I'm sure that Px's scenario designers are already familiar with the recent and highly detailed two volume Rikugun set on the Japanese ground forces, their equipment, OOB, TOE, and unit service with a focus on the divisions. For me and I think most others, some of the facts and conclusions there are startling, the land forces having received vastly less attention than the navy.
In summary, Ness entitles the section on Japan's war effort "Plan for Failure." It “hinged almost completely on German ability to neutralize the powers of the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States" and his opinion is that the only possibly viable expansionist course would have been to accept the 1940 demands, withdraw from China and focus on building up the Kwantung Army to invade the USSR in 1941 in tandem with Germany, which might have achieved Axis victory in Asia. He says, though, that “even this, however, is open to question, for the IJA was simply not a modern army in 1941, and was incapable of logistics support over even medium distances.” Rikugen, Vol 1., p51
This does not mean it was ineffectual in its circumstances. “In keeping faith with the code of Bushido it was perhaps the most ferocious close-quarters infantry force in the world. The Samurai spirit, however, valued only direct combat with the enemy. All else was regarded as slightly below the standards expected of a warrior. The result was neglect of all the other branches vital to a modern army.” The supporting arms we will see in our division templates were often dramatically inadequate.
First, the artillery failed to provide reliable fire support throughout the war except in a few sieges such as Bataan. Communications were poor and artillery was often used in direct fire or unobserved fire based on map coordinates - "Shifting of massed fire, as opposed to spreading out assets along the line, was almost never practiced."
Second, "reconnaissance was often neglected in favor of aggressive offensive action by low-level infantry units. The two are not interchangeable, especially given the poor communications of the IJA. Infantry regiments, especially in the south Pacific, often thrashed about in the jungle, uncertain as to where they were or where they were supposed to go. As a result it was almost unheard of for two separated columns to reach the jump-off point for an attack at the same time." Clearly the ability to coordinate attacks was a serious deficiency that has a direct impact on what should happen ingame. Ness notes that "Innate infantry aggressiveness was often enough to overcome this deficiency in the early years of the war when fighting against a poorly-trained enemy, but against a determined and skillful foe it repeatedly led to disasters first seen at Guadalcanal.” How often have we read of the piecemeal nature of many Japanese operations? One of the things I find startling that helps me appreciate many things I have not put together before is that these deficiencies are not matters that can be rectified simply with more equipment or administration, but structural deficiencies based on fundamental aspects of the Imperial Japanese way of war and military culture.
In this connection, Ness writes that “The emphasis on direct aggressive action also tended to devalue the role of staff planning. Staffs were smaller at all headquarters levels than in their Western counterparts and the individuals placed in staff positions were not only overworked but also suffered from a lack of prestige that made it difficult to bring logistical and other non-combat aspects to the fore. There were few repercussions in the intermittent combat in China or during the brief campaigns of early 1942, but in the prolonged heavy combat of Burma and the south Pacific Japanese logistics would prove woefully inadequate.” (p51)Can a true Samurai fight at a desk?
Ness notes that Japan absorbed selectively some of the lessons of WW1 from Europe, foremost from the French “whose belief in the moral power of the offensive, at least early in the war, most closely approached Japanese views.” We can I think draw the conclusion that this cultural filter admitted only what was permissible within the new "Samurai" culture.
Even more startling are the implications of the detailed information Ness compiles, which seems to me to demonstrate a penchant for shifting and reorganizing existing forces and patching together improvised expedients in a variety of combinations in reaction to developments rather than planful organization for war. As I mention in an earlier thread on the subject, the Independent Mixed Brigades were I think the most significant of the non-divisional forces extracted from the divisions and shuffled around the empire as opportunities first and later threats developed. One general trend was that the Kwantung Army had the pick of the recruits and the best (including the "A") divisions prewar, but served as a strategic reserve and was continually drawn upon by other theatres until in 1945 it was essentially a shell of relatively untrained troops.
As he has done the research in copious detail, I am inclined to accept his express conclusion that “Many of the failures can be attributed to Japanese complacency. Already contemptuous of foreigners the early victories against China and the Western Allies reinforced a self-confidence bordering on arrogance." Crucial new tanks, AT guns, AA guns, and artillery "were developed at a leisurely pace" and in what are to me surprisingly small numbers even considering that they used industrial processes well behind the US.
