Tank Combat in Steel Division

[Baane]

It is; you're asserting that Eugen made a conscious choice between including the locust, (which they've admitted is the biggest unicorn in game) and the M18 (which they admitted was a research mistake)

That's... not what a strawman is. At all.

Ohh and @Baane:
You complain about a meme but are unable to answer a sarcastic point properly.

Not sure what you're getting at with this one. I've answered each and every post directed towards me.

I'm still failing to find an Airborne Division TO&E immediately prior to the invasion that includes light tanks, by the way.

 

[mitchverr]

28th tank battalion has very little if any information existing about it thats quick to find, so finding info on locusts is pretty hard to do beyond "they had locusts, but then were converted to a medium tank battalion in october 44". Given how hard it is to find info on them at all, it isnt suprising to be tough to find proper information about locust D-day possible usage.

 

[Baane]

28th tank battalion has very little if any information existing about it thats quick to find, so finding info on locusts is pretty hard to do beyond "they had locusts, but then were converted to a medium tank battalion in october 44". Given how hard it is to find info on them at all, it isnt suprising to be tough to find proper information about locust D-day possible usage.

Nice try; the 28th Tank Battalion was never organically (or, even, inorganically) attached to the 101st airborne and was a short-term experimental unit. It was lifted from its parent division (18th AD) on 17, November 1943 and reorganized as an Airborne Tank Battalion, where it sat around until it was Reorganized and re-designated as the 28th Tank Battalion, 20, October 1944.

Steve Zaloga has this to say on the topic:

The U.S. Army considered forming special airborne tank units after the successful use of German paratroopers at Eben Emael in 1940 and Crete in 1941. With the development of the T9 Airborne tank underway, in February 1943, the AGF ordered the Armored Force to organize an airborne tank battalion and develop suitable training and doctrine in cooperation with the Airborne Command. However, the Airborne Command was skeptical about the need for a battalion-sized formation due to the airlift problem, so the first unit was trimmed down to a company. The 151st Airborne Tank Company was activated at Ft. Knox on August 15, 1943. In spite of considerable enthusiasm within the army for the concept, the Marmon Herrington T9 airborne tank proved to be so disappointing from a technical standpoint, that enthusiasm soon waned. The 151st Airborne Tank company was not available in time for deployment with airborne units on D-Day, and in July of 1944 was transferred from Ft. Knox to Camp Mackall, North Carolina, where it was quickly forgotten. The 28th Airborne Tank Battalion was reorganized as a conventional tank battalion in October 1944.

Zaloga, US Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45

So, this flies in the face of Eugen's stated "They were present, but a last-minute decision was made to not bring them along" excuse. The fact that they weren't brought along, by itself, should have been enough to leave them out in a game that is beating the realism drum. This, combined with the fact that I can still not find a single TO&E from immediately before the invasion that includes tank companies, tells me that Eugen dropped the ball. The closest TO&E I can find to the invasion (that isn't during the invasion itself) is from March of 1944, and airborne tanks are absent.

 

[mitchverr]

Nice try; the 28th Tank Battalion was never organically (or, even, inorganically) attached to the 101st airborne and was a short-term experimental unit. It was lifted from its parent division (18th AD) on 17, November 1943 and reorganized as an Airborne Tank Battalion, where it sat around until it was Reorganized and re-designated as the 28th Tank Battalion, 20, October 1944.

I didnt say it did, I said that a unit armed with them, specifically designed for it as the "base experament of the process", the only battalion size force to be made so from what I can tell has pretty much 0 information on it really, meaning its likely to be hard to find any information with reguards to them for other units.

Perhaps eugen would enlighten us, but dont hold out for it.

 

[Tankhunter__]

Tank Destroyer Battalions were not organic to divisions. The pathetic, poorly constructed excuse of "But it wasn't attached to any units represented in game!" fails to strike a chord when Eugen went out of its way to include a unicorn vehicle which they should have known was never deployed in that particular campaign.

If they needed to give the 101st Airborne a fast vehicle for the early game, the M18 Hellcat is a superior choice from a gameplay perspective as well as a historical one because it offers to bring something to the table, and the 101st Airborne actually received such an attachment at some point in time; which is more than can be said about the M22.

As a matter of fact, I'm having a hard time finding the M22 in any Airborne TO&E prior to the invasion. What I am seeing, however, is that the only vehicular attachments that the unit had during the earlier portion of the invasion were Tank Battalions, either independent or from other divisions. That means Shermans.

So there's more historical precedent for the 101st to be using elements of Tank Battalions and other Armored Regiments than the M22 Locust.

