1. We probably won't come to a conclusion here without comparing the actual processes. I also, while suggesting here a basis for flawed data, don't believe the differences between true engagment times and tested ones is massively. Nevertheless the results should be taken with a grain of salt.
2. My source only states the development of the optics themselves, thus I can't attribute them to dates or versions, thus my question.
3. 500m is already below the average combat distance and quite close. Nevertheless your point can be countered by the fact that with a 2.5x optic terrain-details can be easier spotted.
Also you made a mistake: The Sherman gunner das not know with the unity optic (AFAIK) if his other (different) magnified optic with the reticles is already on target for fine-laying. The Panther-Gunner can.
Your point that the Sherman Gunner has already a better overview of the terrain is true but stems more from the fact that he is able to oberserve everything even while driving. The point that it is the FoV is IMO not really a good one.
Regarding the study, do you mean this one?:
That is, with all respect, nothing.
A) Too few samples as they themselve state
B) Other factors, as circumstances or crew training aren't factored in but are vital (especially training since most German crews during e.g. the Bulge were pretty much green and nearly untrained and many of these 29 engagements probably took place during the Bulge... untrained crews in an attack against combat veterans... that's not a good comparison between vehicles)
C) The Sherman had an advantage of 8.4 in defense compared to a Panther... 8.4 what? Was he as good as 8.4 Shermans? Or Panthers? The statement is inconclusive.
Overall that statement is, IMO, nearly worthless, which might be because it is out of context.
Also Panthers Final-Drive problem is also one based on Crew training, AFAIK someone explained this here already.
4. But not a decisive one as for example M10-crews confirmed on the reciving end (I think that was stated in Panzer Wars, have to find it again).
1. I don't see how that is necessary, as the French compared their experiences on the Panther, to their experiences on the Sherman, and found that on average it was 20-30 seconds slower. The methods of hand-over are identical as both were in their service.
2. Well I suppose what we've is inconclusive at best then, unless someone else would care to chime in with a better source.
3. Admittedly, I threw it off the top of my head, as 500m is above average engagement range for tanks here in Finland. In any case, it was just an example and the figure itself is irrelevant to the point I was trying to make.
You don't need terrain
details, you just need to see the lay of the land. There is absolutely no reason as to why a Sherman gunner would not be able to fine-adjust quicker, as he has already seen the target or the approximate target location on his unity periscope. He has an idea of where his barrel is located in comparison to the target, now he only has to find that point.
And yes, he did know where the barrel was pointed. The early Shermans came with a M4 periscope that had an M38 telescope inside of it, the telescope being an unmagnified sight with a ballistic reticle in it, and it was linked and bore-sighted to the gun. Later on, and using the same connector so they can be retro-fitted on earlier Shermans, they adopted the M4A1 periscope with a M38A2 telescope, with a 1.4x magnification, and retained the ballistic reticle.
In both cases, what you had was a regular, unmagnified periscope with a large field of vision, and inside the same housing a telescope (either unmagnified or a 1.4x magnification) with a ballistic reticle bore-sighted to the tank gun, and a much narrower field of vision. In addition to this, you had the direct vision sight: if it was a 75mm armed Sherman, likely a M55 telescope with a 3x magnification and 12 degree field of view or if it was a 76mm Sherman, a M51 with the same specs. The example I found was of an M4A1, so we can safely assume that by -43 and -44 all Shermans came with this set-up.
Yes, and what allows him to observe while the tank is on the move? The field of view.
A) Admittedly, however, as the comparison is between Shermans in Normandy and Panthers in Normandy, and it supports the data by the French, I feel it is relevant, if only marginal proof.
B) Because they are impossible to factor in, as the US did not have Panther tanks on-hand for testing, and what they did have was used up for penetration tests. However, French had both Shermans and Panthers, and as such crew quality was comparable, if not identical. As I said, the Ballistic Study
supports my argument, but isn't the main evidence. My main point stems from the French report.
C) Admittedly. I'm assuming the author intended to say, that the Sherman was 8.4 times more effective than a Panther, as that is the comparison made.
Regarding the final drives, your statement is backwards. The final drives were faulty and unreliable, and this problem was solved by telling the crews to not strain them, i.e: to not neutral steer, to not make steep or sudden turns. The problem was further compounded by lack of fuel for training the drivers.
4. Admittedly. But it is a further issue on top of the already problematic target acquisition.
