so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[hkrommel]

What you're forgetting moreover is that Japan had to go south. If they didn't then the economy falls apart in a year or two because of the US oil embargo. Withdrawing from China doesn't change this if the Japanese then suddenly invades the Soviet Union - America was again dead-set on intervening in Europe and was already practically on the Allied camp by 1940 even if war hadn't been declared yet. The Reuben James incident very nearly caused a war anyway well before Pearl Harbor; and Gallup surveys show Americans of 1930-40 period had a much more favorable view of the Soviets than the present generation who keep trying to project their Cold War (false) triumphalism.

Anti-American bias aside (we did triumph in the Cold War, unless you've been living under a rock), peace with China means no more embargo since the rationale for the embargo was Japanese aggression in China. Also, a favorable opinion of a country doesn't mean you will go to war for them, not in America.

Even if we assume limited ground objectives in the Far East however what would be the point?

The Japanese wanted to control the Pacific. Vladivostok was where the Soviet Pacific Fleet (more like the Pacific squadron) was based.

America was again dead-set on intervening in Europe and was already practically on the Allied camp by 1940 even if war hadn't been declared yet.

Based on what? Though by the end of 1941 US public opinion was in favor of war (against Germany, not Japan), they didn't have the congressional majority in favor of declaring war. It would take until 1944 to get that majority in the Senate, based on incumbent reelection rates and the demographics of isolationist-represented districts.

they knew they hadn't made up the difference in 1941.

In OTL, yes, but if they had planned to invade the USSR (the basis for this entire thread, the foundational assumption here), they would have built more heavy equipment. They also had the Soviets outnumbered. Based on the numbers provided earlier in this thread of the average number of men in a Soviet division, 25,000, multiplied by the number of divisions the Soviets had on the Manchurian border in 1941, 34, you get 850,000 men. The IJA had 51 divisions and 1.7 million men. If they were planning to invade the Soviets they would have mobilized more (they had 5.5 million in 1945). That's a numerical advantage of 850,000 or 2:1.

Moreover, recent documents point to a more even contest in terms of casualties, but quite frankly that's because the IJA loss figures were never subject to the same scrutiny as the recent study of Soviet losses. I doubt that the Japanese would have such a reaction to the defeat if it wasn't much worse than the "official" loss figures would indicate; coming from a nation that had difficulty admitting the Midway losses for a whole year after the battle.

And here we go again with the whole "they lied about the numbers" argument. Until you actually produce more credible figures, those figures stand. Otherwise how do we study anything at all? If you call everything into doubt then there's no way to do any analysis whatsoever!

So you're not simply having the Japanese make a different decision, you're re-writing history going back at least 4 years with the benefit of hindsight. You're gaming a scenario and pretending that it had any chance of happening. To achieve what you're suggesting you don't need a different decision in the Japanese high command vs the USSR you need a time machine to bring all of this hindsight. This is completely unrealistic and basically impossible.

It wasn't as if this wasn't an option. If Japanese High Command makes the decision to fight the USSR they are going to prepare accordingly. It was a very real possibility, and the Soviets knew it.

That's why Rommel was constantly waiting for supplies and replacements, because material superiority matters little?

I suppose you'd like to ignore material superiority given the fact that by Summer 1942 Japan would likely be out of fuel, according to their own estimates.

That's why the British couldn't push him out of the desert for 3 years, and even then had to have an American invasion to do that.. They had material superiority the entire time. You really do have a problem comprehending what is being said, don't you?

Again, the oil embargo was a direct response to Japanese aggression in China. A peace settlement removes the embargo.

And Presidents have never guided the US into war of course?

That's actually a post-war phenomenon.

If all you do is go 50km into Siberia then why does this have the disastrous effects you're suggesting on the eastern front vs Germany? Little commitment on the part of the Japanese just brings us back to OTL at a slower pace as the build up of Soviet materiel is slowed by the lack of supplies through Vladivostok.

