so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[SchwarzKatze]

You're not realizing that you are not showing causality.

Yes, the US was slapping embargos on Japan because of China. I am well aware of all the evidence you already showed. However, again, why exactly is the US trying to make Japan withdraw to begin with?

Repeatedly, as I have stated, it's because the US was planning for the real enemy which was Germany. Look up the Victory Plan. It was already started in mid 1941!

In short, removing the historical reason for the embargo doesn't mean the US won't embargo Japan for other reasons. Japan not invading China but invading the USSR still leads to war with the US; because that shows Japan is a German ally! Even if the US doesn't attack Japan directly they will still most certainly slap an embargo on someone who allied with their German enemy.

Why do you think the embargo really became crippling after Indochina anyway? The takeover of Indochina was made possible by Germany's conquest of France. And the take-over was a sign of Japan's collusion with Germany.

You're spending way too much time trying to prove that the US embargo'd Japan because of China without realizing that's irrelevant to the argument of whether or not the US will embargo Japan if they invade the USSR. It's only by completely removing the all-important "Germany was America's real enemy" context that the northern strategy has any chance of succeeding; but with these contexts it's readily apparent why they never picked the northern option to begin with - it was economic suicide because Japan knew that America was going to come hard on them for supporting Germany.

I am aware of the implication, that's why I said emphasized that Japan move before Germany did, that Japan won't be seen as following Germany against the Allies but fighting another war on its own, and only later did Germany smell blood and jumped on the USSR.

And the criteria are sort of far-fetched, remember that Germany colluded to partition Eastern Europe for a few years and each invaded several countries, and that didn't put USSR on the "to war" list, yet somehow Japan fighting the USSR, with whom border frictions predate the Nazis, will directly lead to US declaring war. It doesn't follow.

 

[Zinegata]

I know, that's why I said emphasized that Japan move before Germany did, that Japan won't be seen as following Germany against the Allies but fighting another war on its own, and only later did Germany smell blood and jumped on the USSR. Remember that Germany colluded to partition Eastern Europe for a few years and each invaded several countries, and the didn't put USSR on the "to war" list, yet somehow Japan fighting the USSR, with whom border frictions predate the Nazis, will directly lead to US declaring war. It doesn't follow.

While you can reasonably assume that the US might not totally embargo the Japan for attacking the USSR if Germany is not yet involved, that assumption goes out the window when the Germans do invade.

And Japan preempting Germany would have catastrophic effects for Barbarossa as well, since now the Soviets will have mobilized in the face of a Japanese invasion and be better prepared when the Germans do invade.

The problem here really is you're looking for a technicality - it's like Japan trying to *technically* declare war on the US before bombing Pearl Harbor. But that technicality isn't going to change that America just got his by a sneak attack and was enraged by it. Japan going against the USSR first isn't going to change much - yes the US might not embargo them initially, but as soon as the Germans invade then suddenly it's clear they were in this together.

It's just not a scenario that will work unless you assume a completely isolationist America that was not gunning to go to war against Germany.

Finally, you are correct that the US didn't go to war with the Soviets after the Molotov-Ribbontrop Pact and the German-Soviet collusion. But it did result in US-Soviet relations becoming much worse; not to mention British-Soviet relations. Yet when Barbarossa happened the Brits quickly went from icy to warm and was giving all-out support to the Soviets.

 

[scroggin]

One highly possible outcome from a japanese war against russia is, Russia quickly defeats the japs in manchuria and korea. This would free large numbers of soviet troops to fight against the Germans.

 

[Jazumir]

Zingata: I understand your position and where you come from. On a pure political perspective, i tend to agree. But on a strategic note, i dont think a NAP between the western allies and Japan would be detrimental to the allied cause, as i have laid out earlier. Assuming Japan does not intent to attack the western allies while it is at war with the USSR, such a NAP could effectively be ´unileteral´, since the western allies could decide to attack japan - or not to attack japan. It surely seems to be a shorter way to end the war, to focus on germany. After they are defeated, you still are in the position to embargo japan into submission - or battle it there, if neccessary. Or you could move on to ´unthinkable´ from a much better position than historical post-war. And since japan´s war against the USSR largely depends on you supplying the oil for it, you can make sure, they dont get too far (if you dont want to go ´unthinkable´, after germany is beaten). The USSR might be pissed about that, but they can not opt out of the war, anyways...

So, if you put the strategic layer on top of the political one, the outlook changes, it seems to me.

Regarding co-belligrency: I know the situation are not really comparable, mainly due to size, but did the west declare war on finland? Genuine question.

