Of course, but Death Traps let these people have something they can easily point to as an appeal to authority. Its like Bradley haters and Pentagon Wars.
Tank Combat in Steel Division
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One of the most perceptive comments I saw about the Death Traps moniker is that the Sherman was known as a Death Trap, because so many crew members survived a hit and bailed out. The tanks with higher passenger kill rates wouldn't accumulate that negative reputation, because there'd be fewer survivors to spread stories about their vehicle burning.
My Dissertation was on British Armour and its combat effectiveness, so part of that involved researching the history for the reasons British armour and allied Armour in general received such bad press, so I could then debunk it with the appropriate material.
As for the operational art, the Soviet Army by 1944 had achieved a level of operational expertise that was quite simply terrifying in its ability to execute huge operations, there is a reason why such as Bagration achieved such damage to an already reeling German Army. The Western allies had also achieved a level of expertise that was impressive given the changes done over several years, and it made good use of their innate strengths such as artillery. So yes, I would argue by the end they had far better operational art than the Germans, but that is more due to the German technique effectively stagnation in terms of operational art as much as Allied Improvements.
Jesus, that's terrible. It makes a laughing stock of the guys who say 10 Shermans for whatever German tank under discussion. Thanks for that.
Yamamoto is the Admiral, who planned peral harbor and got assassinated by having his transport shot down. Yamato is the hotel that never did anything.
Yamamoto is the Admiral, who planned peral harbor and got assassinated by having his transport shot down. Yamato is the hotel that never did anything.
Yes and people are always insisting that his ribs were impervious to 16 inch shells but I have it on good authority that even repeated hits by a 6 inch would have killed him.
I think he gained like 20 pounds living on the hotel, shouldn't blame him, it had ramune, air conditioning and live bands.
Why he decided to tour a bunch of basis on a shitty transport to raise morale, instead of parking the hotel somewhere nearby to raise morale, I never understand. Maybe because he's 100 times the samurai I am
.Sarcasms aside, I'd like to raise 3 topics of vehicle combat system. The first point is impact angle. AP strength should be modified by cosine of the hit angle. Beyond certain threshold, say 75 Degrees, all hits will bounce. This prevents ridiculous losses of expensive units because they showed a bit of side armor and RNG hate your life. The second point is the velocity of targets should be taken into consideration for accuracy, not just the velocity of the vehicle firing the weapon. Longer the range to target, the more the gunner have to lead the shot, and greater the effect target movement will have. Ofc gun velocity and crew experience would reduce this effect.
Finally, accuracy of all guns should increase the longer they keep firing at the same target. This will be an asymptote to some maximum value that depends on the dispersion of the weapon. This of course happens much faster with autocannons then artillery, making them effective at shooting light fast targets.
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Ok, but under what circumstances?
During this period the Germans were often on the offensive and during December Panthers were also given to more and more inexperienced crews (unlike Tigers).
I don't doubt those numbers, but having the numbers from January to May might be interesting as comparison.
€: To make my statement more clear: It is generally advised to have a force-advantage of 3:1 against an defending enemy without time to prepare his positions. To this comes in the Normandy aerial superiority and other factors in favor of the Allies.
Under these relations the actual 70:20 ratio looks actually pretty good for the Panther.
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1.) " Literally 90% of time engaging soft targets" is a mild overstatement.
If Pacific was not dragging it down, I am very confident that Tanks would be on 20%, or more.
2.) Panther did not do poorly in Normandy.
German commanders used Pz IV in bocage because it had less gun overhang, and was shorter, which is very important considering what bocage country looks like.
3.) (Having a turret that could not traverse over an incline due to a weak turret motor is just one of many of the glaring faults of the Panther)
Panther could traverse on an incline.
You might want to check other power traverse motors before argumenting that Panther had "weak" turret motor.
I would suggest you would not take reports about a foreign vehicle serviced by unfamiliar crews at face value, because those are only representative of the fact that an old, used vehicle without experienced crews, maintenance personnel and spare part does not operate at acceptable efficiency. Government trying to get rid of it does not help, either.
4.) Panther suffered from prolonged fighting without reserves, proper maintenance and supply chain far more than from reliability faults.
96/245=39% 1 Jul 44 <= (We are missing 74 bridges and tunnels leading to main battle area by this point, local coal stocks are at 6 day supply, which doesnt really matter because locomotives are mainly MIA, and there are no adequate repair facilities or supplies)
122/432=28% 30 Jul 44
111/150= 74% 15 Sept 44
110/194=56% 30 Sept 44
189/222=85% 31 Oct 44
235/329=71% 15 Nov 44
203/285=71% 30 Nov 44
336/471=71% 15 dec 44
240/451=53% 30 dec 44
206/448=45% 15 Jan 45
68/220=30% 9 Feb 45
49/152=32% 15 March 45
I think you can spot the pattern yourself.
Data is from Panther tank: The quest for combat supremacy from Thomas L. Jentz and Report by the supreme commander to the combined chiefs of staff on the operations in Europe of the allied expeditionary force.
5.) "Given the Panthers shoddy ammunition storage placement and tendency to catch fire rather easily coupled with paper thin side armour, they didn't do too well after taking hits from the side."
