Super heavy armour

[Klausewitz]

Now, should the Germans decide to bring back their Stormtroopers...

By 1939 all German troops are practicing storm trooper tactics and are trained to stormtrooper standards.
One of the reasons German Infantry and by extension the Wehrmacht did so well.

 

[safe-keeper]

Never mind accuracy, can you imagine the Imperials upgrading all their weaponry to WWII standards to that AT-ATs could target and hit things beyond a few hundred metres ?

More seriously, I see AT-ATs being a good example of SHARM logic, to be honest: slow and lumbering, but very, very tough to stop. In situations where they aren't required to cover ground to be useful, SHARMs can be incredibly powerful.

 

[1337Hospitaller]

The inclusion of super heavy tanks in the first place is arguably ahistorical, since in reality the number that ever existed in WWII can be counted on one hand (there were all of two Maus in production for instance, neither of which ever actually entered service). There is a valid argument for taking the superheaviess out of the game altogether, never mind adding variants! So personally, I don't think variants should be encouraged. But that's just me.

I think super heavy tanks includes tanks like the Königstiger and Jagdpanther and there were more than one thousand of those two alone produced by Germany.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

I think super heavy tanks includes tanks like the Königstiger and Jagdpanther and there were more than one thousand of those two alone produced by Germany.

No, King Tiger and Jagdpanther were both "only" heavy tank class. Super heavy tanks are way heavier

I believe that is correct scale, but at least it is roughly correct. One on the right is Heavy tank King tiger, one on the left is super heavy tank Maus. It looks like difference between heavy and medium tanks.

 

[Klausewitz]

More seriously, I see AT-ATs being a good example of SHARM logic, to be honest: slow and lumbering, but very, very tough to stop. In situations where they aren't required to cover ground to be useful, SHARMs can be incredibly powerful.

Only there are few instance were that is the case, the only i can think of is defence of a stationary objective.
And there is almost no case were an objective has to be taken and cannot be avoided, circumvented or cut off.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

Only there are few instance were that is the case, the only i can think of is defence of a stationary objective.
And there is almost no case were an objective has to be taken and cannot be avoided, circumvented or cut off.

There are no single objectives that have to be taken. But there are multiple objects that combined together are crucial. That is why idea of Hitler`s festung plan was actually a good one, you can`t conguer Germany if you have not conguered any cities, farms and other important places. It did not work in WW2, but modern militaries are basically doing that: they are not necessarily sending any soldiers into empty forests, instead they focus on all important strategic places like major cities.
Hitler might have been bad general, but he might have been excellent theorist (at times) and arm chair general. Difference between those and real generals is of course big.

 

[Klausewitz]

There are no single objectives that have to be taken. But there are multiple objects that combined together are crucial. That is why idea of Hitler`s festung plan was actually a good one, you can`t conguer Germany if you have not conguered any cities, farms and other important places. It did not work in WW2, but modern militaries are basically doing that: they are not necessarily sending any soldiers into empty forests, instead they focus on all important strategic places like major cities.
Hitler might have been bad general, but he might have been excellent theorist (at times) and arm chair general. Difference between those and real generals is of course big.

You completly overlook supply lines and the other places between the important places.
If you control everything of Germany but the cities and important places, you control Germany, because you can destroy it.

 

[safe-keeper]

Only there are few instance were that is the case, the only i can think of is defence of a stationary objective.
And there is almost no case were an objective has to be taken and cannot be avoided, circumvented or cut off.

There are many examples of battles won by slogs and slow advances. The trudge through Benelux in HOI3 is one good example. No matter how Blitzkrieg-oriented I was, I ended up having to push through Belgium and the French border provinces province by province. The countless rivers didn't exactly help matters. I've never used SHARM to invade Benelux, obviously, but BlackICE had Heavy Artillery units which were super-useful in many offensive situations, particularly assaults on cities and forts, despite moving as slowly as you'd expect them to.

There are plenty of places on the Eastern Front where advances can turn into such grinds, too. The Pripyat marshes, for instance, or the bottleneck when pushing into the Crimean peninsula, or if the Soviets build line after line of forts around Moscow.

 

[Secret Master]

You completly overlook supply lines and the other places between the important places.
If you control everything of Germany but the cities and important places, you control Germany, because you can destroy it.

To clarify:

You are basically saying that even if I control 100% of the factories, coal mines, iron mines, and farms, but you control everything else, then the German economy has more or less ceased to exist and the government is ineffectual. With no way to move stuff around, the food rots on the farms, the coal sits at the mines, the iron sits in the mines, and the factories starve for inputs.

I can agree with that.