EDIT: M18s were given to the 704th and 705th Tank Destroyer Bn's prior to the Normandy landings. Eugen did not pick any division to which these units were attached to, as evidenced when they didn't know that M18s saw combat in Normandy/before Arracourt. We'll see it if Eugen adds another US division(705th was attached to the 83rd Infantry Division during Normandy and Cobra). The 705th was also equipped with M4A3 76s due to a lack of M18 replacements in the European theatre. The likely choice for a US Infantry division is the 1st Infantry Division, and the tank destroyer battalions attached to the Big Red One during the Normandy campaign never received M18s. In-fact, the 1st Infantry never had any M18-equipped units attached to it during the war*

*One TD battalion that previously operated alongside the 1st ID was equipped with M18s in 1945, after the battalion was attached to another unit.

The M22 fulfills a role of an early game unit because it can/should come in Phase A in large numbers due to its glider-borne nature. The Airborne may not have access to heavier armor in phase A or might have to deal with only getting 1 or 2 tanks per card instead of getting more per card in phase B or C.

 

[Baane]

EDIT: M18s were given to the 704th and 705th Tank Destroyer Bn's prior to the Normandy landings. Eugen did not pick any division to which these units were attached to, as evidenced when they didn't know that M18s saw combat in Normandy/before Arracourt. The M22 fulfills a role of an early game unit because it can/should come in Phase A in large numbers due to its glider-borne nature. The Airborne may not have access to heavier armor in phase A or might have to deal with only getting 1 or 2 tanks per card instead of getting more per card in phase B.

The fact is, however, that M18s served in the Normandy area even if they weren't attached to any of the specific divisions which Eugen picked.

That argument is piss-poor, anyway, because the 101st never had a motorized Tank Destroyer battalion attached to it during that campaign. In fact, the first two Tank Destroyer attachments that it had (both of which were after Normandy) were 3-inch gun battalions.

Still not finding any evidence of M22 Locusts being in their TO&E, either. So, really, it just comes down to the M22 not being in-theater, and the M18 being in-theater. The ball was dropped. Stop fanboying a bad call.

 

[Tankhunter__]

The fact is, however, that M18s served in the Normandy area even if they weren't attached to any of the specific divisions which Eugen picked.

That argument is piss-poor, anyway, because the 101st never had a motorized Tank Destroyer battalion attached to it during that campaign. In fact, the first two Tank Destroyer attachments that it had (both of which were after Normandy) were 3-inch gun battalions.

Still not finding any evidence of M22 Locusts being in their TO&E, either. So, really, it just comes down to the M22 not being in-theater, and the M18 being in-theater. The ball was dropped. Stop fanboying a bad call.

I've been going off what others have said previously for M22s being in theater. I can't find any evidence, as only two US battalions were equipped with them. The 151st Airborne Tank Battalion never left the US, and the 28th was refitted as a normal tank Bn and deployed in October 1944. I'll agree with you on the M22 being unhistorical now.

The 101st Airborne does appear to have no attached TD battalions in timeframe. They had attached tank battalions though, so it'll be fine. That does appear to be another mistake on Eugen's part though, as the 101st Airborne's Division of the Week post mentioned that they'd have M10s available.

I'm not happy that the M18 won't be in-game. It robs the US of its best tank destroyer in the timeframe. However, its inclusion in the base game is highly unlikely because Eugen has already picked the divisions for the game. I hope they add the 83rd Infantry, since it's unique among any US division in Normandy for having M18s. It'll be harder to find unique US divisions because of more standardized TO&Es, but the 83rd fit the bill there and fought in an entirely different area from the Big Red One.

 

[sam spade]

You have two such examples up in my post. They do not look very complete to justify such analysis.

And they failed to look at the wrecks and find out what actual caliber knocked it out in 4 out of 5 cases, somehow. And they did not know what actually happened to the tank in quite a lot of cases.