Maybe because you can hurt a country in more ways than capturing lots of land? 50km easily severs the trans-Siberian railroad. It also means that the Soviets have to try and push the Japanese back (politically untenable to ignore them), using resources in that process.

1. Expanded Persian lend-lease route complete with British forces ( from the unharrassed India/Australia/New Zealand ) fighting alongside the Russians on the southern front.

That is certainly an option, with three caveats.

1. The British will have a difficult time supplying both that front and North Africa given the severity of the fighting on the Caucasus front) if the Americans get involved later (say early 1943 at the earliest).
2. The Soviets went out of their way to ensure that the equipment they used immediately around Moscow in its defense was Soviet in origin (British tanks and planes played a part but were based/deployed further from Moscow). This was for appearances and propaganda purposes. How will the Communist hard-liners react to Soviets fighting alongside "western imperialist" forces on Soviet soil?
3. If the US are going to supply lend-lease by that route it will be exceedingly dangerous or exceedingly inefficient, as they will either need to take the long way around and stay close to Australia or go through IJN controlled waters. Since US lend-lease to the Soviets was only on Soviet-marked ships (and would be until they entered the war, again that would be early 1943 (assuming non-interventionists defeat their opponents in large numbers, that's when they would take office), they would be very exposed on their long journey.

2. More aggressive naval activity on the part of the British in the south Pacific, the Illustrious was already in the area in 1942 and only took time out to participate in operations related to the invasion of Sicily and Salerno. Taking either Formidable or Victorious out of the Torch landings with Unicorn providing support provides a sufficient strike force to threaten Japanese interests, and by 1944 at the latest they've got another two Implacable class to work with as well as the freeing up of the other two Illustrious class by that point in the war. The next year sees 8 Colossus class join the fleet. There's also a British Submarine force available as well as enough battleships to demolish the IJN if it comes to a close fight.

If Pearl Harbor doesn't happen, neither does the British declaration of War against Japan. Even if they get involved it will be later.

You're also forgetting that by 1944 the situation in the USSR will be a foregone conclusion.

3. Pushing lend-lease through the arctic route in greater quantities, expensive but certainly worth it for any supplies considered critical to keeping the Soviets in the fight

Incredibly dangerous, and probably past the point of diminishing returns.

4. Supplies through China, China had already had a war with Japan and few had illusions of what they planned next. Given a simple deal of 'when this is all over Manchuria goes to you' it wouldn't be hard to push supplies through.

It would be a slow transfer due to extremely poor infrastructure, and an exceedingly long trip to get to the USSR given the infrastructure available. Much more viable to go through the Tehran route, even though that was dangerous.

5. Scaled down 1941 winter counter-offensive, focus on keeping Leningrad fed and putting some pressure on the Germans directly in front of Moscow. Keep building up the defenses around the capital.

I agree that's an option, but it isn't going to change much. OTL the Soviets built up a lot around Moscow, and tried to keep Leningrad fed as much as possible. Operation Nordlicht would put an end to that in 1942 (especially if coordinated with the Finns), and the city would fall. Honestly the Soviets got extremely lucky OTL that Leningrad held out, and it was due to coincidental timing. It's one of those things that wouldn't happen twice.

6. Complete Operation Uranus, put limited effort into pushing with Operation Little Saturn. This completes the encirclement of the 6th but refrains from pushing at the remaining front. Holding the line as it were. If the British are present in the south in sufficient numbers commit to Little Saturn along with them.

How? Force composition is going to be much better for the Germans because they aren't being worn down by constant (if futile) counteroffensives. A critical part of Uranus was the simultaneous buildup against AGC to make the Germans think they were going to attack there, while they were building up for a real attack in the south. In this timeline it's highly unlikely they have the forces to build up simultaneously like that, and even more unlikely the Axis lines would be as weak as they were, as AGN would likely conclude the siege of Leningrad earlier that year and so troops could be redeployed from AGN and AGC. Also, the mobile reserve (whose absence gave Uranus a much better chance of success) would not be redeployed, because there will not be an invasion of Italy at this time. The US would not have entered the war yet (remember, early 1943 is the earliest, and even that depends on how elections go). I really don't see Uranus succeeding.

