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In the speech, Dewey publicly articulated his new Dewey Doctrine for the first time: "it will be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The nature, degree and circumstances under which such support would be provided was left deliberately vague.
Even if the Dewey administration has "firmed up" its interventionist stance, this still has the look of a pragmatic and cautious policy that shouldn't cause too many problems.
Senator Vandenberg was asked to become the new Secretary of State. He duly accepted the President’s offer and took the reigns of US foreign policy, with a decided shift towards alignment with the newly coalescing Western Alliance.
This looks like it's moving the right direction. The coming together of the western democracies should allow for a reasonable balance of power, and there's still a credible hope that the US-Soviet relationship will not break down altogether in this timeline.
Secretary of State Vandenberg suggested in a speech at Harvard University in May that the United States would help Western Europe solve its economic problems provided the non-Communist European countries themselves adopted a joint economic recovery program. This idea would become the basis of the Vandenberg Plan. It was made clear in the speech that The US did not consider Turkey, the UGNR or its satellite states in the Bucharest Pact to be Communist, despite their current Comintern faction membership; so they could, if they desired, explore participation in the Plan.
Henry A. Wallace completed a nationwide speaking tour in Washington, D.C. in mid-June with a speech urging a meeting between Truman and Stalin to counteract "the present suicidal course toward war and depression."
As Britain’s de-colonisation drive gathered pace, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced on 27 January that British troops would be withdrawn from Egypt.
In February British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced that Britain had given up trying to solve the Palestine problem and would put the issue before the League of Nations.
On 10 April the United States and Britain agreed to support France's claim on the Saarland. The next day, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov refused to agree to hand over the Saarland to France. The Saarland would stay within the borders of the DDR.
Here, the meaning of “Western” Europe means those countries that remain within the Western orbit, not the OTL version. And Comintern doesn’t equal Communist, so Italy is in the ‘Third Path’ orbit run by Turkey. In that limited sense, his comments (OTL quotes) remain valid, but of far less sweep than OTL, so to that extent yours is a fair point.
Eh, it determines whether the UK stays a somewhat relevant world power or not. Almost certainly will get fingers burnt by the US, USSR and UGNR though, and so will carry on its decline.
Relevant also because Egypt is going to be a big player in the middle east and if they end up friends with Turkey, it will help the latter out a lot. Particularly on the west bank.
Secretary of State Vandenberg suggested in a speech at Harvard University in May that the United States would help Western Europe solve its economic problems provided the non-Communist European countries themselves adopted a joint economic recovery program. This idea would become the basis of the Vandenberg Plan [Marshall Plan in OTL]. It was made clear in the speech that The US did not consider Turkey, the UGNR or its satellite states in the Bucharest Pact to be Communist, despite their current Comintern faction membership; so they could, if they desired, explore participation in the Plan.
In practice, it would probably be in Italy. Fixing that war torn exhausted country is going to be a gigantic undertaking. I imagine in practice that France and Italy will be rebuilt with aid from the US, USSR and the League through the IMF. Germany too, if Russia is intelligent.
If one wanted a spiritual sequel to this AAR, where we take a pretty secondary or third rate power and make them high second/first tier, with threat of invasion and tantalising expansion luck pushing for the first half and rhe second fighting a huge world war...I'm not sure who else fits rhe bill. Brazil would be too boring (only possible outside threat is the US). Persia or arabia would be essentially the same thing as Turkey only harder. Same for any other balkans country. Portugal perhaps. Rebuilding a southern amercian empire whilst avoiding the US and European intervention, rhe Spanish civil war and eventually ww2 sounds interesting.
Or China OR Japan, who both have a ton of potential and variation afforded to them, loads of enemies and potential allies...hmm..
In practice, it would probably be in Italy. Fixing that war torn exhausted country is going to be a gigantic undertaking. I imagine in practice that France and Italy will be rebuilt with aid from the US, USSR and the League through the IMF. Germany too, if Russia is intelligent.
If one wanted a spiritual sequel to this AAR, where we take a pretty secondary or third rate power and make them high second/first tier, with threat of invasion and tantalising expansion luck pushing for the first half and rhe second fighting a huge world war...I'm not sure who else fits rhe bill. Brazil would be too boring (only possible outside threat is the US). Persia or arabia would be essentially the same thing as Turkey only harder. Same for any other balkans country. Portugal perhaps. Rebuilding a southern amercian empire whilst avoiding the US and European intervention, rhe Spanish civil war and eventually ww2 sounds interesting.
Or China OR Japan, who both have a ton of potential and variation afforded to them, loads of enemies and potential allies...hmm..
Maybe India, from a shaky post-independence start? With a few scripted events that allow it to build up its LS (say through 'building schools, research labs and & unis' or some such?
Maybe India, from a shaky post-independence start? With a few scripted events that allow it to build up its LS (say through 'building schools, research labs and & unis' or some such?
Not sure where they go from there? Unless they have to conquer/diplo annex/ puppet every former part of the Raj, then go after the himalayas small kingdoms, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan etc. Then go into siam and maybe interfere with China, or go the other way into Afghanistan, persia and Middle East?
I guess it could work. Seems a lot like China eith fewer stakes though.
Palestine always seems to be in this era, OTL or ATL. For now, it's tracking along largely OTL historical lines, but this may change now it's coming to the LNSC for recommendations. East Asia will continue to be 'exciting', though the continuation of Japanese imperialism and the very different situation in China will cause more changes to the OTL narrative.
Yeah, I get that vibe. With a lot more international cooperation on UN organisations, such weighted Soviet advantage in Eastern Europe and a much larger comintern, there's more to be gained from friendship or at least mutual respect than a cold war. If it keeps up, the US will become more socialised, and the comintern will liberalise (eventually).
That's more because the Japanese empire still exists and is self combustibg. Similar to how the Spanish empire limping into the 1890s forced a lot of countries into opposite camps purely because a lot of land was up for grabs and they had to compete.
Once this gets resolved, at least in China and South East Asia (Manchuria, Korea and Japan itself may be an issue for a lot longer), rhe US and everyone else should be able to come to a new reloaded and relaxed sphere agreement.
It still has some way to go and North Asia is going to remain a hotbed of major power rivalry for possibly decades to come. South East Asia may get messy, but perhaps not to the extent it did in OTL.
Even if the Dewey administration has "firmed up" its interventionist stance, this still has the look of a pragmatic and cautious policy that shouldn't cause too many problems.
Thanks, that's the vibe I'm definitely trying to get across. Dewey doesn't want problems - for America, certainly. It's about status quo and keeping the US secure rather than actively seeking world military leadership, even of 'the West'.
