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If not now? When? The Second Battle of Leningrad October-November 1941
The second major German offensive at Leningrad took a very different form to the first. There they had tried to storm the city directly only to be caught up on the complex geography of the central city and unable to cross the Neva bridges in any force. Added to this, they had allocated insufficient forces to secure their frontline in an urban environment.
Their second attempt saw them screening the city itself, making small probes and allocating enough to tie down some Soviet formations. Their main effort was in the industrial district of Metallysty to the east of the city and to force the line of the Neva near to Lake Ladoga.
(this shows the situation on 20 October and Soviet reserves moving to 27 Army sector)
This forced them to attack across a swampy river, with few natural south-north communication links and, as September slipped into October, a combination of autumn rains and the early winter frosts – the ground was alternatively frozen solid and a morass of mud.
(a warning of what the Germans were to face in a Russian autumn and early winter)
This phase of the battle commenced on 23 September even while the first assault on the city was ongoing. However the second battle is better seen as commencing on 29 September when they renewed their action in the main urban area.
The lack of river crossings meant the small town of Petrokrepost became critical to both sides. The initial German attack seemed to the Soviet defenders to be little more than a repeat of the probing attacks they had carried out since early September. As such the focus of the Leningrad Front remained on the battle for the city.
The initial German attack by 87 and 123 Infantry Divisions was relatively quickly repulsed by elements of 27 Army in the sector.
However, this time the Germans quickly moved fresh troops in (including 3 Panzer divisions – 1st, 5th and 21st) with the attack on the crossings at Petrokrepost led by 21 Panzer. Despite the swampy terrain (and the very muddy river bottom) they had established a small bridgehead by 12 October. Fortunately for the Soviet defenders, the Germans could find no reliable crossing points anywhere else so were unable to bring their full force to bear. Small bridgeheads were established and then eliminated
(Soviet troops guarding the Neva crossings at Dubovka)
with German operations hampered by the VVS' near complete control of the skies.
(Sturmovik about to take off to bomb the German positions at Petrokrepost)
(the LAGG-3s of the Leningrad PVO had near complete control of the skies)
The crisis point was 20 October with 21 Panzer firmly entrenched on the north bank of the Neva but unable to reinforce or maintain supply due to constant Soviet artillery fire on their improvised crossings.
(with near complete Air superiority, Soviet artillery was able to fire almost unhindered)
If the Germans had been able to reinforce, they would have probably been able to turn the flanks of the Soviet defenders. As it was 21 Panzer was steadily ground down
(destroyed Stug III)
even as 27 Army was able to call on front reserves (10, 90 Rifle and 1 NKVD).
(Soviet counterattack 25 October)
These fresh troops were too much for the shattered Germans and they were forced to pull back on 31 October. The Germans had allocated far too many troops than they could effectively use in this sector.
(German supply problems, 20 October)
Equally OKH wanted to use the forces now stalled at Leningrad to reinforce their renewed offensive at Moscow.
At the same time in the city itself, 52 Infantry and 23 Panzer redoubled their efforts to clear 115 Rifle from the industrial region of Metalloysty. Their goal was to secure the bridges in this sector.
115 Rifle was pushed into dangerously small bridgeheads covering the two crossings, but as in September, the handful of KV1s, effectively dug in as small fortresses, held up the attacks.
(KV1s on the north side of the Neva, but able to fire on the exposed flanks of 52 Infantry)
Again, in a repeat of September, at a critical stage, 23 Army committed its small reserve (111 Rifle). Faced with escalating Soviet resistance and increasing supply problems the Germans broke off on 23 October.
The final act was an almost half hearted attack on Petrokrepost from 1-5 November which was easily repulsed by the relatively fresh Soviet troops that had ended the main offensive.
In total 18,385 Soviet and 19,268 German soldiers lost their lives in these actions. Enough to deter either side from further offensives in this sector. After this, the siege of Leningrad commenced, with the Germans handing over operational control to their Italian and Hungarian allies. The sector remained quiet until the March battles.
The second major German offensive at Leningrad took a very different form to the first. There they had tried to storm the city directly only to be caught up on the complex geography of the central city and unable to cross the Neva bridges in any force. Added to this, they had allocated insufficient forces to secure their frontline in an urban environment.
