Soviet research slots vs German research slots.

[Harin]

While what you say is true regarding the Soviet need for funds, Between January 1940 and date of the German invasion, the USSR exported goods of a total estimated[by whom?] value of 597.9 million Reichsmarks to Germany. German deliveries amounted to 437.1 million Reichsmarks.[1]

So as you can see, the deal as it panned out was not in the USSRs favor, because the Germans invaded the USSR before they fully paid for the goods they got. The soviets would have been better off selling it to some one more trustworthy, who would actually pay for the goods.

Good point!

While I do believe you are correct that the USSR would have preferred better paying customers, I doubt there were that many nations lining up to buy raw resources in the quantities that the USSR needed, considering the world was recovering from the Great Depression. I suspect that the USSR was motivated to sell whatever they could to whoever would buy. The price was probably not as important as in the past, because the USSR was determined to grow factories where none had existed before. The opportunity cost was negligible, since they were selling resources that were in abundance to purchase something almost priceless to their goals.

In the end, the USSR got the last laugh. They never ran out of those resources, but they did get their factories built. In the long run, their bank account of resources was barely touched, but they changed their country forever into an industrialized nation.

 

[Eisscrat]

So the Soviet SELL Germany all this. For Money and industrial equipment.

• Soviet to Germany
  • US to Soviet

• 1,600,000 tons of grains
  • 4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.)
• 900,000 tons of oil
  • 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products (gasoline and oil) or 57.8 percent of the high-octane aviation fuel
• 200,000 tons of cotton
• 140,000 tons of manganese
• 200,000 tons of phosphates
• 20,000 tons of chrome ore
• 18,000 tons of rubber
• 100,000 tons of soybeans
• 500,000 tons of iron ores
• 300,000 tons of scrap metal and pig iron
  • 2,540,000 tons of steel
• 2,000 kilograms of platinum

In addition the get from the US

• 14.795 aircraft
• 7056 tanks
• 8218 AA guns
• 131.633 machine-guns
• 77.900 Jeeps
• 151.000 light trucks
• 200.000 heavy trucks
• 35.000 radios
• 380.000 Fieldtelefons
• 30 % of all tires
• 56 %of all rails
• 1/3 of all explosives
• 1900 locomotive

And that not even all cause UK also send a lot.

Between June 1941 and May 1945, Britain delivered to the USSR:

• 3,000+ Hurricanes aircraft
• 4,000+ other aircraft
• 27 naval vessels
• 5,218 tanks (including 1,380 Valentines from Canada)
• 5,000+ anti-tank guns
• 4,020 ambulances and trucks
• 323 machinery trucks (mobile vehicle workshops equipped with generators and all the welding and power tools required to perform heavy servicing)
• 1,212 Universal Carriers and Loyd Carriers (with another 1,348 from Canada)
• 1,721 motorcycles
• £1.15bn worth of aircraft engines
• 1,474 radar sets
• 4,338 radio sets
• 600 naval radar and sonar sets
• Hundreds of naval guns
• 15 million pairs of boots

Get this from english and german Wikipedia
Its a mess there is no total list of all deliveries.

How much of all this was paid by the soviet union i dont know. I think only a small percentage.

So to say if soviet dont sell the raw materials to germany it would be as much as lend and lease provides testifies to ignorance.

 

[CrazyZombie]

While what you say is true regarding the Soviet need for funds, Between January 1940 and date of the German invasion, the USSR exported goods of a total estimated[by whom?] value of 597.9 million Reichsmarks to Germany. German deliveries amounted to 437.1 million Reichsmarks.[1]

So as you can see, the deal as it panned out was not in the USSRs favor, because the Germans invaded the USSR before they fully paid for the goods they got. The soviets would have been better off selling it to some one more trustworthy, who would actually pay for the goods.