It caught fire less than Sherman.
49% of hit Shermans caught on fire.
Or a specific Normandy sample.
Panther takes more penetrations while burning less.
6.)The overall point is I think, is that Allied armour has been underestimated in its capabilities for some time, which is largely a result of a number of factors, one of which is the notion that German armour was always qualitatively superior, a notion that is utterly false.
Sherman performed pretty poorly considering the advantage in training, combined arms, raw reserves and numerical advatange ranging from 4:1 to 10:1.
All 29 of them engagements. I have two simillar documents, both of which expressively state they were purely made from allied unit diaries. Is this the case with this document too?
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@Ulatersk
Since your post quite long, I cant directly quote it without jamming the thread, but ill do my best to answer your post.
1.
I was specifically referring to the ETO for the Allies when talking about ammunition usage, I dug up some primary source documentation that suggested ammunition consumption was 90% HE and 10% AP rounds for the 7th Armoured division, which suggested that they primarily engaged soft targets, although I also know they knocked out tanks with HE rounds as well. Regardless the statistics are significant given the nature of 7th Armoured during their operations in the ETO
Now, the table you provided is probably more accurate as to overall tank engagement figures, but even then compared to AT guns allied tanks simply didn't encounter all that many German tanks, although I know this is more the case for the US than the British during Normandy, given they had to face the largest concentration of German armour per mile than anyone else during the war. Furthermore, the table you shown was for the entire war, across all theatres as you say, which gives a result that might be a significant deviation from the ETO. Ill try and dig up my dissertation sources on the subject, and retrieve the required information.
2. For all intends and purposes, the Panther was disappointing in Normandy, if nothing else simply because it was an unsuitable vehicle for the terrain.
3. I believe that it was an incline of over 20 degrees, which is common enough in most battlefield conditions, and still a glaring fault.
A quick Google search reveals the following from the French report on the panther after they temporarily adopted it into service:
The turret traverse drive is not strong enough to either turn the turret or hold it in place when the Panther is on an incline of more than 20 degrees. The Panther is therefore not capable of firing when driving cross-country.
— Elevating the gun is normally simple, but made difficult if the stabilizer — operated by compressed nitrogen — has lost pressure.
— The commander's cupola with its 7 periscopes provides a nearly perfect all-round visibility. Periscopes damaged by shells can be replaced very quickly.
— A scissors periscope with large magnification power was affixed to a bracket in the commander's cupola.
— Aside from his periscope gunsight (which is excellent), the gunner has no other type of observation device. He is therefore practically blind ¬one of the greatest shortcomings of the Panther.
— The gunsight with two magnification stages is remarkably clear and has its field of view clear in the center. The gunsigh t enables observation of a target and shells out to over 3000 meters.
— No type of hollow charge ammunition is planned for the Panther.
— The HE shell can be fired with a delay of 0.15 seconds.
— The PzGr 40 had better penetration out to 1500 meters than the PzGr 39, but then its trajectory drops off considerably.
— During rapid rate of fire it is not uncommon to be forced to break off firing when the recoil of the gun has reached its permissible limit (cease fire).
— A rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute is only permitted in exceptional cases when circumstances so dictate.
— When firing off a round the chassis demonstrates no unfavorable reaction, regardless of what position the turret is in.
— Once the commander has located a target, it takes between 20 and 30 seconds until the gunner can open fire. This data, which is significantly greater than that of the Sherman, stems from the absence of a periscope for the gunner.
— The fatigue life of the mechanical parts was designed for 5000 km. The wear on many parts is greater than expected. Track and running gear have a life of 2000 to 3000 km. Tracks break very rarely, even on rocky terrain. The bogie wheels, however, can become deformed when driven hard.
— The parts of the power train (with the exception of the final drive) meet the planned fatigue life. The replacement of a transmission requires less than a day.
— On the other hand, the engine was not operable over 1500 km. The average engine life amounted to 1000 km. Engine replacement ac-complished in 8 hours by an Unteroffizier (mechanic by occupation) and 8 men with the aid of a tripod beam crane or a Bergepanther. Main gun can be replaced using the same equipment within a few hours. The German maintenance units performed their work remarkably well
— As a result, the Panther is in no way a strategic tank. The Germans did not hesitate to economically increase the engine life by loading the tank onto railcars — even for very short distances (25 km).
— The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km.
— Half of the abandoned Panthers found in Normandy in 1944 showed evidence of breaks in the final drive.
— In order to prevent these breaks it is recommended that the following points be closely observed: when driving downhill and in reverse as well as on uneven terrain to be particularly careful when shifting to a lower gear. In addition, a Panther should never be towed without uncoupling the final drive previously. Finally, under no circumstances should both steering levers be operated simultaneously — regardless of the situation.
— A hollow charge round — regardless of what type — will penetrate
Armor plating equivalent to its own caliber. It is therefore necessary to use a 105 mm round or, at the very least, an 88 mm round to penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther (Miinsingen, 1946)
— A smoke grenade thrown onto the rear deck or the vent openings of the engine will start a fire.