The Report you 'sampled is WO 205 1165 Survey Of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units In NWE 24 March to 5 May 1945. It is by far the most detailed examination of WW2 Tank Casualties ever completed and contrary to your claim it is very complete as to calibre of hit, number of penetrations, aspect of hit, crew casualties, severity of injury and even the time spent in hospital by wounded men. The detail in the full report is overwhelming and it takes several readings before you even start to understand what it reveals. The full report has over 400 pages. Have you read it all?
Sample table

 

[sam spade]

Well you dont have to look in combat reports, albeit contrary to the common belief the germans were pretty accurate in that as Zetterling in his Kursk study proved, you can make it like Norbert Szamveber: He wrote a book about the 12. SS Panzer Regiment and cross check the kill claims with the losses of the allied units in the area who fought against them.
The 12. Ss Pz Reg had an overall exchange ratio of 3,5:1 claimed, after cross checking Szamveber came to an overall ratio of 3:1, so its a seventh part overclaimed, not much in that times.
Now you can go down to the individual Abteilung and check their losses against the kill claims. In case of the I.Abteilung of the 12. SS Pz Reg there are the following numbers:
1st June to 1st September 44: 211 kill claims, to extrapolite the numbers take a seventh away because of overclaiming is 180 kill claiims.
Now we look at the losses of the Panther Abteilung: 65 Panthers lost from 7th June to 4th September 44:
64 Panthers lost, the causes are: Tanks 5, Anti Tank guns 22, Artillery 5, Fighter Bomber Aircraft 3, Destroyed by Crew 5, unknown 21.
180 to 5 kills make a ratio of 36:1, if we include ALL unknown cases and estimate that they all were caused by enemy tanks, which is highly unlikely we get 180 to 26 = 6,9:1 ratio.

Szamveber did not 'cross-reference' anything. His main checking source is Reynolds, Reynolds is obviously smitten by the SS and is very partial in the way he used British Documentation. Furthermore the checking process is basically this. 12th SS claim 20 kills in one day. Allied reports are used to find that c. 15 tanks are casualties in that area, Ergo all those losses are awarded to 12th SS. No account is taken of what other actions were going on or the cause of the casualties. They are then used (via Reynolds) as a Szamveber 'checked' fact. Bottom line is not much in Szamveber is confirmed.

 

[sam spade]

You can look up ORO-T-117 document, its a study into about 12 000 disabled allied tanks.

In a relevant sample of 2579 US tanks in 1944, US army could not find out the cause of what was a certain tank knocked out with in 514 cases.
In case of 473 canadian casualties in the same timeframe, 179 are unknown. Brits had only 55 unexplained tank deaths from a sample of 1103 losses.



Since I am too cheap to spend 7 dollars at the moment, If you would be so nice and tell me about the methodology the author of that document used to come up with those percentages, because in my current sample, about 1/5 of the tanks could not be determined.

Thats assuming that AARs from crews were 100% accurate and there was no misidentification.

It says what it says. That the precise calibre of hit was unknown. This could be for any number of reasons but there is an example from Normandy that shows how this ambiguity is seized upon by promoters of the Uber-panzer in order to bolster their myth.

I can not be bothered to look up the actual detail but this is it in a nutshell.
20 Panthers found with AP hits, 20 abandoned and 5 as cause unknown.
The 5 Unknown were classed as unknown because they have various degrees of damage. That is more than one site of penetration or with AP and mine damage or AP and rocket damage. They were victims of penetration just what killed them was unknown. However those 5 unknown panthers are always added to the 20 abandoned total to get the desired 25 Panthers as non-combat losses.

By the way the Report you mention (ORO-T-117) was done during the Korean War and its aim was to suggest ways that NATO could deal with the massive Soviet Tank Armies. Whilst it is extensive and gives a good overall view I would hardly call it useful for working out precise tank losses from engagements 6 years prior to its compilation. WO 205 1165 is a far better reference.

 

[sam spade]

c.) Given information can not be true because a statistic from entire North-western ETO is being applied to a battlefield with 2,5 tanks for every StuG, Jagdpanther and other SPATs, chronological order where 21st panzer division and 12th SS were the first unit to fight after 352nd ID and bunker crews, and own german kill claims by weapon showing that majority were done with tanks.

A simple cross-reference with the actual period documentation in Szambveber shows a huge discrepency in 12th SS Numbers. They claim a total of 236 kills 6/6/44 to 2/7/44.
No great reliance should be placed in any nations kill claims.

 

[sam spade]

But he also quotes Christer Bergströms book (who is another quite reputable historian) about the Ardennes. I own the book myself and the things he quoted seem to be correct as far as I can see.

Bergstrom dropped the ball when he dealt with tank losses. He got all his tank loss data from Richard Anderson who has commented thus:

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=2045803#p2045803

Sorry, but with apologies to Christer, he somehow made a hash of those figures, even though I helped him with the data. The actually figures for First and Third Army are as I gave them. For First Army it is 299 Medium M4 75mm, 113 Medium M4 76mm, and 108 Light M5 = 520. I did neglect the 20 Medium M4 105mm though. For Third Army it was 72 M4 75mm, 158 M4 76mm, 38 Light M5, and 3 M4 105mm = 271.



