so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[D Inqu]

They didn't make a decision to end the Northern Strategy.

By 1936, they had actually shifted to a posture of getting the China Manchukuo situation settled and no longer trying to separate North China. They were terrified of the Soviets and didn't believe they could take them on if they had a hostile China behind them.

The war in China started and that forced the Japanese to shift away from an Anti Soviet focus. It wasn't a decision as much as them being forced by circumstance. If they had had the freedom to choose, they would have kept the status quo with China and fortified vs. the Soviet Union.

Are you saying that the Japanese didn't want to invade China and were "forced"? While it's true that Japan didn't want to go to war "right now" in 1937, their strategy for the previous 10 years was strongly focused on China, chipping away one region at a time. It was inevitable that eventually, this will escalate to full scale war.

If they wanted a non-hostile China, they were doing it wrong.

 

[ringhloth]

Warplan Orange was created because Japan after the annexation of Korea, Manchuria (only formally independant as Manchukuo) and the former german colonies (Tsingtao in China, Carolines, Marianas and Marshall Islands) and the US after the annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the Phillipines were direct rivals in the Pacific and for China´s market.
The warplan involving the UK was needed because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_color-coded_war_plans#Multilateral_war_plans
and even Canada as a member of the Commonwealth considered it to be a threat that this alliance might drag them into a war against the US on the side of Japan which lead to the end of that alliance in 1923
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Japanese_Alliance#Demise_of_the_treaty
So if Canada saw that risk I would not say that the US warplan was that farfetched as to be "something absurd".

Yes. And those things are evidence that Japan was a threat to the US. However, the creation of a warplan by the US is evidence of nothing more than due diligence on the part of the US, unless you care to explain how France, the UK, China, Iceland, or the United States citizenry were perceived as plausible threats to the US, as there were all plans dealing with the pacification of those parties.

 

[Opanashc]

Are you saying that the Japanese didn't want to invade China and were "forced"?

Japanese Government did not want to. However, part of Japanese Army did. And forced Japan into the war.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

Yes. And those things are evidence that Japan was a threat to the US. However, the creation of a warplan by the US is evidence of nothing more than due diligence on the part of the US, unless you care to explain how France,

French Indochina close to the US Phillipines and a colonial french presence in the carribean near the US islands. Just as much cause to have a plan as the spanish-american war that had the US invade Cuba and annex Puerto Rico and the Phillipines.

the UK,

Anglo-Japanese alliance.

China,

Not a "threat" but a plan for a repetition of the 8nation-action for the Boxer incidents.

Iceland,

Iceland was ruled by Denmark and was occupied by the UK to prevent the possibility of it being used as a base by Germany when Denmark quickly faltered to invasion.
The US while not having joined the real war yet, relieved the UK by replacing them as garrisons in iceland.

Iceland is of strategic importance as from it the seaways in the atlantic could be disturbed and the convoys to the USSR or UK distupted.

or the United States citizenry were perceived as plausible threats to the US,

The US citizenry is a plausible threat to just about everything and the NRA makes sure it stays so.
For a historical example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonus_Army

 

[GhostKiller01]

My general strategy in HoI 3 as Japan was to dominate the Chinese Peninsula until all the Chinese nations that weren't protected were under my control as puppets or otherwise (Nationalist China would be annexed for its IC and danger it poses), and then join Germany in its fight with the Allies, the entire time influencing the USA to join the Axis diplomatically to at least maintain them as neutral. Once India and Singapore were taken, (I would always influence at least 3 nations to join the axis, and would focus on Persia, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and the Netherlands in that order in an attempt to flank the Allied colonies and the USSR through the Cacausus) I would let the "Western Axis" deal with the mess that is Africa, while I would invade the Allied land in the Pacific, taking Australia and New Zealand, and then invading Mexico and Canada (note that the USA were always leaning towards the Axis at this point due to me making the "America's First Comittee" the most poular backed faction in the USA and influencing them diplomatically). By this time, it would be 1946, and the USSR would have signed the peace agreement by which it left all of European Russia to Germany. At this point, I would declare war on the USSR and invade them. While invading, I would order my IC to build two "lines" of provinces in infrastructure to supply my army. The USSR would fall, I would puppet it, and the Comintern nations would all have to accept being my puppets.

 

[Porkman]

Are you saying that the Japanese didn't want to invade China and were "forced"? While it's true that Japan didn't want to go to war "right now" in 1937, their strategy for the previous 10 years was strongly focused on China, chipping away one region at a time. It was inevitable that eventually, this will escalate to full scale war.

If they wanted a non-hostile China, they were doing it wrong.

They had established a perimeter Inside the Great Wall and had been working with the Chinese to end Anti Japanese activities. (Chiang Kai Shek went out of his way to censor anti Japanese speech during 1935-1936. It was done essentially at gunpoint, but they did do it.) In 1936, the Kwangtung Army tried to help separate Inner Mongolia by arming Mongolians and the Chinese had successfully resisted. The Xian incident had strengthened Chiang's hand as well.