— The running gear is sensitive to HE shells. Calibers 105 mm and greater can render the vehicle immobile (Rammersmatt, 8 December 1944).
— Fragmentation shells or 75 mm rounds which strike in the same spot on the front plate can penetrate it or cause the weld seams to break (Miinsingen, 1946).
— No place of the Panther is so armored that it can withstand a "Panzerfaust" or "Panzerschreck."
— In all cases, the great range of the gun should be exploited to the fullest. Fire can commence at a range of 2000 meters with considerable accuracy. The majority of hits were accomplished at a range of 1400 to 2000 meters. The ammunition expenditure was relatively low; on the average the fourth or fifth shot found its mark, even when using HE shells.
Without a doubt, the Panther was a fully combat-capable tank in 1943, which for its day exhibited remarkable performance in regard to its armament and armor.
Yet even German documents showed that it had considerable weak¬nesses:
— Inadequate for strategic mobility due to the short fatigue life of its engine, which lay between six and seven times the vehicle's range. The Panther cannot cover large distances and must restrict itself to short distances.
— Deficiency in mobility due to an inadequate steering mechanism, which had a very high breakdown rate.
— Operations required generally specialized personnel: in the Wehr-mach t an officer or Oberfeldwebel as tank commander, Untereffiners as gunner and driver.
Once the Germans no longer had any experienced tank crews, it was apparent that the Panthers were no longer employed operationally or were abandoned because of mechanical breakdowns.
I don't know about you, but I am seeing some glaring faults here, which pretty much outweigh the benefits.
4. That report pretty much pointed out that the final drive was merely one of several faults mechanically with the panther, others include literally setting itself on fire due to fault fuel lines, as well as issues surrounding the neutral steering and water tightness, which meant that compared to other tanks it suffered engine fires a lot more, hence its tendency to burn.
Having bad supply problems does not explain the significantly higher attrition rate panthers suffered not only in comparison to Allied vehicles, but certain German ones as well. It is a categorical fact that the heavier German vehicles relied on automotive technology that had simply not matured enough to support them. Together with some shoddy design practises that made most forms of maintenance a pain in the arse then its no small wonder that the Panther had such abysmal operational rates, although when you have to remove the damn turret to remove a transmission then its no surprise.
The chaotic supply situation only exasperated the already significant logistical problems the Germans had, given the vast amount of spare parts required for all the various vehicles they had in service. With a logistical branch that neither had the vehicles, experience or expertise the western Allies had, then one can begin to see why German tanks in general, even reliable ones such as the Pz4 had such issues. When you throw in badly vehicles such as the Panther, which had teething troubles, then one can see why availability rates of the Panther remained low even in later variants, compared to contemporary vehicles.
5.
False.
All tanks had a burn ratio of something like 70-80% when hit by penetrating shells. This is data easily found by post WW2 studies. This was regardless of tank or fuel type given it was ammunition cooking off, which in most vehicles was stored in the open or in bins. Sherman's were often found burnt out because the Germans had a policy of shooting a tank as much as possible in order to deny it being recovered by the enemy, even when the crew has already bailed out. (this makes sense given that the germans were unlikely to recover the vehicles themselves given they were on the defensive)
Sherman's actually had lower burn rates once more sensible ammo storage techniques were implemented, and with wet stowage their burn rates went right down to 20-40%, which for the time is exceptional. Panthers actually achieved a slightly higher burn rate because their ammunition was stored less safely than other German vehicles, which contributed to more ammunition cook offs.
6. M4 literally did fine in most situations they were employed in, any suggestion that they did otherwise is simply wrong, given the fact that Shermans literally performed as well as German tanks on the defensive, if not better. The Issue for the Allies was attacking, which was costly regardless if they had Shermans or Pershings.
I would recommend Chieftans article on the French panthers, found here: http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/
Sorry for the brief response, and lack of sourcing, I am digging up my dissertation files as we speak, since I have the primary source links there for you to enjoy
Since your post quite long, I cant directly quote it without jamming the thread, but ill do my best to answer your post.
1.
I was specifically referring to the ETO for the Allies when talking about ammunition usage, I dug up some primary source documentation that suggested ammunition consumption was 90% HE and 10% AP rounds for the 7th Armoured division, which suggested that they primarily engaged soft targets, although I also know they knocked out tanks with HE rounds as well. Regardless the statistics are significant given the nature of 7th Armoured during their operations in the ETO
Now, the table you provided is probably more accurate as to overall tank engagement figures, but even then compared to AT guns allied tanks simply didn't encounter all that many German tanks, although I know this is more the case for the US than the British during Normandy, given they had to face the largest concentration of German armour per mile than anyone else during the war. Furthermore, the table you shown was for the entire war, across all theatres as you say, which gives a result that might be a significant deviation from the ETO. Ill try and dig up my dissertation sources on the subject, and retrieve the required information.
2. For all intends and purposes, the Panther was disappointing in Normandy, if nothing else simply because it was an unsuitable vehicle for the terrain.
3. I believe that it was an incline of over 20 degrees, which is common enough in most battlefield conditions, and still a glaring fault.
