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Tukhachevsky and co had already been purged - you are right it wasn't an ongoing process in 39 but the army had been weakened by purges.
Strengthened: the average level of education and military training rose as a result of the purge.
But that's beside the point that i was making which was that you were wrong about 1939.
I was indeed wrong about 39, but if you believe the purges strengthened the red army, you're a whole order of magnitude wronger.
The initial pincer attack in Poland failed. The cauldron which the German forces closed west of Vistula was empty with virtually all large Polish units remaining outside. The only Polish army that was destroyed in the first three weeks of war was the Prusy army which ceased to exist during the battle of Piotrków on September 5th-7th (its commander, Gen. Dąb-Biernacki was a political appointee and one of the most incompetent generals of the entire war). The other armies slipped away. Some were more battered than others, yet all of them survived as coherent units and two of them - Poznan and Pomorze armies launched a counterattack at Bzura river on September 8th. By mid September a rough frontline was even reestablished. Main Polish armies were all destroyed in static battles between September 18th and 29th, ie when all previous plans were rendered obsolete by the Soviet invasion.
It's my observation that the Polish campaign is virtually unknown and what was essentially propaganda claims by both aggressors is still taken face value. Well at least people no longer believe that the Poles charged tanks on horsebacks. Our do they?
October 6th is the date of capitulation of a last large unit that consisted multiple divisions. That was SGO (roughly equivalent of later German Kampfgruppe) Polesie. The capitulation took place near Kock north of Lublin, so no marches were around. Smaller units continued to fight for a time, some of them blended into the nascent Underground State.
The whole campaign was over within four weeks, and the Poles were on the defensive the whole time. Who, aside from Poles themselves, is supposed to be interested in the story of how this or that chewed-up battle group managed to halt the German Panzers for two or three of days? It's really not much of a story to be honest.
This breeds claims like those on this thread, that Poland was all but finished after two weeks and that even without Soviet help all the Germans needed to do was mopping up. Polish campaign was denigrated from the start. It was concerned for both Germans and the Soviets.
But that does not mean that the Soviets could not have gone to war against the Germans in 1939, nor even that Stalin would have thought it would be disastrous. Yes the USSR is not entirely ready for it, but they are probably better prepared that Italy.
Well, it rather spectacular definition of failure. If we start to evaluate success of first two-three weeks of "Barbarossa" in such way than it was failure too. Because objectives weren't reached in time adn soviets managed to conserve much of their forces. But it is very stupid way of evaluating success.
It is pretty understandable result of dependance of western historians on german memoirs and documents. But the problem is that idea of polish capability to continue fighting for longer is rather unbased on reality. Much stronger forces were defeated by germans in similar timeframes.
This is the disposition of forces map:
And I really fail to see any significant polish reserves in eastern part of Poland. There was just no regular troops present.
I think trybald's claim was that the troops which retreated east towards the general Lwow region were still capable of putting up resistance shortly before the Soviets attacked:
How long though...? In the French campaign, the Germans also did some resting after cutting off the French mobile forces, and the French tried to form a new defence. But the Germans did not rest not for long. And they smashed the French pretty thoroughly once they got going again.
Why should it have been different in Poland if the war had gone on without a Soviet invasion? There might just have been 14 days of slow tempo while the Germans form up to attack the remaining pockets, and then they would again attack in the same operational tempo as in early September. Some places in the swamps or mountains might hold out for a long time. But the campaign would be all but over once the Poles fall back on such isolated strongpoints, and the Germans would be free to re-orient westwards and attack the French on time in May 1940.
How long though...? In the French campaign, the Germans also did some resting after cutting off the French mobile forces, and the French tried to form a new defence. But the Germans did not rest not for long. And they smashed the French pretty thoroughly once they got going again.
Why should it have been different in Poland if the war had gone on without a Soviet invasion? There might just have been 14 days of slow tempo while the Germans form up to attack the remaining pockets, and then they would again attack in the same operational tempo as in early September. Some places in the swamps or mountains might hold out for a long time. But the campaign would be all but over once the Poles fall back on such isolated strongpoints, and the Germans would be free to re-orient westwards and attack the French on time in May 1940.
WWII is not very rich on examples of retreating forces who managed to succesfully defend on a new positions. Troops just loose to much stuff during the retreat and non-mechanized/motorized troops loose most.
And the initiative and professionalism of the officer corps destroyed.
Pre-purge yearly reports on the state of combat readiness of the Red Army weren't very encouraging in this regard. So I do not think that degradation was serious.
Why did not I think sooner that the best way to improve performance is to execute and banish more than half of my staff? I must have been an idiot!
The extent and intensity are greatly inflated in Western propaganda.
c.f. the French purges arguably had a greater impact on the course of WW2 but nobody mentions the deleterious effect of an established regular army having personnel issues. But no, it's the Purge that gave problems to the RKKA. Not the impact of a disastrous first world war, civil war, revolution, transition from militia to regular army, effects of a large expansion. Etc.
The pre-purge Red Army was not as strong as its often made out to be. The whole "If only Stalin hadn't purged people the Red Army would have been the most modern mechanised death machine ever" idea is rather far off the mark. But the effect the purge had on the officer corps was massive. It strongly discouraged initiative and new ideas and encouraged the blind obedience of orders.
Again, Purges weren't about skill/initiative or even obedience. Purges were about factions infighting. Commanders weren't shot because they were too independent or showed too much initiative, people were shot because they were loyal to a wrong person or they were rivals with a right person. And both good and bad commanders can be such unlucky people.
The main problem of the Red Army was always education and amount of practical experience of the commanders. This is a main reason why soviet officers lacked "initiative" and were more reliant on detailed orders from above. It is very logical behavior in case of lacking experience - you just follow orders.
And this was main negative effect of Purge - it promoted even more people with insufficient experience for their posts.
For example we can name general Pavlov (who was shot for collapse of Western Front during WWII). He was damn good brigade commander and decent chief for soviet armoured force, but entire front was too much for him. He failed at this job and lost his life as the result.