Bergstrom made the 800 into 1200 losses

 

[fightinheckfish]

Re: M22s

They were not used in Normandy. Full stop. The only combat use they saw in World War Two was with British units during operation Varsity in very limited numbers (eight total).

The US Armor branch was stupid levels of unsatisfied with the M22 and it's use by Americans was very short indeed and involved no combat. The British received about 260 of them, and they were also deeply unhappy with them, but eventually used some to round out a Tetrarch unit that made the drop during Varsity (again 8 total M22 tanks).

The Brits were the only one with the ability to get them into combat anyway. In American use the M22 was to be landed partly disassembled by a C-54 Skymaster, and this was seen as unsatisfactory due to the exposure of the plane during this process (basically unloading in a combat zone), and later cargo planes were not yet ready for what amounted to a worse M5 so no hurry there. The British had the Hamilcar glider which could, and did bring the M22 into combat, but again ultimately the tank was unsatisfactory and it was not greeted with any sort of enthusiasm or success.

 

[Graphic]

I'm not bothered by the M22 being there since it's just another 37mm, it won't have any more impact on the game than Stuarts do. I know why it was added, without it they'd be a WW1 division in phase A apart from a couple jeeps. So far every single division we've played has had some kind of tank in phase A; 6th AB has the Tetrarch, 3 FJD had StuGs and other stuff attached apparently (not surprising since they weren't parachutists by that point), 716 ID will have French tanks, etc. I guess they didn't want 101st to be the odd one out, and likely they discovered in testing that it was a crippling deficiency.

For a realism mod maybe it can be replaced by the M4A1 ("Hello 2nd Armored")

 

[fightinheckfish]

I'm not bothered by the M22 being there since it's just another 37mm, it won't have any more impact on the game than Stuarts do. I know why it was added, without it they'd be a WW1 division in phase A apart from a couple jeeps. So far every single division we've played has had some kind of tank in phase A; 6th AB has the Tetrarch, 3 FJD had StuGs and other stuff attached apparently (not surprising since they weren't parachutists by that point), 716 ID will have French tanks, etc. I guess they didn't want 101st to be the odd one out, and likely they discovered in testing that it was a crippling deficiency.

For a realism mod maybe it can be replaced by the M4A1 ("Hello 2nd Armored")

I have absolutely zero problem with the M22 being in game. There's no real other choice short of having early arriving M5s or something, and Locusts almost made it to D-Day (in British Gliders, with British Crews but still!).

I'm really surprised Eugen skipped the M4A1 76W because that was pretty signature 3 AD at Cobra (well, 2 AD too, but whatev).

 

[Ulatersk]

The Report you 'sampled is WO 205 1165 Survey Of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units In NWE 24 March to 5 May 1945. It is by far the most detailed examination of WW2 Tank Casualties ever completed and contrary to your claim it is very complete as to calibre of hit, number of penetrations, aspect of hit, crew casualties, severity of injury and even the time spent in hospital by wounded men. The detail in the full report is overwhelming and it takes several readings before you even start to understand what it reveals. The full report has over 400 pages. Have you read it all?

Yes.

It is by far the most detailed examination where ranges, circumstances, tank models or even fates of the crew missing or given based on information of unit leaders. Nice table, I would like to know how is it relevant to what I have posted.

Or just the usual deflection?

Such information is used in good faith to say that german war diaries are always wrong?

No. It isnt. Its pure fanboyism.

It says what it says. That the precise calibre of hit was unknown. This could be for any number of reasons but there is an example from Normandy that shows how this ambiguity is seized upon by promoters of the Uber-panzer in order to bolster their myth.

What? Try to write more clearly please. I dont understand anything except that rather pathetic strawman at the end.

I can not be bothered to look up the actual detail but this is it in a nutshell.
20 Panthers found with AP hits, 20 abandoned and 5 as cause unknown.
The 5 Unknown were classed as unknown because they have various degrees of damage. That is more than one site of penetration or with AP and mine damage or AP and rocket damage. They were victims of penetration just what killed them was unknown. However those 5 unknown panthers are always added to the 20 abandoned total to get the desired 25 Panthers as non-combat losses.

Ah yes, thats why said study mentions that "no-clear cut breakdown of the gunfire category is possible" because they had cases of tanks affected by up to 3 types of weapons: bogged + tank, bogged + artillery, Tank + antitank + bazooka, Tank + antitank + SP and so on.

They still did not know in 80% of cases, according to their own words.