A quick Google search reveals the following from the French report on the panther after they temporarily adopted it into service:
The turret traverse drive is not strong enough to either turn the turret or hold it in place when the Panther is on an incline of more than 20 degrees. The Panther is therefore not capable of firing when driving cross-country.
— Elevating the gun is normally simple, but made difficult if the stabilizer — operated by compressed nitrogen — has lost pressure.
— The commander's cupola with its 7 periscopes provides a nearly perfect all-round visibility. Periscopes damaged by shells can be replaced very quickly.
— A scissors periscope with large magnification power was affixed to a bracket in the commander's cupola.
— Aside from his periscope gunsight (which is excellent), the gunner has no other type of observation device. He is therefore practically blind ¬one of the greatest shortcomings of the Panther.
— The gunsight with two magnification stages is remarkably clear and has its field of view clear in the center. The gunsigh t enables observation of a target and shells out to over 3000 meters.
— No type of hollow charge ammunition is planned for the Panther.
— The HE shell can be fired with a delay of 0.15 seconds.
— The PzGr 40 had better penetration out to 1500 meters than the PzGr 39, but then its trajectory drops off considerably.
— During rapid rate of fire it is not uncommon to be forced to break off firing when the recoil of the gun has reached its permissible limit (cease fire).
— A rate of fire of 20 rounds per minute is only permitted in exceptional cases when circumstances so dictate.
— When firing off a round the chassis demonstrates no unfavorable reaction, regardless of what position the turret is in.
— Once the commander has located a target, it takes between 20 and 30 seconds until the gunner can open fire. This data, which is significantly greater than that of the Sherman, stems from the absence of a periscope for the gunner.
— The fatigue life of the mechanical parts was designed for 5000 km. The wear on many parts is greater than expected. Track and running gear have a life of 2000 to 3000 km. Tracks break very rarely, even on rocky terrain. The bogie wheels, however, can become deformed when driven hard.
— The parts of the power train (with the exception of the final drive) meet the planned fatigue life. The replacement of a transmission requires less than a day.
— On the other hand, the engine was not operable over 1500 km. The average engine life amounted to 1000 km. Engine replacement ac-complished in 8 hours by an Unteroffizier (mechanic by occupation) and 8 men with the aid of a tripod beam crane or a Bergepanther. Main gun can be replaced using the same equipment within a few hours. The German maintenance units performed their work remarkably well
— As a result, the Panther is in no way a strategic tank. The Germans did not hesitate to economically increase the engine life by loading the tank onto railcars — even for very short distances (25 km).
— The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km.
— Half of the abandoned Panthers found in Normandy in 1944 showed evidence of breaks in the final drive.
— In order to prevent these breaks it is recommended that the following points be closely observed: when driving downhill and in reverse as well as on uneven terrain to be particularly careful when shifting to a lower gear. In addition, a Panther should never be towed without uncoupling the final drive previously. Finally, under no circumstances should both steering levers be operated simultaneously — regardless of the situation.
— A hollow charge round — regardless of what type — will penetrate
Armor plating equivalent to its own caliber. It is therefore necessary to use a 105 mm round or, at the very least, an 88 mm round to penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther (Miinsingen, 1946)
— A smoke grenade thrown onto the rear deck or the vent openings of the engine will start a fire.
— The running gear is sensitive to HE shells. Calibers 105 mm and greater can render the vehicle immobile (Rammersmatt, 8 December 1944).
— Fragmentation shells or 75 mm rounds which strike in the same spot on the front plate can penetrate it or cause the weld seams to break (Miinsingen, 1946).
— No place of the Panther is so armored that it can withstand a "Panzerfaust" or "Panzerschreck."
— In all cases, the great range of the gun should be exploited to the fullest. Fire can commence at a range of 2000 meters with considerable accuracy. The majority of hits were accomplished at a range of 1400 to 2000 meters. The ammunition expenditure was relatively low; on the average the fourth or fifth shot found its mark, even when using HE shells.
Without a doubt, the Panther was a fully combat-capable tank in 1943, which for its day exhibited remarkable performance in regard to its armament and armor.
Yet even German documents showed that it had considerable weak¬nesses:
— Inadequate for strategic mobility due to the short fatigue life of its engine, which lay between six and seven times the vehicle's range. The Panther cannot cover large distances and must restrict itself to short distances.
— Deficiency in mobility due to an inadequate steering mechanism, which had a very high breakdown rate.
— Operations required generally specialized personnel: in the Wehr-mach t an officer or Oberfeldwebel as tank commander, Untereffiners as gunner and driver.
Once the Germans no longer had any experienced tank crews, it was apparent that the Panthers were no longer employed operationally or were abandoned because of mechanical breakdowns.
I don't know about you, but I am seeing some glaring faults here, which pretty much outweigh the benefits.
4. That report pretty much pointed out that the final drive was merely one of several faults mechanically with the panther, others include literally setting itself on fire due to fault fuel lines, as well as issues surrounding the neutral steering and water tightness, which meant that compared to other tanks it suffered engine fires a lot more, hence its tendency to burn.