EDIT: If the Japanese would ask me, being POTUS, for such a NAP to start a war with the soviets they can not successfully conclude without the oil i sell them, i would probably not refuse it. It would play all the trumps into my hand and make surprises very unlikely. Why stop the enemy, when he´s making a mistake?

 

[aqvamare]

One highly possible outcome from a japanese war against russia is, Russia quickly defeats the japs in manchuria and korea. This would free large numbers of soviet troops to fight against the Germans.

So untrue...

1.) ground warfare, manschu is bad for japanese without heavy gear, korea on the other side is a nightmare for every tank army. Japanes army in korea would have binded 2-3 mio enemy forces, even when russia+china pushed together against 1941 japanes army. Ask USA UNO army during korea war, how 1mio chinese during perma bombing and no tanks could push them so hard in korea.

2.) numbers: 1941 soviet forces in far east were 720.000 men, from this number sovietunion transfered until 1942 600.000 men to western front against germany, 400.000 until dez 1941, which wer used mostly during the counterattack at moskau, which made up to 40% of all troop used during the battle of moskau on soviet side

the japanes imperial army in 1941 had 1.700.000 men, in 51 division, 27 divs were in china (900.000 men), 13div in manchu (430.000 men), the last 10 div (reserve of 330.000 men) were used on other fronts and home defend.

To counter the 1.300.000 million ground army of japanese, without china, in 1941 in far east, soviets had to dopple there far eastern army from 700.000 to 1.400.000....to understan this number, during 1942 when soviets fought stalingrad, to secure stalingrad soviets used 1.400.000 troops, the counteroffensive in moskau in 1941 used 1.000.000 troops. the failed attack in near moskau in 1942 against AG center used 1.400.000 troops?

where the hell should the soviet army get 1.400.000 more troops for the far east,. when they reduced there starting army from 1941 to 1942 from 700.000 to 200.000 in far east to help at western front?

3.) reserves: the total soviets army over the years from 1941-1945, compare to german army at western front
Date // German + allies // Soviet forces
June 1941 // 3,767,000 3,117,000 (German) 900,000 (Germans elsewhere) // 2,680,000 (in theater) 5,500,000 (overall) (~700,000 in Far East[37])
June 1942 // 3,720,000 2,690,000 (German) (80% Germans in the East) // 5,313,000 (200.000 far east)
July 1943 // 3,933,000 3,483,000 (German) (63% Germans in the East) // 6,724,000 (700.000 fe)
June 1944 // 3,370,000 2,520,000 (German) (62% Germans in the East) // 6,425,000 (700.00 fe)
Jan. 1945 // 2,330,000 2,230,000 (German) (60% Germans in the East) // 6,532,000 (Soviet build up in Far East accelerated greatly since February[37])
Apr 1945 // 1,960,000 // 6,410,000

Japanes army during this timeframe
1941 // 1.700.000
1945 // 5.500.000

So a eastern front around siberia would be the little to much for soviet union, they would need 2-3 mio troops in the east, to hold japanes in bay in korea, or they needed 1 mio troop to hold japanes in bay alongside of transibir railroad. which would reduce there numbers in 1941-1943 at western front so high, that all the sucessful counteroffensives the soviets did, historical, are hard to see that they wozld be sucessfull again.

Image the moral hit to soviets, UK and USa from dez 1941....when counteroffensive failed, becaus eof lack of troops or to little numbers.
Image 1942 stalingrad, when soviets could muster 1.400.000 at stalingrad, but not 1.400.000 at moskau at the same time, because this troops are in the far eas binded.
Image nordlicht, without soviet counteroffensive.

4.) Leand and lease, 50% of leand and lease were transfered through vladiwostok alongeside transibir railroad.
From august 1941 to dezember 1941 through USA shipping, from dez 1941 only thorugh soviet shipping. 8,244,000 tons, or 50% of all support over this way.
Persian corridor, which had 27% of all shipping, were 4,160,000 tons from mid 1942 (before it was not running)
Northern route, 23% of all shipping, 3.900.000 tons, running from aug 1941. loosing rates of 7% of all shipping thourgh german interruption on this route.

With japan in war, soviet union would only get 33% of all leand and lease from 1941-mid 1942....from mid 1942 they would get 50% of historiccal leand and lease.

5.) casualties military

Soviet union military deaths: 8,668,000 to 10,922,000 (only at there western front)
German military deaths: 4,440,000 to 5,318,000 (western + eastern front)[
German allies: hungary 300.000, romania 300.000, italy 320.000, finland 83.000

means kill death rotation from roughly 1:2 for the soviets at there western front, so for every enemy they had to kill in military operation, they had to loose 1 more soldier than the enemy side.