This looks like it's moving the right direction. The coming together of the western democracies should allow for a reasonable balance of power, and there's still a credible hope that the US-Soviet relationship will not break down altogether in this timeline.
Yes, and this balance will be more multi-polar than it was in OTL, even without India having risen yet. Whether its more like the old 'Concert of Europe' balance or more volatile remains to be seen.
Yes, it is alarmist, even more in this TL than the one in which these words were uttered. I didn't tone them down, otherwise there wouldn't have been much point including them
One of them, yes, for sure. Suez? Hmm, I don't really know and I'm no great student of it, though have a very broad/general recollection of the elements. I suspect it probably will be too late for my scope here, you're right, unless something were to trigger it earlier than OTL.
I think there will be some options, perhaps arising from LNSC consideration and possible increased Turkish interest. It may come to a series of % dice event chains similar to what happened with my India partition recreation.
Eh, it determines whether the UK stays a somewhat relevant world power or not. Almost certainly will get fingers burnt by the US, USSR and UGNR though, and so will carry on its decline.
Relevant also because Egypt is going to be a big player in the middle east and if they end up friends with Turkey, it will help the latter out a lot. Particularly on the west bank.
Per above, it may or may get left moot, depending on how far this epilogue goes. If it does ever come to it, Britain will probably carry a fair bit more diplomatic and strategic clout in the West than it did in OTL at the time and the US relatively less. And it will be less less bi-polar strategic environment.
Chapter 260: The Eastern Hemisphere – January to June 1947
Japan
Another round of elections were held in Japan on 25 April 1947. It may be recalled that on 24 August 1946 the House of Representatives of Japan approved the nation's new and somewhat more liberal and democratic post-war constitution by a large margin. With Emperor Hirohito’s support, the Conservative-Liberal coalition government elected in April 1946 had been trying to consolidate its power. Now, a year on, it would be put to a genuine electoral test.
The starting position for the parties from the year before had the governing coalition on a total of 322 seats, where a majority of the lower house (Diet) was 235. The combined Left opposition (Socialists and Radicals, the Communists having been wiped out at the last election) controlled only 95 seats and independents the remaining 51.
About 5% more electors voted in total than the year before. Once more the far-right Imperial Rule (National Socialist) Party attracted no support, nor did the centre-left Minsei (Progressives). But the Leninists did make a comeback, managing to secure 9 seats in the new Diet – mainly at the expense of the Radicals, who lost ground to their left and right (the Socialists). Independents also fared better.
The Socialist Party won 144 of the 466 seats, making it the largest party in the House of Representatives by an eight-seat margin.
This result left the Coalition with ten seats fewer (312) than in 1946 but in net terms, these went to the independents, while the Leftist opposition simply shuffled seats between the parties with the re-emergence of the Communists.
Admiral Okada Keisuke would continue as Prime Minister as leader of the Conservative Party (former Control Clique) with Ichirō Hatoyama as his Deputy, leading the Liberal Party in the right-of-centre coalition government. This also meant their policy program would continue, with negotiations with China and the US resuming momentum with the election campaign out of the way.
Okada Keisuke (left) and Ichirō Hatoyama, returned as Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister with a slightly reduced margin for their Conservative coalition at the first election under the new Japanese ‘post-Meiji’ constitution.
With Dewey locking in his new more internationalist foreign policy doctrine in early 1947 and the continued unease (though not confrontation) between the emerging Western Alliance and the Soviet-led Communist Warsaw Pact, the return of the Conservative Coalition in Japan paved the way for more slow but steady progress in the Japan-US rapprochement.
The powerful US military commander in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, would make an official visit to Tokyo in May 1947 for consultations with the Japanese government as they sought to lock in the proposed (highly secret) consultations between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese government. This included a very significant (in fact, ground-breaking) ceremonial call on the Emperor himself.
General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito meet in Tokyo, May 1947.
MacArthur would then move on to Nanjing to bring the Chinese in on the proposal: a “no preconditions” meeting of senior officials (just below ministerial level) to be conducted in neutral Portuguese Macao in mid-June 1947. This gave both sides the opportunity to formulate their ideas and proposals for the main meeting between respective foreign and defence ministers tentatively scheduled for early July.
The main topics for discussion were agreed in June to centre on: the status of Chinese territory occupied by Japan in 1937; the question of how to deal with the ongoing Communist insurgency in Japanese-controlled territory; and possible trade and economic arrangements should the military and diplomatic discussions progress sufficiently. Specifics would not be broached until the July talks – in part because both sides were (justifiably) paranoid about such details leaking.
Separately, in acknowledgement of the concessions made by Japan in the Philippines and the conduct of their recently elections, widely considered in the West to have been credible and largely ‘democratic’ and thus legitimate, the US began to progressively lift its trade embargoes on Japan, beginning with non-strategic goods. More relaxation would be conditional on further ‘satisfactory (by US judgement) progress on the diplomatic front.
What would no doubt bring more unease but could hardly be objected to by the other LNSC P5 countries without obvious and damning hypocrisy was the slowly developing Japanese nuclear program, which remained some years behind those of the USSR/German, UK and US programs and perhaps even that of Turkey, was Japan’s slow and expensive nuclear weapon program, still in the relatively early theoretical research stage.
---xxx---
The Philippines
The uneasy leadership of Philippine President Manuel Roxas, still seen by many as a Japanese ‘puppet’ ruler, despite the US-brokered independence deal, survived an assassination attempt on 9 March when a barber from Manila tried to kill him with a hand grenade. Those suspicions were only confirmed when Japan and the Philippines signed a treaty in Manila just five days later guaranteeing Japanese military bases in the islands for 99 years.
Philippine President Manuel Roxas and his old wartime Japanese friend (formerly Colonel, now General) Nobuhiko Jimbo meet again at the signing ceremony for the base leasing agreement, 14 March 1947.
---xxx---
Indonesia
Negotiations between Netherlands and Indonesian nationalist representatives had led to the preliminarily conclusion of the British-mediated Linggadjati Agreement on 15 November 1946. But Dutch government troops resumed military hostilities against Indonesian nationalists in north-east Sumatra in early 1947, until the Linggadjati Agreement was formally signed in Jakarta on 25 March 1947, which saw the cessation of military hostilities and the establishment of the United States of Indonesia consisting of the Republic of Indonesia (Java, Madura, Sumatra) and Borneo.
Indonesian President Sukarno makes a speech following the formal ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement in March 1947.
