Chapter III
Diplomatic Arts in the Late Empire
One of the most disgusting practices the Romans engaged in, disgusting in the eyes of the European successors to the Western Roman Empire that is, was the quick and often too heavily relied upon incessant diplomacy of the rulers of Constantinople. The Latin conquerors of Constantine’s city remarked, back in the thirteenth century – that the “Greek” reliance upon diplomacy was the reason they had no claim in calling themselves Roman, for the true Romans (of Rome) would had resorted to the power of the sword instead of the power of the pen. In this sense, I suppose the Greek-speaking Romans took the message of Jesus, “He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword,” more to heart than the Latin Christians.
Of course, one might argue that without Roman diplomatic skill, the empire may have fallen before the fifteenth century. Not to mention that the modern understandings of diplomacy come from this noble Roman tradition came into being inside the walls, palaces, and churches of Constantinople as foreign dignitaries, enemies, and friends alike, were brought to the settlement table by the power and mysticism of Constantine’s glistening city on the Bosphorus. While by this point in her history, Rome no longer had much diplomatic sway over the world, let alone her more immediate neighbors – diplomacy was a central part of Roman culture and identity. While the formal fallout with the Latin Church was finalized, which brought some hardship in securing marriages and alliances with the Latin West, who saw the Orthodox East as brethren who had fallen from the true faith in Christ and therefore subject to subjugation to save them from damnation (more likely to plunder what riches that remained), the schism of the Eastern and Western church did not stop “faithful” Catholic monarchs who certainly eyed the potential impending collapse of the Romans with eager hands.
Thus, perhaps, John’s wedding of family members (he had no children despite being married three times) to the royal courts of Serbia and Hungary had different motives for both parties involved. However, Manuel II’s marriage to Helena, a princess of Serbia, plus the fact the Serbians were part of the Eastern Christian faith, meant the two could be natural allies. After all, both “empires” were threatened by an ever expansionist Mohammedan state headed by the Turkic sultan, Mehmed “the Conqueror.” John’s niece – the daughter of his brother Thomas, Helena, was endowed to the Serbian Grand Prince Lazar, and the marriage cemented, for the time being at least, a solid friend north of the Mohammedans. John also married a sister, whose name is lost to history, not being named by any historical sources, to Ladislaus the Posthumous, the eventual King of Hungary – securing a larger and more powerful friend just to the north of their Greek homelands.
A medieval manuscript depicting a royal wedding. Royal marriages were a quick and easy way to secure political and military alliances, of which the Romans were in desperate need of to ward off a Mohammedan invasion that was sure to come.
The art of diplomacy was necessary for the survival of the Roman state, for, if war to break out between the Romans and the Turks, the Romans would be dependent upon foreign aid to even the scales of battle to a much more manageable level. However, neither Serbia nor Hungary was particularly well suited for this. The Serbians had been decimated at Chernomen in the previous century, nearly whipping out the entire Serbian aristocracy, and they were also present at the fiasco at Varna. Likewise, the Hungarians were not a very formidable military power. While modest and having a large pool by which they could quickly create an army, the Hungarians had proved themselves less than capable against the Mohammedans and Nicopolis and Varna in the past 50 years, they were also constantly embroiled in losing conflicts with the expansionist Venetians along the Adriatic Coastline. Despite alliances with two powers that had constantly proved ineffective against the Mohammedan armies, a triune of Hungary, Serbia, and Rome was in the mutual interests of not only each of these states, but also the rest of Europe. Should the Mohammedans continue their advance, perhaps the Romans, Serbians, and Hungarians could slow the tide and give the Europeans the time necessary to prepare against a foe who they likewise had little success against in multiple crusades – each time with the European coalitions marching off confident of victory only to be utterly defeated by the Turks each and every time.
