so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[Loke]

Hkrommel I think it was who asked for your sources and your answer was;

Demanding that I present more accurate figures is silly. The point is that the figures you used are inaccurate to begin with; which means they should not be used at all.

You did not present any sources that backs your point of view.

So,,,all we have, for better or worse, is the Wikipedia Kalkin Gol article - When we check the results - Russia lost more than Japan.

 

[Loke]

You don't understand or are pretending not to understand the concept of source repudiation through demonstration of internal inconsistency, do you? So you're going to pretend that your source which can't decide if 1,000 or 3,000 Japanese are captured is nonetheless totally accurate so we can make kill ratio assessments out of it... despite it also saying the Japanese were crushed.

Okay then, I will accept your concession; along with your concession of Dinqi's post by failure to address it. There's no point if you're that incapable of comprehension.

There is no need for you to get personal, you do not know me.
I have stated it before and I will do it again, we have only one source of information and that is what I am basing my conclusion upon.

 

[Jazumir]

I think the crux of the problem is, wether if Japan had colaborated with the germans in their attempt to destroy the USSR - would that have led to war with US as well? Wether this would have been a (more) viable strategy than their historical choice seems to entirely depend on this point and examining that could solve the question, if it leads to sustainable results (which may very well not be possible). All japanese preparation or soviet reaction pale in face of this one point.

One possible entry point might be to acertain, one way or the other, wether or not the US would have accepted a japanese blockade of the USSR. They didnt with the UK, and while that didnt mean immediate war with germany, it made it all the more likely the longer the blockade draged on (also in parallel to WW1). The speed in which escalation takes place, if the blockader is determined to actually blockade without gaps, is dictated in this scenario by the blockade runner and by his willingness to blow up predictable losses as results of horrendous war crimes: For any ship lost in the blockade, the public could either go ´Meh, we had it coming for us - so let´s just carry on...´ to ´OMG! It was a civilian vessel, clearly flagged neutral,l and who cares what it had on board! American lives were lost! REVENGE!!´.

So, i´d say, if a combined invasion of the USSR does not prompt the US to react rather immediately with military force (asap - and assuming changes in the japanese preparations, they could start with their pacific holdings), any blockade (of almost any country) gives its government the option to become belligrent at any time in the future, if the blockade is determined to stop them.

Like imagine the USSR had tried to push its convoy through to cuba in, eh, the sixties, on the grounds that they have the right of free trade and their are in intenational waters and whatnot... If they had really had insisted, they could have had WW3 in no time. A blockade is an invitation to any force able to project power to start a war with you - which may start actually, months before dow-notes are exchanged (e.g. "Shoot first!").

 

[Zinegata]

There is no need for you to get personal, you do not know me.
I have stated it before and I will do it again, we have only one source of information and that is what I am basing my conclusion upon.

I never made it personal to begin with? You clearly did not understand the concept; else why would you attempt to talk past it?

And really, it seems you're just saying that to paint me in a bad light while at the same time rather pointlessly repeating your already discredited source. But all is fine as I've already gracefully accepted your concession and that your numbers are in fact unusable.

See, two can play at this parrot game.

 

[Zinegata]

I think the crux of the problem is, wether if Japan had colaborated with the germans in their attempt to destroy the USSR - would that have led to war with US as well? Wether this would have been a (more) viable strategy than their historical choice seems to entirely depend on this point and examining that could solve the question, if it leads to sustainable results (which may very well not be possible). All japanese preparation or soviet reaction pale in face of this one point.

Yep. War with USSR = War with America too.

One possible entry point might be to acertain, one way or the other, wether or not the US would have accepted a japanese blockade of the USSR. They didnt with the UK, and while that didnt mean immediate war with germany, it made it all the more likely the longer the blockade draged on (also in parallel to WW1). The speed in which escalation takes place, if the blockader is determined to actually blockade without gaps, is dictated in this scenario by the blockade runner and by his willingness to blow up predictable losses as results of horrendous war crimes: For any ship lost in the blockade, the public could either go ´Meh, we had it coming for us - so let´s just carry on...´ to ´OMG! It was a civilian vessel, clearly flagged neutral,l and who cares what it had on board! American lives were lost! REVENGE!!´.

The US wouldn't accept blockade against Russia, the problem is how to break the blockade and deliver the supplies to the Soviets. Note that Japan has an actual battlefleet to harass Soviet shipping.

 

[Jazumir]

Okay, hold on. Just stating what you believe cuts it a bit short - why do you believe the US would declare war on japan over them going to war with the USSR? They didnt do it for germany...