The Dutch government recognised West Borneo as an autonomous state within the United States of Indonesia on 1 May 1947. The Dutch government then presented five proposals concerning the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement to Indonesian representatives on 27 May but the proposals were rejected by the Indonesians on 8 June. The US government urged that the interim Indonesian government to accept the Dutch government proposals and offered economic assistance to the interim Indonesian government on 27 June. A response to this overture was expected in early July.
---xxx---
Vietnam
Under pressure from Japanese and Vietnamese puppet regime forces, the Viet Minh (led by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap) abandoned their defence of Hanoi and relocated to jungles of north-west Vietnam. In January 1947. Back in Japan, in February opinion polling indicated a roughly even divide between those favouring the continued use of force to suppress the revolt (36%) and those favouring negotiation (42%).
Viet Minh fighters reverted to guerrilla warfare in the countryside in early 1947.
Fighting continued in limited engagements through to June, as the Soviets smuggled in shipments of weapons and supplies to the Viet Minh as best they could. While French and (to a lesser extent) US diplomatic pressure was exerted on Japan to come to a cease fire and some form of accommodation, this had little impact on the Japanese and it was considered a secondary issue in the wider US-Japanese negotiations. It seemed the decision would rest on Japanese views (both official and public), influenced in large part by events on the battlefield – which appeared to have swung more in Japan’s favour in the first half of 1947.
---xxx---
Korea
Events simmered along in Japanese-occupied Korea through the first half of 1947. In the southern part of the country, some industrial investment began to be made supporting local Korean joint ventures with Japanese financing.
In the north of the country, Kim Il-Sung’s Soviet-backed Communist cadres managed to win a significant proportion of seats in inaugural local council elections in late February. The Japanese governor-general of Korea invalidated their election on dubious technical grounds so they never took up their positions. But Kim’s point had been made – and this episode provided another propaganda club with which he could bludgeon the ‘Imperialist occupiers’.
Polling day in northern Korea, February 1947. The Communists made a strong showing in the north, but results in the south heavily favoured more conservative candidates: not necessarily pro-Japanese, but far less aggressive and less willing to advocate for violent resistance.
In June 1947, the US proposed that a three-way conference including Japan, the USSR and the US to be convened as a sub-committee of the LNSC to discuss the future of the Korean peninsula. Both the Soviets and Japan were non-committal, reserving their responses until July.
---xxx---
China
The Communist guerrilla war against the Japanese continued throughout the first half of 1947. On 30 January the month-long Battle of Guanzhong ended in victory for the Chinese Communist forces over Japanese troops. But on 19 March the Battle of Yan'an was fought as part of the Chinese Civil War, resulting in a Japanese victory. Then the Chinese Communist forces initiated the Summer Offensive of 1947 in North-east China.
In essence, this kept up the pressure on Japan from the Communist perspective without making any decisive turn of the tide. From Japan’s perspective, the pressure being exerted may be driving them into the hands of the US-backed nationalists. Meanwhile, Chiang bided his time, consolidating his control over the recently expanded central Chinese government. And allowing him to prepare for wherever his ambitions might next be directed.
Chiang Kai-shek remained well pleased with the slow but steady diplomatic, military and economic progress China was making in the first half of 1947.
---xxx---
Turkey, the UGNR & Bucharest Pact
On 13 March Turkish Prime Minister Recep Peker hailed President Dewey's landmark speech as inspired by a "point of view both fully realistic and fully humanitarian." Diplomatic feelers were soon sent out regarding the possibility of US partnership in rebuilding the devastated nations on Italy, Central Europe and the Balkans – many of which had seen some of the longest and heaviest fighting of the war.
And reconstruction in the UGNR and Bucharest Pact countries that had suffered most in the fighting was slow and underwhelming: Turkey simply didn’t have sufficient resources to fund such a major undertaking and potential IMF support would only go so far – as well as coming with many strings attached. Not so publicly acknowledged, but obvious enough to the other LNSC P5 powers, was the great cost of Turkey’s incipient atomic program then under way.
The Malagasy Uprising began against the Turkish occupation in Madagascar on 29 March. It would not be the last former French colony and now Turkish occupied territory to face such unrest in the post-war period. On the evening of 29 March 1947, coordinated surprise attacks were launched by Malagasy nationalists, armed mainly with spears, against Turkish military bases in the eastern part of the island.
A nationalist fighter from the rural southeast of Madgascar during the Malagasy rebellion in 1947. The rebels were poorly armed and only a few had rifles.
The nationalist cause was rapidly adopted in the south and spread to the central highlands and the capital of Antananarivo by the following month, with the number of Malagasy nationalist fighters estimated at over one million. By May 1947 the Turks [correction] began to counter the nationalists. The Turks tripled the number of troops on the island to around 18,000 but this was not enough to regain control. By the end of June, it was clear something more had to be done: either Nationalist demands would need to be accommodated or a fierce and bloody repression enacted.
It was clear Turkey would need to formulate some kind of plan to deal with this inherited issue: Madagascar in particular and the other new possessions in general. Peker was wondering whether Turkey may be able to use the League of Nations to help solve this brewing problem, while perhaps stacking up some bargaining chips with the West in general and France in particular. And simultaneously looking the part as the post-colonial ‘Third Way’ leader without having to foot the bill (in treasure, troops and reputation) for looking after the potential mess it had been left with.
Meanwhile, the ‘Diskoerekto Proposal’ for the re-ordering of the internal borders of the UGNR came before the Turkish cabinet for initial consideration in April 1947. Within the limitations previously outlined by Inönü regarding the maintenance of Turkey’s central territorial integrity, the Cabinet gave permission for a sub-committee, which would be chaired by PM Peker, to consult with MAJGEN Diskoerekto to develop a refined proposal. It would be considered at a full Cabinet meeting in July, when a decision would be made.
Turkish PM Recep Peker (right, at the head of the table) chairs a meeting of the sub-committee discussing the ‘Diskoerekto Proposal’, June 1947. The general himself is not visible in this photo, but was sitting at the opposite end of the table to Peker as Special Adviser to the newly formed ‘UGNR Boundary Committee’.
In general, the three broad options to be considered were to retain the current borders, adopt the plan to fundamentally amend the old pre-GW2 borders along the demographic lines put forward, or to recommend the development of a compromise plan that may substantially amend but not radically alter all of those borders, on principles to be stipulated by the Cabinet. Detailed papers would be prepared and distributed in time for that important cabinet meeting.
In the meantime, the Foreign Minister was tasked with developing the Turkish policy approach to the resolution of the ‘Palestinian Question’, to be debated in the LNSC in coming months. Some were advocating a ‘hands-off’ approach – lest they be burned. ‘Hawks’ however were pushing for direct Turkish intervention, hopefully with LN cover via a Security Council resolution. The provision of military options – ranging from policing and monitoring, to peacekeeping and even peacemaking – had been called for.
