so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[BBBD316]

I am not sure why but it is being argued that the US had stopped being isolationist by placing Japan under Embargo when they should have just sold oil to the highest bidder.

So American oil companies should have been requested not to sell oil, but not actually be forced by the government not to sell.

Even with American oil I don't think the Japanese would have expanded much further, everything was at its limits for the Empire and it was not possible for it to do any more even if it had oil.

*All opinions are expressed on behalf of BBBD316 and have not been checked for historical accuracy*

 

[hkrommel]

Yes you can, OTL Japan represents the limitations of the Japanese army and industry, just because you choose to fight the Soviets doesn't mean you can conjure up more tanks and guns.

A Japan that is preparing to fight the Soviets instead of China will build more heavy equipment and focus their production accordingly. In OTL they focused on light infantry. I don't know how this can be any clearer.

This assumption is based on? I've already demonstrated that the Soviets had a numerical advantage and material advantage, without conjuring up whole divisions there's no reason why extant Soviet troops wouldn't be able to hold the Japanese at bay, it's not like they haven't done that before. Even if the Japanese manage to prove too much to handle you've got thousands of kilometers of strategic depth to pull back through with relatively little in the way of populated centers until you're west of Irkutsk

The Soviets had parity with IJA soldiers in Manchuria with the exception of late 1941/early 1942. They would not have parity with the entire IJA. This is simple math, an IJA not engaged in China can focus its entire strength on the Soviets. The Soviets would have to either redirect troops and equipment from the critical Western front or accept the lost of everything east of Khabarovsk.

If you're counting Khalkin Gol that is barely relevant. It was an escalated border skirmish when the Soviets were at peace with every other nation (operations against the Polish commenced 2 days after Khalkhin Gol concluded).

Also, point to where I stated the Japanese would push to Irkutsk. They could try, but there would be no need.

Or it's looking at lend-lease honestly. Obviously food frees up farm labor, but when that food amounts to at most 4% of consumption it's not making a major difference.

There have been numerous threads on this topic so I won't go much further, but you're wrong by
1. Using purely quantitative analysis (war is a game of inches, not miles)
2. Ignoring the point about specialized machine tools

And guess how many locomotives the Soviets had built over the 15 years before that, well over 10000. All of which would have still been in service, it's almost like when the Soviet Union went to war they really meant it and directed the bulk of their productive capacity to the war.

None of this contradicts my point and you would do well in the future to respond to the points actually being made. It was lend-lease that allowed the Soviets to focus on frontline equipment. The fact that the Allies provided so many raw materials, industrial equipment, logistical and communications equipment, etc. allowed this to happen.

Finally winter is disproportionately harsh to the unprepared, the Germans weren't prepared and there's no evidence to suggest that the Japanese would have fared better given the even harder logistics challenge the Russian far east would have presented. In terms of Russian preparation just consider the ground pressure of Russian tanks compared to German or Japanese models.

Again, missing the point. To cut the Trans-Siberian railroad the Japanese would have to move about 50km from the Manchurian border. That's it. That's how much longer their supply lines need to get. From that point the damage is done.

And then? What German offensive would have pushed a less powerful Soviet Union over the edge? The summer offensives against Stalingrad and the Caucuses were too inherently flawed and supported by too weak a logistics backbone to ever have a chance of success.

You should tell that to the Soviets, they certainly had a hard enough time repulsing them.

I've been over this before, the Soviets would either have to:
1. Capitulate
2. Ignore the Japanese and thus threaten their industrial base
3. Divide their forces between two fronts, which means the Germans have a much more time to work with. The Soviets would be drained much more quickly of men and equipment, plus the logistical issues of creating and supplying a large enough force to actually oust the Japanese (again, only 50km from Manchuria) would be crippling.

Either way, Soviets lose.

Yakutsk, over 3000km from Vladivostok, on the Lena river which leads to Irkutsk, cut off?

When the only reliable source of supply is by rail, yes. Do you have any idea how many barges would be needed to supply Yakutsk? How would those barges get there? How would they be safe from Japanese attack?

Given the nature of the German campaign against the Soviets and the commitment of the Soviets and the other allies to the war a conditional surrender would have been exeedingly hard to accomplish, toppling Stalin is a pipe-dream. However reprehensible the purges were it certainly left him in a position of unassailable authority in the Soviet Union.