Now look to japanes and china, the main ground for japanes war.
China: 3,000,000 to 3,750,000
Japan:2,100,000 to 2,566,000[

Now the battle of Khalkhin Gol,
Soviet union: 28.000
japan: 23.000

So we can say, kill deat 1:1,2, so soviets need 20% more man to kill 1 japan.

Transfered to japanese looses in ww2, soviets had to pay 2.500.000 to 3.000.000 extra looses from 1941-1945 with a easteren front, and japanes would focus sovietunion and not china.




Facit: if japan and germany would be done a real alliance with a shared enemy and shared wargoals, and not a paper alliance with "we fight everybody and do not concentrate our forces against 1 (bully). I do not see, how sovietunion would have won a 2 front war, with the switch of numbers and logistical support,. they loose through this.

 

[Loke]

Aqvamare; I agree with your analyze that Germany + Japan would have beaten Russia.
Even Germany or Japan vs Russia, the outcome is not certain, thats one reason why strategy gaming is fun.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

Regarding co-belligrency: I know the situation are not really comparable, mainly due to size, but did the west declare war on finland? Genuine question.

UK did, I'm not sure if the US ever bothered.

where the hell should the soviet army get 1.400.000 more troops for the far east,. when they reduced there starting army from 1941 to 1942 from 700.000 to 200.000 in far east to help at western front??

Can you source this very low figure? Glantz, in Part 1 of August Storm, describes the strength of Far East dwindling to 32 division equivalents by Dec '41 and later rising back to 48. Stavka planners assumed they would be facing 50 divisions, 1200 tanks and 3000 aircraft from Japan and hoped to have 33-34 divisions in order to maintain stable defense (I'd actually take that as bit optimistic). 200.000 men sounds quite low for 32 "division equivalents". He later repeats the manpower/equipment table that was linked to earlier in this thread (the Russian site).

I would conjecture that the reason there is such jump in Soviet strength between mid '41 and mid '42 (according to Glantz's table it goes from about 700.000 to about 1.4 million) is because of general mobilisation and the 500,000+ transfers away from Far East should be reduced from this greater number. It would have been extreme mobilization if most of this extra manpower represents men from Transbaikal (it would be with present day population!). It might be possible that recently mobilized men from beyond Urals in general were shipped to Far East in large numbers (to form up units and do basic training) because there were facilities and stocks of equipment there.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

So untrue...

Pretty well describes your post there.

So untrue...Japanes army during this timeframe
1941 // 1.700.000
1945 // 5.500.000

So a eastern front around siberia would be the little to much for soviet union, they would need 2-3 mio troops in the east, to hold japanes in bay in korea, or they needed 1 mio troop to hold japanes in bay alongside of transibir railroad. which would reduce there numbers in 1941-1943 at western front so high, that all the sucessful counteroffensives the soviets did, historical, are hard to see that they wozld be sucessfull again.

means kill death rotation from roughly 1:2 for the soviets at there western front, so for every enemy they had to kill in military operation, they had to loose 1 more soldier than the enemy side.

The Japanese army never reached the level of equipment that the Soviets had, nevermind equipment and tactical expertise that the Germans had. Suddenly pretending that the Japanese can fight like the Germans is 100% fantasy land, so toss out your 1:2 ratio right there.

Particularly the 5.5 million number involved a lot of notably poorly trained and poorly equipped soldiers being raised to defend the home islands, Japan didn't have the GDP to field a 5.5 million man army with any real amount of equipment to fight a mechanized war.

As an example, the 1 million men involved in fighting the Chinese in 1941 had just 2548 Field artillery pieces and 742 tanks, compare this to the 1440 tanks and 2230 guns moved off the TransBaikal Front in 1941 along with 30000 men. Alternatively the 1.2-1.4 million men defending Moscow in 1941 had 3232 tanks and 7600 guns.

By 1945 the 1.5 million men invading Manchuria had 27000 artillery pieces, 1152 rocket launchers, 5556 tanks and self propelled guns facing the 700 000 Japanese troops with 5360 artillery, 1155 tanks and 1215 armored vehicles.

On a per capita basis, this is how many tanks and artillery each force had per 100 000 men.