 

[svennnnnnnnnnnn]

I don't think a WW1 situation will ever develop simply because the needs necessary to implement it in WW2 would have broken any economy.
In WW1 fighting was contained in a very small strip of land, maybe 40 km across. In that area almost all of the fighting happened, and fighting rarely spilled out of those.
So the whole of rear area could funnel supplies towards the fighting with little to no interference with losses only occuring once they entered the range of enemy artillery.
But even then whole trench system were routinely penetrated and disaster only averted because the defender was always able to get reinforcements in by train faster then the attacker could get his across no man's land (among other things because no man's land was under enemy fire while the train lines were not).
In WW2 a whole extra dimension has opened.
Supplies can be attacked all the way from the factory to the front, necessitating massive anti-air defenses, but the ressources for those need to come from somewhere. So either the air defense is weakened, leading to a weakening of the trenches by way of supply shortage or the trench is weakened, making it more easily captured.
Add in the advances in accuracy of artillery fire and bombing as well as mobility of troops and WW1 still trench warfare becomes unsustainable:
Either the trench is strangle from the air (no supplies), stormed as in WW1 (the Germans routinely took the first and second trench in offensives and sometimes even the third but were always unable to break out before reinforcements by train arrived) or circumvented (mobile units like the Panzerdivisionen or by Fallschirmjäger).

You make some good points, but keep in mind that the capacity of bombers was often overestimated, and that high-altitude bombing didn't become efficient until several years into the war, when the allies has massive air superiority. Assuming the trench-war in mind had roughly equal industries supporting them (i.e. no United States), the defensive benefits in terms of air war, best demonstrated by the battle of britain, should limit the destructive capacity of low-altitude bombers. You have to contend with enemy fighters, that are closer to their bases and can land without their pilots being captured, AA guns on the ground, decreased knowledge of terrain and the targets you are pursuing, radar giving the enemy real-time information on your location, fighters are cheaper to replace than bombers etc etc. If the supplies are properly organised, most trains could travel by night or at least have AA guns on the trains or around the tracks. Most of the "rear area" you speak of doesn't need to be protected by groundbased AA, only supply-depots and transportation.

Furthermore, transporting supplies and troops towards the defense is at least equally difficult compared to transporting towards the attack, assuming neither side has total air superiority. Well prepared defensive position should be harder to bomb than trucks stuck on a road. During their advance into France, the Germans were often extremely vulnerable since they were trying to advance rapidly, but the french and british were unable to exploit it. Since an advancing force lacks the defensive bonuses of their enemy in terms of air war since they have had no time to prepare defenses. This never came to bear during the fall of france due to lack of low-altitude bombers and fighter escorts on the allied side, but assuming parity in air power, offensives should be more vulnerable to bombing than defenses.

 

[Scutatus]

By 1939 all German troops are practicing storm trooper tactics and are trained to stormtrooper standards.
One of the reasons German Infantry and by extension the Wehrmacht did so well.

Sigh, Yes, them and everyone else.

It was a JOKE.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

To clarify:

You are basically saying that even if I control 100% of the factories, coal mines, iron mines, and farms, but you control everything else, then the German economy has more or less ceased to exist and the government is ineffectual. With no way to move stuff around, the food rots on the farms, the coal sits at the mines, the iron sits in the mines, and the factories starve for inputs.

I can agree with that.

In that case those (roads etc) are strategically important locations and thus part of Festung strategy. I did say that all strategically important locations would be part of the Festung plan. You notice that i said "like" and "other important places", meaning i did not list every single important strategic objective.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

By 1939 all German troops are practicing storm trooper tactics and are trained to stormtrooper standards.
One of the reasons German Infantry and by extension the Wehrmacht did so well.

I would modify your post by saying they learned to fight in same fashion with Stormtrooper tactics. They were not however trained to same standards as Elite Stormtroopers, in fact a lot of the time many German soldiers lacked training, even before Barbarossa. They also did not fight same way as Stormtroopers, otherwise German soldiers would all have been lightly armed and focus would be on Sub machine guns (which Germany never issued as standard weapon for any front line soldiers) and grenades, while actually Germans used general purpose machine guns and rifles.

 

[Premu]

By 1939 all German troops are practicing storm trooper tactics and are trained to stormtrooper standards.
One of the reasons German Infantry and by extension the Wehrmacht did so well.

Even if trenches are normally associated with WW I - I'm pretty sure they were used in WW II, too. They still gave the defender at least a tactical advantage, even if it wasn't enough to stop an offensive on its own anymore. So teaching your infantry how to bust them seems to be a reasonable choice.

 

[Klausewitz]

You make some good points, but keep in mind that the capacity of bombers was often overestimated, and that high-altitude bombing didn't become efficient until several years into the war, when the allies has massive air superiority. Assuming the trench-war in mind had roughly equal industries supporting them (i.e. no United States), the defensive benefits in terms of air war, best demonstrated by the battle of britain, should limit the destructive capacity of low-altitude bombers. You have to contend with enemy fighters, that are closer to their bases and can land without their pilots being captured, AA guns on the ground, decreased knowledge of terrain and the targets you are pursuing, radar giving the enemy real-time information on your location, fighters are cheaper to replace than bombers etc etc.