Having bad supply problems does not explain the significantly higher attrition rate panthers suffered not only in comparison to Allied vehicles, but certain German ones as well. It is a categorical fact that the heavier German vehicles relied on automotive technology that had simply not matured enough to support them. Together with some shoddy design practises that made most forms of maintenance a pain in the arse then its no small wonder that the Panther had such abysmal operational rates, although when you have to remove the damn turret to remove a transmission then its no surprise.
The chaotic supply situation only exasperated the already significant logistical problems the Germans had, given the vast amount of spare parts required for all the various vehicles they had in service. With a logistical branch that neither had the vehicles, experience or expertise the western Allies had, then one can begin to see why German tanks in general, even reliable ones such as the Pz4 had such issues. When you throw in badly vehicles such as the Panther, which had teething troubles, then one can see why availability rates of the Panther remained low even in later variants, compared to contemporary vehicles.
5.
False.
All tanks had a burn ratio of something like 70-80% when hit by penetrating shells. This is data easily found by post WW2 studies. This was regardless of tank or fuel type given it was ammunition cooking off, which in most vehicles was stored in the open or in bins. Sherman's were often found burnt out because the Germans had a policy of shooting a tank as much as possible in order to deny it being recovered by the enemy, even when the crew has already bailed out. (this makes sense given that the germans were unlikely to recover the vehicles themselves given they were on the defensive)
Sherman's actually had lower burn rates once more sensible ammo storage techniques were implemented, and with wet stowage their burn rates went right down to 20-40%, which for the time is exceptional. Panthers actually achieved a slightly higher burn rate because their ammunition was stored less safely than other German vehicles, which contributed to more ammunition cook offs.
6. M4 literally did fine in most situations they were employed in, any suggestion that they did otherwise is simply wrong, given the fact that Shermans literally performed as well as German tanks on the defensive, if not better. The Issue for the Allies was attacking, which was costly regardless if they had Shermans or Pershings.
I would recommend Chieftans article on the French panthers, found here: http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/
Sorry for the brief response, and lack of sourcing, I am digging up my dissertation files as we speak, since I have the primary source links there for you to enjoy
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Found one of the tables I used, which was the British experience of things:
I believed this was provided by the ORO Survey of Allied Tank Casualties of WWII by Coox and Naisawald
As you can see, they had far more trouble with AT guns than they did tanks, and when you add SPG's into the mix, which would of been things such as Stugs and the like, then tanks actually become quite a small percentage. Given that Pz4's were the most common AFV, this sidelines the Panthers even more, and especially the Tigers.
I believed this was provided by the ORO Survey of Allied Tank Casualties of WWII by Coox and Naisawald
As you can see, they had far more trouble with AT guns than they did tanks, and when you add SPG's into the mix, which would of been things such as Stugs and the like, then tanks actually become quite a small percentage. Given that Pz4's were the most common AFV, this sidelines the Panthers even more, and especially the Tigers.
I'm glad they are stripping the US of all the tank destroyers they so desperately need (in a video game sense) based on them not being there till a week or so after the landings. This Eugen 'flavor' seems quite reminiscent of the USs bogus tank line up in wargame. Smh. I'm glad the Brits were lucky enough to ship some 17 pounder tanks during the arbitrary couple week time frame to make the cut.
Whatever I'll just do what everybody else will do, make sure I'm playing as the Germans.
Whatever I'll just do what everybody else will do, make sure I'm playing as the Germans.
As the one who got upset in the first place, I have to say that's not true/fair. The crux of the issue is that this game models divisions not nations, and the M18 wasn't attached to any of the US divisions featured in the game. That's fair. As much as I'd love to see M18s, if I'm going to applaud them not having German/British/other American things that are inappropriate given the rules of what qualifies to be in the game, I have to be consistent and accept that M18s don't qualify either.
I am personally just going to enjoy charging around with Cromwells, with Fireflys turning everything into swiss cheese with APDS rounds.....if the damn things hit
Found further evidence:
Courtesy of ORO-T-117
Table XXVI
Fortifications-- 21.2%
Buildings--17.3%
Personel--15.5%
Tanks--14.2%
Art--12.8%
Wheeled vehicles--8.2%
This is where my 90% claim came from, which was pretty close given I was recalling it from memory.
Table IX
Tank hit distribution
Front 37%
side 60%
Rear 3%
Further evidence to suggest that the Panthers weak side armour really wasn't helpful when most rounds being flung at it were striking there.....
Courtesy of ORO-T-117
Table XXVI
Fortifications-- 21.2%
Buildings--17.3%
Personel--15.5%
Tanks--14.2%
Art--12.8%
Wheeled vehicles--8.2%
This is where my 90% claim came from, which was pretty close given I was recalling it from memory.
Table IX
Tank hit distribution
Front 37%
side 60%
Rear 3%
Further evidence to suggest that the Panthers weak side armour really wasn't helpful when most rounds being flung at it were striking there.....
I cant argue with any of that, it's more why the arbitrary 1 month time frame when you are making a game if this nature. The allure of the game is all the units you get to tool around with and the strategies you can implement with all those units. I just can't for the life of can't figure out why restrict yourself like that. All it can do is take away from the game. I'm just assuming and hoping there's more then what meets the eye as of now. Like market garden, Ardennes etc DLCs. Hopefully some Russians too.