230 tanks 543 arty Moscow 1941 Soviets

81 tanks 1222 arty Uranus 1942 Soviets

294 tanks 1896 arty Kursk counter-offensive 1943 Soviets*

370 tanks 1800 arty Invasion of Manchuria 1945 Soviets

74 tanks 256 arty Invasion of China 1941 Japanese

165 tanks 765 arty Kwangtung 1945 Japanese

52 tanks 736 arty Moscow 1941 Germans

185 tanks 1111 arty Stalingrad August 1942 Germans

346 tanks 1007 arty Kursk counter-offensive 1943 Germans*

133 tanks ( and assault guns ) 1000 arty Bagration 1944 Germans

There's a pretty common thread here, the Japanese armies were poorly equipped compared to either the Germans or the Soviets and at no point did they develop sufficiently good tanks to make up for a numbers disadvantage. While Japan might be able to narrow this gap closing it is impossible, fighting at a material disadvantage will be inevitable, particularly since Soviet Deep Battle was all about arranging for material advantages before a major confrontation. Between the material deficiencies of the Japanese and the tactical challenges ( in the form of terrain ) and deficiencies ( compared to the Germans ) there's no way the Japanese are ever going to manage to perform as well as the Germans did against the Soviets. I'd bring out the actual fights the Soviets and Japanese had as an example but the absolute numbers advantage the Soviets had in those engagements makes it hard to say for certain and easy for people to imagine other outcomes. What's more certain is the material deficiencies of the Japanese and the relatively poor GDP they had to fix it with.

 

[aqvamare]

Did you read my post?

I never said japan get 1:2 kill death rotation like germany+ allies got against soviet union.

I only assumes that japan will get a 1:1,2 rotation, like they historical did in the battle of Khalkhin Gol,
Soviet union: 28.000
japan: 23.000
-> 20% higher looses on soviet side than on japan side.

Than i transfered the japan causalties of second world war, 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 and transfered it into the soviet numbers which soviets needed for a eastern front against japan.
-> 2.500.000 to 3.000.000.
Even with 1:1 rotation, it would be 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 extra looses on soviet side, and you can asume you need the same number as extra troop at a eastern front.
So 2mio up to 3mio soviet forces binded in the east, 2-3 mio which couldn't be used in the west.
----
5.500.000 are home defend in 1945, poorly trained. And what are soviet troops during 1941-1945? 1:2 kill death rotation do no show that there training standart is high either.
----
You all say, japan would not build good equicment during a landware, germany didn't update there landequicment from 1939-1942, because they didn't face a goodtank from western production.
They updated there panzer IV from short 70mm to long 70mm (the mainforce in battle of kursk) only through the need from soviet T-34.

Allies only updated there sherman to 75mm firefly post 1944 and normady (only good tank during the second world war), after Tiger showed them the useless of there tanks.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_3_Chi-Nu

75mm, japanese counter to sherman, would be good enough against T-34. If faced with T-34 in 1941...japanese would deploy this tank not in 1944, they would deploy it in 1942. And in 1942 he would not worse than german Panzer IV at this time.

Japanese army didn't get up to date equicment, because japan couldn't produc it, they do not get up to date equciment, because they never needed it against Soviets in 1939 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_95_Ha-Go with 37mm is same level like Panzer II or III, and all soviet tanks t this time), it is same level UK and france could produce. So it is up to date wartank in 1939.

From 1943 onwards, they builded ships which were sunked by the US navy, because of there "south" strategy.

But in this thread, we disuss a "north" strategie without china and war in the south.
And the numbers and real facts during WW2 show, that sovietunion in 1941, faced with a two front war, would simply have a much more harder time to survive than in reality. And in reality, they had already a hard time with only 1 front, a suggar daddy who gaves tham everythin a army needs in the ass.

And there are still people here in the forum, who say japan would be useless and a cakewalk for the soviets in 1941.

That are the same level of strategist in USA, UK and germany, who thought soviet union is a cakewalk for Hitler germany.

 

[aqvamare]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=149223

The thread I us for getting my reference for transfered troops from far east to western front.

 

[teamgene]

Did you read my post?

....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_3_Chi-Nu

75mm, japanese counter to sherman, would be good enough against T-34. If faced with T-34 in 1941...japanese would deploy this tank not in 1944, they would deploy it in 1942. And in 1942 he would not worse than german Panzer IV at this time.

Japanese army didn't get up to date equicment, because japan couldn't produc it, they do not get up to date equciment, because they never needed it against Soviets in 1939 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_95_Ha-Go with 37mm is same level like Panzer II or III, and all soviet tanks t this time), it is same level UK and france could produce. So it is up to date wartank in 1939.

....

If the Type 3 would have been built earlier it would have had a 47mm gun, not the 75mm.