Elsewhere, the Romans could count upon the Duchy of Athens to join in the military affairs of the Roman emperors. Although the ruling family was from Italy, and the official state church was Roman Catholicism, both the Duchy, the empire centered in Constantinople, and the Despotate of Morea, which said it was part of the empire but John’s brother Constantine wielded a large degree of autonomy, it was in the best interests of the small duchy to remain in the good graces of the Romans just as much as it might had been to submit themselves under Mohammedan rule. Another natural reason for the Athenians positive reception of imperial gravitas was the fact that most of the subjects of the Athenian state were Greek, were part of the Greek Church, and saw themselves as separated brothers of the Roman state. So political moves away from the decaying Roman empire would had created a swirl of angry commoners that would had loved nothing more than displace their Latin overlords if given a chance.
John VIII also set out on a path of appeasement to another great Mohammedan power based in Egypt, and the Rus Tsardom of Moscovy – which had become a religious rival to the Romans for the Moscovite domains now had the largest population of Eastern Christians, and the constant attempts of the Palaiologoi emperors earned the scorn of the Patriarchy of Moscovy who saw any attempt to surrender Eastern independence to the Latins as heresy. Even by the end of the fourteenth century, the Christian leadership in Russia had been claiming itself to be the new center of authority for the Eastern world, a claim that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch (who were based in Damascus), Alexandria, and Jerusalem all disputed. Both served the interests of the empire, a friend in the Mohammedan Mamluks seemed natural – the Mamluks were south of the Mohammedan Turks, the two were rivals of the Sunni faith, and the two seemed like they would eventually come at loggerheads to settle Islamic conflicts in the Holy Lands. Likewise, the Rus people had a long attachment to the Romans. The Romans had converted the Rus people to Christianity, and they had given them their alphabet and modern systems of education and law. The Rus people even liked to think of themselves as Romans, or at the very least, the favored child of Rome! And like the Romans, who were fighting against the dynastic and hegemonic threats of a Mohammedan kingdom, so too were the Rus long fighters against Islamic domination over their lands; they both shared a similar religious and political culture, and a common enemy of the faith.
A manuscript detailing diplomacy within the Byzantine palaces. The modern art of diplomacy and negotiations were born from this timely and noble Roman tradition, although the more warlike Europeans thought diplomacy was for the weak.
If it is true that civilized societies resort to diplomacy before the use of force, than despite their small imperial holdings, which centered around Constantinople, Trebizond, and the Peloponnese, the Romans were still one of the most civilized societies in the world despite their poor predicament. The diplomatic endeavors of John VIII earned modest admiration throughout Europe. Indeed, some suggested that the rise of the Mohammedans and the decline of the Romans had been exaggerated, and the evidence for this, although the evidence itself was folly, the diplomatic prowess of the Romans operating out a single city – Constantinople still had much staying power on the world’s diplomatic stage, even if that admirable power was regionally located and did not extend into the Western diplomatic sphere.
Furthermore, the Romans, in comparison to the more “civilized” Europeans, were ahead of the curve when it came to diplomacy. While many European nations only engaged in the tradition of diplomatic marriages, often in bids to eventual have claims to their rival’s throne, the Romans, ever the shrewd diplomats, often formed alliances for mutual benefits and coalitions. It was obvious that the Kingdom of Serbia and the Empire of Rome were in no position to challenge the Mohammedans alone, but together, with the prospect of half of the Mohammedan army stationed in Asia Minor for border conflicts against the Mamluks, the two nations could stand a fighting chance before the Turkish armies from the south circled north of the Black Sea and swept south like a horde intent on destruction.
As it was clear that the Roman army was not in a state to achieve victory, even in defense of the empire, let alone in an offensive bid to reclaim their historic homelands, diplomacy was the only avenue for the survival of the empire. It was not a matter of if the Mohammedans would attack Constantinople and seek the final destruction of the Roman Empire, it was a matter of when. Although a small revival on the shores of the Black Sea was bidding, the Romans, knowing that the real jewel of the empire lay in Constantinople, would leave the Despotate of Trebizond to its fate when a war would break out. And when a war with the Turks would bring a thundering sword to pierce the heart of the East, John VIII wisely understood that it was better to be prepared than not, and it was better to put his trust of survival into the hands of former rivals – for God only knew the Romans wouldn’t be able to defend Constantinople alone.
An etching of the city of Constantinople, the only city (province) that really mattered to the Roman Empire in 1447 AD. The city was given priority defense over all other imperial territories for obvious reasons.