On the level of national policy (which some might call "focus"), "the Japanese seemed to have failed to comprehend the nature of total war. They took little advantage of the chance to build up their army during the period before Pearl Harbor or during the relatively quiet period of late 1942 and 1943. In fact, of the males reporting for induction who were found physically fit in 1941 only 51 percent were actually called to servicve, and this rose to but 60 percent for 1942 and 1943. Only in 1944 was there a significant increase, to 89 percent and then to 90 percent in 1945.* As a result no new divisions were formed, except through consolidation of existing units, between September of 1940 and March of 1943.” p52
“*This represented about 50% of those examined in 1943/43, rising ot 68% in 1944, indicating a probable relaxation of physical standards in the interim as well.” p. 52.
Without going into details, the Japanese realized, particularly after being battered at Nomonhan, and yet slowly even then, the need to bolster their armored forces. Tankettes and cavalry recon were upgraded in formations with actual tanks and other AFVs, even armored engineer vehicles. The army regarded armor as infantry support, while the Kwantung Army had put together an experimental combined arms force as early as 1934. Coordination was problematic, not helped by dearth of radios. Tank production peaked in early 1942 and dropped off to low levels thereafter. Ness goes through the organizational history in detail - in essentials, there were 3 armor divisions and the armor saw some useful service against the Chinese and the Allies except where they sat idle. My practical conclusion is that the tanks were too few and out of date and getting halfway adequate AT guns in production would be essential if facing Soviet armor and mean surmounting major industrial, political and bureaucratic challenges.
The naval side of things is not discussed except as it affects the IJA and IJN ground forces. With the IJN viewing its Pacific bases as unsinkable aircraft carriers, startlingly inadequate consideration was given to their defense against invasion until too late, and often too little. Even the grandiose plan for defense of the home islands was much more on paper than on the ground, handicapped, as was characteristic, by weapons, transport and other logistics deficiencies.
Game designers would be heartlessly "realistic" to force players under restrictions that they need to parallel what Japan did historically, but clearly the "baseline" for Japan needs to take into account what happened historically and the Japanese player should need to work hard (and his cabinet at some "personal" peril from the military) to bend the nation to a serious appreciation of war and pick and choose what he can achieve without incurring backlash or undermining military elan, morale and discipline.
Hope this is helpful. I recommend the Ness books on the Japan ground forces (there is also a volume on China's forces).
In summary, Ness entitles the section on Japan's war effort "Plan for Failure." It “hinged almost completely on German ability to neutralize the powers of the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States" and his opinion is that the only possibly viable expansionist course would have been to accept the 1940 demands, withdraw from China and focus on building up the Kwantung Army to invade the USSR in 1941 in tandem with Germany, which might have achieved Axis victory in Asia. He says, though, that “even this, however, is open to question, for the IJA was simply not a modern army in 1941, and was incapable of logistics support over even medium distances.” Rikugen, Vol 1., p51
This does not mean it was ineffectual in its circumstances. “In keeping faith with the code of Bushido it was perhaps the most ferocious close-quarters infantry force in the world. The Samurai spirit, however, valued only direct combat with the enemy. All else was regarded as slightly below the standards expected of a warrior. The result was neglect of all the other branches vital to a modern army.” The supporting arms we will see in our division templates were often dramatically inadequate.
First, the artillery failed to provide reliable fire support throughout the war except in a few sieges such as Bataan. Communications were poor and artillery was often used in direct fire or unobserved fire based on map coordinates - "Shifting of massed fire, as opposed to spreading out assets along the line, was almost never practiced."
Second, "reconnaissance was often neglected in favor of aggressive offensive action by low-level infantry units. The two are not interchangeable, especially given the poor communications of the IJA. Infantry regiments, especially in the south Pacific, often thrashed about in the jungle, uncertain as to where they were or where they were supposed to go. As a result it was almost unheard of for two separated columns to reach the jump-off point for an attack at the same time." Clearly the ability to coordinate attacks was a serious deficiency that has a direct impact on what should happen ingame. Ness notes that "Innate infantry aggressiveness was often enough to overcome this deficiency in the early years of the war when fighting against a poorly-trained enemy, but against a determined and skillful foe it repeatedly led to disasters first seen at Guadalcanal.” How often have we read of the piecemeal nature of many Japanese operations? One of the things I find startling that helps me appreciate many things I have not put together before is that these deficiencies are not matters that can be rectified simply with more equipment or administration, but structural deficiencies based on fundamental aspects of the Imperial Japanese way of war and military culture.
