I'm talking about the S-35 mostly which equipped the DLMs of 7th Army that actually faced a couple of German Panzer Divisions in Belgium. This was again the reserve that was supposed to shore up any holes in the line like Sedan but went to vainly try and link up with the Dutch instead.
The H35 was supposed to be an infantry tank to begin with, given to the cavalry only because the infantry didn't want it, while the R35s were also in the support role in independent tank battalions (none of which went to 7th Army). It was the AMR 35 which was the other tank that went to the DLMs in large numbers, which didn't really have range issues but were really just tankettes ala the Panzer I. The French had some stinker designs certainly, but the thought processes behind them weren't bad and in large part it's French industry that is to blame for the crappy tanks themselves.
To elaborate regarding design philosophy, the French believed (and were later vindicated) that the next war would favor a defender that had good, centralized artillery control, epitomized by the term "managed battle". Hence, their national army and economy was directed towards a defensive battle against the numerically superior German Army; which contrary to popular belief in fact made provisions for a complete defensive line extending well north of the Maginot that would take advantage of several defensive river lines within Belgium. See the Dyle Plan - named after the river the defensive position rested on - for more details.
The problem again is that any good defense is reliant on a mobile reserve that can shore up any holes or weakpoints in the line. Otherwise, the enemy will just pour through any hole in the line they manage to create. The French accounted for this by creating 7th Army, which was an all-motorized army that had a pair of cavalry/DLM Divisions. It was stationed centrally at Reims precisely so it can reinforce any spot where the Germans are breaking through - and notably Sedan was just a few dozen kilometers away from Reims.
Unfortunately, the French High Command made a terrible mistake and sent 7th Army to Holland instead, extending the Dyle line while trying to link up with the Dutch. That left the frontline French forces bereft of almost all reserves, which was why they ended up sending Char B tanks unsupported into battle in the first place - for want of reinforcements they were just throwing everything they had at the enemy.
It was this complete lack of reserves that was at issue, not the penny-packeting of the tanks nor the lack of range of the infantry tanks. French infantry tanks (especially the Char Bs) were not meant to do massed counter-attacks in the first place; instead they were supposed to support set-piece attacks against fortified positions. This is why the Cuirassier Divisions had no real infantry attached to them at all and ended up doing badly despite the gross disparity in armor and firepower between the Char Bs and the German Panzers.
Thanks for that. That's actually very informative. However, I will point out that the Somua S-35 was hideously outnumbered during the invasion of France as well. Compared to the roughly 450 Somuas, if the production numbers I've read were to be believed Germany had a little under 1200 PzII's, somewhere just short of 200 PzIII's and somewhere between 400 and 500 PzIV's to throw at France, less whatever they were using to occupy Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway at that point.
That means that the performance of France's second line tanks is very much key since their formations would be the ones Germany's army would preferentially target, and they were crap. Most of them were 1917 Renaults and slightly upgraded versions, or the H35 and R35 that were slightly upengined versions of more or less the same thing.