Admiral Okada Keisuke would continue as Prime Minister as leader of the Conservative Party (former Control Clique) with Ichirō Hatoyama as his Deputy, leading the Liberal Party in the right-of-centre coalition government. This also meant their policy program would continue, with negotiations with China and the US resuming momentum with the election campaign out of the way.
Japan's democratic reforms appear genuine enough and the outcome is a stable and pragmatic government. The real question is how the military hard-liners are reacting to all of this?
MacArthur would then move on to Nanjing to bring the Chinese in on the proposal: a “no preconditions” meeting of senior officials (just below ministerial level) to be conducted in neutral Portuguese Macao in mid-June 1947. This gave both sides the opportunity to formulate their ideas and proposals for the main meeting between respective foreign and defence ministers tentatively scheduled for early July.
This US-brokered diplomatic engagement between Japan and the Chinese is overly ambitious, I fear. I can see the possibility of some kind of short-term accommodation so long as they both continue to be threatened by the communist insurgency, but beyond that Chiang wants to recover all the territory the Japanese have taken and I can't see the Japanese just handing it all back...
The uneasy leadership of Philippine President Manuel Roxas, still seen by many as a Japanese ‘puppet’ ruler, despite the US-brokered independence deal, survived an assassination attempt on 9 March when a barber from Manila tried to kill him with a hand grenade.
The Dutch government then presented five proposals concerning the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement to Indonesian representatives on 27 May but the proposals were rejected by the Indonesians on 8 June. The US government urged that the interim Indonesian government to accept the Dutch government proposals and offered economic assistance to the interim Indonesian government on 27 June.
I'm not familiar with the back-story here. Are we seeing reluctance from Sukarno to honour his agreement with Dutch? Or is this the Dutch trying to change the terms of that agreement?
Fighting continued in limited engagements through to June, as the Soviets smuggled in shipments of weapons and supplies to the Viet Minh as best they could.
In June 1947, the US proposed that a three-way conference including Japan, the USSR and the US to be convened as a sub-committee of the LNSC to discuss the future of the Korean peninsula. Both the Soviets and Japan were non-committal, reserving their responses until July.
Meanwhile, Chiang bided his time, consolidating his control over the recently expanded central Chinese government. And allowing him to prepare for wherever his ambitions might next be directed.
The nationalist cause was rapidly adopted in the south and spread to the central highlands and the capital of Antananarivo by the following month, with the number of Malagasy nationalist fighters estimated at over one million. By the end of June, it was clear something more had to be done: either Nationalist demands would need to be accommodated or a fierce and bloody repression enacted.
It was clear Turkey would need to formulate some kind of plan to deal with this inherited issue: Madagascar in particular and the other new possessions in general.
Turkey now has similar problems to Japan and Britain, it seems. Where Madagascar is concerned, independence in exchange for basing rights would seem a good compromise?
In the meantime, the Foreign Minister was tasked with developing the Turkish policy approach to the resolution of the ‘Palestinian Question’, to be debated in the LNSC in coming months. Some were advocating a ‘hands-off’ approach – lest they be burned. ‘Hawks’ however were pushing for direct Turkish intervention, hopefully with LN cover via a Security Council resolution.
Let's see...Japan having looming issues at home with Democrats and traditionalists and the military is good for the rebels on the mainland and pretty much everyone else as well.
The US attempting closer relations is definitely going to blow up in their face at some point, unless the regime collapses into a civil dispute or war at some point.
Vietnam and Korea keep up the good fight, with plenty of Soviet aid and a ton of popular support both in their home countries and around the world. Good for Soviet image post war, good for the comintern generally. They will be welcome members soon enough.
Turkey has a very awkward colonial legacy to now manage in Africa. I think it would be best that they go for managed decolonisation as soon as possible, for the good of their own image, humanity as a whole and in aid of spreading the good word of communism. I would certainly call upon Spain to look into their own imperial legacy also.
As for the Soviets, their overall situation and image is good post war. Their big sin, and one I really don't agree with, is stealing the industry from Germany rather than helping them rebuild. Was an oppurinty to highlight the difference between capitalist empires that robbed their nation whilst it was down in 1918, and Soviet style empathy in 1945. When stalin dies, this should be reversed and the entire comintern and Soviet Union must be the focus, not just western muscovy/Russia.
High time for a grand comintern International Congress to meet and discuss ideas and strategy going forwards.
Meanwhile, the ‘Diskoerekto Proposal’ for the re-ordering of the internal borders of the UGNR came before the Turkish cabinet for initial consideration in April 1947. Within the limitations previously outlined by Inönü regarding the maintenance of Turkey’s central territorial integrity, the Cabinet gave permission for a sub-committee, which would be chaired by PM Peker, to consult with MAJGEN Diskoerekto to develop a refined proposal. It would be considered at a full Cabinet meeting in July, when a decision would be made.
The nationalist cause was rapidly adopted in the south and spread to the central highlands and the capital of Antananarivo by the following month, with the number of Malagasy nationalist fighters estimated at over one million. By May 1947 the French began to counter the nationalists. The Turks tripled the number of troops on the island to around 18,000 but this was not enough to regain control. By the end of June, it was clear something more had to be done: either Nationalist demands would need to be accommodated or a fierce and bloody repression enacted.
when they see under UGNR they'll have regional autonomy like any other region, and democracy and hopefully in time prosperity; they'll also like to stay under us. In the meanwhile we'll try to not be brutal and try appeasing.
In the meantime, the Foreign Minister was tasked with developing the Turkish policy approach to the resolution of the ‘Palestinian Question’, to be debated in the LNSC in coming months. Some were advocating a ‘hands-off’ approach – lest they be burned. ‘Hawks’ however were pushing for direct Turkish intervention, hopefully with LN cover via a Security Council resolution. The provision of military options – ranging from policing and monitoring, to peacekeeping and even peacemaking – had been called for.
we'll suffer burns if that means we can provide democracy and peace to palestinians and jews (and other minorities of the region such as the druze). not an imperialist project in any way, but keeping the peace as a neutral arbiter that doesn't take sides, but also is not an outsider of the region.
Japan's democratic reforms appear genuine enough and the outcome is a stable and pragmatic government. The real question is how the military hard-liners are reacting to all of this?
