The Second Delhi Conference: Global War and Soviet-British tensions
The First Delhi conference in early February 1943 dealt with the problems arising from Yunnan's entry into the war, growing Japanese influence in Tibet and new war between the USA and Japan.
(Soviet delegation - Second Dehi Conference)
At the end it was agreed to hold a second conference in Delhi from 2-5 May to discuss wider issues especially as the war had steadily expanded since late 1942. In February, Brazil had joined Peru in the axis and was adding to the pressure on Ecuador.
and in addition, smaller Central American states such as Nicaragua were becoming increasingly pro-axis. At this stage the British and French were able to hold their colonies in the north but this was likely to change as the Brazilian army applied more presure.
Equally, Soviet actions in Mexico (where the Communist Party was now the dominant political force) were a concern to the British.
More practically, British diplomats argued that their attempts to bring the US into the war on their side were being undermined by Soviet actions in Mexico and Venezuela. The Soviet response was to assert that Mexican political changes were a domestic issue for Mexico, not something to be decided at the whims of a colonial power.
(The Mexican Party, well financed by the Soviets, were able to build on popular anger at poverty)
(And link this struggle to that being waged by the USSR against Nazi Germany)
In any case, a pro-Soviet Mexico would offer a balance to the increasing Axis influence in the region.
In the Middle East, the British had reached the old Libyan-Egyptian border when
Saudi Arabia joined the axis after a military coup.
If this had occured in mid-1942 when the Italians had reached the Red Sea, then the consequences could have been severe. As it was, local UK forces in the region had already forced their surrender.
However, Africa too was now a battle zone from North to South. In the south, South African and Belgian troops were steadily occupying the Portuguese colonies.
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the entry of Vichy meant their troops were steadily overrunning British and Free French holdings in the region and were threatening to take Nigeria.
As ever, it was in Europe that the gap between Soviet and British intentions was at its widest. The British demanded that Italy, Greece and Portugal be seen as their sphere. Voroshilov, under strict instructions, agreed to this, but with the critical caveat – "until those regions become part of the area of the operations of the Red Army". The message was clear, Soviet military planning would not be limited by any notional division of territory – if the British could occupy Greece and Italy that would be welcome, if not the Soviets intended to do so in their own time.
This dispute was repeated over Poland. Again the British demanded the Soviets recognise the legitimacy of the 1939 government. Again the Soviet response was simple. Politically any government intalled in the currently occupied countries would fit their definition of a United Front of parties free from any taint of collaboration with the Germans. Military, the operational needs of the Red Army were paramount, until the Germans were defeated, the Soviets did not intend to operate under any restraints.
At this stage, Eden insisted that the liberation of the UK was to be left to the British. Since the Soviet Baltic Fleet was intermittently engaged with at least 3 German battleships and 1 Aircraft Carrier, and had the capacity to move no more than 3 Rifle Divisions, Voroshilov agreed. Subject to the standard issue – "until it becomes a matter for the planning staff of the Stavka".
By the 4 May, the British were increasingly frustrated. The Soviets had no interest in negotiating and made it clear time after time that the Red Army believed it was the only force capable of defeating the 3 million Axis soldiers in arms in Europe alone. The final day was dominated by the question of Scandinavia. At the moment the region was neutral and the British wanted a promise that the Soviets would not intervene.
This led directly to the problem of the pro-axis regime in Finland. The Soviets pointed to the experience of Saudi Arabia as an example that a state could join the war at any time. To guard the critical cities of Leningrad and Murmansk would take 20-25 divisions that could otherwise be used to defeat the Third Reich. Voroshilov suggested that the British indicate to the Finns that the Soviet conditions were threefold – expulsion of all German delegations and the sacking of any officials deemed to be pro-German; formal acceptance of the borders at the end of the Winter War, legalisation of the Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (SKP) and its participation in Government. If not, as ever, the fate of Finland would depend on "the operational needs of the Red Army".
By 6 May, the conference broke up. Even as the Soviet delegation departed, the opening blow of the Pobeda offensive had torn through the Italian 9 Army at Zgurovka. Voroshilov's words had been stilted but carried real meaning – the fate of Europe was indeed to be decided "according to the operations of the Red Army".