By the way the Report you mention (ORO-T-117) was done during the Korean War and its aim was to suggest ways that NATO could deal with the massive Soviet Tank Armies. Whilst it is extensive and gives a good overall view I would hardly call it useful for working out precise tank losses from engagements 6 years prior to its compilation. WO 205 1165 is a far better reference..

Spoiler

Nothing else is mentioned anywhere in the report, and no comparisons are made to Korean war or the possibility of "fulda gap"-ing it in Europe what-so.ever.

Authors also took their space of a half-page to thank their sources and participants, from The General reference section, through Army operational research group in Britain to General staff in Fort Leavenworth.

A simple cross-reference with the actual period documentation in Szambveber shows a huge discrepency in 12th SS Numbers. They claim a total of 236 kills 6/6/44 to 2/7/44.
No great reliance should be placed in any nations kill claims.

You might want to source that number.

 

[TheDeadlyShoe]

Yes.

It is by far the most detailed examination where ranges, circumstances, tank models or even fates of the crew missing or given based on information of unit leaders. Nice table, I would like to know how is it relevant to what I have posted.

Or just the usual deflection?

Such information is used in good faith to say that german war diaries are always wrong?

No. It isnt. Its pure fanboyism.

you're badly missing the point. Claimed kills were ALWAYS exaggerated, by every side.

 

[77Hawk77]

you're badly missing the point. Claimed kills were ALWAYS exaggerated, by every side.

Well that is not a fact. That depends on how you accept claimed kills. Do you accept a claimed kill because "you say so" or do you accept a claimed kill because the number of tanks destroyed on the field is very close to the amount of tanks claimed destroyed by units present. This is not entirely the same. Of course checking destroyed tanks is quite hard if you're retreating.

 

[FatRefrigerator]

The thread back from the dead

 

[sam spade]

Ah yes, thats why said study mentions that "no-clear cut breakdown of the gunfire category is possible" because they had cases of tanks affected by up to 3 types of weapons: bogged + tank, bogged + artillery, Tank + antitank + bazooka, Tank + antitank + SP and so on.

They still did not know in 80% of cases, according to their own words.

Err no. That's you conflating two different reports. Do you realise you are first praising and then trashing your own 'source'?

Nothing else is mentioned anywhere in the report, and no comparisons are made to Korean war or the possibility of "fulda gap"-ing it in Europe what-so.ever.

Authors also took their space of a half-page to thank their sources and participants, from The General reference section, through Army operational research group in Britain to General staff in Fort Leavenworth.

I have the advantage on you. I was after this report a long time ago before you could buy it on a CD. I contacted Naisawald (one of the authors) and asked if he could source a copy. I know what methods of information gathering were used and having used many a British War Diaries know that it is impossible to work out losses from that source.
It might help if you understood Allied 'tank loss' reporting methods as well. Units did not 'write off' any tank. What they did was turn over all casualties that could not be fixed in under 24 hours to repair Sections. These casualties were collected for repair and examination. If a tank was written off it happened far in the rear and without any way of the original Unit knowing what was repaired and what was scrapped.
This is how it worked. At last light a Unit counted its tanks. Those fit, those damaged but repairable in under 24 hours and those requiring over 24 hours to repair/ not with the Unit. All the last category were struck from the Unit and became a loss.
A loss to a Unit is often taken to be a total loss in battle when it is no such thing. A good number of the tanks 'lost' to the Unit were repaired and placed back in the replacement pool. A unit tank count is a way of working out tank casualties but it most certainly is not a way to work out tank total losses.

You might want to source that number.

I said Szamveber and you can't look at the rear of the book and find Appendix XIV Pg 213 with the title 'Summarised report of enemy tanks and other weapons knocked out by SS Pz Reg 12 7 June-1 Sept 1944(report dated October 1944)?
I only counted tanks claimed up to July 2.

Well that is not a fact. That depends on how you accept claimed kills. Do you accept a claimed kill because "you say so" or do you accept a claimed kill because the number of tanks destroyed on the field is very close to the amount of tanks claimed destroyed by units present. This is not entirely the same. Of course checking destroyed tanks is quite hard if you're retreating.

What is being used here is raw kill claims. They are always inflated. The Germans had a system to deal with this problem. Overall crew claims were tabulated and then a straight % reduction applied accross the board to try and reach a more realistic figure. The reduction varies but was in the 30%-50% range. Note that though this deduction was applied in Intelligence estimates it is never applied to the Unit kill claims. Detailed examination of the 3 most famous individual kill claims in Normandy (Wittmann, Barkmann abd Fey) show then to be vastly inflated.