This is behind the very delicate approach the Government has been taking: that and the fact they have some pressing strategic imperatives to confront that even military hardliners must acknowledge. But yes, it both limits what the government can do and how quickly it can do it. And it could all come crashing down if they go too far or something breaks. Having the Emperor on side and to some extent pushing along this way does give them a degree of coverage. There will be more on this balancing act in the forthcoming chapter, but it is a very apposite point.
This US-brokered diplomatic engagement between Japan and the Chinese is overly ambitious, I fear. I can see the possibility of some kind of short-term accommodation so long as they both continue to be threatened by the communist insurgency, but beyond that Chiang wants to recover all the territory the Japanese have taken and I can't see the Japanese just handing it all back...
This is a very good read of the situation as I imagine it. They will most likely take the approach of small things first, 'trust building activities' and so on. Whether it leads to more lasting cooperation and accommodation, or for a range of reasons reaches a point of diminishing returns for one side or the other (or even both) remains a mystery. Including to me
I'm not familiar with the back-story here. Are we seeing reluctance from Sukarno to honour his agreement with Dutch? Or is this the Dutch trying to change the terms of that agreement?
This is the nub of the problem as the Emperor and the (still very conservative and hardly liberal) civilian government see it. They were almost at breaking point at the end of 1944 and are now faced with a range of conflicts they weren't having to worry about then. Plus trying to break the destructive isolation in trade terms (especially strategic resources) that drove them to war in the first place. They still want to keep as much as they can while normalising their position and defending what they can from what they see as their largest and most dangerous threat: the USSR (who was wronged by Japan far more than the US was in the TTL war) and communist insurgency (whether supported or fomented by Moscow or not).
Turkey now has similar problems to Japan and Britain, it seems. Where Madagascar is concerned, independence in exchange for basing rights would seem a good compromise?
To a certain extent, though much of this new 'empire' (beyond their own direct conquests) simply fell into their laps with the collapse of Vichy France. How much would they really want to keep onto many of those more distant posts anyway, if they prove restive? Or to appear to be colonialists when they also have an interest in fomenting anti-colonial movements in a 'third way' or even 'non-aligned' factional path in the future?
Some will want to grab it and eat it, others to let it burn someone else. It will depend on which view may prevail in Ankara but also events on the ground in the Middle East. Might not doing anything as it all goes to sh!t in their backyard be seen as even worse than stepping in? They have a fairly recent background in the area, so will be aware of both the pitfalls but also the possibilities and the costs to their reputation as a regional and would be world power if they take no direct interest.
There will also be the LN angle to consider, what that body may propose and what the main players (Israeli and Arab) choose to do in response. But for now, the descent to violence is following the OTL timeline pretty closely.
Let's see...Japan having looming issues at home with Democrats and traditionalists and the military is good for the rebels on the mainland and pretty much everyone else as well.
Yes, if they let it get too bad. There is a yin-yang thing happening here between those who view Imperialism as an almost religious national duty, and more moderate (comparatively) realists who see some of these diversions as imperilling national security and the survival of the Empire.
The US attempting closer relations is definitely going to blow up in their face at some point, unless the regime collapses into a civil dispute or war at some point.
Well, maybe, but they're also maintaining a far more careful (and if necessary deniable and expendable) policy approach. For Dewey's team, and to partly paraphrase Patton: if it doesn't work they'd rather see it blow up in some other poor bastards face than their own! It all falling apart in Asia would be better than US troops getting caught up in it directly. Dewey's more interventionist policy does not go as far as becoming perceived as the World's Policeman.
Vietnam and Korea keep up the good fight, with plenty of Soviet aid and a ton of popular support both in their home countries and around the world. Good for Soviet image post war, good for the comintern generally. They will be welcome members soon enough.
Turkey has a very awkward colonial legacy to now manage in Africa. I think it would be best that they go for managed decolonisation as soon as possible, for the good of their own image, humanity as a whole and in aid of spreading the good word of communism. I would certainly call upon Spain to look into their own imperial legacy also.
Indeed they do and I think the decolonisation plan may be the best for them. If there's the odd place that makes a really good base and doesn't mind their presence much, then they might think of hanging on to it. But otherwise, they hardly need an 18th-19th century style colonial empire when they have all that black gold ready to be pumped out closer to home.
All those petro-dinars are something they just need toime to get flowing and fuelling (pun intended) their real post-war development. The danger for them is instability in Arabia and/or Iran undermining that. So far, they're not encountering that. But how long can that last?
As for the Soviets, their overall situation and image is good post war. Their big sin, and one I really don't agree with, is stealing the industry from Germany rather than helping them rebuild. Was an oppurinty to highlight the difference between capitalist empires that robbed their nation whilst it was down in 1918, and Soviet style empathy in 1945. When stalin dies, this should be reversed and the entire comintern and Soviet Union must be the focus, not just western muscovy/Russia.
It's mainly going pretty well for them, but they are still likely to make dodgy calls or outright mistakes along the way, or clumsily blunder into things, miss golden opportunities, etc. But Germany? You don't think Stalin would have done to the whole place what he did to East Germany in OTL if he had the chamnce - no matter how geo-strategically unwise that might be? Things are getting quite nasty there and this time, the whole of a sullen, starved, destroyed and unreconciled Germany is going to be harder to suppress than the far smaller zone they controlled in OTL.
Funny you should mention that, there is something coming up that riffs directly of some OTL stuff that will vibe here too. But it may not live up to your lofty ambitions ...
And what they don't get stripped peeled away may be handed over. And Turkey does have an interesting little policy period to navigate now, thanks (and no thanks) to their extraordinary GW2 gains.
Thanks! We need to get onto this soon. There will be one more chapter after the next one then a special one on Turkey and the UGNR Border Commission which will include the Cabinet discussion. Will be in touch by PM to figure out what we need, but will be welcome for any ideas you have, in or out of character.
when they see under UGNR they'll have regional autonomy like any other region, and democracy and hopefully in time prosperity; they'll also like to stay under us. In the meanwhile we'll try to not be brutal and try appeasing.
Maybe, but I think Turkey will need to do a stocktake on this too, to see what may be worth keeping and what granted autonomy or self-determination for full independence.
we'll suffer burns if that means we can provide democracy and peace to palestinians and jews (and other minorities of the region such as the druze). not an imperialist project in any way, but keeping the peace as a neutral arbiter that doesn't take sides, but also is not an outsider of the region.
This resonates a lot I think in the TTL and some of the points I've made above go to this. But first intentions have to be made clear and then we see how those match up against the harsh realities of that part of the world, whether in the OTL or TTL post-war world.
To All: thanks for the great comments. The next chapter is ready to go and will again return to the Eastern Hemisphere, include South Asia, where the majority of the world's most difficult and increasingly grisly trouble spots currently are.