Using US shipping to support lend-lease, this either forces war between Axis partners and the US or makes the arctic route and the Persian routes much safer. Before the outbreak of war the US was already starting to take responsibility for escorts in the Atlantic to a degree, if the Axis chooses to respect nominal US neutrality Roosevelt can be expected to take advantage of that.

That is a possibility but at the same time they would have to take an inefficient route and I don't think the Lusitania effect is going to happen for a cargo ship transporting military goods.

If you have to re-write the actions of both Germany and Japan over a multi-year basis while leaning heavily on hindsight this is a pretty good hint that what you're imagining isn't anywhere near realistic.

The only thing being rewritten is that at some point the Japanese decide to go for the Northern strategy. You place that at the most plausible point (which would be either 1936 or 1937) and then it's simple cause and effect from there. What would the Japanese do? How would the Soviets react? How would this effect the western front? Where would the western allies be in all this?

It's a pretty clear event chain. There are points of departure and choice that could change things (which I've outlined), but I've picked what I believe to be the most reasonable.

If you have a problem with alternate history analysis, then why are you even on this thread at all?

The only ones killed that were in any way involved in leading a campaign were leading one faction in a civil war that had already broken out, disunity was therefor de facto in the rear view mirror and the elimination of one side actually promoted unity. Assassinating Stalin does just the opposite and very much during a period where the Soviet Union was facing an existential threat.

Tell that to Caracalla, or Macrinus. What happened in most of those cases I listed was the emperor was fighting someone, some general somewhere declared he was the rightful emperor, the original emperor's troops decide they like the other guy better, and they kill the original guy. I purposefully left out the ones who were killed in battle (or captured and executed) against rival claimants or who were killed during a civil war while at peace with external powers.

Why would that hinder the Soviets? If things got worse, Stalin was the guy who let that happen. Stalin was the guy who left the Soviet Union weak. Stalin was responsible. Stalin's paranoia weakened the USSR. That's reason enough to assassinate someone. Do you not think there were already plots? Look at Stalin's rise to power, his paranoia was not entirely unwarranted. Look at the power struggle after Stalin died. If the government evacuated from Moscow, Stalin becomes a liability in the eyes of the government, and is ousted and/or killed.

 

[Opanashc]

Mursolini, can you present the information in english? Otherwise we wont be able to verify your information/source....

Just because you cannot, does not mean others are in the same boat.
Google-translate helps.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

Just because you cannot, does not mean others are in the same boat.
Google-translate helps.

English forum. For sources in other languages use a forum that uses that language.

 

[Opanashc]

peace with China means no more embargo since the rationale for the embargo was Japanese aggression in China.

When did fighting between China and Japan start in earnest vs. when was embargo placed?

In OTL, yes, but if they had planned to invade the USSR (the basis for this entire thread, the foundational assumption here), they would have built more heavy equipment. They also had the Soviets outnumbered. Based on the numbers provided earlier in this thread of the average number of men in a Soviet division, 25,000, multiplied by the number of divisions the Soviets had on the Manchurian border in 1941, 34, you get 850,000 men. The IJA had 51 divisions and 1.7 million men. If they were planning to invade the Soviets they would have mobilized more (they had 5.5 million in 1945). That's a numerical advantage of 850,000 or 2:1.

So, what would Japan produce LESS of, in order to build more heavy equipment? Did you know, that Japanese divisions of ~20,000 men had ~50% of their personnel with no weapons whatsoever?

It wasn't as if this wasn't an option. If Japanese High Command makes the decision to fight the USSR they are going to prepare accordingly. It was a very real possibility, and the Soviets knew it.

And USSR would be able to see them preparing for war. Hence USSR would make its own responses.