In this connection, Ness writes that “The emphasis on direct aggressive action also tended to devalue the role of staff planning. Staffs were smaller at all headquarters levels than in their Western counterparts and the individuals placed in staff positions were not only overworked but also suffered from a lack of prestige that made it difficult to bring logistical and other non-combat aspects to the fore. There were few repercussions in the intermittent combat in China or during the brief campaigns of early 1942, but in the prolonged heavy combat of Burma and the south Pacific Japanese logistics would prove woefully inadequate.” (p51)Can a true Samurai fight at a desk?
Ness notes that Japan absorbed selectively some of the lessons of WW1 from Europe, foremost from the French “whose belief in the moral power of the offensive, at least early in the war, most closely approached Japanese views.” We can I think draw the conclusion that this cultural filter admitted only what was permissible within the new "Samurai" culture.
Even more startling are the implications of the detailed information Ness compiles, which seems to me to demonstrate a penchant for shifting and reorganizing existing forces and patching together improvised expedients in a variety of combinations in reaction to developments rather than planful organization for war. As I mention in an earlier thread on the subject, the Independent Mixed Brigades were I think the most significant of the non-divisional forces extracted from the divisions and shuffled around the empire as opportunities first and later threats developed. One general trend was that the Kwantung Army had the pick of the recruits and the best (including the "A") divisions prewar, but served as a strategic reserve and was continually drawn upon by other theatres until in 1945 it was essentially a shell of relatively untrained troops.
As he has done the research in copious detail, I am inclined to accept his express conclusion that “Many of the failures can be attributed to Japanese complacency. Already contemptuous of foreigners the early victories against China and the Western Allies reinforced a self-confidence bordering on arrogance." Crucial new tanks, AT guns, AA guns, and artillery "were developed at a leisurely pace" and in what are to me surprisingly small numbers even considering that they used industrial processes well behind the US.
On the level of national policy (which some might call "focus"), "the Japanese seemed to have failed to comprehend the nature of total war. They took little advantage of the chance to build up their army during the period before Pearl Harbor or during the relatively quiet period of late 1942 and 1943. In fact, of the males reporting for induction who were found physically fit in 1941 only 51 percent were actually called to servicve, and this rose to but 60 percent for 1942 and 1943. Only in 1944 was there a significant increase, to 89 percent and then to 90 percent in 1945.* As a result no new divisions were formed, except through consolidation of existing units, between September of 1940 and March of 1943.” p52
“*This represented about 50% of those examined in 1943/43, rising ot 68% in 1944, indicating a probable relaxation of physical standards in the interim as well.” p. 52.
Without going into details, the Japanese realized, particularly after being battered at Nomonhan, and yet slowly even then, the need to bolster their armored forces. Tankettes and cavalry recon were upgraded in formations with actual tanks and other AFVs, even armored engineer vehicles. The army regarded armor as infantry support, while the Kwantung Army had put together an experimental combined arms force as early as 1934. Coordination was problematic, not helped by dearth of radios. Tank production peaked in early 1942 and dropped off to low levels thereafter. Ness goes through the organizational history in detail - in essentials, there were 3 armor divisions and the armor saw some useful service against the Chinese and the Allies except where they sat idle. My practical conclusion is that the tanks were too few and out of date and getting halfway adequate AT guns in production would be essential if facing Soviet armor and mean surmounting major industrial, political and bureaucratic challenges.
The naval side of things is not discussed except as it affects the IJA and IJN ground forces. With the IJN viewing its Pacific bases as unsinkable aircraft carriers, startlingly inadequate consideration was given to their defense against invasion until too late, and often too little. Even the grandiose plan for defense of the home islands was much more on paper than on the ground, handicapped, as was characteristic, by weapons, transport and other logistics deficiencies.
Game designers would be heartlessly "realistic" to force players under restrictions that they need to parallel what Japan did historically, but clearly the "baseline" for Japan needs to take into account what happened historically and the Japanese player should need to work hard (and his cabinet at some "personal" peril from the military) to bend the nation to a serious appreciation of war and pick and choose what he can achieve without incurring backlash or undermining military elan, morale and discipline.
Hope this is helpful. I recommend the Ness books on the Japan ground forces (there is also a volume on China's forces).
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