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Chapter 261: The Eastern Hemisphere – July to December 1947
Chapter 261: The Eastern Hemisphere – July to December 1947
India - Starting Situation
The rejection of accession by Hyderabad and Mysore and the partition of Pakistan from the former Raj left the map of India looking as follows by the end of June.
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Hyderabad
Hindu majority Hyderabad’s Muslim ruler, Mir Osman Ali Khan had on 20 June opted to oppose accession into India, defying Nehru’s central government. India began secret planning for Operation Polo, the annexation of Hyderabad through an Indian Army ‘police action’. No further action was taken as Hyderabad maintained its nominal independence through to the end of 1947.
Die roll of 1/12 each month until intervention occurs, from July 1947. Once activated, result per month until resolved: 70% annexed, 25% continue rolling until outcome, 5% independent (India retains a casus belli). In OTL this did not occur until September 1948.
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Jammu and Kashmir
This potential flashpoint had a mostly Muslim population overall, with sizeable Hindu and Buddhist populations and a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. The Maharaja decided to accede to union with India on 22 June but to the surprise of most neither Pakistan nor local militants contested this decision. The whole state became part of India while local unrest simmered among the significant Muslim population for the rest of 1947, with the occasional outbreak of communal violence.
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948, or the First Kashmir War, was a war fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four Indo-Pakistani wars between the two newly independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the war a few weeks after its independence by launching tribal lashkar (militias) from Waziristan, in an effort to capture Kashmir and to pre-empt the possibility of its ruler joining India. On 22 Oct the Pakistani tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir began. In response, on 27 Oct India air-lifted troops to defend Jammu and Kashmir, starting the war. But not in this ATL. So far, anyway!
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Kingdom of Mysore
The Hindu ruler of the mainly Hindu Kingdom of Mysore, the young Maharaja Jayachamarajendra Wadiyar, caused consternation for the Indian government on 24 June when he followed Hyderabad’s example by asserting the continued independence of Mysore from the Indian union. Operation Golf, like Polo for Hyderabad, was added to the Indian Army’s tasks.
If No to accession, mandatory Indian military response, die roll of 1/12 each month until intervention occurs, from July 1947. Once activated, result per month until resolved: 70% annexed, 25% continue rolling until outcome, 5% independent (India retains a casus belli).
The Indians were soon ready to go and crossed the border on 6 August. Mysore was quickly annexed [triggered in August, outcome die roll 15%] when no resistance was offered, with many Hindus coming out in to welcome the incoming troops. The Maharaja was arrested and would eventually be sent into exile.
There was no resistance when the Indian Army rolled over the border to force the breakaway Princely State of Mysore into the union with India in August 1947.
On 16 August Nehru declared in a broadcast that it was "the first and sacred duty of this Government to restore peace and order in the country." Nehru warned that rioting must cease and that his government would spare no one who participated in disorders "whether he be Hindu, Muslim or Sikh." Combined with the annexation of Mysore, the hint was not lost on Hyderabad, but they were more determined and did not relent.
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Pakistan
Like Hyderabad and Mysore in India, Yah Khan of Kalat had refused to accede to the union with the newly created Pakistan. He chose to delay instead, requiring the new Prime Minister Jinnah to decide whether he would pursue peaceful persuasion or stage an armed intervention. Jinnah chose words instead of war. Despite several rounds of negotiations, no resolution was found before the end of 1947.
Delayed Accession die rolls for Peaceful Persuasion. 1/12 chance per month of resolution roll:
1-90%: accession to Pakistan(no further action)
91-100%: independence asserted (Pakistan reacts)
If independence asserted: 1-95%: armed Pakistan intervention then each month 1-70% suppressed, 71-90% continue rolling until outcome, 91-95% long term guerrilla activity; 96-100% independence(Pakistan casus belli).
Meanwhile, in Karachi the Parliament of Pakistan met for the first time on 10 August. Just two days later, huge fires raged in Lahore following a full day of arson, killings and other crimes on the eve of the announcement of how the Punjab boundary commission would partition the province. At least 100 people died in the violence. With ongoing agitation about the fate of Kashmir also causing tension, it seemed to Jinnah that independence for Pakistan would not come without some more fraught moments.
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Indonesia
The Dutch government had presented five proposals to implement the Linggadjati Agreement to Indonesian representatives on 27 May 1947 but they were rejected by the Indonesians on 8 June. The US government urged that the interim Indonesian government to accept the Dutch government proposals and offered economic assistance to the interim Indonesian government on 27 June, but that idea was rejected by the Indonesians in early July
On 21 July the Dutch, claiming violations of the Linggadjati Agreement, began what was termed a "police action" and launched Operation Product against the Republic of Indonesia to occupy large parts of Java and Sumatra. In response, the British government suspended all military aid to the Netherlands on 30 July.
Dutch troops in take part in Operation Product in Ambawara, Central Java, July 1947.
Dutch troops in Indonesia completed Operation Product on 5 August, taking over large parts of Java and Sumatra from Republican forces. A US offer on 19 August to settle the Indonesian-Netherlands dispute was rejected by Indonesian representative Sutan Sjahrir. who renewed his demand that the UN Security Council set up an arbitration commission to settle the matter.
Sutan Sjahrir (b. 5 March 1909) was an Indonesian politician, and revolutionary independence leader, who had served as the first Prime Minister of Indonesia since 1945.
International reaction to the Dutch actions was largely negative. Neighbouring Australia and newly independent India were particularly active in supporting the Republic's cause in the LN, as were the Soviet Union and, most significantly, the United States.
The LN Security Council became directly involved in the conflict and sponsored further negotiations, making the Dutch diplomatic position particularly difficult. A ceasefire, called for by LNSC resolution 27, was ordered by the Dutch and Sukarno on 4 August 1947. LN-sponsored negotiations to hammer out a new agreement continued for the rest of 1947.
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Vietnam
In the first half of 1947 the Viet Minh had received limited Soviet support to continue their armed guerrilla struggle again the Japanese and their local puppet allies while the US exerted moderate diplomatic pressure on Japan to come to a cease fire and some form of accommodation. Japan’s hard-line Army lobby wanted events to be determined on the battlefield, where fighting had swung more in Japan’s favour by mid-1947.
This state of affairs would persist for the rest of the year, with Japanese military hardliners seeing no reason to relent, while the civilian government largely saw the increasing cost in men, money and diplomatic capital as outweighing the benefits of retaining direct control of Indochina in general and Vietnam in particular. Especially when Japan’s main concerns remained in North Asia: China, Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea.
