I mean both are better than non-sources (except not according to one of the posters who said Glantz is propaganda)
He was talking about Beevor, who actually is propaganda, by shilling a specific narrative bias in his novels, then presenting them as historical truth. Ditto Keegan, who literally shilled for the Waffen-SS and HIAG, and was perhaps the architect most responsible for what modern Internetizens refer to as "Wehrabooism" with his worship of SS Tiger tank battalions or whatever, and his description of a bunch of a thugs and ne'er-do-wells as "elite" captivating Western audiences for decades. It's a bit of a shame that the popular consciousness thinks of such titanic tomes as Turtledove, Beevor, and Keegan before David Glantz, Azar Gat, or Christopher Bassford, but alas.
You can't really separate the two types of propaganda either, because at the end of the day they're the same sort of grand narrative, teleological approach to "history", just from opposed angles. Beevor is/was a committed Marxist-Leninist (and, as I can attest to, once a Marxist always a Marxist, whether you're Maoist, Leninist, Analytical, Trotskyite, Posadist, Orthodox, etc, you cannot shake the metaphysical implications and explicit meanderings of the wunderkinder duo of Marx/Engels no matter how hard you try) while Keegan was a Tory, but both approached history as represented by some sort of over-arching plan or narrative set in motion by a higher agency (for Marxism, it is the class struggle between the oppressed workers and the ruling bourgeoisie; for Tories it is the ancient war/volcano god, Yahweh, and the hanger-on Jesus Christ) towards some defined end point.
In that sense it is plainly propaganda. However, Glantz actively tries to avoid making moral judgments (and when he does, he is careful to couch them in the times, rather than presenting them as a unspeakable horror or some such by applying modern American or European morals to Stalinist Russia) about the things he writes about.
The ideal historian is not a moral philosopher, nor a narrative author, since he generally lacks the training for either. Rather, he is an uncoverer of forgotten truths and texts that he presents for the reader to make his own decisions about, and then at worst, perhaps he makes some sidelong glances at, or attempts to synthesize the knowledge thereof, only after he has already presented all available information. Most British historians, unfortunately, tend to be popular historians who would bank on a quick grab at the zeitgeist rather than an impartial presentation and analysis of data.
There's simply no money to be had in proper academic writing in the UK, it seems. Probably why their best historians were retired general officers, judges, and admirals. Shame, since these people, for all their talents, are only amateurs compared the professional historian classes, represented by the likes Glantz, Gat, etc.
A quick Google search turned up a reddit link that provided a bit more context. Seems Marshal Zhukovs real opinion was that basic mine clearance should be a part of regular infantryman training, such that units would not be stalled in front of a minefield and take casualties from artillery while waiting for sappers to arrive. Zhukovs method seems to have been for the infantry to continue to advance and form a bridgehead on the other side of the mines, until sappers could arrive to clear a path for vehicles.
Considering that tanks often encounter minefields on the attack when they're already inside them, after being taken under fire by anti-tank means, the very idea of sitting still and waiting for the plows to arrive is easier solved by removing your sidearm from your holster, placing it on your temple, and pulling the trigger. You will save the enemy the time, money, and effort of firing shells at your tanks. Real hard men drive the tanks through the minefield without waiting for the plows. You don't need breaching equipment, just bull through.
Alas, Stalinists, despite the epithet, were never very good at actually using their tanks. Such incompetent sounding tactical decision-making is something I could see them doing, but would perhaps still have difficulty believing if I saw it with my own eyes.
What you actually seem to be describing is a dismounted breaching operation rather than an "attack". Such breaching operations (at least in the WW2) would done with small groups of hand-picked men, equipped with shovels, bayonets, and flares, who would infiltrate the enemy defensive belt at nighttime, eliminate enemy machine gun positions and start refilling anti-tank ditches, marking mines, and removing concertina wire, in lieu of actual sappers. When it came time to launch the attack, the men fire their flares or use some other signal means to mark cleared obstacle lanes for the attacking force.
After WW2, the Soviets emphasized training motor riflemen in the art of using the bayonet to probe for mines, so they wouldn't have to hand-pick men and have them led by sapper officers or whatever. About the only difference.