Again, the oil embargo was a direct response to Japanese aggression in China. A peace settlement removes the embargo.

And USSR could do a preemptive strike in 1939-40, while Germany is busy in the west, to eliminate the threat to their Far East territories.

That's actually a post-war phenomenon.

Wilson's drive to enter WW1, American-Spanish war and such? Don't confuse casus-belli with intentions.

Maybe because you can hurt a country in more ways than capturing lots of land? 50km easily severs the trans-Siberian railroad. It also means that the Soviets have to try and push the Japanese back (politically untenable to ignore them), using resources in that process.

Why is it politically untenable? Please, share.

2. The Soviets went out of their way to ensure that the equipment they used immediately around Moscow in its defense was Soviet in origin (British tanks and planes played a part but were based/deployed further from Moscow). This was for appearances and propaganda purposes. How will the Communist hard-liners react to Soviets fighting alongside "western imperialist" forces on Soviet soil?

Since Stalin invited the British to "send 30-40 divisions to fight on our southern flank" in fall 1941 (and was rejected) - not too badly.

3. If the US are going to supply lend-lease by that route it will be exceedingly dangerous or exceedingly inefficient, as they will either need to take the long way around and stay close to Australia or go through IJN controlled waters. Since US lend-lease to the Soviets was only on Soviet-marked ships (and would be until they entered the war, again that would be early 1943 (assuming non-interventionists defeat their opponents in large numbers, that's when they would take office), they would be very exposed on their long journey.

Since US is not at war (your words), LL can travel in US ships, and laugh at the IJN. As soon as Japan sinks a ship or two - US is declaring war.

You're also forgetting that by 1944 the situation in the USSR will be a foregone conclusion.

Your assumption. Basically you are saying "I will correct my mistakes, because I know of them, but you cannot do that, because I said so."

The only thing being rewritten is that at some point the Japanese decide to go for the Northern strategy. You place that at the most plausible point (which would be either 1936 or 1937) and then it's simple cause and effect from there. What would the Japanese do? How would the Soviets react? How would this effect the western front? Where would the western allies be in all this?

Soviets, knowing that, will try to escalate Khalhin-Gol into August Storm.

Why would that hinder the Soviets? If things got worse, Stalin was the guy who let that happen. Stalin was the guy who left the Soviet Union weak. Stalin was responsible. Stalin's paranoia weakened the USSR. That's reason enough to assassinate someone. Do you not think there were already plots? Look at Stalin's rise to power, his paranoia was not entirely unwarranted. Look at the power struggle after Stalin died. If the government evacuated from Moscow, Stalin becomes a liability in the eyes of the government, and is ousted and/or killed.

Stalin eliminated all those who had the guts and power to topple him. By the time war starts, no group in USSR has the political and physical power to topple Stalin and his staunch followers.

 

[Opanashc]

English forum. For sources in other languages use a forum that uses that language.

Too bad the subject we are talking about is not about English-speaking countries. You want the information from some country's archives - you HAVE to look at them in original.

 

[Loke]

If it wasn´t translated to english it´s probably not worth to read.

Believing another source does not make one source wrong and WIKI usually has sources listed below it´s articles -)

I agree and this is a english forum.
The Russian source might have good information but as long it is in Russian it does not help us much.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

...
And USSR would be able to see them preparing for war. Hence USSR would make its own responses.

Wasn´t it Stalin who dismissed any notions of e.g. Germany attacking the USSR despite being warned several times? And the same Stalin should expect that some asians would threaten him who had been beaten at Khalkin Gol?

And USSR could do a preemptive strike in 1939-40, while Germany is busy in the west, to eliminate the threat to their Far East territories.

The USSR was busy in the west too, with a war with Finland, occupying the baltic states, occupying the east of Poland and Besarabia while at the same time being suspicious of the western allies who seamt to give in to nearly any of Germanys demands during Chamberlain which made them appear as not reliable allies (and were one of the causes for the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact). Unless that changes I don´t see the USSR sending more divisions to the far east instead of the european part of it.

