"So clear of Victory" – Persia, February – April 1942.
The formations in the Caucasus were seen by STAVKA as a strategic reserve. If the Germans did manage to break through at Stalino and Kharkov, those forces could be shifted to the line of the Don to protect the vital oil fields at Gorki and Baku. Equally if the Italians over-ran the British in Egypt (and in early Spring 1942 this seemed quite possible) then those forces could protect Baku.
Notionally the Caucasus Theatre was also meant to guard against a possible Turkish invasion. Reports from TKP (Turkish Communist Party) cadres and the NKVD confirmed that the Germans were putting pressure on Turkey to join the axis. Equally it was no surprise that the Turks had dreams of recovering the Levant and Iraq that they lost in 1918, nor that they dreamt of a pan-turkic patchwork of states stretching across the Caucasus and into Central Asia. What was very clear was that Turkey would take no aggressive actions unless both the USSR and the UK were on the verge of defeat.
However, the Germans were also seeking to draw Persia into the Axis, and here they found a more ready audience.
(Reza Shah, leader of Persia in early 1942, later lived in exile in Brazil)
They did not have Turkey's bitter memories of defeat and were lured by promises of reincorporating the Iranian speaking areas of the Soviet Union (Southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) as well as the Shia dominated regions of Eastern Iraq. They were perhaps too ready to believe German stories of how the Soviets were committing their very last reserves in an attempt to hold Moscow (which was bound to fall in the Spring) and how the Italians were on the verge of crossing the Suez Canal. Thus Persia joined the axis in early February
and then hesitated on the verge of war. That hesitation, combined with a fatal under-estimation of the Soviet strength in the Caucasus was to set the scene for the subsequent campaign. STAVKA ordered almost all the formations in region to deploy to the Persian border (leaving a garisson at Batum in case of an ampibious invasion across the Black Sea from Rumania).
These troops were still in transit when Persia finally declared war on 24 February.
Here they made their second miscalculation. The great bulk of their army struck into the Turkmenistan Republic along the east of the Caspian leaving only reserve formations to screen the Caucasus and to guard Tehran. STAVKA had stripped the Central Asian theatre to cope with the Japanese incursion and had only left a DNO formation at Ashqabat and a single rifle division (78) near Tashkent.
A third advantage the Soviets held was the degree of resistance to the war in Persia and the existence of a strong local Communist Party (the Tudeh).
(Tudeh irregular formations supporting the Soviet attack at Tehran)
STAVKA quickly gathered intelligence about the disposition and plans of the Persian army. From the Caucasus front, 3rd Corps was ordered to take Tehran and 31st to drive south to the Persian Gulf.
In effect, the campaign would be waged by forces already in reserve and offered the strategic prize of ports on the Indian Ocean (with the capacity to interdict any sea borne trade in that region). The British too, belated, realised this, so in many places the war was a race for the oilfields at Ahvaz and the port at Bandar-e-Abbas.
For the most part it was a campaign of manouvre, Tehran fell on 24 March
, and Soviet forces won the race for Bandar-e-Abbas.
The only battle with significant Soviet losses was at Bezameh in the east where 78 Rifle had been surrounded when trying to cut the supply lines to the Persian forces occupying Turkmenistan. The formation was probably saved from destruction by the surrender of Persian forces on the 30 April.
The British insisted on retaining their small gains along the Euphrates in the West and in Baluchistan in the east.
(British Imperialist forces occupying SE Iran)
Given the strength of the Tudeh, the Soviets were content to hand as much of the practical administration to local control.
(Tudeh HQ in Tehran)
Additional garrison troops were deployed to the major cities, a small offensive force left at Bandar-e-Abbas and Ahvaz. 4 divisions, including a freshly raised cavalry formation that had taken part in the later stages of the campaign were re-allocated to Central Asia and the balance redeployed to the Turkish border. Somewhat unwillingly, the Soviets allowed the British to send forces from India to the Middle East. In the short term, stopping the Italians before they could occupy Iraq was in the USSR's own interests.
For the loss of 1400 Soviet lives (800 at Bezamah alone) and 3000 Persian troops, the first member of the axis had been forced out of the war. Even better, the USSR now had a potentially powerful position in the Middle East and on the western flank of British occupied India.
Bandar-e-Abbas was steadily built up as a naval and signals base and heavily fortified. Given the fast developing Soviet appreciation of submarine warfare, it had the potential to bring UK communications to and from India to a halt in the event of conflict.