Submarines are still garbage

[Secret Master]

He was a fool though. Check the numbers, by 1943 he had his envisioned number of soupmarines at his disposal and ironically that was the point where they became moot.

You should read his memoirs.

His argument there was that he needed those submarines at the outbreak of hostilities. Years later, or in small doses over a long period of time, isn't sufficient. He discusses how important it is to have the concentration of force once the shooting starts to begin sinking critical amounts of war material. The goal isn't to just sink a lot of tonnage, but do it quickly and early enough to make a difference.

In HOI4 terms, he wanted Britain sitting at 0% efficiency on critical convoy routes while her factories were trying to build up production bonuses. As HOI4 players know, insufficient resources slow the gain of production bonuses. So, if you have to strangle resources, it's better early and often.

The failure of the u-boat campaign, though, is in many respects a failure of Germany to be able to apply a multi-dimensional series of weapons to the problem. More submarines would have been great for Germany, but more Condors, long range fighters to escort those Condors, and not having ENIGMA broken would have helped substantially.

Averaged over the entire war the allies actually spent roughly 10 times as much industrial effort as Germany on the battle of the Atlantic ( including research, convoy construction, ships, escorts and airplanes involved ).

Of course, this highlights the general problem facing the Axis. What do you do when the just the US has more GDP than your entire freaking faction? Oh, and the Allies start out controlling all the major resources. And the Soviets have enough manpower by themselves to keep the fight going long after you are scraping the barrel?

 

[Anthropoid]

You should read his memoirs.

His argument there was that he needed those submarines at the outbreak of hostilities. Years later, or in small doses over a long period of time, isn't sufficient. He discusses how important it is to have the concentration of force once the shooting starts to begin sinking critical amounts of war material. The goal isn't to just sink a lot of tonnage, but do it quickly and early enough to make a difference.

In HOI4 terms, he wanted Britain sitting at 0% efficiency on critical convoy routes while her factories were trying to build up production bonuses. As HOI4 players know, insufficient resources slow the gain of production bonuses. So, if you have to strangle resources, it's better early and often.

The failure of the u-boat campaign, though, is in many respects a failure of Germany to be able to apply a multi-dimensional series of weapons to the problem. More submarines would have been great for Germany, but more Condors, long range fighters to escort those Condors, and not having ENIGMA broken would have helped substantially.

Of course, this highlights the general problem facing the Axis. What do you do when the just the US has more GDP than your entire freaking faction? Oh, and the Allies start out controlling all the major resources. And the Soviets have enough manpower by themselves to keep the fight going long after you are scraping the barrel?

So, these "condor" aircraft. I must have forgotten about there role in Battle of the Atlantic. Had a look at wiki and saw that a grand total of 276 of the aircraft were built. Was that really enough to make an impact? Did they have the range to fly out to the remote parts of the Atlantic and assist with convoy spotting? And obviously yeah, if your radio transmissions are being intercepted, read and decrypted by the Brits then having 5000 Condors out there spotting convoys for your wolf packs will be of diminishing value UNLESS, you have such a high density of wolf packs that it is difficult for the allies to use the information you gave them when your Condor radioed sub-command to tell the appropriate wolf packs where there were targets . . .

 

[Secret Master]

So, these "condor" aircraft. I must have forgotten about there role in Battle of the Atlantic. Had a look at wiki and saw that a grand total of 276 of the aircraft were built. Was that really enough to make an impact?

Churchill is on record as referring to the Condor as "The Scourge of the Atlantic."

276 isn't that many. Imagine how much more effective they might have been if there had been 1000 of them. (And no stupid influence by Goering)

Churchill also pointed out that the only thing that really worried him during the war was the threat of the U-boat. He took that sort of thing seriously.

(I'll point out here that the closing of the mid-Atlantic gap would have hurt Condor operations as much as it hurt u-boat operations. I'm not going to sit here and argue that Condors would have won the war for Germany, but they could have made a bigger difference if used more prodigiously.)

I'll point out that in HOI4, we have a hard time building Condor-ranged NAVs, since they use the light air frame instead of the medium one. But in HOI4, NAVs are great at killing all kinds of things when used in sufficient numbers.