Wilson's drive to enter WW1, American-Spanish war and such? Don't confuse casus-belli with intentions.

Don´t you know that the US never enters a war without a true and just casusbelli?
WW1 Lusitania (transporting ammunition that made it a valid target), Spanish-American war the Maine (that was not attacked but had an internal explosion), Panay (being in China doing what no other navy would be allowed to dare in the US)... The US never seem to run out of ships to use for that purpose that just happen to be at the right place

Since Stalin invited the British to "send 30-40 divisions to fight on our southern flank" in fall 1941 (and was rejected) - not too badly.

I would assume that he knew that the UK would not have that much manpower to spare when they wanted to be able to defend the british islands and north africa.
Sound more like mockery about the small british army from him

Since US is not at war (your words), LL can travel in US ships, and laugh at the IJN. As soon as Japan sinks a ship or two - US is declaring war.

Which they historically did not do. On the Vladiwostok route the lendlease was transported in USSR ships because the US wanted to avoid further tensions with Japan, see under "Pacific Route" here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_USSR
Offering themselves as shields to convoys to the UK against German subs - that I can understand. Doing the same for the Soviets? Unlikely.

Soviets, knowing that, will try to escalate Khalhin-Gol into August Storm.

I think that Stalin was more worried even than Germany about a twofrontwar because he didn´t trust the western allies - especially as Churchill was seeing the Soviets as evil incarnate until the day of the start of WW2 when he saw them as a tool to use against a worse evil
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill#Relations_with_the_Soviet_Union

Stalin eliminated all those who had the guts and power to topple him. By the time war starts, no group in USSR has the political and physical power to topple Stalin and his staunch followers.

To depose a tyrant it just needs one lucky dagger. Hitler would have been almost gone several times due to failed assasinations, too.

 

[D Inqu]

Wasn´t it Stalin who dismissed any notions of e.g. Germany attacking the USSR despite being warned several times?

That's a myth.

The USSR was busy in the west too, with a war with Finland, occupying the baltic states, occupying the east of Poland and Besarabia

The former was over by March, the latter did not involve any fighting.

while at the same time being suspicious of the western allies who seamt to give in to nearly any of Germanys demands during Chamberlain which made them appear as not reliable allies (and were one of the causes for the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact). Unless that changes I don´t see the USSR sending more divisions to the far east instead of the european part of it.

There was no immediate fighting in west Russia in 1940, so no reason not to redeploy some troops.

Which they historically did not do.

Because the situation was different

On the Vladiwostok route the lendlease was transported in USSR ships because the US wanted to avoid further tensions with Japan

If you check the chronological order, the transfer of ships to the USSR to be used in LL convoys happened in 1942, when the US was at war with Japan. It was nothing to do with "avoiding tensions" it was simply a way for ships to pass in relative safety.

 

[teamgene]

In HOI3 as japan I would invade Russia to support germany in multi player. By then China was puppeted, freeing Japan from having to garrison and the war between the two is just cat and mouse using small units to keep in supply and just grab land. It was this tactic that we decided Russia needed two players. With one, he was forced to just ignore the east and hope to defeat Germany before it became a major issue. Generally if Germany hasn't won by 42, the game is lost for axis, but by then Japan would have conquered all the way thru India and pushing into middle East and Med. The entire east and southern under belly of USSR under threat of attack if not under attack.

 

[Loke]

That's a myth.

Seems it is NOT a myth afterall. On the contrary Stalin got several warnings...

 

[D Inqu]

Seems it is NOT a myth afterall. On the contrary Stalin got several warnings...

Yes, he got a lot of different intel, giving a range of dates from spring 1941, to summer 1942. He wasn't "warned several times". Nor did he "dismiss" the idea that Germany was planning to invade.