Because by restricting it to a specific battle we get something that looks like an actual battle that took place in WW2. Setting it in "WW2", as in the entire war or an entire front, gives us a giant mushy mess that doesn't resemble anything, just a sandbox game with WW2 vehicles. After Red Dragon that kind of approach isn't satisfying to me and a lot of other people anymore, while attention to detail, historical accuracy, and a strong sense of authenticity is extremely satisfying.
I guess I'm just wishing too hard for it to be a wargame successor when it clearly isnt. Not personally crazy about just playing in the setting of one battle, mind you the most reshashed battle in WW2 media. Don't get me wrong I think game will be great and it's already a guaranteed purchase for me especially given the absolute sludge game devs are slinging these days. It's just bummer to find out your fav tank won't be in game it seemingly belongs in on a technicality. M36's an m18s in wargame but not steel division 44 lol. Done crying now.
1.
One Stug unit from February to March 1942 fired 12 370 HE shells, 5120 AP shells and 1360 HEAT rounds. You might say that these Stugs were tank killers extraordinaire and fought against soviet tanks quite often, but they claimed only 29 KV-1s, 27 T-34s and 2 KV-2s.
A different stug brigade from December 43 to May 44 fired 315 280 rounds, and only 36 374 AP rounds.
Yet Stug units claimed near 19 000 tank kills until the end of 1944, and are supposedly the most common cause of demise for any allied tank.
Yes, table has a deviation caused by Pacific theatre, which had no tanks compared to the grand scale of North africa or ETO. Italy where there were few hundred german tank also contributes negatively to the overall percentage.
2.
Bocage as an ultimate anti-tank weapon is overplayed. I also find it strange that people think Normandy is 100% bocage.
Mostly because research done on that suggests that even in early days of Normandy, the tank losses were higher in open terrain, than closed terrain. And that engagement ranges were quite long.
Survey of tank warfare from D-day to 12th August 1944:
BRL Memo no. 798, "Data on World War II tank engagements involving the US Third and Fourth Armored Divisions" between june and december 1944 puts mean engagement ranges between 750 and 900 yards.
3. Thats nice.
Powered traverse in Sherman should not be used over the incline of 30 degrees, T-34/85 was at 15. Nevermind that we are approaching maximum inclines tank could climb in that era.
"The turret traverse drive is not strong enough to either turn the turret or hold it in place when the Panther is on an incline of more than 20 degrees. The Panther is therefore not capable of firing when driving cross-country."
You can try to explain these and dozens more:
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/564x/9d/42/ee/9d42ee49c364bc55bd1c0793d4e7861d.jpg
http://www.worldwarphotos.info/wp-c...nthers_tanks_knocked_out_in_Normandy_1944.jpg
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/52/4c/10/524c1046aeb7c88b6c145ee9e7a4af17.jpg
https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7342/9244204404_6bb888048f_b.jpg
Mind you, these are knocked out tanks that had no hydraulic pressure.
For the french report, it is as I said. It should not be taken seriously. You can find basically the same thing happening with soviet tanks in german service. During invasion of Iran, Soviets were maintaining about 60% tanks at the ready, while traveling significant distances in a very humid enviroment.
Germans had quite the contrasting experience.
"A platoon of 3 T-26 tanks was used by 221. sich. Div. . One completely burned-out due to engine fire, other tanks had transmission and engine problems. On top of that, they broke down after being driven for several hundred meters on good roads, while engines proved unusable due to being inproperly run in. All 3 tanks were canibalized. But it does not end here. Report from 1 february 1942 by Lt. Bracken talks about huge reliability problems regarding a batch of 7 T-26 and 3 BT tanks completed in Riga arsenal. Tanks broke down continuously and needed multiple repairs before being capable of achieving a 100 km test drive problem-free. Most of the failures were blamed on shoddy construction material. In one tank, a cylinder block burst suddenly after driving 70 km, even though lubrication worked correctly. Extensive failures involving clutches, brakes and track pins were also noted. Another report from 26th February 1942 speaks in a similar tone. It portrays the T-26s and BTs as tanks that can not be used in a concetrated unit, and can be at best used as mobile bunkers. Massive mechanical bearkdowns were encountered even though tanks in question were carefuly refurbished and re-assembled."
Various tankies of the world would like to claim that T-34 engine life was 3000 km.
"Experience report on repair and use of T-34 and SU-85 by the 2.Kompanie/Abteilung 128 puts it quite bluntly: Although the spare parts for their tanks were mostly captured from other tanks and it was hard to say how usable they actually were, and drivers were in need of thorough training before being effective in russian tanks, they still performed horribly. At first, 8 out of 9 tanks in company had transmission failures. Highest speed that could be achieved was 10-12 km/h. Tanks had to be halted every 30 minutes for atleast 15 minutes to cool down. In general, tanks were deemed unsuitable for long road marches and high speeds. Extensive problems involving clutch were encountered."