Soviets exported stuff that they had no shortage of. Germans on the other hand were selling Soviets complex industrial goods like machines for factories, the very same factories which would pump out T-34-s in insane quantities just a couple of years later. I'd say, that if trade was not in someone's favour, it was Germany. Money are the thing that you can always earn more, but time... time is precious and no amount of money would buy it to you.

 

[Ffire]

Soviets exported stuff that they had no shortage of. Germans on the other hand were selling Soviets complex industrial goods like machines for factories, the very same factories which would pump out T-34-s in insane quantities just a couple of years later. I'd say, that if trade was not in someone's favour, it was Germany. Money are the thing that you can always earn more, but time... time is precious and no amount of money would buy it to you.

no, I remember they used their strategic reserves for some materials like copper to satisfy germany's need previous to France fall.
And that was clever : Stalin's wished to balance the fight as much as possible between allies and axis, and understood that Germany was the underdog, but failed to understand that situation would not be enough to prevent Hitler from attacking SU.

To get back to OP, a good way to measure the research capability of a country is the number of pattents registered. Prior to WW2, USA and Germany were far ahead anyone else, including SU.

 

[HugsAndSnuggles]

Also gives you time to cover for the Great Purge which did horrendous damage to the officer corps.

To be fair, the recovery from the main damage source to officer corps was not so much about time, as about getting asses kicked during it. I think that this gives a relatively adequate summary.

How much of all this was paid by the soviet union i dont know. I think only a small percentage.

To date, about 6.5% of total equipment cost (not taking inflation into account). Do note that only stuff that was not used up/destroyed was supposed to be paid for, as per lend-lease agreement, which was estimated at 12% of total equipment cost.

 

[Zauberelefant]

no, I remember they used their strategic reserves for some materials like copper to satisfy germany's need previous to France fall.
And that was clever : Stalin's wished to balance the fight as much as possible between allies and axis, and understood that Germany was the underdog, but failed to understand that situation would not be enough to prevent Hitler from attacking SU.

To get back to OP, a good way to measure the research capability of a country is the number of pattents registered. Prior to WW2, USA and Germany were far ahead anyone else, including SU.

Nah, patents are not strictly in the game's scope. A GE toaster, with Patent, would probably not benefit the war effort. A nuke probably had very few actual patents for nuclear explosive device going.

 

[Secret Master]

So as you can see, the deal as it panned out was not in the USSRs favor, because the Germans invaded the USSR before they fully paid for the goods they got. The soviets would have been better off selling it to some one more trustworthy, who would actually pay for the goods.

That depends on what you think the real goal of the deal was.

If you think war between Germany and the Soviet Union is inevitable, but that you can buy time for 4-6 years to build up while the other country is wasting resources fighting against another enemy, even a poor return on trade payments is made up for by the time you gain. In that scenario, you are buying time, not just goods.

Put another way, you might ask whether the time Stalin bought was worth it. I don't have a definitive answer to that question by June of 1941. I will say that by June of 1942, the time purchased would have definitely been worth it.

I'm not a big fan of the Icebreaker hypothesis by Suvorov, and one of the reasons I'm not is that it's very clear that the M-R Pact was meant to buy time. And the pay off for that time wasn't June of 1941. It was further down the road.

 

[Vlad123]

That depends on what you think the real goal of the deal was.

If you think war between Germany and the Soviet Union is inevitable, but that you can buy time for 4-6 years to build up while the other country is wasting resources fighting against another enemy, even a poor return on trade payments is made up for by the time you gain. In that scenario, you are buying time, not just goods.

Put another way, you might ask whether the time Stalin bought was worth it. I don't have a definitive answer to that question by June of 1941. I will say that by June of 1942, the time purchased would have definitely been worth it.

I'm not a big fan of the Icebreaker hypothesis by Suvorov, and one of the reasons I'm not is that it's very clear that the M-R Pact was meant to buy time. And the pay off for that time wasn't June of 1941. It was further down the road.

