"So Goodnight, Day": The Ukraine 1-20 September 1942
Soviet intelligence failed comprehensively to understand the German strategic intentions in the late summer and autumn of 1942. Essentially, Stalin and his immediate entourage repeated their mistakes before the 7 June 1941. They did not believe the Germans were capable of mounting a strategic offensive after their losses in the spring and early summer. On this basis, any evidence that a major blow was being prepared were dismissed as defeatism. Reports came in from Pe-2 overflights, from partisans, and from deserters that reinforcements were flowing into the German divisions and some 15-20 divisions that had been shattered in the spring battles had been refitted and moved back to the Soviet front.
The opening phase of the German counterstroke was seen as confirming the leadership's assessment that, at worst, this was just a stiffening of their defense and a localised counterattack.
For the first three weeks in September, the northern Ukraine remained quiet and the German blow fell on 4 and 9 Armies in Bessarabia and NE Rumania and 26 Army to their north. In consequence, by 5 September, rather than allow the South Ukrainian Front to go onto the defense, STAVKA ordered a disastrous offensive by 4 Army into Bessarabia.
The result was a brutal swirling battle from Uman to Chisinau.
(Infantry from 4 Army attacking in Bessarabia)
By the time it was over on 10 September, 4 Army had been driven from Balta,
exposing its northern flanks and had expended its remaining strength. Some 13,134 lives were lost for 8,852 Germans and their allies.
(a surprising Soviet POW after 4 Army retreated from Bessarabia)
Now, that 4 Army was vulnerable, on 10 September, the Germans went over to the offense across the sector hitting the Soviet lines at Ananyiv,
Talne, Artsyz and Tulcea all of which were in German hands by 18 September.
In the midst of these defeats, STAVKA finally accepted that the South Ukrainian Front was facing something more serious than just a localised attempt to regain a few provinces. Given permission to fall back to a new defence line, the first goal was to stem the German attack to allow a disengagement. So as the bulk of the 2 armies fell back, a major rearguard action was fought at Slobozia for 15 days from 16 September to 1 October,
badly disrupting the German timetable. Equally, 8 Tank Division counterattacked at Krasni Okny, briefly stemming the German advance.
(8 Tank Division pushing through retreating forces to attack at Krasnyi Okni)
This slowing of the German advance was temporary but the respite did allow 9 Army to complete its retreat from the lower Danube region.
However, even as the southern Ukrainian front started to unravel, STAVKA repeated its mistake in Bessarabia. Now 18 Mechanized Corps hit the Italian forces at Polonne.
(T-34s from 18 Mechanized pushing past destroyed Italian vehicles)
As expected, the Soviet armour slashed through the Italian lines reaching into the German rear.
However, the corps had attacked just as the German offensive broadened to include the entire Ukraine. As opposed to exploiting its gains and cutting German supply lines, it had advanced into a trap as the German offensive swept around its flanks.
Soviet losses reflected the failed offensives followed by the need to hold open retreat routes and to slow the German offensive. In total 31,646 Soviet soldiers died in the first three weeks of September, for 19,923 Germans and 5,741 of their allies. Across the entire front, September 1942 was to prove the bloodiest single month of the war as the German offensive gathered momentum and the Red Army, yet again, sought to stop them before they flooded across the Dniepr and again threatened Moscow.
Soviet intelligence failed comprehensively to understand the German strategic intentions in the late summer and autumn of 1942. Essentially, Stalin and his immediate entourage repeated their mistakes before the 7 June 1941. They did not believe the Germans were capable of mounting a strategic offensive after their losses in the spring and early summer. On this basis, any evidence that a major blow was being prepared were dismissed as defeatism. Reports came in from Pe-2 overflights, from partisans, and from deserters that reinforcements were flowing into the German divisions and some 15-20 divisions that had been shattered in the spring battles had been refitted and moved back to the Soviet front.
The opening phase of the German counterstroke was seen as confirming the leadership's assessment that, at worst, this was just a stiffening of their defense and a localised counterattack.
For the first three weeks in September, the northern Ukraine remained quiet and the German blow fell on 4 and 9 Armies in Bessarabia and NE Rumania and 26 Army to their north. In consequence, by 5 September, rather than allow the South Ukrainian Front to go onto the defense, STAVKA ordered a disastrous offensive by 4 Army into Bessarabia.
The result was a brutal swirling battle from Uman to Chisinau.
(Infantry from 4 Army attacking in Bessarabia)
By the time it was over on 10 September, 4 Army had been driven from Balta,
exposing its northern flanks and had expended its remaining strength. Some 13,134 lives were lost for 8,852 Germans and their allies.
(a surprising Soviet POW after 4 Army retreated from Bessarabia)
Now, that 4 Army was vulnerable, on 10 September, the Germans went over to the offense across the sector hitting the Soviet lines at Ananyiv,
Talne, Artsyz and Tulcea all of which were in German hands by 18 September.
In the midst of these defeats, STAVKA finally accepted that the South Ukrainian Front was facing something more serious than just a localised attempt to regain a few provinces. Given permission to fall back to a new defence line, the first goal was to stem the German attack to allow a disengagement. So as the bulk of the 2 armies fell back, a major rearguard action was fought at Slobozia for 15 days from 16 September to 1 October,
badly disrupting the German timetable. Equally, 8 Tank Division counterattacked at Krasni Okny, briefly stemming the German advance.
(8 Tank Division pushing through retreating forces to attack at Krasnyi Okni)
This slowing of the German advance was temporary but the respite did allow 9 Army to complete its retreat from the lower Danube region.
However, even as the southern Ukrainian front started to unravel, STAVKA repeated its mistake in Bessarabia. Now 18 Mechanized Corps hit the Italian forces at Polonne.
(T-34s from 18 Mechanized pushing past destroyed Italian vehicles)
As expected, the Soviet armour slashed through the Italian lines reaching into the German rear.
However, the corps had attacked just as the German offensive broadened to include the entire Ukraine. As opposed to exploiting its gains and cutting German supply lines, it had advanced into a trap as the German offensive swept around its flanks.
Soviet losses reflected the failed offensives followed by the need to hold open retreat routes and to slow the German offensive. In total 31,646 Soviet soldiers died in the first three weeks of September, for 19,923 Germans and 5,741 of their allies. Across the entire front, September 1942 was to prove the bloodiest single month of the war as the German offensive gathered momentum and the Red Army, yet again, sought to stop them before they flooded across the Dniepr and again threatened Moscow.