The First Delhi conference in early February 1943 dealt with the problems arising from Yunnan's entry into the war, growing Japanese influence in Tibet and new war between the USA and Japan.
(Soviet delegation - Second Dehi Conference)
At the end it was agreed to hold a second conference in Delhi from 2-5 May to discuss wider issues especially as the war had steadily expanded since late 1942. In February, Brazil had joined Peru in the axis and was adding to the pressure on Ecuador.
and in addition, smaller Central American states such as Nicaragua were becoming increasingly pro-axis. At this stage the British and French were able to hold their colonies in the north but this was likely to change as the Brazilian army applied more presure.
Equally, Soviet actions in Mexico (where the Communist Party was now the dominant political force) were a concern to the British.
More practically, British diplomats argued that their attempts to bring the US into the war on their side were being undermined by Soviet actions in Mexico and Venezuela. The Soviet response was to assert that Mexican political changes were a domestic issue for Mexico, not something to be decided at the whims of a colonial power.
(The Mexican Party, well financed by the Soviets, were able to build on popular anger at poverty)
(And link this struggle to that being waged by the USSR against Nazi Germany)
In any case, a pro-Soviet Mexico would offer a balance to the increasing Axis influence in the region.
In the Middle East, the British had reached the old Libyan-Egyptian border when
Saudi Arabia joined the axis after a military coup.
If this had occured in mid-1942 when the Italians had reached the Red Sea, then the consequences could have been severe. As it was, local UK forces in the region had already forced their surrender.
However, Africa too was now a battle zone from North to South. In the south, South African and Belgian troops were steadily occupying the Portuguese colonies.
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the entry of Vichy meant their troops were steadily overrunning British and Free French holdings in the region and were threatening to take Nigeria.
As ever, it was in Europe that the gap between Soviet and British intentions was at its widest. The British demanded that Italy, Greece and Portugal be seen as their sphere. Voroshilov, under strict instructions, agreed to this, but with the critical caveat – "until those regions become part of the area of the operations of the Red Army". The message was clear, Soviet military planning would not be limited by any notional division of territory – if the British could occupy Greece and Italy that would be welcome, if not the Soviets intended to do so in their own time.
This dispute was repeated over Poland. Again the British demanded the Soviets recognise the legitimacy of the 1939 government. Again the Soviet response was simple. Politically any government intalled in the currently occupied countries would fit their definition of a United Front of parties free from any taint of collaboration with the Germans. Military, the operational needs of the Red Army were paramount, until the Germans were defeated, the Soviets did not intend to operate under any restraints.
At this stage, Eden insisted that the liberation of the UK was to be left to the British. Since the Soviet Baltic Fleet was intermittently engaged with at least 3 German battleships and 1 Aircraft Carrier, and had the capacity to move no more than 3 Rifle Divisions, Voroshilov agreed. Subject to the standard issue – "until it becomes a matter for the planning staff of the Stavka".
By the 4 May, the British were increasingly frustrated. The Soviets had no interest in negotiating and made it clear time after time that the Red Army believed it was the only force capable of defeating the 3 million Axis soldiers in arms in Europe alone. The final day was dominated by the question of Scandinavia. At the moment the region was neutral and the British wanted a promise that the Soviets would not intervene.
This led directly to the problem of the pro-axis regime in Finland. The Soviets pointed to the experience of Saudi Arabia as an example that a state could join the war at any time. To guard the critical cities of Leningrad and Murmansk would take 20-25 divisions that could otherwise be used to defeat the Third Reich. Voroshilov suggested that the British indicate to the Finns that the Soviet conditions were threefold – expulsion of all German delegations and the sacking of any officials deemed to be pro-German; formal acceptance of the borders at the end of the Winter War, legalisation of the Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (SKP) and its participation in Government. If not, as ever, the fate of Finland would depend on "the operational needs of the Red Army".
By 6 May, the conference broke up. Even as the Soviet delegation departed, the opening blow of the Pobeda offensive had torn through the Italian 9 Army at Zgurovka. Voroshilov's words had been stilted but carried real meaning – the fate of Europe was indeed to be decided "according to the operations of the Red Army".