 

[Anthropoid]

Intriguing stuff. I think In my next play through I'm going to try to give Donitz his ~300 Type VIIs by Fall 1939. See if that is even possible and if so how I might use them effectively. I can already tell that it is going to impact progress in many other areas though, based on two abortive partial play throughs which got into late 1940.

I hadn't looked at the aircraft tech trees at all.

One dimension the game doesn't really adequately convey is the distinction between recon aircraft and offensive aircraft. There do not seem to be any pure recce models in the game at all, which is a shame, because for combined air-sea operations, recon aircraft are what made the difference in WWII. Hands down the single most important type of aircraft in both Pacific and Atlantic theaters.

 

[seattle]

You should read his memoirs.

His argument there was that he needed those submarines at the outbreak of hostilities. Years later, or in small doses over a long period of time, isn't sufficient. He discusses how important it is to have the concentration of force once the shooting starts to begin sinking critical amounts of war material. The goal isn't to just sink a lot of tonnage, but do it quickly and early enough to make a difference.

In HOI4 terms, he wanted Britain sitting at 0% efficiency on critical convoy routes while her factories were trying to build up production bonuses. As HOI4 players know, insufficient resources slow the gain of production bonuses. So, if you have to strangle resources, it's better early and often.

The failure of the u-boat campaign, though, is in many respects a failure of Germany to be able to apply a multi-dimensional series of weapons to the problem. More submarines would have been great for Germany, but more Condors, long range fighters to escort those Condors, and not having ENIGMA broken would have helped substantially.

#Condors
The envy of Goering led to the Luftwaffe not supporting the Kriegsmarine as much as it would have been possible. That is a character flaw of Goering that you can't ignore and change.

--------------------------
#Enigma
Again, of course it would have been great for Germany if Allied intelligence wouldn't have been vastly superior. It would also have been great if the US wouldn't have produced more war goods than the rest of the world combined. But why not simply accept the fact that Allied intelligence was superior and logically led to them decrypting German codes? It's hardly a coincidence, just like the US code breaking contributing to Midway.

--------------------------------
#U-Boat Blitz
First of all: Germany can't build 300 U-Boats by 1939 without the Allies noticing and drawing conclusions like: d'uh, they are prepping for starving us via U-Boat!
Secondly: German torpedos in 1939 were abysmal and often convoys were saved by torpedo-duds. Before even discussing the effect of greater U-Boat numbers, one would have to make better torpedo R&D a pre-requisite for the discussion.

I agree that Germany should never have built a surface navy with all those fancy battlecruisers and such. Accept that you won't even match Kaiser Wilhelm's fleet which wasn't even enough. Also accept that one dimension never beats multiple dimensions. Hence, draw the conclusion that the navy should only be a limited effort which doesn't even try to rival the UK. Instead align diplomacy accordingly so that you won't face another constellation you can't win.

My opinion is that the harder you hit with a one-dimensional weapon, the more determined the reaction will be. If Germany sinks 100 convoys per year, the Allies won't bother reacting to it. If Germany sinks 1000 convoys per year, the reaction will be vicious.
That was the fallacy of WW1: today we sink x convoys with y subs and Britain starves if we sink 3x convoys within z months --> if we produce 3y subs Britain will surrender in z months (which is before the US can make a difference). Fallacy: assuming that Britain won't take counter measures which destroys the equation.

This is what Doenitz correctly analyzed and you are stating with his argument: I need 300 subs when war breaks out.
The fallacy is the assumption that Germany could have simply multiplied her number of subs without causing any difference in Allied actions. We had 57 subs at the outbreak of hostilities. You can't just multiply that number by a factor of nearly 6 and assume everything else equal, then you're insulting Allied intelligence.

At this point I always recommend reading "Strategy" by Edward Luttwak about action and reaction. Interesting chapter about one dimensional weapons like the 19th century pop-star, the torpedo boat, and the later submarine and NATO bazooka troops, hoping to stop the Warsaw pact armoured onslaught, neglecting the infantry support which neglects the AT qualities...

 

[seattle]

@Secret Master
This sheet is a nice visualization of the action and reaction. I find it most ironic that German U-Boats in WW2 have sunk less tonnage than the primitive German U-Boats in WW1 and still have gathered that much more infamy.