As for the ability to actually do something about the blockade: Let´s assume, that Japan did prepare for a more continental war and somehow has less fleet but more tanks, say. So its naval capacity is diminished somewhat when compared to real life. OTOH, it´s not like vladivostok is next to pearl or even guam, when compared to its distance from japanese bases (air & sea). And then there´s the problem, that once it falls - where do the convoys go, esp in the winter?

All these things must have been considered by the strategy makers in the US back then, right? Isnt there some color-coded plan they had for this scenario? Maybe it would be possible to find indications in those?

 

[Zinegata]

Okay, hold on. Just stating what you believe cuts it a bit short - why do you believe the US would declare war on japan over them going to war with the US? They didnt do it for germany...

Because the US never planned a war with Japan to begin with in the historical timeline. They were in fact negotiating peace with Japan because they expected to be going to war with Germany already and very soon.

It has always been a big myth that the US wasn't going to declare war on Germany without Pearl Harbor. America had already started mobilizing in 1940 and the Victory Plan - which was meant to liberate Europe - was already ongoing in mid 1941.

Japan not going to war with America may in fact accelerate American involvement in Europe - even if war wasn't declared you will see more US Navy ships in the Atlantic supporting British convoys (they were already doing so in late 1941, and one US destroyer was even sunk by U-boats and almost led to war). Meanwhile Japan invading the USSR instantly makes Japan a US/British enemy because they need to keep the Soviets in play to ensure the Germans don't just crush any US/UK beachhead in France. Note that the British in fact sent most of their 1941 tank production to the Soviets just to try and keep them in the war; albeit the tanks did kinda prove crappy.

As for the ability to actually do something about the blockade: Let´s assume, that Japan did prepare for a more continental war and somehow has less fleet but more tanks, say. So its naval capacity is diminished somewhat when compared to real life. OTOH, it´s not like vladivostok is next to pearl or even guam, when compared to its distance from japanese bases (air & sea). And then there´s the problem, that once it falls - where do the convoys go, esp in the winter?

All these things must have been considered by the strategy makers in the US back then, right? Isnt there some color-coded plan they had for this scenario? Maybe it would be possible to find indications in those?

Japan doesn't really need to take Vladivostok. It's so close to Japan and so far from the US that the IJN's home forces could blockade it well enough. The Soviets meanwhile had no real fleet. Even assuming a weaker IJN due to an IJA buildup we're talking about a Japan with Nagato-class battleships and several fleet carriers - as all of these were already built/in-building in the 20s.

The real problem is that if Japan goes north to the USSR then the US just slaps back the oil embargo again. Hence Japan's war machine literally crashes to a halt within a few months.

This is why Japan HAD to go South. They HAD to take the oil in Brunei. And this is why they had to take on America.

That said, even in a war against America the Japanese could still put Vladivostok under blockade. They didn't do this historically. They in fact allowed completely unarmed Soviet merchant ships to freely ship goods from America to Vladivostok. The vast majority of early Soviet Lend-Lease grain in fact went through this route. It may have in fact been possible to cut it and make the life of the USSR harder had the Japanese blockaded Vladivostok after declaring war on America.

 

[Jazumir]

I see. So the question is not if, but when. If we assume they were on a build-up to war with germany anyways with some date planed ahead to get officially belligrent, would that date then also be the one for japan? That would give them at least a couple of months time between going to war with the USSR and the western allies. But the embargo would be rather immediate... it could prompt the japanese to conduct a surprise attack of some sort (even with less fleet)... but how likely is that? ;P

We are at peace with china, right, on pre Marco-Polo borders (i wonder how long that would last in this scenario)? So we should have a couple of divisions to spare to go around the pacific and the dutch islands, right? But this pushes the timeline so far back - how do we even know, germany is ever going to attack the soviets - that we are not subdueing our entire long term strategy to a war that may never come?

And if we dont push the timeline back that far, the question arises, why the japanese did not blockade vladiwostok after pearl - it seems they thought it would hurt them more than it would hurt the soviets...

 

[SchwarzKatze]

And thinking there would be no embargo against Japan because they withdrew from China is wishful thinking. Again, America's main concern was Germany. Japan invading the Soviet Union in concert with the German kinda gives America an even bigger reason to go to embargo Japan.