37mm on Type 95 was a low velocity gun.

 

[Loke]

Pretty well describes your post there.



The Japanese army never reached the level of equipment that the Soviets had, nevermind equipment and tactical expertise that the Germans had. Suddenly pretending that the Japanese can fight like the Germans is 100% fantasy land, so toss out your 1:2 ratio right there.

Particularly the 5.5 million number involved a lot of notably poorly trained and poorly equipped soldiers being raised to defend the home islands, Japan didn't have the GDP to field a 5.5 million man army with any real amount of equipment to fight a mechanized war.

As an example, the 1 million men involved in fighting the Chinese in 1941 had just 2548 Field artillery pieces and 742 tanks, compare this to the 1440 tanks and 2230 guns moved off the TransBaikal Front in 1941 along with 30000 men. Alternatively the 1.2-1.4 million men defending Moscow in 1941 had 3232 tanks and 7600 guns.

By 1945 the 1.5 million men invading Manchuria had 27000 artillery pieces, 1152 rocket launchers, 5556 tanks and self propelled guns facing the 700 000 Japanese troops with 5360 artillery, 1155 tanks and 1215 armored vehicles.

On a per capita basis, this is how many tanks and artillery each force had per 100 000 men.

230 tanks 543 arty Moscow 1941 Soviets

81 tanks 1222 arty Uranus 1942 Soviets

294 tanks 1896 arty Kursk counter-offensive 1943 Soviets*

370 tanks 1800 arty Invasion of Manchuria 1945 Soviets

74 tanks 256 arty Invasion of China 1941 Japanese

165 tanks 765 arty Kwangtung 1945 Japanese

52 tanks 736 arty Moscow 1941 Germans

185 tanks 1111 arty Stalingrad August 1942 Germans

346 tanks 1007 arty Kursk counter-offensive 1943 Germans*

133 tanks ( and assault guns ) 1000 arty Bagration 1944 Germans

There's a pretty common thread here, the Japanese armies were poorly equipped compared to either the Germans or the Soviets and at no point did they develop sufficiently good tanks to make up for a numbers disadvantage. While Japan might be able to narrow this gap closing it is impossible, fighting at a material disadvantage will be inevitable, particularly since Soviet Deep Battle was all about arranging for material advantages before a major confrontation. Between the material deficiencies of the Japanese and the tactical challenges ( in the form of terrain ) and deficiencies ( compared to the Germans ) there's no way the Japanese are ever going to manage to perform as well as the Germans did against the Soviets. I'd bring out the actual fights the Soviets and Japanese had as an example but the absolute numbers advantage the Soviets had in those engagements makes it hard to say for certain and easy for people to imagine other outcomes. What's more certain is the material deficiencies of the Japanese and the relatively poor GDP they had to fix it with.

What sources do you use?

 

[aqvamare]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O-I

1940 tank design, never more than prototyp. But the interesting is the 105mm cannon. If you are in need in a strong anti tank weapon, there would be a really strong weapon ready to us.


http://forum.axishistory.com/download/file.php?id=360871

Here a list of the captured material in japan and korea in 1945 through US army.
Big point, for japan artillery was more important than tanks.

 

[Gethsemani]

Did you read my post?

I never said japan get 1:2 kill death rotation like germany+ allies got against soviet union.

I only assumes that japan will get a 1:1,2 rotation, like they historical did in the battle of Khalkhin Gol,
Soviet union: 28.000
japan: 23.000
-> 20% higher looses on soviet side than on japan side.

Than i transfered the japan causalties of second world war, 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 and transfered it into the soviet numbers which soviets needed for a eastern front against japan.
-> 2.500.000 to 3.000.000.
Even with 1:1 rotation, it would be 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 extra looses on soviet side, and you can asume you need the same number as extra troop at a eastern front.
So 2mio up to 3mio soviet forces binded in the east, 2-3 mio which couldn't be used in the west.

You can not count this way, period. You can not take casualty figures from one battle and extrapolate for an entire war. You can not directly compare different ways to count casualties in different countries and assume they "speak the same language". The idea that the Axis had a 2:1 K/D ratio against the USSR is false, just look at the closest Barbarossa thread on this forum to find an explanation of why.

So in short: Your numbers are pure fiction. They mean nothing.

5.500.000 are home defend in 1945, poorly trained. And what are soviet troops during 1941-1945? 1:2 kill death rotation do no show that there training standart is high either.