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Korea
In June 1947, the US had proposed a three-way conference including Japan, the USSR and the US to convene under LNSC auspices to discuss the future of the Korean peninsula. Both the Soviets and Japan reserved their responses until July. For differing reasons, both powers would reject the proposal: the Soviets because of what they wanted to get, the Japanese for what they wanted to keep.
Then on 23 September the LN General Assembly (which was of course not subject to any P5 veto) overrode Soviet and Japanese objections to include the question of Korean independence on its agenda. In the north, Kim’s Soviet-backed Communist infiltration and military preparations continued; in the south pro-nationalist but conservative Korean groups pushed for independence.
The LN Political Committee voted on 5 November to send a special LN Commission to Korea to investigate the situation there and options for its political freedom. The Soviets refused to participate in the vote, making it plain that the commission was not welcome and that ‘revolutionary’ freedom should be seized by the people of Korea, not by an outside body.
The ‘Korea session’ of the LN GA Political Committee meets in Geneva in November 1947 to discuss its terms of reference for the proposed mission to Korea. The Soviets refused to engage with it, but Japan grudgingly agreed to comply – then sought to limit its scope and terms of reference as much as it could.
Japan was unhappy, but after being prevailed on by the US in their private dialogue, grudgingly allowed the LN Committee to proceed, with the first visit due for January 1948. In doing this, they hoped to defuse growing unrest and buy time, as well as trying to attain some high moral ground that Japan had rarely been able to claim in recent years. The Philippines example had played out relatively well for them with basing rights maintained to appease the military, so they began to explore whether a mutually acceptable solution might be possible for Korea, before yet another Communist challenge exploded there.
Japan began to increase its troop presence in the latter part of 1947 but had limited options due to the continuing heavy fighting against the Communists in China, the ongoing guerrilla war in Vietnam and the need to man the long border with the Soviets in Mongolia and Manchuria. And the US continued to push on Korea in their bilateral ‘détente’ negotiations with Japan. But no dramatic moves occurred on the ground in Korea before the end of the year.
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China
Mao’s Summer Offensive of 1947 in North-east China ended in a qualified victory for the Communists, with some significant areas made ‘no-go zones’ for the Imperial Japanese Army, which was now on the defensive. As casualties mounted, the cost in lives and equipment began to strain the wider Japanese logistic and recruiting systems, given the other demands being placed upon it.
PLA troops attack Japanese positions in the Summer Offensive, July 1947. In this phase of the war, Mao was moving from a primarily guerrilla campaign to one where more pitched battles were being fought.
The strain this exerted on Japan, combined with persistent US diplomacy, pushed Japan further towards meaningful talks with Chiang Kai-shek’s increasingly powerful Nationalist government. In this environment, General MacArthur’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’ advocating a “no preconditions” meeting of senior Chinese and Japanese officials in neutral Portuguese Macao was agreed to by both sides in July. The first meeting would be conducted in August – without direct US involvement, though a team remained nearby for either or both parties to consult with; or to ‘smash heads together’ if necessary.
The most difficult topic for both sides was the status of Chinese territory occupied by Japan in 1937. It was therefore made the last on the agenda, to see if other areas of cooperation might lead to a more fruitful path. Possible trade and economic arrangements were considered to be a lesser and subsequent matter at that point.
The immediate question of how to deal with the ongoing Communist insurgency in Japanese-controlled territory was the one the military and diplomatic representatives at the talks would engage on. In this case, both sides had something in common: Chiang had decided his next target was to be the elimination of Mao’s Communist state in Shanxi and what better time to strike than when they were engaged in a full-on guerrilla war against Japan?
The first proposal agreed was that China would strike the Communists at a time of Chiang’s choosing. Until that time, Japan would remain on the defensive, keeping the Communists engaged and distracted, while preparing forces for an Autumn Counter-Offensive. There would be no formal nor public link between the two, giving each some ‘plausible deniability’ while they reconciled potential domestic political and military opposition to what would come next.
The Macao Post Office building. Using the pretext of an official meeting on postal services cooperation between China and Macao, these US brokered bilateral talks were conducted in early July 1947, leading to the conclusion of what eventually became known as the Macao Protocols, a series of secret agreements of less than treaty status between Nationalist China and Japan concerning ‘concurrent actions and understandings’ on dealing with Mao’s Communist China.
Because Chiang’s condition for this was that if the concurrent operations succeeded, each side would respect a division of territory to be demarcated in secret discussions brokered by the US. In broad terms, this would see the Nationalists take the whole of Shanxi, and parts of Heibei and Heinan provinces: details were worked out in subsequent talks during August. The fate of the rest of occupied China (the ‘1937 Annexation’) and possible trade and economic cooperation was left to a later time. In some ways, this arrangement had parallels to the ’secret protocols’ of the German-Soviet Pact in 1939, but without the public aspect.
Chiang would gain important territory, while Japan could get rid of the most troublesome areas of the Communist insurgency and let the Nationalists worry about them. Whether the hardline military Kwantung Army leaders would support this – and what action they may take if they didn’t – was another matter that the Japanese government would have to tackle in coming months.
Chiang ordered the general mobilisation of Nationalist troops in mid-July. He sowed seeds of disinformation that this would be directed against Sinkiang, knowing that Communist spies were bound to realise something was happening and that some of those spies would be reporting his real intentions. Much as the Germans had done in 1941, he maintained the formalities of the ceasefire and normal relations with Mao’s government and started to make increasingly belligerent statements to and about Sinkiang. To the extent that they also began to mobilise and start sounding out the Soviets for possible support.
Chiang continued to keep up the façade of good relations with the Communists in July 1947. Here, the two leaders toast each other at one of the regular official summits between the two – even while Chiang’s representatives were negotiating with their Japanese counterparts in Macao.
Mao did receive conflicting reports, but much as Stalin before Barbarossa he did not want to give Chiang any pretext and in any case was in the final stages of the Summer Offensive as August lengthened towards autumn. He would hold and consolidate the new gains then divert some of those troops back the western Shanxi, which had not been left completely undefended in any case.
Chiang struck hard on 2 August 1947, formally commencing the Chinese Civil War. Fierce initial battles were fought but after about a week two breakthroughs had been made as Mao withdrew more forces from the east to shore up his defensive line. Initially, the Japanese held back: partly to complete their recovery from the setbacks over the summer, in part to see if Chiang was serious in this new attack, in part to be able to deny collusion and lastly to see the Chinese bleed each other for once while they looked on.
Chiang inspects troops during the mobilisation in July 1947. Soon they would be storming across into Shanxi with the aim of eliminating the PLA as an effective fighting force, retaking Shanxi and pushing further east to seize territory pledged by Japan under the Macao Protocols.