Information comes from Panzer Tracts 19-2 Beute-Panzerkampfwagen, Thomas L. Jentz, Walter Regenberg.
Just to add to this, our government here stocked a few panthers that were left in the country after the war. Some of the serial numbers date back to the first half of 1943.
So excuse me If I disregard a report of uncertain methodology, on vehicles of uncertain origin, without spare parts, and no support chain, that are in as extreme opposite to german reports as the previous information few lines up are at the extreme opposite to domestic russian reports on their vehicles.
Bergepanther managed to drive over 4000 km without any engine changes nor any damages to the transmission, final drive and clutch... 1000 of those while towing another Panther.
Entire Panther battalion in the 11. Pz Div with over 1500 km run and without the 800 km overhaul, during the fighting in Alsace, sourced from the book about 11th Panzer division by A. Harding Ganz.
4.
Report talks about Panthers that were by that time several years old, and considering that all factories producing them were destroyed or closed, they had no spare parts.
You can find at most a dozen cases through the entire WW 2 when Panther caught on fire.
It had no such thing as significantly higher attrition rates. In fact they were lower than allied medium tanks on the western front.
From Statistical analysis of Kursk battle by Zetterling.
In fact, operational readiness was very simillar.
Percentage Operational At The Front:
EASTERN FRONT WESTERN FRONT
% Pz IV Panther Tiger Pz IV Panther Tiger
31 May44 84 77 79 88 82 87
15 Sep44 65 72 70 80 74 98
30 Sep44 65 60 81 50 57 67
31 Oct44 52 53 54 74 85 88
15 Nov44 72 66 61 78 71 81
30 Nov44 78 67 72 76 71 45
15 Dec44 79 69 79 78 71 64
30 Dec44 72 61 80 63 53 50
15 Jan45 71 60 73 56 45 58
15 Mar45 54 49 53 44 32 36
Overall 68 62 70 71 65 65
Source : JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics
As for teething trouble, you are half a year behind timeframe: "The Panther is in its present shape mature for combat. It is much superior to the T-34. Amost all teething troubles are gone. Much superior to the Pz IV in terms of armament, armor, terrain mobility and speed. The engine has a life span of 700-1000km." Der Gen.Insp.d.PanzerTruppen Nr.510/44 g.Kdos, 4.3.44.
If those ready rates dont suggest that, statement from guderian himself might.
5.)
False? Im not sure what are you calling false in two studies that both say the same thing.
Overall 60%, locally 80% if you take smaller samplings like in Armoured Thunderbolt from Zaloga or Buckley's books.
And no, germans usually fired once and moved on to another target.
And if Germans ever were concerned about shooting enemy tanks to scrap, they were doing horrible job.
I dont think it would be applicable to a battlefield with 2,5 tanks per every Self-proppeled gun, and fighting between tank units at pretty much constant basis.
You can not equip any tank with side armor that could defend it against contemporary weapons.
And you forgot to mention that according to the same study, frontal armour actually helped Panther significantly.
As opposed to the Sherman.
Which gives percentage of penetrations to hits: 95% front, 97% sides, 90% rear.
One Stug unit from February to March 1942 fired 12 370 HE shells, 5120 AP shells and 1360 HEAT rounds. You might say that these Stugs were tank killers extraordinaire and fought against soviet tanks quite often, but they claimed only 29 KV-1s, 27 T-34s and 2 KV-2s.
A different stug brigade from December 43 to May 44 fired 315 280 rounds, and only 36 374 AP rounds.
Yet Stug units claimed near 19 000 tank kills until the end of 1944, and are supposedly the most common cause of demise for any allied tank.
Yes, table has a deviation caused by Pacific theatre, which had no tanks compared to the grand scale of North africa or ETO. Italy where there were few hundred german tank also contributes negatively to the overall percentage.
2.
Bocage as an ultimate anti-tank weapon is overplayed. I also find it strange that people think Normandy is 100% bocage.
Mostly because research done on that suggests that even in early days of Normandy, the tank losses were higher in open terrain, than closed terrain. And that engagement ranges were quite long.
Survey of tank warfare from D-day to 12th August 1944:
BRL Memo no. 798, "Data on World War II tank engagements involving the US Third and Fourth Armored Divisions" between june and december 1944 puts mean engagement ranges between 750 and 900 yards.
3. Thats nice.
Powered traverse in Sherman should not be used over the incline of 30 degrees, T-34/85 was at 15. Nevermind that we are approaching maximum inclines tank could climb in that era.
"The turret traverse drive is not strong enough to either turn the turret or hold it in place when the Panther is on an incline of more than 20 degrees. The Panther is therefore not capable of firing when driving cross-country."
You can try to explain these and dozens more:
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/564x/9d/42/ee/9d42ee49c364bc55bd1c0793d4e7861d.jpg
http://www.worldwarphotos.info/wp-c...nthers_tanks_knocked_out_in_Normandy_1944.jpg
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/52/4c/10/524c1046aeb7c88b6c145ee9e7a4af17.jpg
https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7342/9244204404_6bb888048f_b.jpg
Mind you, these are knocked out tanks that had no hydraulic pressure.
