 Democrats; 45 Republicans

1952 Presidential Election
Occurrence: Thomas E. Dewey's Second Term (1949-1953)
House: Democrats picked up 32 seats
Senate: Democrats picked up 10 seats
House Composition Afterwards: 267 Democrats; 167 Republicans; 1 Independent
Senate Composition Afterwards: 61 Democrats; 34 Republicans; 1 Independent

 

[Nathan Madien]

Evaluating Vietnam
For the first few months of his Presidency, Stevenson paid little attention to Southeast Asia. Dealing with other issues, he considered the First Indochina War to be of low priority. That changed in the spring of 1953. Throughout his tour of Asia, Stevenson found Vietnam to be lurking in the shadow. Sooner or later, it would have to be dealt with. Upon his return to the United States, the President chose the “Sooner” option.

That May, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a full review of the First Indochina War and America’s role in it. In his report, Secretary of Defense Royall wrote that America was very much involved in the war. Since 1950, the United States has been actively aiding and advising the French, along with training Vietnamese soldiers who were fighting with the French. Substantial numbers of small arms and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of support had flowed into the French military effort. Indeed, America was shouldering a large percentage of the cost of the “French war”.

So what should Stevenson do about this? The President had four options open to him: increase the support, maintain the current level, decrease the support, or cease the support altogether. The first option would dig America further into the conflict, the second option would give America flexibility in dealing with the problem and allow them to adjust accordingly to changing conditions, the third option would allow America to back away from her commitments, and the fourth option would be tantamount to abandoning the French. The third and fourth options were politically unpopular. Congress at the time was in a pro-Asia state of mind – having just approved trade agreements with India and Pakistan – and was unwilling to curb aide to Indochina. Furthermore, Democrats both on Capitol Hill and within the Administration were spooked by the prospect of Southeast Asia toppling under Communist subversion and were afraid of being blamed by Republicans for “losing Asia”.
That left the first and second option on the table. Rather than rush into a decision, Stevenson wanted more information first. He therefore dispatched Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Collins to Saigon to gather the facts on the ground and make a military assessment of the situation.

When Collins returned to the White House from his trip to Saigon, he carried with him an honest appraisal of the French effort to suppress the Viet Minh. “Mr. President,” he began, “I have just seen for myself the state of affairs in Indochina. In all honesty, I do not see the current situation as being a good one for the French.”
Collins next proceeded to list the facts:
-Half of the twenty-two million people living in Indochina were under control of the Viet Minh. Nationalism was running strong among the civilian population, who were growing increasingly resentful of the Bao Dai French puppet government.
-The Viet Minh guerillas controlled the Southern Delta, the Central Plateau, and about half the villages in the Red River Delta around Hanoi. The French forces sitting in the Salan Line of fortifications were being isolated, their offensive ability weakened.
-The French had about 225,000 troops on the ground, but weren’t as organized as the Viet Minh were. Furthermore, the Viet Minh was effectively using propaganda to win over civilians. They also enjoyed the terrain advantage, which was greatly hampering the French.
-When asked about Bao Dai, Collins remarked that “His Majesty was a hard and remote person to get straight answers out of. He kept dodging my questions and didn’t seem enthusiastic to be even talking to me.”
-“Mr. President, it’s in my judgment that the French are completely mishandling this situation. They fail to understand that this isn’t a traditional war. In order to make progress, it is necessary to win over the people. The French refuse to do so. They don’t trust the Vietnamese soldiers fighting for them. In turn, the soldiers don’t feel like they have a stake in this matter and aren’t fighting like they should be. The Vietnamese people don’t trust their government, which they consider to be an emanation of the French."
-“Paris and Saigon are out of touch with reality. That is the simple truth. They must realize that this war is essentially a political contest for the people’s loyalty. To win that contest, Paris and Saigon must protect the people from the Viet Minh. Otherwise, this is a hopeless war without end.”

Armed with the facts, the President made his decision: he would continue supporting the French at the current level. Although it looked unlikely that the French would ultimately succeed, Stevenson and others within the Administration took a broader view of the situation. Their justification: America had to take a stand in Southeast Asia or risk losing it and looking weak on the world stage. “From a look at the map,” Stevenson would argue more than once, “We can readily see why Indochina must be held. The rice-rich associated states are the strategic gateway to all of Southeast Asia. If Vietnam falls, all of Indochina is doomed; Thailand and Burma would be in mortal danger; Malaya and Indonesia would be exposed and vulnerable. If this vast area of the world, with its 175,000,000 people, its tin, rubber, minerals, and oil is absorbed into the Communist empire, the still vaster nations of India and Pakistan would quickly lose any freedom of action. All Asia would slide behind the Iron Curtain.”

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

The Domino theory under another name... Let's see if the French are so stubborn as they used to...

 

[soulking]

An Asian Iron Curtain; that would put the Capitalist countries in Asia in the frontlines of the Cold War.

Also, I found a neat picture depicting the situation of the last update.

 

[unmerged(75409)]

You'll have to change the names around a bit, though, since Korea is anti-communist in this story and most of China isn't communist either.

 

[Davout]

Lightning Joe must feel he is hitting his head against a brick wall. If the status quo ain't working, why would you decide to maintain the status quo?

Is the Malayan Emergency or the rise of the Indonesian Communists active in TTL?