1. I don't see how that is necessary, as the French compared their experiences on the Panther, to their experiences on the Sherman, and found that on average it was 20-30 seconds slower. The methods of hand-over are identical as both were in their service.
2. Well I suppose what we've is inconclusive at best then, unless someone else would care to chime in with a better source.
3. Admittedly, I threw it off the top of my head, as 500m is above average engagement range for tanks here in Finland. In any case, it was just an example and the figure itself is irrelevant to the point I was trying to make.
You don't need terrain details, you just need to see the lay of the land. There is absolutely no reason as to why a Sherman gunner would not be able to fine-adjust quicker, as he has already seen the target or the approximate target location on his unity periscope. He has an idea of where his barrel is located in comparison to the target, now he only has to find that point.
And yes, he did know where the barrel was pointed. The early Shermans came with a M4 periscope that had an M38 telescope inside of it, the telescope being an unmagnified sight with a ballistic reticle in it, and it was linked and bore-sighted to the gun. Later on, and using the same connector so they can be retro-fitted on earlier Shermans, they adopted the M4A1 periscope with a M38A2 telescope, with a 1.4x magnification, and retained the ballistic reticle.
In both cases, what you had was a regular, unmagnified periscope with a large field of vision, and inside the same housing a telescope (either unmagnified or a 1.4x magnification) with a ballistic reticle bore-sighted to the tank gun, and a much narrower field of vision. In addition to this, you had the direct vision sight: if it was a 75mm armed Sherman, likely a M55 telescope with a 3x magnification and 12 degree field of view or if it was a 76mm Sherman, a M51 with the same specs. The example I found was of an M4A1, so we can safely assume that by -43 and -44 all Shermans came with this set-up.
Yes, and what allows him to observe while the tank is on the move? The field of view.
A) Admittedly, however, as the comparison is between Shermans in Normandy and Panthers in Normandy, and it supports the data by the French, I feel it is relevant, if only marginal proof.
B) Because they are impossible to factor in, as the US did not have Panther tanks on-hand for testing, and what they did have was used up for penetration tests. However, French had both Shermans and Panthers, and as such crew quality was comparable, if not identical. As I said, the Ballistic Study supports my argument, but isn't the main evidence. My main point stems from the French report.
C) Admittedly. I'm assuming the author intended to say, that the Sherman was 8.4 times more effective than a Panther, as that is the comparison made.
Regarding the final drives, your statement is backwards. The final drives were faulty and unreliable, and this problem was solved by telling the crews to not strain them, i.e: to not neutral steer, to not make steep or sudden turns. The problem was further compounded by lack of fuel for training the drivers.
4. Admittedly. But it is a further issue on top of the already problematic target acquisition.
1. Wrong. It took the French gunners 20s to 30s from Spotting to Shooting and wasn't 20s to 30s slower than the Sherman.
I quote here Chieftains Hatch for the French report as he was used as a source here in the topic:
"
Once the commander has located a target, it takes between 20 and 30 seconds until the gunner can open fire. This data, which is significantly greater than that of the Sherman, stems from the absence of a periscope for the gunner." They base this on the fact of the absence of a periscope. Please see Point 3b.)
2. Found another source which is a little bit more detailed. The Periscope underwent continous upgrades throughout the war. (Need confirmation by other sources if possible)
Early Shermans only had the M4 Periscope (first M4A2 even the worse M3 Periscope, but not long enough to be mentioned here) with the unmagnified M38 telescope inside. This optic was soon replaced by the M4A1 periscope which contained the incorporated M38A2 telescopic sight with 1.44x magnification. Only the telescopic sight within the periscope had a reticle. So here I can confirm your statement by my sources.
The M4A1 was probably the optic used by the US-Forces in normandy in tanks that didn't had Wet-Stowage or were 76mm tanks. Otherwise it would be rather the M8 (only 76mm) or M10 (appeared at a similiar time to wet-storage Shermans, rather later than sooner) optics.
Now the M4A1 was as disliked as the M4 for the reason that it seemed to have a rather weak linkage causing it to lose gun-alignment annoyingly easy. The M8 suffered from similiar issues.
3. I just used your 500m mark as base of argument. With terrain-details I meant prominent objects within the sight to guide the gunner more easily.
In the way the optics in the Sherman work I have to revoke my point regarding the fine-laying. Nevertheless I stumbled across an interesting point:
3b.) During my researches I came upon a very interesting difference that causes me to believe that the Hand-Over-Process was indeed different and far more detailed within the Panther crew than it could possibly be within the Sherman. I thus believe that the hand-over-process during the French trials might have a bigger impact than some might think.
The Commander in the Panther (no matter what version) has a sighting vane in alignment to the gun (next to his periscope) and was thus able to guide his gunner onto the target far more easily than the Sherman commander could do. This feature combined with the generally high FoV on the German telescopic sights allows a quick hand-over process on average and above average combat-distances. Nevertheless it is a rather complicated system that needs training and has clear disadvantages below I would bet roughly 500m.
While in Normandy crews had time to train with one another to make up for that shortcoming that couldn't be said for example for the Battle of the Bulge (which is Zaloga main comparison source for the Panther, just saying).
To this comes a generally better situational awareness for the Panther-commander due to e.g. the protected look-out-position (no clue how to explain it in English, the commanders head is "Outside" of his hatch, while the hatch is still above him granting protection) and a turret-position indicator.
Also the ability to mount an SF14Z can be seen as an indicator for above described higher commanders-responsibility and -ability on gun-alignment. I'm going to quote here Michael and Gladys Green (Panther: Germany's quest for combat dominance) who themselve quote the British:
The TSR-1 seems to have been used for the same role, even when smaller.
And to all of this comes the famous German reticles that allowed far higher chances of a first-hit-capability.
A) I don't see the French data being confirmed. I actually don't see any connections to the French statements.
B) The French report that is actually more a praise to the Panther except for really a few exceptions. May I quote out of the same French report: "
Aside from his periscope gun sight ( which is excellent), the gunner has no other type of observation device. He is therefore practically blind, one of the greatest shortcomings of the Panther. The gunsight with two magnification stages is remarkably clear and has its field of view clear in the center. The gunsight enables observation of a target and shells out to over 3000 meters." The situational awareness of the gunner was rightly seen as the biggest short-coming of the Panther, nevertheless the French statement sounds still more like a praise to the sight itself.
If they cannot factor in "soft-stats", how it comes than that they even came to a conclusion they themselve state as "inadequate"? And you base your opinion upon these, obviously, flawed numbers.
C) That is your assumption. If you want to believe that a single Sherman while in defense is worth 8.4 Panther and during an attack can compete with a single Panther in defense... that is your right. But if you try to use those numbers as basis for a comparision, while the author themselves state that they are inadequate, than I can't take this point you're making seriously. The author in the quoted part is merely using these calculations to show the audience that the outcome of a tank-vs-tank-engagement is not based upon technical values but a lot of other factors. He thus uses these numbers even in humoristic way.
"Training the drivers"... so yes, the final-drives weren't perfect and crap, no doubt, but to base a point about the operational qualifications of the panther upon it while the Germans found a way around this problem... well, that is really a high degree of standard you apply on the German side here.
4. It is not a problem, when it is fast enough to track enemy vehicles in 99.9% of the cases.
