jacob-Lundgren said:
1. How many troops did Germany have garrisoning their Russian takings?
2. What is it about lack of US intervention that stops those lands needing that garrison?
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1. How many troops did Germany have garrisoning their Russian takings?
2. What is it about lack of US intervention that stops those lands needing that garrison?
Yakman said:
I agree that the tank did not break the deadlock (although it play a part), but that more sophisticated artillery tactics were more influential in seeing that front lines were subdued more effectively. As for infiltration tactics, I wouldn't describe them as solely 'German', as the Allies had developed similar methods of fighting through 1916 and 1917. It was however, the Germans who used them most spectacularly during the Kaiserschlacht, and similarly, by the Allies during the 100 days offensive.
Indeed - the results of Operation Micheal can be described better as a British failure than a German success: caused by too few troops trying to hold too long an expanse of front line, and failing to organise an adequate defence in depth.
It's easy for infiltration tactics to score spectacular successes when the enemy has obligingly left great big gaps in his lines...
It's easy for infiltration tactics to score spectacular successes when the enemy has obligingly left great big gaps in his lines...
StephenT said:Indeed - the results of Operation Micheal can be described better as a British failure than a German success: caused by too few troops trying to hold too long an expanse of front line, and failing to organise an adequate defence in depth.
It's easy for infiltration tactics to score spectacular successes when the enemy has obligingly left great big gaps in his lines...
The British lines probably would not have been so overstretched had David Lloyd George not withheld reinforcements, when Haig had been demanding them, and saying that a full blown German offensive was expected in spring 1918. Gough was always going to have a hard time in defending 42 miles of front with just eleven divisions, plus one in reserve - and with the inadequate defensive system left behind by the French.
Allenby said:
Maybe if Haig had used his men more effectively, rather than wasting them in senseless combat, then he wouldn't have needed reinforcements. The British Army performed awfully during WW1, and didn't learn the lessons of trench warfare like the Germans or the French.
Yakman said:
On the contrary, the British Army performed better than the German Army and the French Army on the Western Front, and Haig didn't waste men in combat more than any other commander in that theatre.
Yakman said:
Yeah, those foolish British. They went and developed tanks as a way to break the trench system, unlike the brilliant French who flat stopped attacking, or the Germans who thought they could do it with just really good infantry tactics.
pcasey said:
What saved more lives? Cambrai? Or the French refusing to attack post-mutiny? Which was better for the war effort?
The French performed better during the Somme, and in general did better than the English after say, 1916. They at least changed their tactics, while Haig kept thinking--lets go to Passchendale! Yeah, that'll work great!!! Ypres is where the war can be won!! Just hit them there and it'll all collapse. And he did, and failed. And did it again, and failed. And did it again, and failed. Also, the French opposed the Gallipoli operation, which was doomed to failure.
Yakman said:
Cambrai, as the British learned more about tank tactics.
Yakman said:
The ground they attacked over on the 1st July, as an example, offered more cover as it was a wooded area. The French also had more artillery available, and was vastly more experienced in offensive operations than their British counterparts. Therefore, it is no surprise that the French perfomed better than the BRITISH at the Somme (not 'English'!)
Yakman said:
Where? During the Nivelle offensive?
Yakman said:
The British Army changed tactics. Learning the hard fought lessons of the Somme and applying them in 1917. The BEF became a more effective fighting force over this year and was capable, in 1918 of beating the German Army.
Yakman said:
Not a bad idea when the French army has mutinied and may collapse if attacked. An even better idea when the First Sea Lord tells you that the country will lose the war within a year if the Channel Ports aren't cleared...
Yakman said:
The German army nearly withdrew from Flanders as a result of the offensive whilst sustaining casualties that they could not afford....
Yakman said:
Maybe, maybe not.
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Yakman said:
Most of those "debacle" battles you listed have similar casualty counts for the attacker and the defender e.g. it cost the Germans roughly as many troops to defend against Passchendale as it cost the British to attack. Even the totality of the Somme cost the Germans nearly as many men as it cost the British. WW I was an attritional war, like it as not, and you have to take losses to inflict losses.