Yeah, who wouldn't be completely loyal to a boss who would just as soon kill you as anything else. If there was an opportunity to topple Stalin, even his closest advisors would take it. The man was a danger to everyone around him. In fact, it is likely that poisoning was his actual cause of death.

In addition, the Allied call for unconditional surrender wasn't until 24th January 1943 in Casablanca. The Soviets would be in significant danger long before then.

 

[Daelyn75]

A Japan that is preparing to fight the Soviets instead of China will build more heavy equipment and focus their production accordingly. In OTL they focused on light infantry. I don't know how this can be any clearer.



The Soviets had parity with IJA soldiers in Manchuria with the exception of late 1941/early 1942. They would not have parity with the entire IJA. This is simple math, an IJA not engaged in China can focus its entire strength on the Soviets. The Soviets would have to either redirect troops and equipment from the critical Western front or accept the lost of everything east of Khabarovsk.

If you're counting Khalkin Gol that is barely relevant. It was an escalated border skirmish when the Soviets were at peace with every other nation (operations against the Polish commenced 2 days after Khalkhin Gol concluded).

Also, point to where I stated the Japanese would push to Irkutsk. They could try, but there would be no need.



There have been numerous threads on this topic so I won't go much further, but you're wrong by
1. Using purely quantitative analysis (war is a game of inches, not miles)
2. Ignoring the point about specialized machine tools



None of this contradicts my point and you would do well in the future to respond to the points actually being made. It was lend-lease that allowed the Soviets to focus on frontline equipment. The fact that the Allies provided so many raw materials, industrial equipment, logistical and communications equipment, etc. allowed this to happen.



Again, missing the point. To cut the Trans-Siberian railroad the Japanese would have to move about 50km from the Manchurian border. That's it. That's how much longer their supply lines need to get. From that point the damage is done.



You should tell that to the Soviets, they certainly had a hard enough time repulsing them.

I've been over this before, the Soviets would either have to:
1. Capitulate
2. Ignore the Japanese and thus threaten their industrial base
3. Divide their forces between two fronts, which means the Germans have a much more time to work with. The Soviets would be drained much more quickly of men and equipment, plus the logistical issues of creating and supplying a large enough force to actually oust the Japanese (again, only 50km from Manchuria) would be crippling.

Either way, Soviets lose.



When the only reliable source of supply is by rail, yes. Do you have any idea how many barges would be needed to supply Yakutsk? How would those barges get there? How would they be safe from Japanese attack?



Yeah, who wouldn't be completely loyal to a boss who would just as soon kill you as anything else. If there was an opportunity to topple Stalin, even his closest advisors would take it. The man was a danger to everyone around him. In fact, it is likely that poisoning was his actual cause of death.

In addition, the Allied call for unconditional surrender wasn't until 24th January 1943 in Casablanca. The Soviets would be in significant danger long before then.

One thing to keep in mind during the German/Soviet War, was that from 1941-1942 the Soviets were disastrously led on the tactical level and poorly trained to fight a modern war. I was not aware of just how out of touch they were until watching the Russian documentary series - Soviet Storm. They would charge en mass, out in the open against fortified positions - being one of the tactics that stick out in my mind after watching it nearly a year back. Soviet officers had to be threatened in 1942 to change their tactics or severe consequences would happen to them.

Also, the Soviets waited into October I believe it was, while watching the Japanese in Manchuria, while also relying on their spies to make sure that the Japanese didn't plan to attack in Siberia before ordering 40 of their Siberian divisions west. Basically they waited as long as they could, and without these divisions I doubt much of an offensive especially in the Moscow area could have taken place. At one point, in October there was one division protecting Moscow, while the forward armies were surrounded and cut off. Those surrounded forces were ordered to continue fighting so that the Germans couldn't advance on the capital. I don't think the Soviets could have been in a worse situation right there. The heavy rains and the resulting mud that could in anecdotal accounts swallow small vehicles, did slow the German advance but it wouldn't have stopped them.

Yes other forces were brought to the Moscow area before the Siberian ones could reach there, but I think without them the front would have more or less stabilized, and not been thrown back like around Moscow, or in several other places. It's my opinion that if Japan had sent in everything they had after a victory in China, then the Germans would have been able to launch offensives in the spring, and not the summer since they wouldn't be up against an enemy with that much numerical advantage if any. I'm sure those 40 Siberian divisions would have given a good fight against the Japanese, but knowing how the Soviets fought at the time, and how hardened and fanatical the Japanese were, I'd bet on the Japanese. Don't forget that China would have provided industry, resources, and troops for the Japanese. Not a massive number, but enough to really help. The Manchukeo army was largely made up of you guessed it, Chinese in Manchuria. There were also tens of thousands of Chinese volunteer units that aided the Japanese in their war against China.

