1839-1842: The Yemeni Conflict
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1839-1842: The Yemeni Conflict
Misguided historians have often described the conflict between Oman and Yemen in the early 1840’s as a war between two unified states – but nothing could be further from the truth. At that time, Sultan Sa'id al bu Said of Oman controlled little beyond the coastal regions of his country. The Bedouin tribes of the interior paid lip-service to his decrees, if that.
As the bu Said dynasty had long since abandoned any pretence of religious authority, and there was no Imam of the Ibadi faith at that time, there was little the Sultan could do to control these unruly elements. Whilst he had greatly extended his control since taking the throne in 1806, he was still not the disputed master of his lands. The same could be said of Yemen.
Comparison of Oman and Yemen power, prior to Yemeni Conflict 1839-1843 (British Bureau of Statistics, London 2001)
There was in fact, no Sultan of Yemen – which had been divided since 1729 between the Sultan of Lahej in the south, and the Imamate of Sana in the north. Mohsin, the Sultan of Lahej, controlled Aden, which harboured the Qawasim pirates that had so precipitously begun the war. Aden had once been the greatest harbour in the region, such that the 16th century Italian explorer, Ludovico di Varthema had described it as a city so ‘mighty and powerful that I have hardly seen another city of its might during my life.’ It had thrown back Portuguese, Egyptian and Ottoman invaders, yet under the Lahej sultans, it had been reduced to a fishing village of little more than a 1000 people. But its great harbours, remnants of an ancient volcano, remained – and the pirates came.
Overview of Oman and Yemen, prior to Yemeni Conflict 1839-1843 (National Omani Archives, Muscat 2005)
Of course, the fractured state of Yemeni politics made little difference to Captain Atkins Hamerton, and none at all to the East India Company. Captain Hamerton had a mission, and he intended to fulfil it. The pirates were a threat to the vital Indian shipping route, and they had to be eliminated.
However, when Sultan Sa'id marched across the border into Hadramaut in July of 1839, Mohsin of Lahej wasted no time in turning to the powerful Imam of Sana, Abdullah al-Hassan. The Imam saw the conflict as an opportunity to bring the Sultan of Lahej under his control – and extend the power of the Imamate of Sana. He was convinced that the soldiers of Oman – led by a schismatic Ibadi Sultan, would fall before the righteous Sunni Moslems warriors of Yemen. He swiftly agreed to the alliance with Mohsin, and marched his troops south to join the Sultan of Lahej in Mokkha – the westernmost portion of Lahej. There they awaited the soldiers of Oman on a battleground of their own choosing.
As the Royal Army of Oman marched into Lahej, Captain Hamerton convinced Sultan Sa'id– who desired to test his new soldiers against his foes – that the best tactic would be to pacify the lands behind them, so as to secure their rear. The Sultan eventually agreed, though he split the Royal Army into two divisions, and granted control of one division to General Qasim al-Nawfuli, an Omani leader in the new style. General al-Nawfuli would be responsible for pacifying Hadramaut, whilst the Sultan marched west to Schibam.
Meanwhile, in the Gulf of Aden, the vessels of the Royal Navy of Oman fought a brutal tooth-and-nail campaign against pirate forces in order to assure Omani dominance of the seas. The Sultan, with his love of steamers and other naval projects, was convinced that dominance of the sea would factor into his victory. He demanded his Royal Navy win for him free and unfettered control of the coasts, which they eventually achieved.
By February of 1840, both Schibam and Hadramaut were under Omani control. Meanwhile, the Sultan of Lahej and Imam of Sana had moved their forces east to Aden itself – were they had spent six months preparing their forces, fortifying their positions and studying the terrain. General al-Nawfuli took advantage of this, and the Royal Navy swiftly transported his men to Mokkha, bypassing the two enemies altogether, and began to lay siege to the capital of Lahej.
For his part, the Sultan Sa'id marched into Aden – determined to face his untested soldiers against the Yemeni warriors. It was to prove a costly battle – the Yemeni fortifications were unassailable, their knowledge of the local terrain allowed them to attack and retreat swiftly, and the soldiers of the Royal Army swiftly became discouraged. After two weeks of fierce battles the Sultan was forced to retreat to Schibam. The Sultan of Lahej swiftly followed, attempting to rout the retreating soldiers, and the Sultan was forced to move further west to Hadramaut, where they swiftly regrouped under their Sultan – and were able to set about re-organising themselves for another assault.
It is interesting to note that Captain Hamerton’s diaries blame the loss not on the location and fortifications of the Yemeni warriors, but rather on the Ottoman military advisors – many of whom were still attached to the Royal Army. He concluded that they lacked the ability to lead men properly, and that this lack was directly responsible for the Omani defeat. “They were not defeated in battle, but in mind”, he would later write of the Royal Army. It is interesting to note that in the years following the Yemeni Conflict, the Sultan of Oman would turn to the British Empire to provide his military advisors.