60% of Red Army losses were inflicted within the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, from June 1941 to December 1941. After that the USSR starts trading soldiers about one to one with the Axis on the Eastern Front. A Soviet soldier on the western front in autumn 1941 was most likely ill-equipped and ill-trained, but it does not hold true for most other Soviet soldiers. Especially not the soldiers found in the East, guarding the border against Manchukuko. The soldiers posted in the East had plenty of time to train and would have performed well in case of war (as was seen when some of the arrived on the West front in 1941, the fabled "Siberian divisions").

You all say, japan would not build good equicment during a landware, germany didn't update there landequicment from 1939-1942, because they didn't face a goodtank from western production.
They updated there panzer IV from short 70mm to long 70mm (the mainforce in battle of kursk) only through the need from soviet T-34.

75mm, japanese counter to sherman, would be good enough against T-34. If faced with T-34 in 1941...japanese would deploy this tank not in 1944, they would deploy it in 1942. And in 1942 he would not worse than german Panzer IV at this time.

Japanese army didn't get up to date equicment, because japan couldn't produc it, they do not get up to date equciment, because they never needed it against Soviets in 1939 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_95_Ha-Go with 37mm is same level like Panzer II or III, and all soviet tanks t this time), it is same level UK and france could produce. So it is up to date wartank in 1939.

Japan did not have either the industrial capacity to produce heavy equipment in anywhere near USSR levels or the engineering knowledge to design advanced tanks. The simple truth is that Japan did not have the industry required to fight a war with the USSR and that they could never design heavy equipment to compete with that of the Red Army. The Type 97 was pretty much the best tank the Japanese actually used during the war, because they took way too long to get a better working design. If Japan had had the capability to design better heavy equipment in the 30's and 40's, they would have capitalized on that ability.

From 1943 onwards, they builded ships which were sunked by the US navy, because of there "south" strategy.

But in this thread, we disuss a "north" strategie without china and war in the south.

There can be no "North" strategy without a "South" strategy, because trying to invade Siberia without the rare materials and oil in South-East Asia would have churned Japan's industry to a halt. Trying to imagine an invasion of the USSR without simultaneous or prior invasions of Brunei, Dutch East Indies etc. is more akin to playing with toy soldiers then actual "what-if"-scenarios, because it is totally divorced from reality.

And the numbers and real facts during WW2 show, that sovietunion in 1941, faced with a two front war, would simply have a much more harder time to survive than in reality. And in reality, they had already a hard time with only 1 front, a suggar daddy who gaves tham everythin a army needs in the ass.

The trickle of Lend-Lease was minuscule in 1941, it only really took off in 1943 and onward.

Furthermore, what exactly is there to defend in Siberia? The USSR could easily give ground on two fronts because the Siberian front would be lots and lots of untamed wilderness with nothing of value. The Red Army could easily have gone full scorched earth for thousands upon thousands of miles, forcing the Japanese to move forward into undeveloped wilderness with only a few railroads to support their entire army. This is literally a war that the USSR can not lose (if things go bad, just retreat until the Japanese supply lines fail, then counter-attack and re-take everything) and the Japanese can not win. Not that there's anything in it for Japan to begin with, apart from getting to lay claim to Vladivostok, Port Arthur and a few other places of dubious strategic importance.

And there are still people here in the forum, who say japan would be useless and a cakewalk for the soviets in 1941.

That are the same level of strategist in USA, UK and germany, who thought soviet union is a cakewalk for Hitler germany.

The Japanese lacked Germany's ability to rapidly advance and access to heavy equipment. They stood against the best troops in the Red Army in a theater of war that was largely wilderness, without any proper targets to take and no war goals to achieve. The same theater of war is also directly hostile to all forms of military maneuvers for some 6-10 months every year depending on the length of the winter and has a climate that directly favors the defender and which their enemy has lots of experience fighting and surviving in and the Japanese has no practical experience of.

Would Japan be a cakewalk? Maybe not. But no matter how well they fought they would still have lost a war against the USSR, simply by virtue of the unwinnable nature of the project. There was no chance that Japan could advance West far enough to threaten the Soviet heartland but a sizable chance that the USSR would be able to advance into Manchukuko and force Japan out of it.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=149223

The thread I us for getting my reference for transfered troops from far east to western front.

For whatever the reason, I can't open the link even though I can view the main page of the forums. In any case, I'm not really disputing the transfers, but the amount of troops left despite them. At least nominally (i.e. they might be recently mobilized men in recently formed units and might even be in the theatre only administratively on paper) the Soviet manpower in Far East seems to have doubled between start of the war and mid '42.

