Chapter XXVIII
The Greek Aristocracy Backs Gabras
The Greek Aristocracy Backs Gabras
~ Perhaps the most intriguing episode of the first triumvirate of the Long Regency was the power-politicking between the Greek aristocracy, backing—or backed by—Ambrosios Gabras, and the nobility in Asia Minor that coalesced around the Komnenoi Family and the faux news of the arrest of Melissinos to prevent any ambition in Greece. The teetering body politic had been ruptured by Melissinos’ invasion of the Steppes and the propaganda machine that produced the image of victory while, at best, the conquest ended in a status-quo antebellum between the parties involved. Moreover, the moves against the great general from the halls of Constantinople were more problematic.
In Greece, far from the glorious fields of battle in the far east, Gabras was still hamstrung in his maneuvers. Without achieving the loyalty of the fleet, he had no passage into Constantinople. Without the fleet, he also had no means to enter Asia Minor. However, Gabras had long secured the loyalty of the Greek aristocracy which loathed the idea of a woman—Sophia—as the primary ruler whilst the infant Constantine slept in his crib.
Here, the story takes a more interesting turn. Was Gabras a strong-willed military leader who had secured the loyalty of the aristocracy and was a principal contender for the throne? Or was he a weak man but a capable general who had been taken advantage of by the desires of the Greek aristocracy? Gibbon had famously retorted that Gabras was an effeminate general who rode to glory on the backs of his field officers and blind luck, “perhaps even stupidity.” Here, however, I would contend to argue that Gabras was a political man all along—after all, securing the backing of the rivalrous Greek aristocracy was a marvelous feat by any standard.
It is even more remarkable considering that Gabras was initially the eastern commandant, exiled to Greece in his failed bid to grab power which opened the door for Melissinos to move on the Steppe Hordes and position himself as the rex populare among the people of Constantinople—the only citizenry that truly needed to be won over to secure the decadent throne. In addition, Gabras embarked on an ambitious building program of his own—the construction of his own private fleet. In the span of six months, in the midst of turmoil in the east and the repositioning of Fernio’s Imperial fleet to Constantinople, perhaps at the wishing of Empress Sophia who grew nervous of having the main Imperial squadrons so close to a general who could not be entirely trusted upon, Gabras would order the construction of six galleas, eleven smaller warships, and nineteen transports.
Empress Sophia’s spy network was quick to pick up on the deforestation and makeshift ships being built in the dockyards of Athens. What made matters worse within the halls of the imperium in Constantinople was that, rumors being true, the majority of the Imperial garrison stationed in the city had been sent to Trebizond to arrange the arrest of Melissinos (or perhaps to quickly bring him back to the city to once again be the protector against Gabras’ ambitions). Regardless of the reasons for Sophia’s decision to send the majority of the Imperial Army to the east, Constantinople was vulnerable to Gabras’ intentions.
The Greek aristocracy, with their representatives—spies really—within the city, also pestered Gabras to make his move against Sophia and the infant emperor. All that remained in the city was the Imperial Guard of some 1,000 men who had pledged their fealty to the young Constantine, but could probably be swayed from their loyalty to a child who simply drooled and couldn’t give orders. Everyone knew the John’s wife, the seductive and beautiful Empress Sophia was the de facto regent and person in command of Constantinople and the main forces loyal to the infant emperor. But would the militaristic officers of the guard, all men, remain loyal to a woman when a prominent male general—and former hero and confidant to the late Emperor John—would arrive and seek their fealty to install himself as emperor?
Such circumstances have occurred all throughout Roman history. From the Barracks Emperors in the Crisis of the Third Century, to the civil wars of the past few centuries, even going back to the day when Julius Caesar crossed the Tiber River and marched on Rome—there is a long history of Roman generals seizing control of the imperium. Granted, most did not last long, for their power was based upon the mood and loyalty of the armies rather than a stable body politic, Gabras—no doubt—saw himself in this same tradition. Who wouldn’t?
By the spring, Gabras’ makeshift fleet was ready, and the Greek aristocracy had fully backed his efforts. Gabras set sail for Constantinople. Only the Imperial fleet under Admiral Fernio was the wall that stood between him and the ultimate prize.
Gabras' makeshift fleet set sails for Constantinople, this is a manuscript from the German historian Hieronymus Wolf's "The History of the Byzantine Empire."[1]
Despite the reports that Fernio was firmly committed to the defense of the city and loyal to Constantine—more likely Sophia—Gabras was confident that he would be able to negotiate a bypass with the Italian-born Roman admiral. After all, the Imperial Navy was predominately comprised of mercenaries, loyal to coin and not blood, loyal to whomever promised the most and delivered on said promises. By contrast, Gabras’ makeshift navy was comprised of Romans, men who were fully devoted to his cause and the cause of the Greek aristocracy. They had the perennial “buy in,” the commitment to see any job through. Gabras intuitively believed that the majority Italian sailors, and their Italian officers, would simply let him pass through if deliberations passed. If not, Gabras was confident that his forces could secure victory.
Here, Gabras highlighted his lack of naval understanding. While boarding and close quarters fighting was still the main form of naval combat in the sixteenth century, the introduction and widespread use of cannons had made close maneuvering and boarding attempts riskier. Ram attacks too, while deadly, could suffer catastrophic disaster if the attackers did not close the distance quick enough—allowing enemy ships armed with cannons and fire arrows to set the ship ablaze or outright destroy it. Furthermore, the Imperial Navy possessed a 50-gun carrack, a ship that dwarfed anything in Gabras’ arsenal.
However, Gabras was convinced that if deliberations deteriorated and the situation turned hostile, his transports could act as boarding ships. He even had them specifically designed for easier boarding maneuvers. Like the corvus that defeated the Carthaginian navy, Gabras was of the opinion that if he boarded the Roman ships under Fernio, his seasoned infantry veterans would cut down the lightly armed sailors and take control of the prospective enemy vessels. Only the small detachment of marines would be the properly trained soldiers on board the ships—they would be overwhelmed by sheer superiority in numbers.
Thus, as Gabras set sail from Athens for Constantinople, he was confident in victory. Sophia’s spies quickly alerted her of the situation. Fernio’s ships were quickly dispatched from the Golden Horn on a course to intercept the emboldened general.
[1] Although the term "byzantine" became popular in the Enlightenment, Wolf was the first recorded historian to use the term in his histories of the Eastern Romans. He lived from 1516-1580.
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