the end of WW1

[unmerged(15208)]

Not true. The French sat behind their trenches not only because the Germans had broken their spirit, but because the Americans were coming. The US Army's numbers won the war, but the French saved countless lives by not attacking. Likewise, after the debacle of Passchendale, Haig rested his men for months before the German spring offensives, waiting for the Americans to enter the fray.

America participation did provide a great morale boost by the *expectations* that there would be victory, and if the campaign had continued into 1919 there is little doubt that the greatest military burden would have been carried by Pershing's Armies. But American contributions to the Allied victory *at the front* in 1918 while important were not critical. The German spring offensives had been halted and the Allies had resumed the offensive before the AEF had become an equal partner at the front.

As for casualties being similar, I don't believe it. If they were, Germany would not have been able to carry on the war, considering she was also fighting in Russia [and Italy to some extent]. The figures must be inflated, and I read a book called, "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier, which argues for these inflations, saying that the German casualty figures given are often for months of combat rather than actions, so that the German deaths are for all fronts, and all battles. For instance, it is common to say that there were 600,000 German casualties at the Somme. But in reality, it is 600,000 German casualties on all fronts during the Somme combat. To feel better about themselves, British historians have given the Germans ludicrously high casualty figures, so that they are comparable to British/French ones for given actions.

Mosier's figures are highly misleading. He counts only German dead as those listed as "dead" in German unit records; i.e. assuming that all "missing" are "alive in French PoW camp" when most of the missing were "blown to little unrecognizable bits all over the battlefield." He then compares this to finalized British/French casualty returns which do take the missing into account.

The breakdown from Churchill's The World Crisis (revised 1937 edition updated for 'finalised' casualty figures) is as follows (all from German Reichsarchiv data):

Killed in action Western front (Reichsarchiv) 829,400
Died of wounds Western front 300,000
Missing-reclassified as dead 364,000
Total Western front 1,493,400

This is more than double Mosier's figure of 669,263 for total German deaths in the West. The Germans were having serious manpower problems by the end of the war and had to resort to a system attack divisions and second rate trench divisions.

Otherwise, how could Germany fight for 4 years????

If the German army really was enjoying this inflated attrition rate that Mosier claims why didn't they just advance, mop up the remnants and sun bath on the English Channel?

 

[Allenby]

As for casualties being similar, I don't believe it. If they were, Germany would not have been able to carry on the war, considering she was also fighting in Russia [and Italy to some extent]. The figures must be inflated, and I read a book called, "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier, which argues for these inflations, saying that the German casualty figures given are often for months of combat rather than actions, so that the German deaths are for all fronts, and all battles. For instance, it is common to say that there were 600,000 German casualties at the Somme. But in reality, it is 600,000 German casualties on all fronts during the Somme combat. To feel better about themselves, British historians have given the Germans ludicrously high casualty figures, so that they are comparable to British/French ones for given actions.

The same Mosier who argues that the Germans won the first battle of the Marne, and whose book has two 'recommendations' from people, including Niall Ferguson, who don't agree with him? He isn't even an historian, twists history to satisfy his thesis, and seems to have strange concepts of what constitutes victory and defeat, arranged around body counts and the belief that Germany was winning the war on the basis that the German army was sustaining less casualties than the Allies (which doesn’t seem to hold up). In that respect, I concur with what Anthony EJW has to say. It's a school of Great War history with no disciples and a single teacher: Mosier.

At least, all the First World War historians that I know of: Strachan, Wilson, Prior, Ferguson, Keegan, Sheffield, Holmes almongst them, refute his arguments. Therefore, Yakman, I commend you for arguing so vigorously what is a minority viewpoint, in a historiographical sense.

All true. But that was not the British strategy. Haig wanted victory on the battlefield, not from exhaustion but from attack. The Allied strategy was not attrition. If it were, their behavior would have been vastly different. Instead, they genuinely thought that one more push would be enough to send the Germans running. It wasn't. What emerged was the "strategy" of attrition, which no one planned and no one, least of all Haig, wanted.

I'd argue that judging from what Haig wrote before the battle of the Somme...

...[our] armies will undertake offensive operations...astride the Somme, with the object of relieving the pressure on the French at Verdun and inflicting losses on the enemy...

I think Haig hoped that a breakthrough could be achieved - and it did seem that one could be achieved at the end of October/early November when it did seem that the German army at the Somme could collapse and allow for a large hole to develop. No doubt Haig would have remembered what happened at the Battle of Loos a year before, when his First Army staggeringly tore a hole in the German lines, yet the paralysis of Field Marshal French's character and command ensured that the necessary reinforcements were not delivered quickly enough. When it seems that the German army is on the verge of capitulation (and it was at Passchendaele), then it is only expedient to carry on the offensive with the belief that the final push will take a decisive victory. How many times in history has an army been on the brink of defeat, only for the opposition's commander not to continue the battle for X reason, and then to be chastised by history?

 

[Yakman]

To argue that the attack on the Somme was one designed to take pressure off of Verdun is without refute. To argue that it was designed with the same motives as the Germans used to justify Verdun is questionable.

Haig wanted to break the lines in all of his battles. He didn't want to stack up the German bodies next to the British and French bodies and see whose was higher. He was always trying to make a war of trenches into a war of manuever. However, this was impossible, until the Germans were out of their trenches in 1918, and the war became fluid again.