Likewise, it's untrue that the British didn't change their tactics. The British radically changed their artillary doctrine, force composition, and assault tactics between 1915 and 1916. Likewise, they developed an entirely new military arm (tanks) to add to their infantry/artillary mix. The idea that they persisted with 1914 era mass assaults simply isn't true, though it is rooted in the popular imagination.
In the Somme in particular, probably the last battle in which the British attacked en mass, the individual units did so *against* their field orders. The Somme field orders called for a tactical dispersal into assault lines 100 yards apart with a 1 yard spacing between men. The green troops of the territorial divisions and Kirtchner divisions (and their officers), however opted to advance in the much denser waves they'd been drilling with for years, probably because it felt psychologically "safer" to advance in a dense mass of humanity.
After the French mutinies, the British *had* to keep attacking in order to draw attention away from the French front. There was a very real fear among the combined allied staffs that the post-mutiny french army wouldn't withstand a full blooded German assault e.g. Verdun II. They were probably wrong mind you, but that doesn't mean it wasn't a reasonable fear under the circumstances.
Realistically, accepting a strategy of attrition was the only option. To simply sit on the defensive behind your works was to play for a draw.
pcasey said:
Not true. The French sat behind their trenches not only because the Germans had broken their spirit, but because the Americans were coming. The US Army's numbers won the war, but the French saved countless lives by not attacking. Likewise, after the debacle of Passchendale, Haig rested his men for months before the German spring offensives, waiting for the Americans to enter the fray.
As for casualties being similar, I don't believe it. If they were, Germany would not have been able to carry on the war, considering she was also fighting in Russia [and Italy to some extent]. The figures must be inflated, and I read a book called, "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier, which argues for these inflations, saying that the German casualty figures given are often for months of combat rather than actions, so that the German deaths are for all fronts, and all battles. For instance, it is common to say that there were 600,000 German casualties at the Somme. But in reality, it is 600,000 German casualties on all fronts during the Somme combat. To feel better about themselves, British historians have given the Germans ludicrously high casualty figures, so that they are comparable to British/French ones for given actions.
Otherwise, how could Germany fight for 4 years????
Moreover, arguing that Haig was a believer in the attrition strategy is missing the facts. Haig, and many others believed that Germany was always on the edge of disaster, and that one solid push would force the mythical "breakthrough". He kept hammering away in the misguided belief that he could break the German lines and force a victory, not by attrition, but by tactical success.
Darkrenown said:
But the population differences weren't that great. If you combine Britain and France's populations of potential fighting men, they are significantly larger than Germany's. Plus we add in fighting on the Eastern front, where 1/4 - 1/3 of German manpower was deployed. I don't see how they can take the losses that are ascribed to them without numbers being fudged.
Yakman said:
Germany had a larger pool of military age men than a strict comparison of populations would imply. She had a "front-loaded" demographic curve, especially when compared with France, which meant she could field more soldiers per million population than the other European powers.
Likewise, she wasn't fighting alone. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires both had their own significant armies and populations.
You're right in the general sense that the Central powers were outnumbers by the allies (Russia), but, if anything, that advocates all the more strongly for an allied strategy of attrition. If you know you have a manpower advantage, and you know you can inflict casualties on your enemy at an exchange ratio that is better than your manpower ratio, then you'll win eventually.
Even if you're at a manpower disadvantage, attrition still makes sense if you can inflict disproportionate casualties. That ultimately was the German plan for Verdun. They could have cared less about the city; they wanted to goad the French into massing troops there so they could shell them into oblivion and rack up a huge exchange ratio.
pcasey said:
All true. But that was not the British strategy. Haig wanted victory on the battlefield, not from exhaustion but from attack. The Allied strategy was not attrition. If it were, their behavior would have been vastly different. Instead, they genuinely thought that one more push would be enough to send the Germans running. It wasn't. What emerged was the "strategy" of attrition, which no one planned and no one, least of all Haig, wanted.