In Hadramaut, the Sultan was disheartened by the defeat, and the Imam of Sana quickly proposed a treaty – without informing the Sultan of Lahej – ceding both Hadramaut and Schibam to Oman, in return for peace. It is unknown whether Sultan Seyd seriously considered this treaty or not, as the Sultan of Lahej became aware of the treaty and quickly denied it.
Infuriated, the Imam of Sana marched west, where his warriors surprised General al-Nawfuli from the rear, forcing him to retreat to Aden. The Imam of Sana then set about undoing General al-Nawfuli’s work, as he had succeeded in bringing Mokkha under Omani control.
It was now November of 1840. The impetus of the Omani invasion had been blocked, and they now found themselves engaged in what looked like a long-term war. One that perhaps they, with their new methodologies, was better prepared to fight than the warriors of Yemen, whose leaders already had begun to look at each other with scepticism. The alliance of Lahej and Sana, not even a year old, now found itself on shaky ground. The Royal Army of Oman, though defeated, swiftly regained its composure – sure of its eventual superiority. Conversely, the warriors of Yemen saw every loss as an insurmountable defeat – a sign of Allah’s displeasure – and it was only with great effort that the Sultan of Lajeh and the Imam of Sana would be able to force them to continue to fight.
Sultan Sa'id al Bu Said leads an attack on Sultan Mohsin of Lahej (National Omani Archives, Muscat 2005)
Meanwhile, in Hadramaut, Sultan Sa'id summoned up his remaining men and boarded the vessels of the Royal Navy and joined the retreating General al-Nawfuli in Aden, bypassing the Sultan of Lahej who was still occupied in Schibam. There, the united Royal Army led a vicious rear-guard campaign against the Sultan of Lahej in January of 1841. Abandoned by the Imam of Sana, Mohsin’s warriors broke, fleeing back to Aden – were the Royal Army fell upon them, and destroyed the forces of Lajeh. The Sultan of Lahej himself was captured, and brought before Sultan Sa'id and forced to sign a humiliating treaty that reduced him in power to little more than a local chieftain. The independence of Lajeh was at an end.
Aden had fallen to the Royal Army of the Oman, and Sultan Sa'id turned his eyes north, to the Imamate of Sana. The Imam remained in Mokkha, which he had reclaimed from Omani forces, and began to fortify his positions in the mountains. His position swiftly became all but unassailable. Thus, while General al-Nawfuli remained behind in Aden to continue pacification of any remaining forces, Sultan Sa'id sailed north with Captain Hamerton to Haradja, where he quickly lay siege to the capital of the Imamate.
To the south, the Imam saw a chance, and swiftly struck at the forces of the General al-Nawfuli in March of 1841. In a daring dawn raid, Imam Abdullah was able to capture the General, whom he swiftly executed. The 2nd Division of the Royal Army was broken, and fled before the warriors of the Imam, who ran them down in great numbers.
Hearing of this, Sultan Sa'id was enraged. The execution of a prisoner was antithetical to an Ibadi Moslem. Violence was given religious consent in almost only one case – that of the unjust Imam or ruler. Sultan Sa'id declared that Imam Abdullah al-Hassan was such a man, and he demanded of Captain Hamerton that the British assist in the defeat of this man, or he would eject the Resident from Muscat and turn to the French who were eager to extend their influence in the region.
With little choice, Captain Hamerton contacted a passing British vessel, and within a month a detachment of Royal Marines had joined the Royal Army of Oman, which was greatly buoyed in spirit by the appearance of these soldiers that they strove to emulate.
This combined force then marched south, and attacked the Imam’s forces in Mokkha, where he had returned after executing the Omani General. With the assistance of the Royal Marines, the outcome was in no doubt whatsoever – and in late April of 1841, the Imam was killed in battle at Mokkha. The warriors of the northern Imamate were slaughtered, much as they had done to General al-Nawfuli’s army a few scant months before. In fact, such was the slaughter that ‘Sa'ids Revenge’ became a byword for bloody vengeance on a massive scale in later years.
However, even with their forces broken, it would not be until August of the following year that the Imamate of Sana would be incorporated into Oman.
The Yemeni Conflict had taken three long years to resolve. Of the twenty thousand men of the Royal Army of Oman who had marched into Yemen in 1839, less than ten thousand would march out. An entire division had been lost, a costly loss that would take several years to resolve.
For the bloody price it paid, the Sultanate of Oman had greatly increased its power. Now not only the most powerful Arabian state economically, it was also the largest. The soldiers of the Royal Army had been tested, and had seen the worth of their new training and weaponry. Oman was poised now as the dominant native force of the Peninsula.
Kingdom of Oman, 1842 (National Omani Archives, Muscat 2005)
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