Again, see Hull Note presented earlier, here's the interesting parts:

Section 2

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support-militarily, politically, economically-any Government or regime in China other than the national Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

Color:
Grey: Probably not binding, notice that they used "will endeavor to V" instead of "will V"
Green: Favorable to the US
Yellow: Favorable to Japan
White: Appears to be rather neutral

Though 2. is definitely pro-US, and I assume Japanese economy was way more fragile in 8.

Yep. War with USSR = War with America too.

We're talking about a Japan that didn't further invade China after 1933 nor snatched Allied countries' colonies. Unlike IRL, Japan likely didn't commit as nearly many war crimes nor bombed the US, and for the US, Japan would be "an enemy of an enemy of my enemy", far from "enemy". Japan also had no juicy colonies up for grab in convenient places, unlike the earlier wars with Mexico and Spain.

One possible entry point might be to acertain, one way or the other, wether or not the US would have accepted a japanese blockade of the USSR. They didnt with the UK, and while that didnt mean immediate war with germany, it made it all the more likely the longer the blockade draged on (also in parallel to WW1). The speed in which escalation takes place, if the blockader is determined to actually blockade without gaps, is dictated in this scenario by the blockade runner and by his willingness to blow up predictable losses as results of horrendous war crimes: For any ship lost in the blockade, the public could either go ´Meh, we had it coming for us - so let´s just carry on...´ to ´OMG! It was a civilian vessel, clearly flagged neutral,l and who cares what it had on board! American lives were lost! REVENGE!!´.

So, i´d say, if a combined invasion of the USSR does not prompt the US to react rather immediately with military force (asap - and assuming changes in the japanese preparations, they could start with their pacific holdings), any blockade (of almost any country) gives its government the option to become belligrent at any time in the future, if the blockade is determined to stop them.

Like imagine the USSR had tried to push its convoy through to cuba in, eh, the sixties, on the grounds that they have the right of free trade and their are in intenational waters and whatnot... If they had really had insisted, they could have had WW3 in no time. A blockade is an invitation to any force able to project power to start a war with you - which may start actually, months before dow-notes are exchanged (e.g. "Shoot first!").

In reality, any military vessel is fast enough to board a freighter - there's no need to shoot. And Japan could form a line outside of every ports in the Russian Far East, unlike Germany, so there's little chance someone could make it through even if no shot is fired. Though it's not going to be in the Cuban way, there must be hostilities between Japan and USSR for Japan to seal the waters off, telling everyone that this is a warzone that's offlimits. If the freighters were turned back or towed back at the blockade line, it's no more insulting than arresting neutral citizens who tried to walk through an active trench line and sending them back.

And if we dont push the timeline back that far, the question arises, why the japanese did not blockade vladiwostok after pearl - it seems they thought it would hurt them more than it would hurt the soviets...

Because Japan and the dominant faction within the military opted to stay peaceful with the USSR with their Southern Plan and gave a giant middle finger to anyone trying otherwise, hence the basically-almighty commander of the Kwantung Army was sent to reserves for his aggression against them. Kodoha had fallen in 1936 so there's no one he could seek help from.

 

[Jazumir]

So what do you think the reaction of the US would have been? Do they send freighters to get stopped or do they accept the blockade?

 

[SchwarzKatze]

So what do you think the reaction of the US would have been? Do they send freighters to get stopped or do they accept the blockade?

I don't think there will be many attempts provided that the ports are blocked, see how US didn't really try to supply China via ship even if most of the southeastern coastline outside of 5 major ports remained Chinese-controlled.

 

[Dromido]

Japan invaded the U.S because they embargoed them on Oil which as a overseas empire Japan needed or it would collapse, which is why they invaded the U.S so invading the USSR would be for that reason a disaster since they would not have enough fuel to go though with the operation successfully.

 

[SchwarzKatze]

Japan invaded the U.S because they embargoed them on Oil which as a overseas empire Japan needed or it would collapse, which is why they invaded the U.S so invading the USSR would be for that reason a disaster since they would not have enough fuel to go though with the operation successfully.

The US is not likely to be embargoing Japan over war aganst USSR alone, just like how Japan wasn't embargoed until the invasion of Indochina while the war in China had been all-out for 3 years and if you count all the border aggressions, then it's 9. Also Japan's conquest in China and SEA was a direct challenge to US hegemony in the Pacific, so it directly threatened US interests. On the other hand, a land war between Japan and USSR was not a direct threat to US interests, especially if it started before a German invasion as USSR had yet to become an enemy of my enemy. Oh and since the IJN would be pretty much idle and the big, slow oil beasts would be pretty much useless in a blockade, and there are no convoys to maintain beside the existing ones, the oil need wouldn't be as big.