I think the Soviet Union would have collapsed, personally.

 

[Loke]

One thing to keep in mind during the German/Soviet War, was that from 1941-1942 the Soviets were disastrously led on the tactical level and poorly trained to fight a modern war. I was not aware of just how out of touch they were until watching the Russian documentary series - Soviet Storm. They would charge en mass, out in the open against fortified positions - being one of the tactics that stick out in my mind after watching it nearly a year back. Soviet officers had to be threatened in 1942 to change their tactics or severe consequences would happen to them.

Also, the Soviets waited into October I believe it was, while watching the Japanese in Manchuria, while also relying on their spies to make sure that the Japanese didn't plan to attack in Siberia before ordering 40 of their Siberian divisions west. Basically they waited as long as they could, and without these divisions I doubt much of an offensive especially in the Moscow area could have taken place. At one point, in October there was one division protecting Moscow, while the forward armies were surrounded and cut off. Those surrounded forces were ordered to continue fighting so that the Germans couldn't advance on the capital. I don't think the Soviets could have been in a worse situation right there. The heavy rains and the resulting mud that could in anecdotal accounts swallow small vehicles, did slow the German advance but it wouldn't have stopped them.

Yes other forces were brought to the Moscow area before the Siberian ones could reach there, but I think without them the front would have more or less stabilized, and not been thrown back like around Moscow, or in several other places. It's my opinion that if Japan had sent in everything they had after a victory in China, then the Germans would have been able to launch offensives in the spring, and not the summer since they wouldn't be up against an enemy with that much numerical advantage if any. I'm sure those 40 Siberian divisions would have given a good fight against the Japanese, but knowing how the Soviets fought at the time, and how hardened and fanatical the Japanese were, I'd bet on the Japanese. Don't forget that China would have provided industry, resources, and troops for the Japanese. Not a massive number, but enough to really help. The Manchukeo army was largely made up of you guessed it, Chinese in Manchuria. There were also tens of thousands of Chinese volunteer units that aided the Japanese in their war against China.

I think the Soviet Union would have collapsed, personally.

Yes, agreed.

 

[MGL 86]

One thing to keep in mind during the German/Soviet War, was that from 1941-1942 the Soviets were disastrously led on the tactical level and poorly trained to fight a modern war. I was not aware of just how out of touch they were until watching the Russian documentary series - Soviet Storm. They would charge en mass, out in the open against fortified positions - being one of the tactics that stick out in my mind after watching it nearly a year back. Soviet officers had to be threatened in 1942 to change their tactics or severe consequences would happen to them.

Also, the Soviets waited into October I believe it was, while watching the Japanese in Manchuria, while also relying on their spies to make sure that the Japanese didn't plan to attack in Siberia before ordering 40 of their Siberian divisions west. Basically they waited as long as they could, and without these divisions I doubt much of an offensive especially in the Moscow area could have taken place. At one point, in October there was one division protecting Moscow, while the forward armies were surrounded and cut off. Those surrounded forces were ordered to continue fighting so that the Germans couldn't advance on the capital. I don't think the Soviets could have been in a worse situation right there. The heavy rains and the resulting mud that could in anecdotal accounts swallow small vehicles, did slow the German advance but it wouldn't have stopped them.

Yes other forces were brought to the Moscow area before the Siberian ones could reach there, but I think without them the front would have more or less stabilized, and not been thrown back like around Moscow, or in several other places. It's my opinion that if Japan had sent in everything they had after a victory in China, then the Germans would have been able to launch offensives in the spring, and not the summer since they wouldn't be up against an enemy with that much numerical advantage if any. I'm sure those 40 Siberian divisions would have given a good fight against the Japanese, but knowing how the Soviets fought at the time, and how hardened and fanatical the Japanese were, I'd bet on the Japanese. Don't forget that China would have provided industry, resources, and troops for the Japanese. Not a massive number, but enough to really help. The Manchukeo army was largely made up of you guessed it, Chinese in Manchuria. There were also tens of thousands of Chinese volunteer units that aided the Japanese in their war against China.