 

[Secret Master]

Before I respond to Seattle's excellent post, let me state clearly that I am at no time and in no way arguing that Germany was going to win the Battle of the Atlantic or the war magically conjuring up hundreds of extra u-boats. However, Germany could have fought both more efficiently.

#Condors
The envy of Goering led to the Luftwaffe not supporting the Kriegsmarine as much as it would have been possible. That is a character flaw of Goering that you can't ignore and change.

Well, you are right... although I can change it in HOI. (I rarely appoint him as minster these days; to Hell with him.)

But leaving aside Goering's problems, I stand by my statement that more Condors with fighter support would have had more impact.

Whether such a thing was possible with Goering alive and in power is a different question.

--------------------------
#Enigma
Again, of course it would have been great for Germany if Allied intelligence wouldn't have been vastly superior. It would also have been great if the US wouldn't have produced more war goods than the rest of the world combined. But why not simply accept the fact that Allied intelligence was superior and logically led to them decrypting German codes? It's hardly a coincidence, just like the US code breaking contributing to Midway.

It didn't have to be this way. Had the Germans known, at least the U-boat arm would have changed things. There was a point during the war where Donitz was suspicious of some things related to encryption. He didn't think ENIGMA was broken, but he thought that the Allies had some of his code books. So, they kept the machines (bad), but redid all the code books from scratch (good). This created a blackout period that hurt the Allies.

If the ENIGMA secret had gotten out, or the British hadn't actually got their hands on ENIGMA and were just breaking codes using codebooks and other decryption techniques, it would have had a positive impact for Germany. War winning? Probably not, but imagine how much more efficient the U-boat arm could be without Allied SIGINT working overtime on their message traffic.

--------------------------------
#U-Boat Blitz
First of all: Germany can't build 300 U-Boats by 1939 without the Allies noticing and drawing conclusions like: d'uh, they are prepping for starving us via U-Boat!

Well, yeah. The diplomatic and political ramifications make this either an impossibility OR would lead to faster Allied rearmament before the war.

But I stand by Donitz's argument that 300 U-boats (Hell, even 50 more U-boats than he started with in the actual war) would have made a positive difference. It's not the overall number of U-boats available during the entire war that matters. It's the concentration of force. (Boy, does he beat this drum during his memoirs. He hates it any time U-boats were diverted from the Atlantic to do something else.)

Secondly: German torpedos in 1939 were abysmal and often convoys were saved by torpedo-duds. Before even discussing the effect of greater U-Boat numbers, one would have to make better torpedo R&D a pre-requisite for the discussion.

Well, everyone except Japan could use better torpedoes in 1939. The torpedo problem is well documented, and I would agree that it makes a difference.

I agree that Germany should never have built a surface navy with all those fancy battlecruisers and such. Accept that you won't even match Kaiser Wilhelm's fleet which wasn't even enough. Also accept that one dimension never beats multiple dimensions. Hence, draw the conclusion that the navy should only be a limited effort which doesn't even try to rival the UK. Instead align diplomacy accordingly so that you won't face another constellation you can't win.

Which was kind of what Hitler's diplomacy in the pre-war period wanted. No naval race with the UK.

But once you are at war with the UK, or war has become inevitable, letting the Allies control the oceans for free and without contest means more Allied steel for guns/planes/tanks and less for ships. It also doesn't help that the Norwegian merchant marine ended up going to Britain after the invasion of Norway.

My opinion is that the harder you hit with a one-dimensional weapon, the more determined the reaction will be. If Germany sinks 100 convoys per year, the Allies won't bother reacting to it. If Germany sinks 1000 convoys per year, the reaction will be vicious.
That was the fallacy of WW1: today we sink x convoys with y subs and Britain starves if we sink 3x convoys within z months --> if we produce 3y subs Britain will surrender in z months (which is before the US can make a difference). Fallacy: assuming that Britain won't take counter measures which destroys the equation.

Of course countermeasures will be taken. But all things in war have a cost. If the submarine arm is costing you X, and the countermeasures cost Britain X+Y, then you might come out ahead if you wage the Battle of Atlantic more efficiently.