Their second attempt saw them screening the city itself, making small probes and allocating enough to tie down some Soviet formations. Their main effort was in the industrial district of Metallysty to the east of the city and to force the line of the Neva near to Lake Ladoga.
(this shows the situation on 20 October and Soviet reserves moving to 27 Army sector)
This forced them to attack across a swampy river, with few natural south-north communication links and, as September slipped into October, a combination of autumn rains and the early winter frosts – the ground was alternatively frozen solid and a morass of mud.
(a warning of what the Germans were to face in a Russian autumn and early winter)
This phase of the battle commenced on 23 September even while the first assault on the city was ongoing. However the second battle is better seen as commencing on 29 September when they renewed their action in the main urban area.
The lack of river crossings meant the small town of Petrokrepost became critical to both sides. The initial German attack seemed to the Soviet defenders to be little more than a repeat of the probing attacks they had carried out since early September. As such the focus of the Leningrad Front remained on the battle for the city.
The initial German attack by 87 and 123 Infantry Divisions was relatively quickly repulsed by elements of 27 Army in the sector.
However, this time the Germans quickly moved fresh troops in (including 3 Panzer divisions – 1st, 5th and 21st) with the attack on the crossings at Petrokrepost led by 21 Panzer. Despite the swampy terrain (and the very muddy river bottom) they had established a small bridgehead by 12 October. Fortunately for the Soviet defenders, the Germans could find no reliable crossing points anywhere else so were unable to bring their full force to bear. Small bridgeheads were established and then eliminated
(Soviet troops guarding the Neva crossings at Dubovka)
with German operations hampered by the VVS' near complete control of the skies.
(Sturmovik about to take off to bomb the German positions at Petrokrepost)
(the LAGG-3s of the Leningrad PVO had near complete control of the skies)
The crisis point was 20 October with 21 Panzer firmly entrenched on the north bank of the Neva but unable to reinforce or maintain supply due to constant Soviet artillery fire on their improvised crossings.
(with near complete Air superiority, Soviet artillery was able to fire almost unhindered)
If the Germans had been able to reinforce, they would have probably been able to turn the flanks of the Soviet defenders. As it was 21 Panzer was steadily ground down
(destroyed Stug III)
even as 27 Army was able to call on front reserves (10, 90 Rifle and 1 NKVD).
(Soviet counterattack 25 October)
These fresh troops were too much for the shattered Germans and they were forced to pull back on 31 October. The Germans had allocated far too many troops than they could effectively use in this sector.
(German supply problems, 20 October)
Equally OKH wanted to use the forces now stalled at Leningrad to reinforce their renewed offensive at Moscow.
At the same time in the city itself, 52 Infantry and 23 Panzer redoubled their efforts to clear 115 Rifle from the industrial region of Metalloysty. Their goal was to secure the bridges in this sector.
115 Rifle was pushed into dangerously small bridgeheads covering the two crossings, but as in September, the handful of KV1s, effectively dug in as small fortresses, held up the attacks.
(KV1s on the north side of the Neva, but able to fire on the exposed flanks of 52 Infantry)
Again, in a repeat of September, at a critical stage, 23 Army committed its small reserve (111 Rifle). Faced with escalating Soviet resistance and increasing supply problems the Germans broke off on 23 October.
The final act was an almost half hearted attack on Petrokrepost from 1-5 November which was easily repulsed by the relatively fresh Soviet troops that had ended the main offensive.
In total 18,385 Soviet and 19,268 German soldiers lost their lives in these actions. Enough to deter either side from further offensives in this sector. After this, the siege of Leningrad commenced, with the Germans handing over operational control to their Italian and Hungarian allies. The sector remained quiet until the March battles.
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The Germans didn't come very close to success this time, but it's still impressive how much force they're able to throw around. If they could get their supply in order, or if they managed to contest your air superiority... You'd be in a lot of trouble.
That was a sweet map of Leningrad and environs, by the way. Really helps to put the actions in perspective.
Finally, I thought I'd mention that I broke down and ordered SF (I'd almost ordered it two days before they lowered the price, once that happened it was an utter no-brainer). Mostly, if not exclusively, based on this AAR, so give yourself a pat on the back for directing a few more Dollars to Paradox' pockets.