I think the Soviet Union would have collapsed, personally.

This Siberian Divisions saving Moscow is myth.

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/

 

[Amur_Tiger]

snip

So you're assuming that:

1. Japan would have the industrial capacity, resources and skill to assemble a considerably more potent army then it did.

2. That the pressure from this, along with a reduction, but not elimination of lend-lease would allow the Germans to accomplish something in 1942 other then get bogged down in disastrous city fighting and stretching their logistical system to the breaking point again.

3. That somehow the Germans would suddenly decide to ask for less then complete capitulation, in spite of their attitudes towards the Soviets.

4. That someone with enough power in the Soviet Union was left alive who actually thought it would be a good idea to kill Stalin in the middle of this.

I don't consider any of these assumptions to be reasonable in no small part due to the fact that one of the huge reasons why the Germans didn't assault Moscow in 1941, the point of greatest jeopardy for the Soviets, was due to logistical limitations. Read this if you want to understand what I'm referring to.

The key part to understand is that for all the Germans had accomplished in tearing Soviet forces apart they'd also been considerably weakened over the course of Barbarossa, less due to defeat so much as the wear and tear of the whole operation and the difficulty they had actually repairing things.

Just as a taste of what this sort of attrition looked like for the Germans, they wrote-off on average 115% of their January strength in aircraft during 1941 ( excluding November ), some aircraft categories would be higher, others lower.

 

[hkrommel]

1. Japan would have the industrial capacity, resources and skill to assemble a considerably more potent army then it did.

It did assemble a very potent army, against a certain kind of enemy. An IJA prepared to fight the Chinese is not an IJA prepared to fight the Soviets, and vice versa. If the Japanese planned to take on the Soviets then yes, they would spend time training in more conventional ways, and would have manufactured heavy equipment. They would have prepared to fight the Soviet army, not the Chinese irregular forces.

2. That the pressure from this, along with a reduction, but not elimination of lend-lease would allow the Germans to accomplish something in 1942 other then get bogged down in disastrous city fighting and stretching their logistical system to the breaking point again.

It could possibly mean something is accomplished in 1941. The Soviet government was on the brink of collapse and barely held together in the winter of 1941. If they devote sufficient resources to stop the Japanese, the Germans have an easier time in the West, but even psychologically a two-front war is much more threatening. Why would they care about Siberia when Moscow is threatened? However, losing one or the other would be a serious blow.

The OTL situation and the situation 22 June 1941-onwards in this alternate timeline are simply not comparable. A two front war is vastly different from the challenges the Soviets faced OTL.

3. That somehow the Germans would suddenly decide to ask for less then complete capitulation, in spite of their attitudes towards the Soviets.

Again, what do you mean by "complete capitulation?" Do you mean surrender? Certainly. Do you mean annexation? The Germans didn't want that at all. You seriously need to define your terms here.

4. That someone with enough power in the Soviet Union was left alive who actually thought it would be a good idea to kill Stalin in the middle of this.

Beria, considering he probably had Stalin killed OTL. Molotov, for another. Vorishilov hated Stalin. Perhaps a general who saw the situation was untenable. You seem to be failing to grasp the utter cutthroat nature of Soviet politics. The only person Stalin could trust was Stalin (and possibly Kaganovich).

I don't consider any of these assumptions to be reasonable in no small part due to the fact that one of the huge reasons why the Germans didn't assault Moscow in 1941, the point of greatest jeopardy for the Soviets, was due to logistical limitations. Read this if you want to understand what I'm referring to.

That has literally nothing to do with any of the assumptions you listed. German capabilities in winter 1941 have nothing to do with Japanese preparations, whether the situation after the Soviets are exhausted by a year of two-front fighting is better for the Germans (undeniably the answer is yes), what peace terms the Germans would settle for, and what the internal political situation of the Soviet Union is.

The key part to understand is that for all the Germans had accomplished in tearing Soviet forces apart they'd also been considerably weakened over the course of Barbarossa, less due to defeat so much as the wear and tear of the whole operation and the difficulty they had actually repairing things.

Just as a taste of what this sort of attrition looked like for the Germans, they wrote-off on average 115% of their January strength in aircraft during 1941 ( excluding November ), some aircraft categories would be higher, others lower.