Time is also a factor here. Again, that's why Donitz beats the drum of concentration of force. If you hurt Britain in 1939 or 1940 and force them to take countermeasures, it diverts resources away from other things that could harm Germany at a crucial time in the war. The US isn't in the war yet, so Britain has to invest tons of resources in countering the U-boat threat. A more efficient Battle of the Atlantic requires more British resources to fight. And I think we would both agree that 1939-1941 are crucial years for the war. The US is in the war and gearing up in 1943, so Germany's war to sink Allied shipping is doomed to failure at that point. But in 1940, every ship Britain has to build means fewer guns, tanks, and planes to throw against the Reich and her allies.

This is what Doenitz correctly analyzed and you are stating with his argument: I need 300 subs when war breaks out.
The fallacy is the assumption that Germany could have simply multiplied her number of subs without causing any difference in Allied actions. We had 57 subs at the outbreak of hostilities. You can't just multiply that number by a factor of nearly 6 and assume everything else equal, then you're insulting Allied intelligence.

Of course not. It also tips the hand of the Axis towards Britain with a lot of unintended results. But it also means that Britain must commit to defeating this particular German approach, and do so during a critical point in the war.

I'd also like to point out that the British Admiralty preferred a well-rounded German navy to a u-boat focused one. Defeating a German navy with surface ships was easier in their mind than trying to counter a u-boat threat. Hell, the AGNA was signed off by the heads of the RN, because it gave Germany a well rounded navy that they thought they could beat easier.

But that raises the point again of efficiently fighting the war in question. The German surface fleet, as scary as it was at certain points, didn't really accomplish that much. Yeah, the British kept tabs on Tirpitz in Norway and tried to bomb her many times, but for the most part, it was a threat the British felt they could contain. Think about all the steel, manhours, and POL that went into building and maintaining Bismark, Tirpitz, and all the other big surface ships. My back of the envelope math suggests that for the cost just Bismark, you could build at least 39 Type VII u-boats.

Foregoing the capital ships and focusing on u-boats, even if Germany loses the war, may have been a more efficient approach.

(Without looking at Tooze, I can't say right off the top of my head whether the steel savings of scrapping the capital ships would have benefited other war industries; I can't tell if Germany comes out ahead beyond naval considerations if she declines to build capital ships.)

@Secret Master
This sheet is a nice visualization of the action and reaction. I find it most ironic that German U-Boats in WW2 have sunk less tonnage than the primitive German U-Boats in WW1 and still have gathered that much more infamy.

Imagine how that graph looks with more u-boats in action in 1939 instead of Bismark and Tirpitz wandering around being a nuisance.

Then imagine the Pacific war for the RN if the RN has focused far more on ASW.

 

[sterrius]

@Anthropoid I will try to answer the best i can .

1-> on SP its actually easy with germany even without italy and spain doing the job for you. As long you take france and get a Submarine III with speed 5 you can reach the bahamas or daakar in africa and do it yourself. If not you can´t reach with just the upgrade use the advisor that gives +naval range. From the bahamas you can get pretty much anywhere you want. Even the US coast. (A well prepared plan can take out even a good player).

I can´t say 100% sure about the sub III and IV ranges because it has been month since i toyed with this. But its possible for a fully upgraded sub + advisors to reach the US coast.

but the real damage on convoys only happens when Suez or Gibraltar is down. its easy for the allies to keep the mediterran safe. But the atlantic is an ightmare, too many regions to defend.


2-> when i recommended air assets to help submarines im talking from a pure game perspective, no historical flavor o reason here. Planes and radar helps a lot with detection and damage if you can afford them. The Middle of the atlantic does have one drawnback, its size. So any % of extra detection there helps a lot. Those planes also keep your submarines safe from surface ships as long they are not carriers.

 

[Anthropoid]

Redid with some of the points I've learned from you guys on here, and have about 90 Type VIIs in the water in Dec 1939. Type XXI will be ready for production in about a month. About 100 divisions maybe 150. Enough to take out Poland. Getting the subs setup the way Doenitz wanted (though not 300 boats in the water, that may take till Dec 1940) basically has delayed me starting the war by six months to a year.

ADDIT: re more general discussions on Nazi Germany's prospects. First it deserves to be said since none of us are real well acquainted, that the underlying worldview of the movement and the regime it created were loathsome beyond compare. I'm sure we all agree on that, but it can be good to just repeat it in case anyone who doesn't realize we agree is reading. We don't play these positions to bask in their glory, its an analytical thing.