 

[Jazumir]

So, depending on the point of departure from our timeline, we have as an immediate response of the US, none (early departure - no aggression in china) or an oil embargo (after some aggression in china, which is concluded more or less successfully for japan, now). In any case, the US is probably going to declare war later, when it has finished its buildup (say 43, 44 at the latest), when they start going after germany in earnest, right? Or do you think, there would be something akin to the NAP the japanese historically had with the soviets, so that while japan could focus on the USSR, the western allies can focus on germany and italy? Wouldnt be the worst thing for the allies, as the japanese attack on the soviets has little chance of being decicive, while OTOH, the japanese might be happy not to have everyone around them at war with them (as long as the oil keeps flowing in sufficient quantities to sustain their rather futile war effort up in siberia, while the allies land in normandy...). Then, when europe´s done, they could still close the pipes and have japan run dry... Chances are pretty good, the allies will be in Berlin and Rome before the japanese reach moscow...;P And even if not, it might turn out to be a good thing... Japan will always be easier to invade than continental europe.

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

Given what we know of the trade and production system, is there any logic to attacking the Soviets now? Taking Siberia won't net Japan the oil she needs.

Or will that not even matter if you fuel synthetic oil factories with resources in Siberia?

The annihilation of worldwide communism after the fall of the USSR (no commies in China), the military supremacy of Nazi Germany and the Axis around Europe and beyond, and the glory and honor of Emperor Hirohito are valid enough reasons to attack the Soviets now.

 

[Gethsemani]

The annihilation of worldwide communism after the fall of the USSR (no commies in China), the military supremacy of Nazi Germany and the Axis around Europe and beyond, and the glory and honor of Emperor Hirohito are valid enough reasons to attack the Soviets now.

Your first two reasons are ahistorical at best and your third is sort of vague and non-committal. Japan never had major problems with Communism, simply because it never really spread to the Japanese islands. To Japan the Chinese communists were just another bunch of Chinese people getting in their way, just like every other warlord or self-appointed ruler in China, not to mention that the Chinese communists held a rather low profile for most of the Sino-Japanese war. They did sign the Tripartite pact, but it was an obvious move to curtail the USSR, not rooted in some ideological conviction of the dangers of communism.

The supremacy of the Axis in Europe didn't really affect Japan either, at least not any further then said Axis supremacy would have helped Japan stave off the USSR. Japan's focus was solely on creating their own empire. Lastly the Japanese high command had already realized that a prolonged war with the USSR would be needlessly costly for very little gain. There was simply nothing to gain in territory or resources from invading Siberia, and Japan was in desperate need of oil and other rare resources that were found around the pacific and Asia which meant that Japan had to go south and risk the ire of the USA and the European colonial powers. To go after the USSR at the same time would simply be a waste of resources and unnecessarily spreading your military forces thin, something that Japan already did to a dangerous degree.

There was no logic to Japan attacking the USSR after 1938, which is why it never happened.

 

[Secret Master]

The annihilation of worldwide communism after the fall of the USSR (no commies in China), the military supremacy of Nazi Germany and the Axis around Europe and beyond, and the glory and honor of Emperor Hirohito are valid enough reasons to attack the Soviets now.

But none of these were included in the important reasons Japan went south and actually fought a war.

Japan's imperialism against China and the DEI was a move clearly designed to mimic British imperialism in India and Asia in economic terms. The goal is to create captive markets for goods and raw materials to lessen Japan's dependence on foreign markets. Sure, Japan is couching it in terms of "Hey Asian buddies, let's throw of the yoke of the western devils!" But the real goal is to set up an empire with a large population base that will feed Japan's industries and buy her products. Siberia does not provide nearly as many resources or people. (I also question whether Japan can annex everything including the West Siberian Basin, which contains some oil in 1940.)

It's not a bad strategy if the worlds largest industrial power isn't opposing you; the Asian Gambit is one I use in Vic2 all the time (not just as Japan). He who controls China and the oil of the Indies, controls the world.

I bring all of this up, because puffing up Germany by helping them conquer the Soviets does not actually help Japan very much and is contrary to realpolitik moves Japan should make. Glory to the Emperor would be attained by also running the southern strategy, with the added incentive that it makes economic sense.