That was a sweet map of Leningrad and environs, by the way. Really helps to put the actions in perspective.
Finally, I thought I'd mention that I broke down and ordered SF (I'd almost ordered it two days before they lowered the price, once that happened it was an utter no-brainer). Mostly, if not exclusively, based on this AAR, so give yourself a pat on the back for directing a few more Dollars to Paradox' pockets.
Leningrad mustn't fall, it mustn't I tell you!
Also, I've been meaning to ask, what does the Rubik's cube in the battle screen mean. :wacko:
Also, I've been meaning to ask, what does the Rubik's cube in the battle screen mean. :wacko:
'Mein Führer, Steiner könnte es nicht...'
Hitler is quite obsessed with Leningrad.
As long as you get supplies, everything is fine.
Good Finns!
Hitler is quite obsessed with Leningrad.
As long as you get supplies, everything is fine.
Good Finns!
at the end of July I was in a bit of a panic that I'd not get traction to hold them anywhere, by the end of September, except in the NW I was pretty pleased with how it went - the only loss that was really hurting at this stage was in terms of leadership, I'd had to wind down my spy effort and was making all sorts of unwelcome trade offs between research & officers.
No, this time it was a lot easier, I still had to rotate stuff in and out to regain org (that province to the north of Leningrad is invaluable as its quite high infra), but I could let stuff properly recover before pushing it back & even release a few divisions to contest the battles on the east side of L Ladoga. And any German bomber that appeared was very quickly dispatched back to its base.
They are rather wonderful. Well I've found a full set of 1:250,000 maps of the USSR, former Warsaw Pact countries and Manchuria from the early 1950s (so they are pretty accurate for the Great Patriotic War.) So I'll be making a lot of use of them, the only pity is they are the product of imperialist spies ... but one can't be too choosy.
In that case it really drives in the point that the Neva, except at Leningrad is near uncrossable, not due to terrain as such as much as its a huge marsh on both sides of the river, but the complete lack of an even vestigual north-south road net. Would have been a nightmare even for infantry to fight across.
Finally, I thought I'd mention that I broke down and ordered SF (I'd almost ordered it two days before they lowered the price, once that happened it was an utter no-brainer). Mostly, if not exclusively, based on this AAR, so give yourself a pat on the back for directing a few more Dollars to Paradox' pockets.
I think you're my second convert
but I don't think Johann does rebates. Actually its a good choice. Ignore the 'Paradox ate my granny' posts on the main forum, but if you read over the SF aars it seems as if the AI is now pretty nasty to deal with - far less only about the player winning and far more of defeats and/or tough fighting.'Mein Führer, Steiner könnte es nicht...'
Hitler is quite obsessed with Leningrad.
As long as you get supplies, everything is fine.
Good Finns!
Just hoping the Finns stayed out of the Axis has been my (in game) obsession for almost 2 years. All sorts of odd bits have joined (I'm still not sure how I'll conquer Peru) but not the worthy Finns. I think they are waiting for the Germans to take Leningrad and the Germans need them to be able to take Leningrad.
I had to double check ... one of these days I'll learn how to play this game. Its the symbol for hard, not sure if you get a really fiendish rubik cube on VH though?
Anyway, we've got lots of snow, I sent a report to a client for comments yesterday so should have been off up something steep (not too steep - fresh snow and a slope, plus frozen ground = avalanches) to celebrate - except the car battery decided this is a good time to die ... So, here's a bonus post:
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"I've heard it in the chilliest land", The Arctic Campaign September-December 1941
From late July, STAVKA had tended to ignore the German offensive into the North West. The need to find the will to hold Leningrad and to block the direct attack on Moscow took priority. However, by October, the situation was becoming serious.
(Stalin was apparently driven to smoking as the stress mounted)
Partly as all the great cities of the North (Leningrad, Murmansk and Archangelsk) were in danger of being severed from the rest of the USSR. Certainly by mid-November all the main rail links had been cut. However, with the fall of Vologda in early October, the situation became far more serious. The Germans were now in a position to push down the east side of the Rybinsk reservoir and cut into the east of the Moscow defense lines. Equally the vital Trans-Siberian Railway, carrying reinforcements and munitions to the Moscow defense could be lost.