Nazi Germany could have won WWII; I'm confident of that. They had no chance of winning the war that they FOUGHT, but they could have won a different war that occurred in largely the same time and place and which accomplished many of the same objectives which the society held as cause to go to war in the first place.

1. The racialism was an enormous hindrance. Imagine if all the ethnicities and various other groups they deemed to be sub-human and thus devoted so much time and effort into demonizing, tormenting and exterminating were just regarded passively, much less tolerantly. The nation suffered tremendous brain drain, economic loss, demographic and industrial burden, diplomatic backlash and loss of standing, and generally gained absolutely NOTHING for it. The Final Solution was, from a rational strategic analytical standpoint, the most worthless, as well as loathsome national project ever undertaken. It hurt the nation far more than it helped it. No one can say how big an impact, but I'm willing to be it was quite substantial and an alternate history in which racialism never entered into Hitler's notions about his destiny and that of the "Germans" is a fascinating what if I think.

I think this point deserves to be made in a discussion about a game in which these dynamics are completely left out of the picture primarily because of what it reveals about the actors the game portrays.

Hitler was a moron. Many Germans who didn't see the idiocy of the racialist policies were dumbasses for not getting the hell out sooner. The generals, lawyers, industrialists, etc., who all went along with it, pretty damn dumb too.

All this to say: despite the incredible intellectual capacity of the German ethnic group and all its wonders of precision, industriousness, rigor, etc., the nation itself seems to have been more or less possessed with a wave of stupidity the like of which hadn't hit Europe since perhaps the French Revolution.

Thus, with this overarching point in mind, it isn't surprising the number of absolutely bone headed strategic blunders the regime made in the course of its undertakings

2. The diplomatic game(s) they played all the way up through Fall Weiss were probably sufficiently briliant that Machiavelli would have been proud. Except for a couple things: allying with Italy, or rather allying TOO closely. A diplomatic arrangement which did not embroil the Germans with the Italians and their misadventures would have been far wiser. Fortify the alps, keep Mussolini pacified (throw him some scraps) and more or less leave him to his own devices. If he switches sides mid war, nothing lost nothing gained and the Alps are one of the best defensive barriers on Earth as long as properly prepared.

3. Allying with Japan: another seemingly useless entanglement which brought the Nazi regime nothing but problems. I cannot think of a SINGLE strategic benefit of note which Nazi Germany gained from her alliance with Japan nor Italy, which she could not have gained from some other source without the entanglements.

4. Declaring war on the U.S. Most likely with Germany allied with Japan (and even if they were not) U.S. entry into the war might well have been inevitable. But that was a matter of public and legislative opinion which could have swung either way. Hitler game Roosevelt the "get in the war free" card twice: first by allying with Japan, then by making the war dec himself. Absolutely NO reason to have done that.

5. Stepping back to Fall 1939: what is the rush? My understanding is Germanys industrial base was not into full-fledged war time level until 1942? There may be factors which compelled the war to be started earlier rather than later, but even just six months delay would have helped them immensely. The flurry of new gear and gadgets between 1940 and 1943 is astounding, and tells me that Germany could have sat pat with Czech annexed or even with just Sudeten annexed for a year or more and benefited herself far more than by going to war against Poland so soon. Even if Hitler was "convinced" that the French and Brits would back down, it was stupid to hinge major strategic decisions on that (and here the salience of the points I made above about the stupidity of the racialism comes into play: if you are so stupid that you have spent 25 years of your life obsessing about how certain ethnic groups or types of people are the root of all evils then it isn't surprising the person/group/corporation/nation in question will be unable to make sound strategic decisions.

There were more stupendous blunders, at least a half-dozen of them if not a score or more.

All this to say: the game we play bears very little resemblance to the game they played. We are not boneheaded megalomaniacs.

 

[SeekTruthFromFx]

Redid with some of the points I've learned from you guys on here, and have about 90 Type VIIs in the water in Dec 1939. Type XXI will be ready for production in about a month. About 100 divisions maybe 150. Enough to take out Poland. Getting the subs setup the way Doenitz wanted (though not 300 boats in the water, that may take till Dec 1940) basically has delayed me starting the war by six months to a year.