 

[Loke]

Yes, he got a lot of different intel, giving a range of dates from spring 1941, to summer 1942. He wasn't "warned several times". Nor did he "dismiss" the idea that Germany was planning to invade.

On the contrary(again) thats exactly what the link/source says - he got several warnings.

 

[teamgene]

Seems it is NOT a myth afterall. On the contrary Stalin got several warnings...

Wikipedia also says the Hitler commited suicide and Eva Braun took cyanide, which is also a myth. Just we don't know exactly what REALLY happened. Scientifically, it couldn't happen the way its written in the history books. So,also what Stalin knew/believed depends on who you believe.

 

[D Inqu]

Thats exactly what the link/source says - he got several warnings.

It's typical wikipedia word-play. The intel continuously came up with new dates for a possible invasions ("several warnings"), and among those dates there was one correct one.

 

[MGL 86]

No matter how many times Stalin got warned is not relevant. Important thing is Soviet Union was not ready for the Barbarossa scale invasion. See, if the soviets are thoroughly prepared (ammunition distributed, war planes in air, commanders are in place) it is doubtful Germans could have reached Moscow.

Speaking of which we got many threads about how to destroy Soviet Union. But no thread about how SU could have handle Nazis differently and more efficiently. Not doing purge, being prepared etc comes to mind.

 

[Loke]

Speaking of which we got many threads about how to destroy Soviet Union. But no thread about how SU could have handle Nazis differently and more efficiently. Not doing purge, being prepared etc comes to mind.

Another boss comes to mind...

 

[Opanashc]

No matter how many times Stalin got warned is not relevant. Important thing is Soviet Union was not ready for the Barbarossa scale invasion. See, if the soviets are thoroughly prepared (ammunition distributed, war planes in air, commanders are in place) it is doubtful Germans could have reached Moscow.
Speaking of which we got many threads about how to destroy Soviet Union. But no thread about how SU could have handle Nazis differently and more efficiently. Not doing purge, being prepared etc comes to mind.

You are told, that your neighbor, will attack you tomorrow. Or next month. Or next year. Or the year after. Do you stay up all those nights, with gun in hand?
Not doing the purge would have done nothing to prepare SU better for the war. Simply put - those, who replaced the removed officers were simply better educated. If a lieutenant (Tukhachevsky) becomes a general overnight, does that make him a better general, then the lieutenant who spent 20 years advancing in rank to become a general (Zhukov)?

 

[Daelyn75]

Isn´t that what discussing alternative history or alternative strategic decisions is all about?
The North vs. South discussion in Japan started years before Pearl Harbour and was not simply: "Mmmh, what to do today on this pretty 7th of Decembre - pearl harbour the US or invade the USSR with exactly the same forces?"

In game context I see it as usual that we would go back as far as the games starting date allows. Be happy, very happy, that we are not discussing Europa Universalis here

This frustrates me more than anything else when it comes to what if's in the forums here. All it takes to change everything is a different decision on something, and everything after that will have to react or make a decision based upon that change in history. That is all we do in these PDS games, is write our own history. If it's so bloody unrealistic to do this, then why do we play these games at all?

Case in point - The Byzantine Emperor Romanos Diogenes decides not to split his army when facing the Turks in 1071 and defeats the Turks, driving them back across the border. The Byzantine Empire isn't swallowed up, and the crusades are never launched afterwards. This could have seriously impacted the Renaissance since Europeans wouldn't have had the experience and knowledge in foreign lands to return to Europe with. The exploration of the Americas never take place because the Turks haven't sealed trade with the East etc . . . The point is one fateful decision can have massive ramifications that could very well change everything.

Same with each person's life. This is just how reality works.

Yeah, I don't agree that Japan could have an industry that could produce what it needed to take out the Soviets one on one, but we aren't discussing that. Japan did have several hundred light tanks that it used in 1937-1942 with great effect against the Chinese and later against the British in Malaya. All it needed was the strength to take on a relatively small portion of the Soviet Union's military in Siberia - not the entire thing.