(Soviet rail net showing the threat to the Trans-Siberian Rail Lines)
STAVKA had to rob other fronts to shore up the position in the North West. First 7 Corps was pulled off the Finnish border and hurled into the fighting between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. The corps was all but shattered in 3 weeks but did seriously slow the German advance long enough for 27A to pull troops away from the Neva and restore and occupy the old Finnish defense positions at Suojarvi. Here from mid October to mid November a desparate battle raged that ended with the Germans pulling back. They had been held less by the Red Army and more by their own lack of supplies and the impact of winter. Day time temperatures were already below -10c.
(The Pe-2s were the backbone of the VVS interdiction effort, this robust plane could land at poor quality airstrips and in the snow, giving them a great flexibility)
Equally 58 Corps (with 2 mountain and 2 rifle divisions) was pulled from Ponca and Kandaleska. This was pushed into the fighting at Onega and then fell back towards Archangelsk. Again a stiffening of the Soviet defence came at a critical stage as the German offensive faltered under the impact of winter and the VVS' incessant attacks on their vulnerable supply lines.
58 Corps was replaced by the 3 DNO formations that had been raised at Leningrad. These were steadily being pushed back towards the rest of 14 Army now completely isolated at Murmansk.
The other problem for the RKKA in this sector was that many formations were ground down in terms both of manpower and organisation by the constant retreats since July.
(34 Corps after it had been driven back at Vologda)
After Vologda fell,
1 Army was allowed to draw on STAVKA's vital reserves and committed enough fresh troops to finally stall the Tigers of 4 Heavy Armoured Divisions. This formation had been constantly hit by the VVS and its supply route through Cherepovets was in ruins. Bridges were regularly blown by partisans and Pe-2s and any unescorted supply convoys subject to ambush (if they moved at night) or bombing (if they moved by day).
(Pe-2 hunting German supply convoys)
By the start of December, the German offensive had been held. The problem for STAVKA was this was less due to the RKKA and more to do with the appalling weather
(German infantry near Archangelsk)
and the VVS' dedication to destroying the German supply network.
(typical Soviet airraids on axis supply dumps)
If the front was not significantly reinforced before the spring, then a renewed offensive could easily see Moscow attacked from the East, North and West.
(the Germans tried to use air supply to avoid Soviet interdiction of land routes, but almost all their missions were caught by VVS interceptors - in any case unlike the Soviets, their planes were less well adapted to a Russian Winter)
From late July, STAVKA had tended to ignore the German offensive into the North West. The need to find the will to hold Leningrad and to block the direct attack on Moscow took priority. However, by October, the situation was becoming serious.
(Stalin was apparently driven to smoking as the stress mounted)
Partly as all the great cities of the North (Leningrad, Murmansk and Archangelsk) were in danger of being severed from the rest of the USSR. Certainly by mid-November all the main rail links had been cut. However, with the fall of Vologda in early October, the situation became far more serious. The Germans were now in a position to push down the east side of the Rybinsk reservoir and cut into the east of the Moscow defense lines. Equally the vital Trans-Siberian Railway, carrying reinforcements and munitions to the Moscow defense could be lost.
(Soviet rail net showing the threat to the Trans-Siberian Rail Lines)
STAVKA had to rob other fronts to shore up the position in the North West. First 7 Corps was pulled off the Finnish border and hurled into the fighting between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. The corps was all but shattered in 3 weeks but did seriously slow the German advance long enough for 27A to pull troops away from the Neva and restore and occupy the old Finnish defense positions at Suojarvi. Here from mid October to mid November a desparate battle raged that ended with the Germans pulling back. They had been held less by the Red Army and more by their own lack of supplies and the impact of winter. Day time temperatures were already below -10c.
(The Pe-2s were the backbone of the VVS interdiction effort, this robust plane could land at poor quality airstrips and in the snow, giving them a great flexibility)
Equally 58 Corps (with 2 mountain and 2 rifle divisions) was pulled from Ponca and Kandaleska. This was pushed into the fighting at Onega and then fell back towards Archangelsk. Again a stiffening of the Soviet defence came at a critical stage as the German offensive faltered under the impact of winter and the VVS' incessant attacks on their vulnerable supply lines.