Again, irrelevant. Who knows how significant Soviet resistance would have been if they were split between two fronts? Why would the German attack have worn down if Timoshenko stayed in command (as Zhukov would likely be sent east due to his experience there), and thus the Soviets wouldn't develop the tactical counter to the German pincer? I'm not saying the Germans take Moscow in 1941, but they would certainly have an easier time of things.

Most importantly here, the Germans have time. They don't need to wear their troops down in headlong attacks and advance beyond their logistical capabilities. They can let their supply lines catch up and focus on Leningrad, for example, link up with the Finns, and once operations there are concluded focus on encircling Moscow. The biggest problem the Germans had was that they were looking for the killing blow the whole time, but in this timeline they can afford to be more deliberate and calculating. Who knows if they would have realized there is not a schwerpunkt in the USSR (other than the government itself), but regardless they have more time to work with and an increased ability to put pressure on the schwerpunkt whether they realize it or not.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

A Japan that is preparing to fight the Soviets instead of China will build more heavy equipment and focus their production accordingly. In OTL they focused on light infantry. I don't know how this can be any clearer.

They'll need to fight the navy for the budget (and industrial resources and raw materials) to equip a more heavily armed and more mechanized army. The navy will want it it's circle three plan with Yamatos and Shokakus regardless of what the army's priority is, because it views them essential for national defence.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

It did assemble a very potent army, against a certain kind of enemy. An IJA prepared to fight the Chinese is not an IJA prepared to fight the Soviets, and vice versa. If the Japanese planned to take on the Soviets then yes, they would spend time training in more conventional ways, and would have manufactured heavy equipment. They would have prepared to fight the Soviet army, not the Chinese irregular forces.

By when? The Japanese industrial base wasn't sufficient to do this on short order and likely wasn't able to do this at all without diverting resources from other areas. As such I don't consider this assumption to be credible.

It could possibly mean something is accomplished in 1941. The Soviet government was on the brink of collapse and barely held together in the winter of 1941. If they devote sufficient resources to stop the Japanese, the Germans have an easier time in the West, but even psychologically a two-front war is much more threatening. Why would they care about Siberia when Moscow is threatened? However, losing one or the other would be a serious blow.

The OTL situation and the situation 22 June 1941-onwards in this alternate timeline are simply not comparable. A two front war is vastly different from the challenges the Soviets faced OTL.

As has been explained a few times, the forces in the East were not a decisive factor in stopping the Germans in 1941, they wouldn't have had an easier time until well into the winter, by which point the logistics elements which you consider 'irrelevant' are taking a major toll on the German ability to maintain offensive operations.

Again, what do you mean by "complete capitulation?" Do you mean surrender? Certainly. Do you mean annexation? The Germans didn't want that at all. You seriously need to define your terms here.

Unconditional surrender and huge swaths of the Soviet Union being annexed.

Beria, considering he probably had Stalin killed OTL. Molotov, for another. Vorishilov hated Stalin. Perhaps a general who saw the situation was untenable. You seem to be failing to grasp the utter cutthroat nature of Soviet politics. The only person Stalin could trust was Stalin (and possibly Kaganovich).

You seem to be failing to grasp that the Soviets had other things to worry about then their favorite pastime of cutthroat politics during the war.

That has literally nothing to do with any of the assumptions you listed. German capabilities in winter 1941 have nothing to do with Japanese preparations, whether the situation after the Soviets are exhausted by a year of two-front fighting is better for the Germans (undeniably the answer is yes), what peace terms the Germans would settle for, and what the internal political situation of the Soviet Union is.

Assumption #2 has a huge amount to do with this, however you'd like to ignore the logistics challenge in defeating the Soviet Union it's there none the less.

Again, irrelevant. Who knows how significant Soviet resistance would have been if they were split between two fronts? Why would the German attack have worn down if Timoshenko stayed in command (as Zhukov would likely be sent east due to his experience there), and thus the Soviets wouldn't develop the tactical counter to the German pincer? I'm not saying the Germans take Moscow in 1941, but they would certainly have an easier time of things.

Most importantly here, the Germans have time. They don't need to wear their troops down in headlong attacks and advance beyond their logistical capabilities. They can let their supply lines catch up and focus on Leningrad, for example, link up with the Finns, and once operations there are concluded focus on encircling Moscow. The biggest problem the Germans had was that they were looking for the killing blow the whole time, but in this timeline they can afford to be more deliberate and calculating. Who knows if they would have realized there is not a schwerpunkt in the USSR (other than the government itself), but regardless they have more time to work with and an increased ability to put pressure on the schwerpunkt whether they realize it or not.

