The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
Extract from “Independence to Empire, A New History of the Californian Republic” (By Chris Carmack and Michael Connor, Berkeley University Press, published 2007)
The fall of the Piedra Cruces fort in Baja California marks, at least retrospectively, the collapse of serious Mexican resistance against the twin advances of the Californian and US armies. Santa Anna, having so commendably and energetically resisted the arguably impossible odds facing him for close to a year, realised he had nothing left to give, and began actively to seek a way out.
In the east, the Americans had finally managed to bring their overwhelming strength of numbers to bear against the militarily more successful Mexican Army, and by the end of November had occupied the entire of Texas and most of New Mexico. US troops moved with an apparent sluggishness- but in reality it was because they were forced to reverse the effects of Santa Anna’s brief abolition of slavery in Texas every step of the way, largely by means of violent coercion, quite literally in some cases dragging the unfortunate slaves back to their masters. At the beginning of December, however, the Americans were ready to launch two offensives- one south into Coahuila Province from Texas, the second a sea-borne attack on Mexico’s principal port of Veracruz. The question was merely whether the enemy would collapse internally before these measures were necessary.
The Californian Army, meanwhile, had done equally well for itself. The agreement with the Apache having been long since finalised, the Californians were also in occupation of both their southern objectives- Baja and the Sonora. Don Javier de la Vega and Don Alejandro del Serrano had made heavy work of General Cos’ defences at Piedra Cruces, but losses were still fairly light- and still considerably lower than those of their American allies. In Sonora, meanwhile, Don Tibalto Barja had done brilliantly (though the meagre opposition he faced ought to be taken into account). Capturing not only his entire goal of the Province, he added Tucson, Arizona, to his acquisitions- where American and Californian representatives met on November 27th, largely merely to offer mutual self-congratulation about how well it all seemed to be going. Barja seems to have acquitted himself with (sometimes suspiciously excessive) honour- missing no chance to kiss babies, feed the poor and nurse the dying on his way south. Doubtless he had one eye on his reputation for the future, but he was not the only one looking. On 4th December, having received news of the saintly adulations being offered to the Californian general, the Papal Curia voted to confer upon him the honorary title of a Knight of the Order of St. Peter, and despatched a nuncio to California. The fact that Barja was, in fact, never to receive this award should not obscure the fact that contemporaries obviously had an extremely positive view of the much-vilified Don.
The coat of arms of the Order of St. Peter, to which Don Tibalto Barja was nominated in December 1846.
Regardless, however, of the individual conduct of generals, the war was practically over. It would probably have been over earlier, had Santa Anna felt able to simply make peace. The dictator, however, quite correctly identified that his reputation depended entirely on Mexico’s military record- thus he could in no way be seen to have been the architect of any Mexican surrender (which, according to the predictions of Santa Anna’s advisors, would necessarily be harsh on the losers). Thus he sought a way out- recalling his liberal opponents, led by Valentin Farias, to office and appointing a group of them (again led by Farias) as a “Peace Commission”, who were to seek a treaty with California and America (the latter being seen as the more important), and most significantly were also to sign this treaty as Mexico’s plenipotentiaries when it came to be ratified. It took not a little cajoling to persuade men who had been violently opposed not only to Santa Anna himself but also to the Texan War, to subsequently become his agents in constructing a humiliating treaty of concessions. Farias eventually saw no way out and agreed- but the dictator’s (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to pass the buck necessitated almost another full month of fighting, and around 3,000 more deaths (at least 2,200 of which were Mexicans).
Valentin Farias, leader of the Mexican liberals and chief of the Peace Comission set up by Santa Anna in late November.
When two divisions of the US Army landed at Veracruz on December 14th, they were greeted not by an attempt to throw them back into the sea (which they would most likely have had great difficultly in withstanding), but a Mexican delegation under a flag of truce, entreating them to make peace. Houston, with the full backing of President Polk and majority opinion in Washington, clamoured for a harsh treaty, and when Farias protested that what ought to be a negotiated truce on the question of Texas was becoming a punitive diktat to a vanquished power (which Mexico by no means was), the solution was simple: recompense Mexico for her losses to America (which included an indemnity and the surrender of two frigates as well as the loss of Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and control over the Apache) by short-changing California.
The Mexican Peace Comission, under Valentin Farias, accepted the American proposal. More difficult was the question of Californian approval.
San Francisco, it was rightly believed, would not risk fighting alone against Mexico, and, seeing as Mexico was treating Washington as the principal member of the alliance, would simply have to accept whatever the Americans chose to allow them. This turned out to be the ratification of the Yosemite Treaty (which the Americans would subsequently do their best to subvert anyway) and the annexation of Baja California. Everything else that California asked for, during the one brief conference on December 18th at which the Californians were consulted at all, was ignored, including an indemnity, a commitment to Mexican disarmament, trade concessions and most glaringly the Sonora Province. To add insult to injury, the Californians were also “allowed” to annexe Tucson and its hinterland, but only on the understanding that they would then sell it on (at a knockdown price) to the Americans.
The borders between Mexico, California and the USA according to the proposed Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty, December 1846. Note the Tucson area, which was to be surrendered to California and then sold to America.
On Christmas Eve, the joint chiefs of the Californian War Cabinet- that is to say Alvarado’s ministers, plus Don Tibalto, Don Javier, Don Alejandro and bizarrely also the captured Don Mariano Vallejo (who was probably acting as an advisor on Mexican sentiments), met in Hermosillo, the capital of the Sonora, to discuss whether this offer was acceptable. To most of them, it seems, it was quite simply not. Even a cursory examination of written opinions of some of those at the meeting will reveal as much: Don Rafael Montero called the proposed Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo a “preposterous and unacceptable document” in his diary, Sir Roland Perry simply thought it was “a joke”, while Don Tibalto described it in a letter to his sister (and Don Alejandro’s wife) Elena as “[a] most beastly and malicious insult… to the honour of our nation and army”. Seemingly, then, it ought to have been a short meeting, and ought to have resulted in a curt rejection of the terms offered (which were indeed unfair on the Republic). The fact that it was not was to change the course of Californian history.