 

[Loke]

You can not count this way, period. You can not take casualty figures from one battle and extrapolate for an entire war. You can not directly compare different ways to count casualties in different countries and assume they "speak the same language". The idea that the Axis had a 2:1 K/D ratio against the USSR is false, just look at the closest Barbarossa thread on this forum to find an explanation of why.

So in short: Your numbers are pure fiction. They mean nothing.

Yes they do have an impact on the calculation, he has numbers and sources for them. Do you have a source? I mean you do say his are false, pure fiction and that they mean nothing...

60% of Red Army losses were inflicted within the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, from June 1941 to December 1941. After that the USSR starts trading soldiers about one to one with the Axis on the Eastern Front. A Soviet soldier on the western front in autumn 1941 was most likely ill-equipped and ill-trained, but it does not hold true for most other Soviet soldiers. Especially not the soldiers found in the East, guarding the border against Manchukuko. The soldiers posted in the East had plenty of time to train and would have performed well in case of war (as was seen when some of the arrived on the West front in 1941, the fabled "Siberian divisions").

Sources for this?

 

[Amur_Tiger]

Did you read my post?

I never said japan get 1:2 kill death rotation like germany+ allies got against soviet union.

I only assumes that japan will get a 1:1,2 rotation, like they historical did in the battle of Khalkhin Gol,
Soviet union: 28.000
japan: 23.000
-> 20% higher looses on soviet side than on japan side.

I did, different conventions in expressing decimal points sorta confused the issue and made it look like you meant 1:1.2 ( our convention )

Than i transfered the japan causalties of second world war, 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 and transfered it into the soviet numbers which soviets needed for a eastern front against japan.
-> 2.500.000 to 3.000.000.
Even with 1:1 rotation, it would be 2,100,000 to 2,566,000 extra looses on soviet side, and you can asume you need the same number as extra troop at a eastern front.
So 2mio up to 3mio soviet forces binded in the east, 2-3 mio which couldn't be used in the west.
----

Even deploying 2 million men against the Soviets would have been a challenge from what I can tell they never had that sort of deployed manpower early in the war, reserves sure but given the equipment issues the Japanese already have arming all of those 2 million men is going to be a challenge at best.

5.500.000 are home defend in 1945, poorly trained. And what are soviet troops during 1941-1945? 1:2 kill death rotation do no show that there training standart is high either.

I'd venture to guess that the average Soviet soldier over those years was better trained then an average Japanese Soldier in 1945, many of which are going to be a result of the mass recruitment in anticipation of a US attack. Compare this to the Soviets who if nothing else had built up a fair bit of experience by 1945 and had veterans of many battles scattered through their army. 1941 Soviet vs 1945 Japanese is probably going to be a better comparison as they faced a similar number of fresh raised troops after the initial losses of Barbarossa.

You all say, japan would not build good equicment during a landware, germany didn't update there landequicment from 1939-1942, because they didn't face a goodtank from western production.
They updated there panzer IV from short 70mm to long 70mm (the mainforce in battle of kursk) only through the need from soviet T-34.

Allies only updated there sherman to 75mm firefly post 1944 and normady (only good tank during the second world war), after Tiger showed them the useless of there tanks.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_3_Chi-Nu

75mm, japanese counter to sherman, would be good enough against T-34. If faced with T-34 in 1941...japanese would deploy this tank not in 1944, they would deploy it in 1942. And in 1942 he would not worse than german Panzer IV at this time.

Actually my issue wasn't primarily about quality, but quantity, whatever the quality of Japanese equipment they just didn't build a lot of it, just take your Type 95 as an example, 2300 built over the entirety of the war. Assuming that they had all of them on hand at the end of the war ( they wouldn't but we'll be generous ) that's about 46 of those tanks per 100 000 men by the time you reach that 5 million man army mark.

But since we're addressing the quality issue....

Obviously the T-34s and KV-1s of the world are going to be a bit rough to try and counter but this is less of Japan having poor quality equipment and more of the Soviet tanks being notably good for their time.

The Type 3 you mention was made in 1944, and looks to be a poorly armored Pz4 analogue with the L43. At best this might show up a year after fighting the Soviets, but that's going to be a rough year, really rough actually as unlike the Russian steppe this isn't tank country to begin with. Offensives are going to move very slowly and mechanized forces are going to be tightly restricted to the few areas that could support them and have space for them to fight. Either way it's pretty clear that in tanks the Japanese were behind the curve historically and unlikely to completely catch up.