It must be said that if Germany had not had to help Italy ... (or rather no front to the south with neutral Italy, or send the DAK immediately) it would have changed everything a lot. And fly would probably have fallen (with psychological effects) so would Stalin have bought time? In this hypothesis: no. Time has bought it in the long run, also thanks to all the LL

 

[Alpha2518]

I just want to note that tanks at the time, in their majority, were not designed to fight tanks - they simply lacked the punch for that. It was the job primarily for AT guns (or AA in a pinch) and their mobile variations. Ratios like that hardly paint a proper picture, if any. Percentage of tanks lost on monthly basis would do a better job, I think.
There's this one, for example.

They certainly had the punch for it, most tanks did. You are assuming the 3:1 loss ratio is 3 Soviet T-34s to 1 German Tank. No. It is 1German, ATGs, AFVs, Infantry (Squad for a value of 1? Not sure how the author in citation counts infantry, I'm assuming squad is a value of 1 in K/D) to 3 T-34s. This is worse then a pure AFV vs AFV fight for the Germans and Soviets as the K/D is even higher in the German favor with the previous assumption of removing the Western Allies.

And no % of tanks is just another way of calculating a kill to loss ratio. However, I would also say it is less precise then having 3:1 ratio. But all your doing is breaking down the kill to loss ratio different with percentages. And if were are trying to say a tank is an effective piece of equipment we need to be able to have precise values, the more accurate the better. After all, what does a percentage even mean if I say 82% of T-34s were lost for example? What is this 82%? Well to answer my own question and according to my bare minimum research on Wikipedia, over 57,300 T-34s were made by the end of the war in 1945. That is 46,986 T-34s being so destroyed that the factory can't fix them and are permanent losses In the end, breaking down by percentages still doesn't change why the T-34 was horrible tank and suffered the horrendous losses that it did.

 

[DicRoNero]

I'm not a big fan of the Icebreaker hypothesis by Suvorov, and one of the reasons I'm not is that it's very clear that the M-R Pact was meant to buy time. And the pay off for that time wasn't June of 1941. It was further down the road.

Suvorov isn't the only Russian-speaking historian author to insist on the planned Soviet aggression towards Germany. Ever heard of a Jewish author Mark Solonin? I'm not sure he's available in English, but watching him speak in Russian at YouTube is a pure joy. He quotes many amazing sources, which to my knowledge are yet to be debunked by Kremlin and its pet historians.

When the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was signed, no one among the Soviets expected France to fall within 6 weeks. And that wasn't even the most crushing blow in their eyes - i.e. operation Marita left the Soviets close to panic. This is why R-M pact was adhered to.

 

[Crecer13]

They certainly had the punch for it, most tanks did. You are assuming the 3:1 loss ratio is 3 Soviet T-34s to 1 German Tank. No. It is 1German, ATGs, AFVs, Infantry (Squad for a value of 1? Not sure how the author in citation counts infantry, I'm assuming squad is a value of 1 in K/D) to 3 T-34s. This is worse then a pure AFV vs AFV fight for the Germans and Soviets as the K/D is even higher in the German favor with the previous assumption of removing the Western Allies.

And no % of tanks is just another way of calculating a kill to loss ratio. However, I would also say it is less precise then having 3:1 ratio. But all your doing is breaking down the kill to loss ratio different with percentages. And if were are trying to say a tank is an effective piece of equipment we need to be able to have precise values, the more accurate the better. After all, what does a percentage even mean if I say 82% of T-34s were lost for example? What is this 82%? Well to answer my own question and according to my bare minimum research on Wikipedia, over 57,300 T-34s were made by the end of the war in 1945. That is 46,986 T-34s being so destroyed that the factory can't fix them and are permanent losses In the end, breaking down by percentages still doesn't change why the T-34 was horrible tank and suffered the horrendous losses that it did.