58 Corps was replaced by the 3 DNO formations that had been raised at Leningrad. These were steadily being pushed back towards the rest of 14 Army now completely isolated at Murmansk.
The other problem for the RKKA in this sector was that many formations were ground down in terms both of manpower and organisation by the constant retreats since July.
(34 Corps after it had been driven back at Vologda)
After Vologda fell,
1 Army was allowed to draw on STAVKA's vital reserves and committed enough fresh troops to finally stall the Tigers of 4 Heavy Armoured Divisions. This formation had been constantly hit by the VVS and its supply route through Cherepovets was in ruins. Bridges were regularly blown by partisans and Pe-2s and any unescorted supply convoys subject to ambush (if they moved at night) or bombing (if they moved by day).
(Pe-2 hunting German supply convoys)
By the start of December, the German offensive had been held. The problem for STAVKA was this was less due to the RKKA and more to do with the appalling weather
(German infantry near Archangelsk)
and the VVS' dedication to destroying the German supply network.
(typical Soviet airraids on axis supply dumps)
If the front was not significantly reinforced before the spring, then a renewed offensive could easily see Moscow attacked from the East, North and West.
(the Germans tried to use air supply to avoid Soviet interdiction of land routes, but almost all their missions were caught by VVS interceptors - in any case unlike the Soviets, their planes were less well adapted to a Russian Winter)
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Car batteries do tend to die when it gets cold... But your loss is our gain, clearly.
It looks like there's a theme to your battles, a rhythm, if you will: the Germans attack, the Germans push you back, your defense slowly strengthens and your incessant interdiction strikes destroy the Germans' ability to keep their armies supplied, leading to eventual stalemate. So, how much of the eventual stalemate is due to your troops' ability to hold the Germans on their own, and how much due to your air force (I assume that - at least at this point in time - it's mostly the air force)?
Do you have enough of an air force to hold the Germans everywhere, or do you need to concentrate your planes - meaning that the Germans can keep some traction going at some place at any time? I guess what I'm asking is: can you hold the Germans everywhere at the same time yet, or are you still being pushed back somewhere at any time?
It looks like there's a theme to your battles, a rhythm, if you will: the Germans attack, the Germans push you back, your defense slowly strengthens and your incessant interdiction strikes destroy the Germans' ability to keep their armies supplied, leading to eventual stalemate. So, how much of the eventual stalemate is due to your troops' ability to hold the Germans on their own, and how much due to your air force (I assume that - at least at this point in time - it's mostly the air force)?
Do you have enough of an air force to hold the Germans everywhere, or do you need to concentrate your planes - meaning that the Germans can keep some traction going at some place at any time? I guess what I'm asking is: can you hold the Germans everywhere at the same time yet, or are you still being pushed back somewhere at any time?
i'm not sure but does Archangielsk poses a rairoad going eastwards, becausei believe germans just took every single one?
The situation up north looks rather unappealing. Can the RKKA push back the Germans in time to resupply the besieged (operationally, if not tactically) defenders of Leningrad?
It should be soon -30.
I live near the coast and it is already -15 as of late November. The sea-winds provide that it rarely goes below -20.
But as of Karelia... it should be on the other side of -30.
Too bad the Germans do not freeze to death as they should.
Even -5 without proper winter-clothing could be deadly that north.
Maybe they have proper clothing?
But they cannot get supplies, right?
Bah, the game sucks.
General Winter ought to help you more.
I live near the coast and it is already -15 as of late November. The sea-winds provide that it rarely goes below -20.
But as of Karelia... it should be on the other side of -30.
Too bad the Germans do not freeze to death as they should.
Even -5 without proper winter-clothing could be deadly that north.
Maybe they have proper clothing?
But they cannot get supplies, right?
Bah, the game sucks.
General Winter ought to help you more.
I imagine the supply situation is going straight to hell in Karelia, with all the supplies being having to travel the length of the front, reach Arkhangelsk, board a ship to Murmansk, and then be routed down the length of the Finnish border to divisions along the front.