ADDIT: re more general discussions on Nazi Germany's prospects. First it deserves to be said since none of us are real well acquainted, that the underlying worldview of the movement and the regime it created were loathsome beyond compare. I'm sure we all agree on that, but it can be good to just repeat it in case anyone who doesn't realize we agree is reading. We don't play these positions to bask in their glory, its an analytical thing.

Nazi Germany could have won WWII; I'm confident of that. They had no chance of winning the war that they FOUGHT, but they could have won a different war that occurred in largely the same time and place and which accomplished many of the same objectives which the society held as cause to go to war in the first place.

1. The racialism was an enormous hindrance. Imagine if all the ethnicities and various other groups they deemed to be sub-human and thus devoted so much time and effort into demonizing, tormenting and exterminating were just regarded passively, much less tolerantly. The nation suffered tremendous brain drain, economic loss, demographic and industrial burden, diplomatic backlash and loss of standing, and generally gained absolutely NOTHING for it. The Final Solution was, from a rational strategic analytical standpoint, the most worthless, as well as loathsome national project ever undertaken. It hurt the nation far more than it helped it. No one can say how big an impact, but I'm willing to be it was quite substantial and an alternate history in which racialism never entered into Hitler's notions about his destiny and that of the "Germans" is a fascinating what if I think.

I think this point deserves to be made in a discussion about a game in which these dynamics are completely left out of the picture primarily because of what it reveals about the actors the game portrays.

Hitler was a moron. Many Germans who didn't see the idiocy of the racialist policies were dumbasses for not getting the hell out sooner. The generals, lawyers, industrialists, etc., who all went along with it, pretty damn dumb too.

All this to say: despite the incredible intellectual capacity of the German ethnic group and all its wonders of precision, industriousness, rigor, etc., the nation itself seems to have been more or less possessed with a wave of stupidity the like of which hadn't hit Europe since perhaps the French Revolution.

Thus, with this overarching point in mind, it isn't surprising the number of absolutely bone headed strategic blunders the regime made in the course of its undertakings

2. The diplomatic game(s) they played all the way up through Fall Weiss were probably sufficiently briliant that Machiavelli would have been proud. Except for a couple things: allying with Italy, or rather allying TOO closely. A diplomatic arrangement which did not embroil the Germans with the Italians and their misadventures would have been far wiser. Fortify the alps, keep Mussolini pacified (throw him some scraps) and more or less leave him to his own devices. If he switches sides mid war, nothing lost nothing gained and the Alps are one of the best defensive barriers on Earth as long as properly prepared.

3. Allying with Japan: another seemingly useless entanglement which brought the Nazi regime nothing but problems. I cannot think of a SINGLE strategic benefit of note which Nazi Germany gained from her alliance with Japan nor Italy, which she could not have gained from some other source without the entanglements.

4. Declaring war on the U.S. Most likely with Germany allied with Japan (and even if they were not) U.S. entry into the war might well have been inevitable. But that was a matter of public and legislative opinion which could have swung either way. Hitler game Roosevelt the "get in the war free" card twice: first by allying with Japan, then by making the war dec himself. Absolutely NO reason to have done that.

5. Stepping back to Fall 1939: what is the rush? My understanding is Germanys industrial base was not into full-fledged war time level until 1942? There may be factors which compelled the war to be started earlier rather than later, but even just six months delay would have helped them immensely. The flurry of new gear and gadgets between 1940 and 1943 is astounding, and tells me that Germany could have sat pat with Czech annexed or even with just Sudeten annexed for a year or more and benefited herself far more than by going to war against Poland so soon. Even if Hitler was "convinced" that the French and Brits would back down, it was stupid to hinge major strategic decisions on that (and here the salience of the points I made above about the stupidity of the racialism comes into play: if you are so stupid that you have spent 25 years of your life obsessing about how certain ethnic groups or types of people are the root of all evils then it isn't surprising the person/group/corporation/nation in question will be unable to make sound strategic decisions.

There were more stupendous blunders, at least a half-dozen of them if not a score or more.

All this to say: the game we play bears very little resemblance to the game they played. We are not boneheaded megalomaniacs.