The Germans did win the first battle of the Marne. But they couldn't follow through. They didn't have enough resources or manpower and the French were fighting back hard. So a decision was made to move the armies back, where they were better defended against a possible flanking action from the south, which would have rolled up the lines and inflicted a severe defeat upon the Kaiser's host.

 

[unmerged(3902)]

T<snip>

Haig wanted to break the lines in all of his battles. He didn't want to stack up the German bodies next to the British and French bodies and see whose was higher. He was always trying to make a war of trenches into a war of manuever. However, this was impossible, until the Germans were out of their trenches in 1918, and the war became fluid again.
<snip>

Why is it impossible? Trench lines got broken all the time in WW I; they just didn't get broken on the *western* front with great regularity. Even there, you did see complete breaks on the trench line. Michael broke all the british trench lines for example. Likewise so did the German/Austrian counterattack in Italy, and the Brusilov offensive to name two others.

Just because it was *hard* to break a trench line didn't mean it was impossible or that the proper military solution to the problem was to throw up your hands and say "it's hard so I won't try."

And, ultimately. your much maligned British army *did* break the Hindenburg line in 1918.

 

[Nikolai II]

Haig wanted to break the lines in all of his battles. He didn't want to stack up the German bodies next to the British and French bodies and see whose was higher. He was always trying to make a war of trenches into a war of manuever. However, this was impossible, until the Germans were out of their trenches in 1918, and the war became fluid again.

It wasn't impossible per se, only unlikely considering Haigs reluctance to visit the front or delegate authority.

The first day of the Somme saw a breakthrough, but the plans combined with bad commanders let it be ignored.

 

[Allenby]

It wasn't impossible per se, only unlikely considering Haigs reluctance to visit the front or delegate authority.

The first day of the Somme saw a breakthrough, but the plans combined with bad commanders let it be ignored.

I don't know what visiting the front has to do with the potential occurrence of a breakthrough, but Haig certainly was not reluctant to visit the front. Infact, Kiggell and Charteris were often asking him not to as he often showed a zealous desire to do it often. Haig was nearly shot dead on his horse in 1914 as I Corps commander, and stayed at the front during a German artillery bombardment in 1915 when he was visiting. As for delegating authority, did he not give considerable responsibility for the waging of the Battle of the Somme in particular to Fourth Army commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson? I have the Fourth Army Tactical Notes in mind.

The plans for the first day were flawed concerning the use of artillery, yet I don't think 'bad' commanders were responsible for the lack of a breakthrough. Firstly, Haig had accepted before the battle that it would not primarily aim at the breakthrough, but would seek to cause German casualties, conforming in a sense with Rawlinson's 'bite and hold' doctrine. Secondly, the British Army of 1st July 1916 was an inexperienced one - a weapons system in the making - and so it was perhaps unsurprising that it had a tragic first day, or even 'a fluke' as historian John Terraine put it.

 

[unmerged(25744)]

America participation did provide a great morale boost by the *expectations* that there would be victory, and if the campaign had continued into 1919 there is little doubt that the greatest military burden would have been carried by Pershing's Armies. But American contributions to the Allied victory *at the front* in 1918 while important were not critical. The German spring offensives had been halted and the Allies had resumed the offensive before the AEF had become an equal partner at the front.

The final German offense was checked by AEF at Belleau Wood/ Chateau-Thierry, without the Americans there, Paris may well have fallen and France knocked out of the war. The Germans had broken through combined French/British forces at the 3rd Battle of Aisne and captured 50,000 soldiers and driven within 90 km of Paris.


http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/aisne3.htm

 

[unmerged(15208)]

The final German offense was checked by AEF at Belleau Wood/ Chateau-Thierry, without the Americans there, Paris may well have fallen and France knocked out of the war. The Germans had broken through combined French/British forces at the 3rd Battle of Aisne and captured 50,000 soldiers and driven within 90 km of Paris.


http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/aisne3.htm

The two American divisions involved during the 3rd Battle of the Aisne were important and did allow the Allies greater flexibility in there defensive. However, the American forces involved did not constitute the entity of the Allies reserve forces. Further, by this point the Germans were suffering from the same problems as the rest of their 1918 attacks- their troops were getting exhausted, they were outrunning supplies and artillery, and they were facing stiffening resistance. I don't mean to slight the Americans involvement, but believe it is a matter of scale. I don't think it amounts to a critical role compared to the magnitude of the British and especially French commitment to this battle.

 

[StephenT]

Allied forces during the Château-Thierry operation, as far as I can discover, included the French 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th Armies (on 18 July), with a total of 29 divisions including the two American ones.

Also, Ludendorff wasn't even intending to capture Paris during this offensive. It was a strategic diversion aimed at drawing Allied reserves south, so he could launch a further attack against the British in Flanders during August.

 

[phelbas]

I wonder for how many years, people will look back with the benifit of hindsight and say how awful the commanders in WW1 were.

 

[Allenby]

I wonder for how many years, people will look back with the benifit of hindsight and say how awful the commanders in WW1 were.

Happily, I believe it is changing already - history generally wins out over poetry and novels.

 

[Yakman]

I wonder for how many years, people will look back with the benifit of hindsight and say how awful the commanders in WW1 were.

They really weren't. Imagine the constraints. Commanding armies of hundreds of thousands of men without the benefits of radio or telephone is simply impossible. They did the best they could, given the technological constraints. Certainly they had unrealistic views of warfare [at least some did] but the overarching fact is that even the best commanders were hampered by the failures of 19th century communications to deal with 20th century warfare.