However, that leaves a huge problem for Leningrad, who has been cut off. How are supplies reaching them? Are you airdropping them, or are you shipping them through the Baltic?
However, that leaves a huge problem for Leningrad, who has been cut off. How are supplies reaching them? Are you airdropping them, or are you shipping them through the Baltic?
I always like to see that photo of Stalin and his trusty pipe. I once read a HOI AAR about Stalin with his pipe giving him all the advice about what to do. Like Mr. Hat from South Park, it was Mr. Pipe. It was truly hilarious....
I once read a fascinating biography on Stalin. A true tyrant... But had it not been for Stalin, the SU would have certainly lost the war against the Germans, despite the initial setbacks for the Russians. Only a ruthless leader like him could have taken the extreme measures needed for defeating the Axis.
I once read a fascinating biography on Stalin. A true tyrant... But had it not been for Stalin, the SU would have certainly lost the war against the Germans, despite the initial setbacks for the Russians. Only a ruthless leader like him could have taken the extreme measures needed for defeating the Axis.
One could also argue that it was Stalin's tyranny that caused RKKA's early collapse. And Stalin initially micromanaged the Red Army, leading to several spectacular failures, until he learned to trust his generals. Ironically, Hitler then did the reverse, and started to override his generals.
I recommend reading David Glantz's When the Titans Clashed for a good analysis of the Eastern Front. It is fascinating in that at the war's end the two sides had changed 180 degrees: at the end the Soviets gave more credence to nationalism, lessened the powers of the commissars, and emphasized individual initiative at all command levels - without which deep operations wouldn't have been possible. In contrast, the Germans turned to idelogy, adding the equivalent of commissars to the officer ranks, and destroyed all vestiges of initiative by insisting on absolute centralized command.
I recommend reading David Glantz's When the Titans Clashed for a good analysis of the Eastern Front. It is fascinating in that at the war's end the two sides had changed 180 degrees: at the end the Soviets gave more credence to nationalism, lessened the powers of the commissars, and emphasized individual initiative at all command levels - without which deep operations wouldn't have been possible. In contrast, the Germans turned to idelogy, adding the equivalent of commissars to the officer ranks, and destroyed all vestiges of initiative by insisting on absolute centralized command.
ummh this could go spectacularly off topic ... but here's 2 observations (in part from my own research into CPSU-PCI relations in the 20s and 30s), first you could argue that both these murderous pair sort of relaxed when they thought they could win - but even late in the war Soviet army and front commanders were in dread of the 11.30 (always Moscow time) phone call with detailed instructions. What Stalin did, mainly out of lack of choice, from about 43 onwards was to hold off detailed involvement once an operation was started.
Second is you can make a case for blaming the rise of Fascism on Stalin (not so much the Trotskyist orthodoxy that their man would have been different), but Stalin's cynical use of the Comintern as part of the domestic power struggle in the late 20s early 30s first handed over the Chinese Party to the KMT (& Mao was then freed of the shackles of an urban conventional Marxist leadership), stopped the PCI building a united front in Italy (at a time when Mussolini was vulnerable) and, worst of all, forced the KPD to its suicidal fight with the SPD just as Hitler came to power. Add in Spain and its quite a charge sheet.
But its certainly true that by the end of the war the Red Army had real mastery of its chosen model of offensive warfare, from planning through implementation with a lot of flexibility to exploit sudden opportunities or call something off. But even as late as March 45 Tolbukhin caught badly caught on the defense when the Germans counterattacked in Hungary. So its a bit hard to come to any hard and fast judgements.
At last the weather is beginning to help you out a bit. Considering how snow covered Edinburgh is at present, and how bloody annoying that is proving, I almost feel sorry for the Axis troops. Well, actually no I don't! Regardless very good updates, as ever, once more the tenacious Soviet defence seems to be holding back strong Axis attacks.
Is it possible for the Germans, if they capture a major port like Archangelsk, to start supplying their arctic forces by sea? If so, can you continue to hold if you can't interdict the convoy routes?
one of the things that I'm really enjoying about this game is the way that lulls break out in the fighting for a variety of reasons. Sometimes its winter, sometimes its a period when we are very closely matched and at least once it was pure exhaustion - there's a month coming up when the combined death toll was over 300,000 set in a 4 month period where the total was 1.2m - not surprisingly both sides took a bit of a break after that.