Going full on total war against China is what I do every time as Japan. I triple the initial army size by 1941, and have an army that's larger than anything in the world below Germany, and the Soviets. At the same time I double my starting industry, and have a powerhouse of a nation. The only issue is Oil, but this is partially offset by the resources gained from China, and Indochina, as well as my conversion of energy into oil. The Dutch East Indies are the next target, and it's just all too easy to fight the allies without the USA involved. In fact it gets boring. I never neglect my carriers though, and they are my number one weapon needed to counter the US. The fighting against the USA causes me some losses, but with the best carriers in the world with up to date technology, it's the US that takes so many losses that I tend to dominate the Pacific. Later on, after India, Australia/New Zealand, and the USSR are defeated, I can land on the Western coast of the USA.

Anyhow, this is what I do every chance I get as Japan, and it works well.

 

[SchwarzKatze]

When did fighting between China and Japan start in earnest vs. when was embargo placed?

Did you notice that this actually works against your argument? You're actually saying that Japan can invade China as long as Indochina is left alone, and a Soviet-focused Japan wouldn't consider further invading China, let alone Indochina.

And Hull Note did propose to resume trade and unfroze Japanese assets if Japan withdraw from China and Indochina.

So, what would Japan produce LESS of, in order to build more heavy equipment? Did you know, that Japanese divisions of ~20,000 men had ~50% of their personnel with no weapons whatsoever?

Material from the big-ass ships IJN were endeavouring that would serve no purpose against the USSR and the factories that manufactured tankettes that didn't even provide enough protection against Chinese regulars? They would serve no purpose if Japan targeted USSR and the armors and guns on Japanese ships weren't bad at all. Unless IJN went total asshole and denied IJA any of their technologies even when they're just sitting around doing nothing (instead of "we're in hot waters too and can't spare anything" IRL), I don't see why IJA couldn't field adequate armored units.

And what's those number you came up with? A IJA division usually had 12~15 thousand men, if you add the baggage train and other logistic functions in your count, then about 10k combatants per division is pretty reasonable. If you're talking about the Volksgrenadier-equivalents in 1945 then I hope you realize that it's like arguing that Blitzkrieg had no chance whatsoever because Volksgrenadiers had crappy equipment.

And USSR would be able to see them preparing for war. Hence USSR would make its own responses.

Unless USSR wasn't running at 100% capacity in the war against Germany, the total capacity wouldn't increase, it might actually get worse due to splitting their focus on two enemies that fought differently.

And USSR could do a preemptive strike in 1939-40, while Germany is busy in the west, to eliminate the threat to their Far East territories.

And leaving Europe even less defended than IRL? Hitler might just cancel/not start Battle of Britain and keep sorties only on the continent and caught Stalin pants down, and I don't think he would be unaware of that.

Since US is not at war (your words), LL can travel in US ships, and laugh at the IJN. As soon as Japan sinks a ship or two - US is declaring war.

There's a commonly deployed SOP of blockading—declare your intention, delimit the no-sail zone, and allow the personnel and properties of third parties be evacuated. During the blockade, any blockade runners are fair game to be boarded or turned back, not fired upon, unless they opened fire or tried to ram the ships stopping them.

And a normal freighter has no chance to avoid boarding or halted, being much slower and bulkier than most military vessels.

Soviets, knowing that, will try to escalate Khalhin-Gol into August Storm.

Soviet performance then was actually not very good, achieving only a meager victory with a K/D ratio close to or even less than 1 even with more men, more guns, more tanks, more planes and more support back home than their Japanese counterparts. Hokushinron had already fallen out of favor when Kōdōha was purged or sidelined after 2/26 incident in 1936, so this was actually an unprepared escalation on the Japanese side. Had Japan be prepared, with Kwantung Army deploying in the north instead of in China, armed to fight a world power instead of bullying weak neighbors, and have their navy prepared to bombard coastal targets, there would be a big margin for things to go wrong for the Red Army.