Once again we're talking about what the Germans can accomplish so the according to you 'irrelevant' German logistics challenges have their effect. Time isn't in favor of Germany in the long run, even with the Soviets under more pressure Germany will be losing North Africa soon and start losing Italy. The Luftwaffe will be stuck in it's death-spiral of over-commitments and lack the personnel and equipment to regain or build strength.

The German land forces will fare better of course in facing less counter-attacks from the Soviets but will still have few good answers for how to capture a city like Moscow, Leningrad or Stalingrad. Without accomplishing this as time passes after Barborssa the overall pressure on the Soviets is reduced, even with Japan's efforts as the Soviets get a handle of things over the winter and stabilize the situation.

They'll need to fight the navy for the budget (and industrial resources and raw materials) to equip a more heavily armed and more mechanized army. The navy will want it it's circle three plan with Yamatos and Shokakus regardless of what the army's priority is, because it views them essential for national defence.

Yup, and they'd be right about that, minus the Yamatos and Shokakus you could easily see the British more active and aggressive in the Pacific along with the Americans accelerating the Japanese collapse there. This whole thing would basically be a sacrifice play for Germany's sake that only makes sense in a game-world, IRL the Japanese didn't want to sacrifice their empire for the sake of the German one.

 

[seattle]

1. Japan could obviously never beat the Soviets in land warfare and they knew it.
2. Japan was still in deep s*** in China which made any invasion plans impossible.
3. Japan's frontier with the Soviets was in inhospitable Siberia. There weren't any key strategic points to conquer, just low infra barren endless terrain.

That said, the only question is: how many Soviet units would have been tied up in the east instead of fighting Germany.
I doubt that the devastating winter offensive in 41/42 would have been possible without the 50-60 Siberian divisions which would have been tied up in the east. In 1942 the Soviets would have been considerably weaker in the west which might have made the difference.

Conclusion: Had Japan dow'ed the Soviets AND made credible (yet eventually futile) invasion attempts (not just a phoney war), then sizeable Soviet forces would have been tied up in the east, thus making a German victory that much more likely. It wouldn't have changed anything pre-December 1941 but a lot from that moment forth.

EDIT:
I completely forgot about the "instead of US" part which is equally vital. Before Pearl Harbour the US senate didn't support a dow against any warring party. After Pearl Harbour Roosevelt only got the green light to dow Japan, not Germany. Now, without Japan attacking the US, it is safe to argue that Roosevelt couldn't have entered the war actively as early as historically. Whether the senate would have allowed an active participation is up for speculation, 100% sure is only that it would have been later than historically. Probably the US wouldn't have been able (due to the senate) to actively engage Germany any time soon.
--> the impact of that change is obvious

 

[Daelyn75]

This Siberian Divisions saving Moscow is myth.

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/

You didn't read what I wrote there. I never stated that they did. However, they were instrumental in the December 6th counterattack.

 

[Opanashc]

You didn't read what I wrote there. I never stated that they did. However, they were instrumental in the December 6th counterattack.

How many divisions were transferred? What where their numbers? When were they formed? Where did the recruits come from?

 

[krieger11b]

Siberia was something that would be thought to be useful in the future, not a proven large resource like it is now BTW. The Pacific had something they could use now, not when they had better ability to do resource extraction in the cold.

 

[mursolini]

I doubt that the devastating winter offensive in 41/42 would have been possible without the 50-60 Siberian divisions which would have been tied up in the east. In 1942 the Soviets would have been considerably weaker in the west which might have made the difference.

Actually 12. 1941 Winter offensive troops were mostly green recruits of third mobilisation wave.
Soviet far east only had 34 divisions in the first place. Not only that, but due to Soviet mobilisation, the amount of troops in the far east actually grew, by june 1943, SU had 43 divisions there.

 

[SchwarzKatze]

Siberia was something that would be thought to be useful in the future, not a proven large resource like it is now BTW. The Pacific had something they could use now, not when they had better ability to do resource extraction in the cold.

So was Manchuria. Japan's original goal was to ensure buffers around the homeland and curb any nearby threats, which was why Japan occupied Russian Far East for a few years after White Russia fell. There were no significant natural resource reserves then either.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

So was Manchuria. Japan's original goal was to ensure buffers around the homeland and curb any nearby threats, which was why Japan occupied Russian Far East for a few years after White Russia fell. There were no significant natural resource reserves then either.