In effect, this respite up north is nothing to do with my ability to fight them to a stalemate and everything to do with winter and going after all their supplies (both combined), so unless I do something then once one or the other of those factors is removed, I'm back in big trouble.
All my bombers (8 tac, 4 cas) are working the Moscow-Arctic sector so I have no offensive air in the ukraine. The interceptors are spread out a bit more, as I more or less have enough to keep the luftwaffe under wraps. I just wish I had more air wings as if I shift from logistics to ground attacks then pretty quickly their supply nets repair. But yes, its the VVS that is keeping the Rodina afloat at this stage.
i'm not sure but does Archangielsk poses a rairoad going eastwards, becausei believe germans just took every single one?
Aye, the only Moscow-archangelsk rail is the one that runs straight from Vologda. There probably were eastern rails from Archangelsk (that map was not a secret one) serving mines and things not to be mentioned up on the White Sea. But I'd doubt in reality if it was set up (either capacity or the way it linked up) to support a military effort. In reality the Germans would now have Archangelsk cut off from supply, in game I'm tracing supply via the Northern Urals (which seems inherently implausible).
Thats my goal this winter, the entire offensive is aimed at relieving Leningrad and Archangelsk ... you'll have to wait and see if it works
It should be soon -30.
I live near the coast and it is already -15 as of late November. The sea-winds provide that it rarely goes below -20.
But as of Karelia... it should be on the other side of -30.
Too bad the Germans do not freeze to death as they should.
Even -5 without proper winter-clothing could be deadly that north.
Maybe they have proper clothing?
But they cannot get supplies, right?
Bah, the game sucks.
General Winter ought to help you more.
the weather system isn't HOI3s crowning glory. The intent is wonderful but in truth the arbitrary weather model in HOI2 was more realistic. Has any player yet looked at a front moving in and thought no I'll delay that offensive. The worst thing is the lack of spring muds, find it frustrating the way it all clears in late March, when in reality April was probably the worst month for any military action.
Murmansk oddly is ok, its benefitting from the supply logic of supply the furthest first. So the heroic defenders of Archangelsk are sending their supplies to Murmansk. My approach in Karelia is to run away quickly till I get to the provinces around Kandalaska, since the Germans have supply problems its quite a while before we get any more fighting in that direction.
Supply at Leningrad is a bit of a fiddle. A couple of times the German production AI went bonkers, it seemed utterly confused by the supply in/out of the network system (the thing that as a player you just ignore). First time I gave them a decent dump of supply and fuel at Minsk (that was in late Jan) and that settled it back down. Second time I gave it a huge dump in Berlin (July 42) and again its been fine since then. Since Leningrad's factories did supply the defenders in the war I gave myself a batch of supply at Leningrad as a balance - not enough to keep me in full supply but it stopped the units degrading to 0 org. Also once I got Smolensk back I was able to use air supply a lot.
Compared to my extreme concern in August, in general the late Summer/early Autumn went pretty well, all I now need to do is to more or less hold my lines to December and then look for a place for a counterblow.
V tempted to take some pictures in Pollock Park & slip them in ... looks lile the E Front to me.
Welcome to the forums ... and thanks for your very first post
They should is the short answer, but one problem with the HOI supply model is that it won't look for a sea route when it has an overland one. So yes, grab Archangelsk and poke a mass of supplies in by sea would be logical and would skip all my bombing etc. I do later cut them off from overland links and then they did use convoys for supply - and to my frustration the coast was just, just out of reach of my bombers, so I bombed the hell out of Archangelsk instead.
Oddly around Leningrad they are convoying something in/out of Narva and I do sink a fair few of their convoys in the Baltic ... so in all honesty, I'm not really sure I do properly understand the supply model and the different ways it selects routes.
Interestingly, Semper Fi added the ability to use both land and sea supply, and I've noticed the AI using it entirely on its own initiative (in the Baltic and elsewhere) when I set supply convoys to automatic. So the German AI is probably doing the same thing - after all, why not do it for its own account when it does it for the human too .
.