You should read Adam Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction'. He is a first-rate historian who disagrees with you on everything except the utterly vile nature of the Nazis' murderous racism (which he, you, and I all agree cannot be condemned too often or deeply). In particular, he argues:
- that there was a perverted economic logic to the racist murders and 'ethnic cleansing' because the alternative, voluntary emigration, was a major drain on Germany's scarce foreign exchange reserves;
- that the whole point of the war, in Hitler's view, was to employ all the resources of Europe to destroy the US and the USSR before they got even more powerful. To use an analogy: even I can beat Usain Bolt with enough of a head start. Germany's head start in rearmament would allow it to overcome its stronger enemies. Delay only allowed the US time to catch up in the one critical sector (military) where it was weak. Once you're mentally committed to war with the US, then any distraction by Japan is a plus. But Tooze agrees with you that this analysis was hopelessly clouded by anti-Semitic lies about Jewish conspiracies in Washington.
- the late 1930s diplomatic game did work out far better than the Nazis might have expected, but Hitler's grand plans were premised on an alliance with the British Empire, and the failure to secure that was disastrous.

To bring the discussion back to subs, he suggests that even if Dönitz had been able to build the fleet he wanted, and the Royal Navy had used less successful tactics, then a German victory in the Battle of the Atlantic would not have changed the outcome of the war. He thinks that the UK had sufficient stocks in Great Britain to withstand many months of total siege, by which point American public opinion would have been ready to enter the war. The Nazis wouldn't have been able to force Britain into a deal anything like the one Vichy accepted in order to focus all their efforts on the USSR before the 'inevitable' clash between Europe and North America.

 

[SeekTruthFromFx]

#Doenitz
I loved his interviews in the BBC series "World at War", particularly his pronounciation of "submarines" which sounded like "soupmarines". He was a fool though. Check the numbers, by 1943 he had his envisioned number of soupmarines at his disposal and ironically that was the point where they became moot.

Tiny factual correction: 'The World at War' was made by Thames Television, not the BBC. I know that seems trivial, but it was the most expensive documentary in history at the time of its creation, and Thames was a regional commercial station (they didn't even broadcast seven days a week!) that produced it as a public service, a decision that many of its former staff are justly proud of. Anyone who plays HoI should watch the whole series, as it includes many interviews with key players, often shortly before they died. The rights were held by the BBC for a time in the 1990s, after Thames lost their licence (due to a stupid decision by Mrs Thatcher). They are now held by UKTV, which is essentially Thames' successor, and in which the BBC holds a 50% stake.

 

[Covfam]

Playing as Germany, standard war with UK/France starting end of '39. I built a submarine fleet pre-war of Type IIAs.

I sent fleets of 9 submarines each to 5 naval zones: African Coast, Iberian Coast, Bay of Biscay, North Atlantic Ridge, and Western Approaches. So far my 45 submarines have sank 0 convoys, 2 destroyers, 1 heavy cruiser, and 1 light cruiser (all french). I have lost about 10 of them, and it's been a week.

Anecdote: it seems like subs are still too busy being in combat to go convoy raiding.

Am I doing it wrong? Are fleets of 9 too large, and getting them detected too easy? Germany only has 6 naval commanders, so if I were to make the sub fleets smaller I'd be faced with a choice of either sending fleets out without commanders, or leaving half the submarine fleet in port. Or, building fewer of them. These all seem like poor choices.

Of your plating ahistorical i recomend invading amd annexing denmark asap before doing anyrhing else, controling denmark, faero islands, icelands and greenland and fortifying and airbasing those islands will give germany a tremendous leg up in the north atlantic, while doing that do the same with portugal annex them again and fortify all thier islands as well. Its easy to defend them and between all the portugees and danish holdings you can lock down the atlantic and turn inward and consolidate europe. These "island carriers" with radars + naval bombers + wolfpacks will do more to hurt the allies than a surface fleet ever will and is cheaper to maintain. Plus eventually they will give supply points when its time to leave europe

 

[seattle]

Of your plating ahistorical i recomend invading amd annexing denmark asap before doing anyrhing else, controling denmark, faero islands, icelands and greenland and fortifying and airbasing those islands will give germany a tremendous leg up in the north atlantic, while doing that do the same with portugal annex them again and fortify all thier islands as well. Its easy to defend them and between all the portugees and danish holdings you can lock down the atlantic and turn inward and consolidate europe. These "island carriers" with radars + naval bombers + wolfpacks will do more to hurt the allies than a surface fleet ever will and is cheaper to maintain. Plus eventually they will give supply points when its time to leave europe