Well Manchuria actually had notable coal and mineral deposits but I'm sure there are portions of Siberia with that, the main thing was that unlike the vast majority of Siberia, Manchuria south of the Amur River was populated as they were able to do some agriculture and thus build up the population over time. North of there is a very different story as this was not at all far removed from the land of 'Dersu the trapper' where one made their living by trapping and the fur trade. I'd venture to guess there was more industry and resource extraction going on in Manchuria then there was in Siberia east of Irkutsk.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

So you're assuming that:

1. Japan would have the industrial capacity, resources and skill to assemble a considerably more potent army then it did.

I think the assumption is that Japan shifts it´s focus from going south to go north instead which means that more of it´s army is available to fight the Soviets than just the Manchurian army that watched the border doing pretty much nothing for the whole Pacific War. And that it does not Pearl Harbor the US so it wouldn´t fight the USSR and US at the same time.

2. That the pressure from this, along with a reduction, but not elimination of lend-lease

50% less lend-lease already is an enourmous blow to the Soviets losing 8 Million tons of goods
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_USSR
e.g. the Katyushas that were transported on US trucks and that would be missing from Soviet forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#/media/File:Katjuscha_1938_Moscow.jpg

3. That somehow the Germans would suddenly decide to ask for less then complete capitulation, in spite of their attitudes towards the Soviets.

Realpolitik. Even the most euphoric plans did not ask for the annexation of the whole USSR from Poland to Kamtchatka into Germany.
Rather the USSR would be reduced to a Russia a bit smaller than nowadays while ceding any conquered areas like the baltic states, Karelia or Ukraine.
I think that the Allies demands were much more set in stone with their "only accept unconditional surrender" condition than Germany. After all making a favourable peace for Germany was how it was done in WW1 in Brest-Litowsk.

4. That someone with enough power in the Soviet Union was left alive who actually thought it would be a good idea to kill Stalin in the middle of this.

Autocratic rulers at all times faced the threat of being disposed once they even appeared to show weakness. Happened in the first Rome and it could have happened in the third Rome too. Had Stalin run from Moscow I doubt he would have been able to return
http://ww2history.com/key_moments/Eastern/Panic_in_Moscow


If Japan would manage to get to terms with China they might even sell their attack on the Soviets as being in the interest of their asian brothers to undo the unequal treaties with which Russia stole that whole area from Quing China
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_ussr_e_88.jpg

Edit: They should rename their Great East Asian coprosperity sphere" plans into "Monroe doctrine: Gangnam style" to appease the US. ;-)

 

[Loke]

How many divisions were transferred?

18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to the Western Front against Germany.

 

[mursolini]

e.g. the Katyushas that were transported on US trucks and that would be missing from Soviet forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#/media/File:Katjuscha_1938_Moscow.jpg

They weren`t the only trucks on which Katushas were mounted, nor were they first. SU produced over 200k trucks, quite enough for LL loss to not be that devastating.

18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to the Western Front against Germany.

Article, sadly doesn`t cite any source. Nor does it cite first transfers of 3 Siberian divisions to Kiev region in april 1941, due to "increased Nazi threat".

Here, is an actual Russian goverment source(sadly, it is in Russian, but one can google translate it), of what was present in far east theartre in 1941-1945 by half-year. Divisions, brigades, Man, artillery pieces, planes, ex.
http://protown.ru/information/hide/5452.html

The wikipedia`s articles`s data seem quite wrong.

As a shortened version of this article:
most transfering of troops happned in may, july and july and was mostly done by august(!)
It took less that half-year to replenish and increase Far eastern group of troops to almost double.
Thrugh the duration of war, SU maintained over a million of soldiers, at least 3k tanks and 3k planes and 8k artillery pieces on Japanese border. Yes, even in 1942.

While the amount of equipment transfered was very learge, there was very little shortfall, over 2k tanks were transfered, yet the amount avialable to theatre only fell by 500 units, as one can see, the theatre was extencivly reinforced, to make sure Japan wouldn`t try anything stupid.

 

[Daelyn75]

18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to the Western Front against Germany.

That is a bit better in terms of numbers. My West Point Military History Of WW2 states that 15 Siberian divisions were used in the Moscow counter offensive, it doesn't state how many in total were used all along the entire front.