For the french report, it is as I said. It should not be taken seriously. You can find basically the same thing happening with soviet tanks in german service. During invasion of Iran, Soviets were maintaining about 60% tanks at the ready, while traveling significant distances in a very humid enviroment.
Germans had quite the contrasting experience.
"A platoon of 3 T-26 tanks was used by 221. sich. Div. . One completely burned-out due to engine fire, other tanks had transmission and engine problems. On top of that, they broke down after being driven for several hundred meters on good roads, while engines proved unusable due to being inproperly run in. All 3 tanks were canibalized. But it does not end here. Report from 1 february 1942 by Lt. Bracken talks about huge reliability problems regarding a batch of 7 T-26 and 3 BT tanks completed in Riga arsenal. Tanks broke down continuously and needed multiple repairs before being capable of achieving a 100 km test drive problem-free. Most of the failures were blamed on shoddy construction material. In one tank, a cylinder block burst suddenly after driving 70 km, even though lubrication worked correctly. Extensive failures involving clutches, brakes and track pins were also noted. Another report from 26th February 1942 speaks in a similar tone. It portrays the T-26s and BTs as tanks that can not be used in a concetrated unit, and can be at best used as mobile bunkers. Massive mechanical bearkdowns were encountered even though tanks in question were carefuly refurbished and re-assembled."
Various tankies of the world would like to claim that T-34 engine life was 3000 km.
"Experience report on repair and use of T-34 and SU-85 by the 2.Kompanie/Abteilung 128 puts it quite bluntly: Although the spare parts for their tanks were mostly captured from other tanks and it was hard to say how usable they actually were, and drivers were in need of thorough training before being effective in russian tanks, they still performed horribly. At first, 8 out of 9 tanks in company had transmission failures. Highest speed that could be achieved was 10-12 km/h. Tanks had to be halted every 30 minutes for atleast 15 minutes to cool down. In general, tanks were deemed unsuitable for long road marches and high speeds. Extensive problems involving clutch were encountered."
Information comes from Panzer Tracts 19-2 Beute-Panzerkampfwagen, Thomas L. Jentz, Walter Regenberg.
Just to add to this, our government here stocked a few panthers that were left in the country after the war. Some of the serial numbers date back to the first half of 1943.
So excuse me If I disregard a report of uncertain methodology, on vehicles of uncertain origin, without spare parts, and no support chain, that are in as extreme opposite to german reports as the previous information few lines up are at the extreme opposite to domestic russian reports on their vehicles.
Bergepanther managed to drive over 4000 km without any engine changes nor any damages to the transmission, final drive and clutch... 1000 of those while towing another Panther.
Entire Panther battalion in the 11. Pz Div with over 1500 km run and without the 800 km overhaul, during the fighting in Alsace, sourced from the book about 11th Panzer division by A. Harding Ganz.
4.
Report talks about Panthers that were by that time several years old, and considering that all factories producing them were destroyed or closed, they had no spare parts.
You can find at most a dozen cases through the entire WW 2 when Panther caught on fire.
It had no such thing as significantly higher attrition rates. In fact they were lower than allied medium tanks on the western front.
From Statistical analysis of Kursk battle by Zetterling.
In fact, operational readiness was very simillar.
Percentage Operational At The Front:
EASTERN FRONT WESTERN FRONT
% Pz IV Panther Tiger Pz IV Panther Tiger
31 May44 84 77 79 88 82 87
15 Sep44 65 72 70 80 74 98
30 Sep44 65 60 81 50 57 67
31 Oct44 52 53 54 74 85 88
15 Nov44 72 66 61 78 71 81
30 Nov44 78 67 72 76 71 45
15 Dec44 79 69 79 78 71 64
30 Dec44 72 61 80 63 53 50
15 Jan45 71 60 73 56 45 58
15 Mar45 54 49 53 44 32 36
Overall 68 62 70 71 65 65
Source : JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics
As for teething trouble, you are half a year behind timeframe: "The Panther is in its present shape mature for combat. It is much superior to the T-34. Amost all teething troubles are gone. Much superior to the Pz IV in terms of armament, armor, terrain mobility and speed. The engine has a life span of 700-1000km." Der Gen.Insp.d.PanzerTruppen Nr.510/44 g.Kdos, 4.3.44.
If those ready rates dont suggest that, statement from guderian himself might.
5.)
False? Im not sure what are you calling false in two studies that both say the same thing.
Overall 60%, locally 80% if you take smaller samplings like in Armoured Thunderbolt from Zaloga or Buckley's books.
And no, germans usually fired once and moved on to another target.
And if Germans ever were concerned about shooting enemy tanks to scrap, they were doing horrible job.
Yeah, that one.
I dont think it would be applicable to a battlefield with 2,5 tanks per every Self-proppeled gun, and fighting between tank units at pretty much constant basis.
You can not equip any tank with side armor that could defend it against contemporary weapons.
And you forgot to mention that according to the same study, frontal armour actually helped Panther significantly.
As opposed to the Sherman.
Which gives percentage of penetrations to hits: 95% front, 97% sides, 90% rear.
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