The crusade against Communism is a more interesting argument. It looks like the IJA had this in mind during the 1920s and 30s. I wonder what might have happened if the conflicts between Japan and the Soviets during the 1930s had turned out differently. If Japan had been successful, would it have emboldened them and not led to the purging of key generals and officers? Would a far more serious series of defeats have spurred Japan into planning a larger war due to a fear of losing Korea and Manchuria and the spread of Communism?

I guess what I'm saying is that it seems to me that in 1936, the northern strategy doesn't make a lot of sense. I think that ship has sailed. Unless I am missing something obvious.

 

[Zinegata]

Again, see Hull Note presented earlier, here's the interesting parts:

Color:
Grey: Probably not binding, notice that they used "will endeavor to V" instead of "will V"
Green: Favorable to the US
Yellow: Favorable to Japan
White: Appears to be rather neutral

Though 2. is definitely pro-US, and I assume Japanese economy was way more fragile in 8.

We're talking about a Japan that didn't further invade China after 1933 nor snatched Allied countries' colonies. Unlike IRL, Japan likely didn't commit as nearly many war crimes nor bombed the US, and for the US, Japan would be "an enemy of an enemy of my enemy", far from "enemy". Japan also had no juicy colonies up for grab in convenient places, unlike the earlier wars with Mexico and Spain.

In reality, any military vessel is fast enough to board a freighter - there's no need to shoot. And Japan could form a line outside of every ports in the Russian Far East, unlike Germany, so there's little chance someone could make it through even if no shot is fired. Though it's not going to be in the Cuban way, there must be hostilities between Japan and USSR for Japan to seal the waters off, telling everyone that this is a warzone that's offlimits. If the freighters were turned back or towed back at the blockade line, it's no more insulting than arresting neutral citizens who tried to walk through an active trench line and sending them back.



Because Japan and the dominant faction within the military opted to stay peaceful with the USSR with their Southern Plan and gave a giant middle finger to anyone trying otherwise, hence the basically-almighty commander of the Kwantung Army was sent to reserves for his aggression against them. Kodoha had fallen in 1936 so there's no one he could seek help from.

You're not realizing that you are not showing causality.

Yes, the US was slapping embargos on Japan because of China. I am well aware of all the evidence you already showed. However, again, why exactly is the US trying to make Japan withdraw to begin with?

Repeatedly, as I have stated, it's because the US was planning for the real enemy which was Germany. Look up the Victory Plan. It was already started in mid 1941!

In short, removing the historical reason for the embargo doesn't mean the US won't embargo Japan for other reasons. Japan not invading China but invading the USSR still leads to war with the US; because that shows Japan is a German ally! Even if the US doesn't attack Japan directly they will still most certainly slap an embargo on someone who allied with their German enemy.

Why do you think the embargo really became crippling after Indochina anyway? The takeover of Indochina was made possible by Germany's conquest of France. And the take-over was a sign of Japan's collusion with Germany.

You're spending way too much time trying to prove that the US embargo'd Japan because of China without realizing that's irrelevant to the argument of whether or not the US will embargo Japan if they invade the USSR. It's only by completely removing the all-important "Germany was America's real enemy" context that the northern strategy has any chance of succeeding; but with these contexts it's readily apparent why they never picked the northern option to begin with - it was economic suicide because Japan knew that America was going to come hard on them for supporting Germany.

 

[Vonboe]

You're not realizing that you are not showing causality.

In short, removing the historical reason for the embargo doesn't mean the US won't embargo Japan for other reasons. Japan not invading China but invading the USSR still leads to war with the US; because that shows Japan is a German ally! Even if the US doesn't attack Japan directly they will still most certainly slap an embargo on someone who allied with their German enemy.

Pretty sure all you need is the anti-comintern pact to see that germany and japan are allied.

 

[Zinegata]

Pretty sure all you need is the anti-comintern pact to see that germany and japan is allied.

They were, but France and Czechoslovakia likewise had a treaty and yet the French never came to their aid. Everyone forgets this today though and instead blames Chamberlain despite Britain never having a treaty with the Czechs.

There is a considerable difference between having a paper treaty - which were being ignored left and right in the 30s - and showing active collaboration and co-belligerence. Indochina was the first sign of real German-Japanese cooperation, which is exactly why it's when the sanctioned intensified.

Sending 300,000 men into Siberia while Barbarossa is ongoing would be an even more extreme and overt sign of German-Japanese cooperation. And really, if you expect America to keep supplying Japan with oil when they are fighting America's sole remaining ground partner in Europe then you're ignoring the real position of American diplomacy in 1941. It was not all isolationist and neutrality. They were actively preparing to fight Germany since the previous year.