I recently read an article about the T - 60 as a suicide tank. And there are data on the survival of various tanks in 1942. Worth this information:

Let's count. For the entire time, about 5500 T-60s were produced, excluding the chassis for the M-8-24 multiple launch rocket systems. Removing the 1941 production vehicles, as well as adding on the tanks available on January 1, 1942, we get 4,560 small tanks. The same report from the organizational department of the BT and MV KA headquarters for 1944 tells us that on January 1, 1943, there were 1977 small tanks, that is, approximately 43% of the "kids" survived. Now let's take a look at the T-34. In 1942, 12,534 tanks were produced, add here the 651 survivors of the 1941 battles. Total - 13 185 units, by January 1, 1943, there were 6465 units, a little less than half. That is, the difference in survival statistics is not significant. Next, consider the KV: in 1942 they produced 1802 KV-1 / KV-8 and 624 KV-1s / KV-8s. Together with the tanks that survived 1941, 2829 units are obtained. On January 1, 1943, there were 1376 KVs of all types, that is, approximately 48%. It is also interesting to look at the T-70. In 1942, 4883 of them were produced, and on January 1, 1943, there were 3042, that is, more than 60%. Such a surprise! According to statistics, the crews of the T-70 light tanks had the least chance of death.

In 1942, 812 M3 Lee tanks were delivered to the USSR, of which 502 were listed on January 1, 1943, that is, also more than 60% (despite the fact that 1942 was the time of the most intensive use of these machines). Other foreign machines are also worth mentioning. During 1941-1942, 771 infantry tanks "Matilda" entered the Red Army, while on January 1, 1943 there were 375 of them, that is, slightly less than half. The "Valentine" survival rate was higher: of the 1175 units delivered in 1941-1942, on January 1, 1943, there were 672, that is, about 57%. At the same time, both "Matilda" and "Valentines" were losing back in 1941, so the losses for 1942 are actually less.

Despite the fact that the T-34 and KV had problems with visibility as well as technical problems. Well, it doesn't correspond to 80% of losses.

 

[Ketchup & friends]

Technologies in HoI are highly abstracted.
It's not easy to recreate the ability of some countries like SU to produce small number of high-tech stuff (@Sunforged General 's examples) but have an overall lower base level of technology.

In order to fix this, some kind of Wunderwaffen mechanic will be neccessary.

he Soviets start out with a bigger Navy overall than Germany, and with more Battleships and Submarines than Italy.

But it's spread across multiple oceans.

And Italy lacks some historical submarines in the game.

In a strategic sense, perhaps, on a tactical level 1vs1 I dont think any amount of FCE will save a Panzer III that simply cannot penetrate a T-34s armor from any side at any range. A hard stat tank isn't necessarily worse than a soft stat focused tank.

You don't need to penetrate a tank's armor to mission-kill it. Destroying the tracks makes it unable to move.

Gameplay balance.

even if it was intended, Germany got a rework with many research buffs in WtT.

 

[Alpha2518]

I recently read an article about the T - 60 as a suicide tank. And there are data on the survival of various tanks in 1942. Worth this information:

Let's count. For the entire time, about 5500 T-60s were produced, excluding the chassis for the M-8-24 multiple launch rocket systems. Removing the 1941 production vehicles, as well as adding on the tanks available on January 1, 1942, we get 4,560 small tanks. The same report from the organizational department of the BT and MV KA headquarters for 1944 tells us that on January 1, 1943, there were 1977 small tanks, that is, approximately 43% of the "kids" survived. Now let's take a look at the T-34. In 1942, 12,534 tanks were produced, add here the 651 survivors of the 1941 battles. Total - 13 185 units, by January 1, 1943, there were 6465 units, a little less than half. That is, the difference in survival statistics is not significant. Next, consider the KV: in 1942 they produced 1802 KV-1 / KV-8 and 624 KV-1s / KV-8s. Together with the tanks that survived 1941, 2829 units are obtained. On January 1, 1943, there were 1376 KVs of all types, that is, approximately 48%. It is also interesting to look at the T-70. In 1942, 4883 of them were produced, and on January 1, 1943, there were 3042, that is, more than 60%. Such a surprise! According to statistics, the crews of the T-70 light tanks had the least chance of death.