You misunderstand me.
Success of the bombers is not even necessary.
The fact that they exist means that significant force have to be seconded to defend the rear areas.
This was not necessary in WW1.

If the supplies are properly organised, most trains could travel by night or at least have AA guns on the trains or around the tracks. Most of the "rear area" you speak of doesn't need to be protected by groundbased AA, only supply-depots and transportation.

Again, the fact alone that the effectiveness of the rail network is halved if one wants to be safe is drastic divergence from WW1.
Also not only AA is needed (and supply depots and trasnportation is not such a small area) but also garrison troops to defend against para troops.

Furthermore, transporting supplies and troops towards the defense is at least equally difficult compared to transporting towards the attack, assuming neither side has total air superiority. Well prepared defensive position should be harder to bomb than trucks stuck on a road. During their advance into France, the Germans were often extremely vulnerable since they were trying to advance rapidly, but the french and british were unable to exploit it. Since an advancing force lacks the defensive bonuses of their enemy in terms of air war since they have had no time to prepare defenses. This never came to bear during the fall of france due to lack of low-altitude bombers and fighter escorts on the allied side, but assuming parity in air power, offensives should be more vulnerable to bombing than defenses.

The problem is another. Defence is static.
By the end of WW1 every square metre on the western front was registered or close enough to registered point to be easily hit.
Any static defence faces the same problem:
The enemy knows where you are, while the attack does not need at a certain point.
If we assume air parity (which seems more likely than the air superiority you assume) both sides are equally blind, but not equally liable to be bombed because the attacker can hidden, displace or withdraw his troops if they are spotted while the defender can't.
The defender needs to stay where he is.
So when the attacker starts his operation he can smother known positions by artillery and aircraft (artillery does not kill as much as blind and suppress, same as aircrafts) and push his troops in fast enough to eliminate defensive air (if attacker and defender are within 500 metres of each other aircrafts of either side will become quite scrupulous about attacking) and defensive artillery.
The problem with trench warfare in WW2 is that what made it viable in WW1 (impossibility of breakout after breakthrough, problems with coordinating artillery, invulnerability of the rear area, the allied always pushing) are no longer available in WW2.

In that case those (roads etc) are strategically important locations and thus part of Festung strategy. I did say that all strategically important locations would be part of the Festung plan. You notice that i said "like" and "other important places", meaning i did not list every single important strategic objective.

In that case you have lead the Festungs plan ad absurdum.
Now EVERYTHING is part of the Festung, or close enough that it does not make a difference, which destroys the whole advantage of the Festungs plan, namely concentration of force.

 

[Klausewitz]

Even if trenches are normally associated with WW I - I'm pretty sure they were used in WW II, too. They still gave the defender at least a tactical advantage, even if it wasn't enough to stop an offensive on its own anymore. So teaching your infantry how to bust them seems to be a reasonable choice.

Yes there were lots of trenches in WW2. As soon as a infantry unit stopped for more than a few hours, trenches would be dug.
There is a difference though between a trench, or even a strongpoint and the fortified zones of WW1 with a minimum of three trench lines, artillery posts, concrete machine gun post, etc.

 

[aruon]

Indeed, the story of King Tiger and JagdTiger pretty much shows that they were already pushing the limit of weight too far. It is simply impractical to build anything heavier, which, is pretty much exactly what happened IRL.

well the failures of the Tiger II and Jagdtiger could also be chalked up to the desperate situation at the time and lack of resources, as well as the lack modern alloys (as the only real option back then was homogeneous armor) and modern digital machinery, as many MANY other tanks were prone to critical failures. with the first model of M4 sherman as example, there was a ridiculous risk of a tank being a lemon straight off the assembly line due to the hurried nature of tank construction. and the soviets were even worse as they kept shipping skilled engineers to the front lines or chucking them in gulags.

while the panzer VIII Maus was a tad bit extreme at 188 tons, the Jagdtiger was "only" 71 tons, near the upper end of reasonability but within safe limits. even now the US army has a prototype Ground Fighting Vehicle that weighs about 84 tons and many modern MBTs hover around 60-70 tons. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-02/why-armys-new-tank-so-heavy

bottom line, if WWII heavies and super heavies were redesigned or at least built in the modern era, they'd be a hell of a lot more reliable. hell, one Porsche version of the Tiger II was a friggin' gasoline-electric engine HYBRID that had 2 engines running in tandem! so even current tanks still have lessons to learn.

no seriously cross a Prius, one of the most uncool cars ever made with a nazi, and you have a twin hybrid engine tank. go figures amirite?