Japanese army didn't get up to date equicment, because japan couldn't produc it, they do not get up to date equciment, because they never needed it against Soviets in 1939 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_95_Ha-Go with 37mm is same level like Panzer II or III, and all soviet tanks t this time), it is same level UK and france could produce. So it is up to date wartank in 1939.

From 1943 onwards, they builded ships which were sunked by the US navy, because of there "south" strategy.

Absolutely, if you want to pull the Yamatos and Shokakus out of the naval lineup then you can start to narrow the gap in equipment between Japan and the Soviets.

But in this thread, we disuss a "north" strategie without china and war in the south.
And the numbers and real facts during WW2 show, that sovietunion in 1941, faced with a two front war, would simply have a much more harder time to survive than in reality. And in reality, they had already a hard time with only 1 front, a suggar daddy who gaves tham everythin a army needs in the ass.

And there are still people here in the forum, who say japan would be useless and a cakewalk for the soviets in 1941.

That are the same level of strategist in USA, UK and germany, who thought soviet union is a cakewalk for Hitler germany.

I'm honestly not sure how much harder Japan can make things as there's some pretty huge wild cards left unaddressed.

1. Timing, some of this discussion has been around Japan striking before the Germans, other parts it's after the Germans, mostly in an effort to avoid the 18 month deadline of their oil supplies.

2. Soviet reaction, immensely important in the losses the Soviets took during the war was reacting poorly to situations as they presented themselves. Everyone who's advocating for the idea that the Soviets are screwed is assuming that the Soviets react just as poorly with less resources ( due to two front war ). At least a few of those 'costly counter-offensives' are going to be cancelled due to the resources pulled into fighting Japan and that can't be a bad thing for the early-war Red Army. Whether it's enough to balance out the loss of men and materiel to the far east fight is anyone's guess.

3. Terrain, it's going to be something like fighting in Korea, large mobile offensives are going to be extremely challenging. This might play into the Japanese preference for light skirmishing warfare or this might play into the Soviet defenders, it could well restrict the amount of fighting possible on the front no matter how much the Soviets and Japanese wish to commit.

If you call all of these wild cards in favor of the Japanese then they'll have a major impact, if only some go the Japanese way then a limited impact and if all of these favor the Soviets the Japanese may inadvertently end up helping the Soviets.

To explain the last one there, an early Japanese invasion that faces an effective Soviet counter-attack that kicks them out of Manchuria while Germany's still busy with France could bloody the Soviets and secure their eastern flank in advance of Barbarossa and leave them better off.[/quote][/QUOTE]

 

[Gethsemani]

Yes they do have an impact on the calculation, he has numbers and sources for them. Do you have a source? I mean you do say his is false...

No they don't. It is bad science, period. Especially since the numbers are misleading (the USSR routinely lump "Sick & Wounded" into category, Japan only counts wounded, if we look at only wounded the numbers are pretty much 1:1 for Khalkin Gol). Just go read the wikipedia article he linked.

It would be like me going onto a lung medicine ward and concluding that a majority of patients in modern hospitals have COLD or lung cancer. The sample size is too small and the sample too localized to be relevant.

Sources for this?

You were active in the last thread were this fact was brought up (one of the Barbarossa ones), if you can't remember the source from there I ain't gonna bother to dig it up again.

 

[Loke]

No they don't. It is bad science, period. Especially since the numbers are misleading (the USSR routinely lump "Sick & Wounded" into category, Japan only counts wounded, if we look at only wounded the numbers are pretty much 1:1 for Khalkin Gol). Just go read the wikipedia article he linked.

It would be like me going onto a lung medicine ward and concluding that a majority of patients in modern hospitals have COLD or lung cancer. The sample size is too small and the sample too localized to be relevant.

It would be so much easier if you just post a link to your sources so I can go read myself instead of calling Aqvamares sources for "pure fiction", " false" and "that they mean nothing". He has sources you do not.

 

[Gethsemani]

It would be so much easier if you just post a link to your sources so I can go read myself instead of calling Aqvamares sources for "pure fiction", " false" and "that they mean nothing". He has sources you do not.

I gave you one source, the same one he is using (the Battle of Khalkin Gol article on wikipedia, go read). The numbers are simple math: 4 million casualties killed/missing/captured from the USSR in Operation Barbarossa, out of a total of 10 million dead for the entire war. See how easy that was? Now can you stop holding up the actual discussion by asking for sources for information that is already widely available on this forum and on the wider internet for anyone who cares to go looking?

It is not as if these sources are particularly important either, since my main point is the lack of valid reasons to attack north for Japan and their inability to score a victory even if they were.