In 1942, 812 M3 Lee tanks were delivered to the USSR, of which 502 were listed on January 1, 1943, that is, also more than 60% (despite the fact that 1942 was the time of the most intensive use of these machines). Other foreign machines are also worth mentioning. During 1941-1942, 771 infantry tanks "Matilda" entered the Red Army, while on January 1, 1943 there were 375 of them, that is, slightly less than half. The "Valentine" survival rate was higher: of the 1175 units delivered in 1941-1942, on January 1, 1943, there were 672, that is, about 57%. At the same time, both "Matilda" and "Valentines" were losing back in 1941, so the losses for 1942 are actually less.

Despite the fact that the T-34 and KV had problems with visibility as well as technical problems. Well, it doesn't correspond to 80% of losses.

But that 82% of losses is irrecoverable total losses throughout the war. You can't expect it to be 80% at any one period of the war. Sure it can very well fluctuate at various levels throughout the war. But once you add up the numbers for losses that you cannot recover, you get 82%. The essay which I take my percentage from is citing books which themselves draw from the Russian archives themselves. I have my doubts that the Russians are lying if their own sources say 82% of their own T-34s were not capable of being recovered even if they could send them back to the factory. If anything, I would expect them to try and say they lost less then 82% as irrecoverable losses.

 

[Alpha2518]

You don't need to penetrate a tank's armor to mission-kill it. Destroying the tracks makes it unable to move

Indeed, this is what is called a maneuverability kill I believe. Air combat has a similar kind of kill where by, you force enemy to stall and he crashes. It is considered a kill for pilot as he forced the enemy to crash even though he didn't kill him with guns.

 

[Harin]

You don't need to penetrate a tank's armor to mission-kill it.

This is such a true statement. Even today's modern main battle tanks are outright killed or taken out of the equation by semi-trained, but determined, infantry running around in civilian trucks and motorcycles.

A tank's "stats" cannot overcome leadership that is inferior to the local enemy's. This is probably the number one killer of tanks for all sides. A local company or battalion commander that is superior to the enemy has a large influence on local outcomes. An inexperienced, or badly learned tank commander, is going to have a bad day against an infantry commander who has learned well.

Other killers of tanks are poor design, incompetent logistics, and the nuances that appear when the tank makes enemy contact.

Such nuances are avenues of approach, combat recon, communications, prior intel before the fight, angles of attack, situation awareness, coordination among the friendly tanks vs coordination among the enemy outside the tanks, access to resupply, maintenance, robustness, amount and location of terrain that the tanks cannot cross or enter, terrain that can be crossed at high speed, terrain that requires very slow speed to cross, heights, depressions, water, weather, temperature, mud, how far the tank must move before it is safe to stop and shoot, how long it must stop to take a shot, and the amount of infantry support that was able to keep up and protect the tanks.

The list is longer, but one thing is probably clear to those who read it. Almost all of it is something a defending leader can influence or take advantage. An experienced military will equip its combat units with the means to address those nuances and win.

 

[Crecer13]

But that 82% of losses is irrecoverable total losses throughout the war. You can't expect it to be 80% at any one period of the war. Sure it can very well fluctuate at various levels throughout the war. But once you add up the numbers for losses that you cannot recover, you get 82%. The essay which I take my percentage from is citing books which themselves draw from the Russian archives themselves. I have my doubts that the Russians are lying if their own sources say 82% of their own T-34s were not capable of being recovered even if they could send them back to the factory. If anything, I would expect them to try and say they lost less then 82% as irrecoverable losses.

Do not forget this is 1942, when the USSR was just recovering from the shock of 1941, then tactics and skill were not so worked out And this is only about 50%.