Seeing developing discussion in neighbouring thread about German imports of oil, I've decided to write small elaboration about other important resource for German war machine - iron ore. In vanilla Darkest Hour if Germany doesn't control Narvik, it can't trade with Sweden. Is it historically correct? Let's see.
Since 1933 German iron ore yearly consumption had risen from almost 7.5 mn tons to about 37.3 mn of tons in 1938*. This enormous growth was obviously caused by rearmament of Germany. However, Germany itself wasn't able to provide such vast amount of iron ore - German domestic production was about 3 mn of tons in 1933 and had risen to 12.3 mn of tons in 1938. As you can see these numbers stand for about one third of German pre-war consumption of iron ore. The rest was compensated by imports, mostly from Sweden, which provided about 30% of German pre-war consumption. Though Germany was able to quadruple its domestic production of iron ore, it doesn't change share of imports - during the period in question Germany had to buy about two thirds of needed iron ore from other countries.
I skipped German exports of iron ore, as it was negligible before war and dropped to zero after 1939.
Wartime yearly consumption of iron ore remained at the level of about 34 mn of tons. At the same time German domestic production had risen to ~16 mn of tons per year (on average), which stood for more or less half of German demand. Nevertheless, Sweden remained the most important foreign supplier of iron ore - imports from that country stood on pre-war level of about 9 mn of tons per year.
From the Swedish point of view Germany was the most important buyer of iron ore - between 1933 and 1938 Germany bought about 70% of Swedish iron ore and since 1941 Germany was in practice the sole buyer. After invasion of Norway, Sweden was cut off from other exports directions - mostly Great Britain, which stood for about 15% of Swedish pre-war exports of iron ore - therefore total Swedish exports fell to the level of exports to Germany.
Before the war more than half of Swedish iron ore was exported via Narvik. However, in 1940 share of Narvik naval port in exports of iron ore fell to 14% and to 8% in 1941. Narvik's share had risen to 21% in 1943, but it didn't even come close to the levels from 1938 and before. Even though Germany controlled Narvik, it didn't become major route for iron ore again. At the same time German imports of Swedish iron ore remained at similar level of about 9 mn of tons.
It may also be interesting to look at the origin of Swedish iron ore. Since 1935, on average, more than 70% of the ore exported came from Norrland (in DH it would be Kiruna and Lulea). Especially since 1941, this means that about 70% of the Swedish ore delivered to Germany came from there (as all of Swedish ore exports went to Germany). However, while before the war most of the ore from this region was transported by rail to Narvik, from 1940 this raw material was sent to the port of Lulea.
As you can see, the importance of Narvik as a vital transport route for Swedish iron ore is overestimated. Trade between Sweden and Germany also continued during the Battle of Narvik. During this time (April-June 1940), about 0.4 mn of tons of ore were shipped to the port of Lulea per month. Of course, that doesn't mean the fight for Narvik made no sense. Keeping Narvik by the Allies might have been a springboard to seize Kiruna and cut off the Germans from accessing most of the Swedish ore. However, the struggle for Norway itself should not block trade between Sweden and Germany, but at best limit the amount of iron ore available for purchase, which would reflect the need to reorganize transport and limited capacity of the Baltic ports.
*All data come from article Sweden's iron ore exports to Germany, 1933–1944 by Rolf Karlbom. As sources he used Swedish, Norwegian and German statistical yearbooks, so I believe data above are correct.
Since 1933 German iron ore yearly consumption had risen from almost 7.5 mn tons to about 37.3 mn of tons in 1938*. This enormous growth was obviously caused by rearmament of Germany. However, Germany itself wasn't able to provide such vast amount of iron ore - German domestic production was about 3 mn of tons in 1933 and had risen to 12.3 mn of tons in 1938. As you can see these numbers stand for about one third of German pre-war consumption of iron ore. The rest was compensated by imports, mostly from Sweden, which provided about 30% of German pre-war consumption. Though Germany was able to quadruple its domestic production of iron ore, it doesn't change share of imports - during the period in question Germany had to buy about two thirds of needed iron ore from other countries.
I skipped German exports of iron ore, as it was negligible before war and dropped to zero after 1939.
Wartime yearly consumption of iron ore remained at the level of about 34 mn of tons. At the same time German domestic production had risen to ~16 mn of tons per year (on average), which stood for more or less half of German demand. Nevertheless, Sweden remained the most important foreign supplier of iron ore - imports from that country stood on pre-war level of about 9 mn of tons per year.
From the Swedish point of view Germany was the most important buyer of iron ore - between 1933 and 1938 Germany bought about 70% of Swedish iron ore and since 1941 Germany was in practice the sole buyer. After invasion of Norway, Sweden was cut off from other exports directions - mostly Great Britain, which stood for about 15% of Swedish pre-war exports of iron ore - therefore total Swedish exports fell to the level of exports to Germany.
Before the war more than half of Swedish iron ore was exported via Narvik. However, in 1940 share of Narvik naval port in exports of iron ore fell to 14% and to 8% in 1941. Narvik's share had risen to 21% in 1943, but it didn't even come close to the levels from 1938 and before. Even though Germany controlled Narvik, it didn't become major route for iron ore again. At the same time German imports of Swedish iron ore remained at similar level of about 9 mn of tons.
It may also be interesting to look at the origin of Swedish iron ore. Since 1935, on average, more than 70% of the ore exported came from Norrland (in DH it would be Kiruna and Lulea). Especially since 1941, this means that about 70% of the Swedish ore delivered to Germany came from there (as all of Swedish ore exports went to Germany). However, while before the war most of the ore from this region was transported by rail to Narvik, from 1940 this raw material was sent to the port of Lulea.
As you can see, the importance of Narvik as a vital transport route for Swedish iron ore is overestimated. Trade between Sweden and Germany also continued during the Battle of Narvik. During this time (April-June 1940), about 0.4 mn of tons of ore were shipped to the port of Lulea per month. Of course, that doesn't mean the fight for Narvik made no sense. Keeping Narvik by the Allies might have been a springboard to seize Kiruna and cut off the Germans from accessing most of the Swedish ore. However, the struggle for Norway itself should not block trade between Sweden and Germany, but at best limit the amount of iron ore available for purchase, which would reflect the need to reorganize transport and limited capacity of the Baltic ports.
*All data come from article Sweden's iron ore exports to Germany, 1933–1944 by Rolf Karlbom. As sources he used Swedish, Norwegian and German statistical yearbooks, so I believe data above are correct.
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