Stalin eliminated all those who had the guts and power to topple him. By the time war starts, no group in USSR has the political and physical power to topple Stalin and his staunch followers.

There will be people seeking alternatives if things gone terribly wrong—see how Hitler was target by so many assassination plots that it's a miracle he survived them all.

And there's also the problem of demographics, unlike the Slavic population and the Han Chinese, Central Asians might not feel as mortally threatened by the Axis powers to die fighting for their motherland, and if Stalin ended up relying on drafting them, he could end up with many soldiers with questionable loyalty.

 

[Opanashc]

Did you notice that this actually works against your argument? You're actually saying that Japan can invade China as long as Indochina is left alone, and a Soviet-focused Japan wouldn't consider further invading China, let alone Indochina.

And Hull Note did propose to resume trade and unfroze Japanese assets if Japan withdraw from China and Indochina.

You are saying this, as if you know what I am thinking.

Material from the big-ass ships IJN were endeavouring that would serve no purpose against the USSR and the factories that manufactured tankettes that didn't even provide enough protection against Chinese regulars? They would serve no purpose if Japan targeted USSR and the armors and guns on Japanese ships weren't bad at all. Unless IJN went total asshole and denied IJA any of their technologies even when they're just sitting around doing nothing (instead of "we're in hot waters too and can't spare anything" IRL), I don't see why IJA couldn't field adequate armored units.

Because they don't have the experience to build good tanks. Look at US tanks, prior to Sherman.

And what's those number you came up with? A IJA division usually had 12~15 thousand men, if you add the baggage train and other logistic functions in your count, then about 10k combatants per division is pretty reasonable. If you're talking about the Volksgrenadier-equivalents in 1945 then I hope you realize that it's like arguing that Blitzkrieg had no chance whatsoever because Volksgrenadiers had crappy equipment.

Your surrender on the point has been counted.

Unless USSR wasn't running at 100% capacity in the war against Germany, the total capacity wouldn't increase, it might actually get worse due to splitting their focus on two enemies that fought differently.

And why would USSR split up? Deal with the East first, then worry about the west.

And leaving Europe even less defended than IRL? Hitler might just cancel/not start Battle of Britain and keep sorties only on the continent and caught Stalin pants down, and I don't think he would be unaware of that.

Hitler does not have the resources to attack USSR in 1939-40, while having France and UK on the continent. Besides, USSR was NOT running total war economy in 39-40, and could have stepped up its game, to deal with Japan.

There's a commonly deployed SOP of blockading—declare your intention, delimit the no-sail zone, and allow the personnel and properties of third parties be evacuated. During the blockade, any blockade runners are fair game to be boarded or turned back, not fired upon, unless they opened fire or tried to ram the ships stopping them.

Ramming the US Navy? Good one.

Soviet performance then was actually not very good, achieving only a meager victory with a K/D ratio close to or even less than 1 even with more men, more guns, more tanks, more planes and more support back home than their Japanese counterparts. Hokushinron had already fallen out of favor when Kōdōha was purged or sidelined after 2/26 incident in 1936, so this was actually an unprepared escalation on the Japanese side. Had Japan be prepared, with Kwantung Army deploying in the north instead of in China, armed to fight a world power instead of bullying weak neighbors, and have their navy prepared to bombard coastal targets, there would be a big margin for things to go wrong for the Red Army.

You did notice the word try, did you not? Or did you interpret my words as "Red Army turns Khalhin-Gol into August Storm, and kicks Japan off the mainland in 2 months"? Nice one, again.

And there's also the problem of demographics, unlike the Slavic population and the Han Chinese, Central Asians might not feel as mortally threatened by the Axis powers to die fighting for their motherland, and if Stalin ended up relying on drafting them, he could end up with many soldiers with questionable loyalty.

And Canadians had 0 vested interest in fighting against Germany. Hence, their army was full of soldiers with questionable loyalty. Another nice one.

I counted 4.