By the end of August, as Mao’s strength in the east was thinned out and Shanxi began to be occupied by Chiang, Japan also struck in a careful and rather limited offensive. They did not want to fight and die for ground that would be going to the Nationalists anyway under the secret Macao Protocol agreed in July.
By mid-November, when the weather was turning and both sides began to hunker down for winter, much of Shanxi had been taken by Chiang, including the capital Ya’an. In occupied China, the Japanese had marginally rolled some of Mao’s summer gains, but had reserved their strongest efforts for the areas of southern Mengukuo Mao had been controlling, while also putting down localised outbreaks in some part of Manchukuo.
Map indicating the main axes of attack in the Autumn Offensive and complementary Japanese counter attack, August-November 1947.
The Chinese Communists were on the brink of reverting to a fully guerrilla campaign, as holding ground and running a formal state apparatus under these twin pressures was proving untenable.
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Japan
Japan’s painfully slow advances in nuclear research continued throughout the remainder of 1947 as they juggled many competing demands for the scientific and industrial efforts. The military gains of the latter half of the year and the government’s careful balancing of hardline and more moderate elements in the faction-ridden Japanese military establishment held.
The existence of so many real and potential threats kept the more Imperialistic elements occupied enough to prevent an outright military coup, while the Emperor’s active support for the new policies also had a calming effect, while his new program of previously unthinkable public appearances made him a less remote but more popularly influential figure in what remained a constitutional monarchy in which he retained significant powers and semi-divine prestige.
Emperor Hirohito makes a public appearance in Hiroshima, December 1947. [Which of course in TTL was never seriously bombed, let alone nuked.]
But the greatest challenges were perhaps yet to come, as Japan tried to manage the diabolical mess they had inherited from their wartime expansions and later partial reverses. In reality, had the Allies known it, they had been only months away from collapse when the treaties were signed in Geneva in November 1944. And events since had both tested Japan’s ability to maintain what they had kept from Geneva and given them incentives for playing a more reasonable and integrated role in the new multi-polar post-war order.
The LN Political Committee voted on 5 November to send a special LN Commission to Korea to investigate the situation there and options for its political freedom. The Soviets refused to participate in the vote, making it plain that the commission was not welcome and that ‘revolutionary’ freedom should be seized by the people of Korea, not by an outside body.
The Soviets refused to engage with it, but Japan grudgingly agreed to comply – then sought to limit its scope and terms of reference as much as it could.
Really should have taken part, given how powerful their postion is and how much popular support on the ground there is for the rebellions.
Japan is in serious trouble still. Just about got away with ww2 but trying to maintain Korea, let alone China and Vietnam, is going to wreck them. Plumping for half of Mongolia too is just nonsense.
Unfortunately for China, its so large and easy to mount guerrilla warfare that the Marxists can continue for as long as the Soviets can be bothered to supply them, which could be effectively forever unless the US does a deal with them.
Unless Vietnam has a valuable resource, it should be Japan's first release. The Indian subcontinent looks a little better than OTL. Thanks for your work and vision.
Vietnam actually is quite valuable. However, its also impossible to hold onto if the natives don't want you there. The most powerful military ever seen on earth failed, repeatedly and epically, for decades, trying to take half of the country down.
Japan is much, much weaker, and is fighting the whole country.
They are not going to win.
I'm actually a little surprised they're holding out in Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia without collapsing somewhere. Where is all their money and fuel coming from?
Japan is in serious trouble still. Just about got away with ww2 but trying to maintain Korea, let alone China and Vietnam, is going to wreck them. Plumping for half of Mongolia too is just nonsense.
Theirs is one long tightrope walk ever since they scraped through GW2 to what (given the outcome that would have occurred if the game had continued through 1945) ended up being a very lucky peace at Geneva.
As mentioned before, imho Mongolia is probably neither here nor there. It simply pushes the front line against the Soviets a few hundred kilometres back. The killers are really continued Soviet hostile focus in the east and the various hot spots you have highlighted.
They’ve managed to pretty much neutralise the Philippines as a potential disaster zone, but can they do anything constructive about Korea and Vietnam? Will the more recalcitrant generals cop any perceived ‘shameful retreats’ there or when the proposed accommodation in China is fully revealed? It would be easy for something to go badly wrong each time they take another step along that rope.
Unfortunately for China, its so large and easy to mount guerrilla warfare that the Marxists can continue for as long as the Soviets can be bothered to supply them, which could be effectively forever unless the US does a deal with them.
Without a common border with them, it may be difficult for the Soviets to give Mao too much material support, but they will surely try. But you’re right, China is big and fractious and a Long March may be possible to keep the Revolution going. But in the TTL, Chiang is in an enormously better position than he was at the same time in OTL.
Unless Vietnam has a valuable resource, it should be Japan's first release. The Indian subcontinent looks a little better than OTL. Thanks for your work and vision.
Vietnam actually is quite valuable. However, its also impossible to hold onto if the natives don't want you there. The most powerful military ever seen on earth failed, repeatedly and epically, for decades, trying to take half of the country down.
Whatever value Vietnam may have as a client state and member of the Co-prosperity Sphere, it is indeed doubtful at this stage, even with the Viet Minh driven back into the hinterland, that it would be worth the investment of blood and treasure of trying to hold onto it. But did that stop France and then the US from trying to do so in OTL?
The Japanese will need to rise above those examples and defy internal military dissent to successfully disentangle … and even if they do, may not like the result. One may hear the sound of dominoes falling one by one in the distance.
On India, it’s broadly tracking OTL for now, but with a few key differences that, as @Midnite Duke says, look a bit more promising. And to come is the final resolution of the post-partition borders, which in TTL will not be done via a hastily cobbled together shemozzle concocted by the British, but something more considered, via mediation between India and Pakistan from a LN Commission. Which should also remove a few more niggling tensions. But the potential for future clashes, especially over Kashmir, remain.
Japan is much, much weaker, and is fighting the whole country.
They are not going to win.
I'm actually a little surprised they're holding out in Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia without collapsing somewhere. Where is all their money and fuel coming from?
The fuel is coming from Turkey, the money perhaps from the gradual relaxation of trade restrictions to the West, trade within the GEACPS and the fact that Japan itself was never bombed to hell. But the strain on treasury and manpower of too many of these commitments is one of the things driving Japan towards a range of diplomatic and political accommodations.
China is by far the largest and most demanding of these for now, hence the desperate search for a deal with Chiang. Even the hardline generals of the Kwantung Army can see the need for something to be done.