Still my favourite German ahistorical route in any HoI game. It was most fun in Darkest Hour where you could actually starve Britain due to the stockpile limitations.
It's also a fun route because taking Denmark and investing heavily in Iceland and Greenland isn't a particularly strong strategy. The cost and early world tension are probably even detrimental to Germany's success. That's why the Denmark blitz doesn't feel like an exploit. It's only worthwhile if you invest heavily in submarines, naval bombers and infra, radar, naval bases and coastal forts in Iceland and Greenland
Now I've talked myself into starting a new Germany game with the Denmark blitz today... damn!

@Anthropoid
I think you misunderstood Doenitz: He wanted 300 subs in total which translates to roughly 100 in active service, 100 in repair/maintenance, 100 in training. That's the typical rule of thumb. It is also what he explicitly said in the Thames (thanks @SeekTruthFromFx ) documentary series "World at War".

 

[Belryuminus]

To come back to the initial subject (not saying the debate about submarines is not intersting, on the contrary you all mentionned facts and documents very enlightning), i'm on a Mexico game, and the war is over.

I mostly beat the USA and UK with submarines.

I can confirm in this game that Subs III with a boost to Furtivity / Fiabilty are a pain in the a** for the allies. I sunk a massive amount of their convoys in the Atlantic along with several fleets (battle cruisers and heavy cruisers mostly), while Japanese fleet was dealing with USA carriers in the Pacific.
Subs II's were not that bad at sunking but i had casualties. Subs III's and then IV's later were barely not even hit by AI's NAVs and it was really easy to make severals fleets of 15 - 25 of them in all the Atlantic regions.

I had the middle doctrine (Etranglement du Commerce) and researched only the submarine part.
My first fleet had an Admiral but not even the others.

As a fascist Mexico, my troops were in sufficient number to force USA defending California and Texas. Without those troops and without all the support they usually bring to Europe, the Axe took out USSR by 1942. Killing the allies with the Asian Confederation (which i was part off) and the Reich was a piece of cake after that.

They were so exhausted that UK barely resisted the land invasion i launched from Portugal wich i seized before.

Was able to achieve "The Revenge of Montezuma" and "Sunset Invasion" in the same run as a bonus !

I guess i can go to "New World Order" with no difficulties now.

 

[Anthropoid]

You should read Adam Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction'. He is a first-rate historian who disagrees with you on everything except the utterly vile nature of the Nazis' murderous racism (which he, you, and I all agree cannot be condemned too often or deeply). In particular, he argues:
- that there was a perverted economic logic to the racist murders and 'ethnic cleansing' because the alternative, voluntary emigration, was a major drain on Germany's scarce foreign exchange reserves . . .

Thanks, I will keep an eye out for that. Convincing me on that argument will be an uphill battle, but it would be a fun read in any case.

To bring the discussion back to subs . . .

Yes! Back to the subs!

Gentlemen! You cannot politik in the sub room!

 

[Deinhardt]

I have spend my entire afternoon reading this excellent thread.

Thank you all for the informations given!

I have a question though. Regarding the Condor or air support for German sub warfare in general, in hearts of iron.

A few patched ago tactical bombers got the ability to naval and port strike.

Would tactical bombers, beefed out with range, since beefing out attack doesn't influence tac bombers nav strike capabilities, be a good method to support subs in the Atlantic?

Or beef up the range on naval bombers?

I am asking, because I want to try the concept of the Condor + sub warfare in my next Germany game.

 

[myzael]

Or beef up the range on naval bombers?

You can't increase it enough for it to matter for Atlantic War. Unless you conquer Azores/Bermuda/Iceland. If you want to role-play Condors I'd use He 111's with 5 range, giving them 3600 in total. IRL Condors had about that much range.

 

[Secret Master]

I'm not sure why a submarine thread steered us towards a discussion of the Final Solution and Holocaust, but here we are.

As much as I love Wages of Destruction, we aren't discussing how Nazi racist policies contributed to or hurt the war effort.

Remember to follow the forum rules, folks. Thread closed.