Basically, in early 1937, the Japanese were interested in fighting the Soviets and wanted to avoid further friction with China.

On January 25th 1937, the Japanese General Staff published the "Expression of Opinion on North China Policy to the Army Ministry,"

It said, "Imperial Japan must establish a self sufficient economy for Japan and Manchukuo and perfect preparations for war by renovating all areas of government. With this as a turning point, we should change our China Policy. Priority should be assigned to economic and cultural policies in accordance with the aim of promoting mutual assistance and coprosperity. At this juncture we should maintain a just and fair attitude towards the movement for national unity in China, and the separation of North China should not be carried out."

The Japanese Army in China was by this time, more interested in having access to Chinese industry and materials than they were to territory, especially as the Chinese regime had de facto agreed to the status of Manchukuo.

There was a lecture given by the Japanese Consul General Suma of North China. Here are the points

1) Japan's ability to coerce China has declined.

2) The British adopted a far more conciliatory China policy 7 years ago and they are now reaping the benefits. Japan could learn a great deal from the way in which Britain has made inroads into China, particularly in the creation of an organ such as the economic headquarters for China in Shanghai for continuing government and private cooperation. By means of long range planning, Britain has steadily advanced its interests.

3) China is gradually moving towards national unity.

4) The awakening of China's youth. There is a demand by the youth, especially the young officers, for national unity and recovery of sovereignty.

At the same lecture, the Chinese foreign minister enumerated 3 groups that determined China's Japan policy.

A) Yang Hu-cheng's faction, which urged the formation of a popular front and strengthened resistance to Japan.

B) Those who, in the final analysis, would resort to arms and even join forces with communists to fight Japan.

C) Those, like Chiang Kai Shek and Wang Jing Wei, who know Japan, seek peace on the basis of equality, and endeavor insofar as possible to avoid collision with Japan.

The Chinese foreign minister also said that Japan would have to undo some of their fait accompli and promise to cut that shit out in the future if they wanted the third faction to prevail.



Anyway, the final gasp of this policy was the sending of Kodama Kenji, the president of the Japan China Trade Association, to China in March of 1937. His report of what the Chinese wanted out of Japan before granting economic cooperation prompted the Japanese government to have a conference in May between the ambassador to China, the foreign ministers and the army and navy ministers.

Unfortunately, the Hayashi cabinet fell on May 31. The conference thus ended with no concrete resolution. Japan's China policy drifted until the outbreak of hostilities on July 7. (A little over a month later)

Now, what Japan wanted in 1937 was a China which would be sovereign and work with Japan but still accept all of their previous losses. At this point, Japan just talking about making the change. Most of this change in China Policy was internal, they hadn't announced anything public.

The Chinese had no reason to trust the Japanese and July 7th destroyed any chance for the proposed changes in policy to become real.

When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened, the Japanese dusted off the policies that they were previously going to discontinue and they got a war that they didn't want.

 

[Antiboyscout]

The US citizenry is a plausible threat to just about everything and the NRA makes sure it stays so.
For a historical example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonus_Army

Did we read the same wiki? The only mention of a shooting was the police against the protesters. An excuse given was they were attempting to topple the government. But that was it, an excuse.

 

[D Inqu]

Anyway, the final gasp of this policy was the sending of Kodama Kenji, the president of the Japan China Trade Association, to China in March of 1937. His report of what the Chinese wanted out of Japan before granting economic cooperation prompted the Japanese government to have a conference in May between the ambassador to China, the foreign ministers and the army and navy ministers.
Unfortunately, the Hayashi cabinet fell on May 31. The conference thus ended with no concrete resolution. Japan's China policy drifted until the outbreak of hostilities on July 7. (A little over a month later)

Thank for the information. But as you say, the Hayashi administration only lasted a few months. It was not representative of the feeeling of the power circles in Japan (or China for that matter).

Now, what Japan wanted in 1937 was a China which would be sovereign and work with Japan but still accept all of their previous losses.

Essentially the "moderates" in Japan wanted to say to China "look, we slowly cannibalised your country for the last 30-odd years, but now we want to be friendly and cooperate. We are absolutely honest, really! Oh, and don't expect any lands back, maybe some token concessions".
This was obviously impossible. The very position of the Nationalist Chinese administration and the centralisation of power hanged on the promise of a strong state, with the implied promise of restoration of Japanese-occupied land. Without a clear unifying goal and enemy the country was on the verge of collapsing into the warlord era again.

Most of this change in China Policy was internal, they hadn't announced anything public.

Because even in Japan, there was a lot of opposition to this line of thought.

 

[Porkman]

Thank for the information. But as you say, the Hayashi administration only lasted a few months. It was not representative of the feeeling of the power circles in Japan (or China for that matter).

Essentially the "moderates" in Japan wanted to say to China "look, we slowly cannibalised your country for the last 30-odd years, but now we want to be friendly and cooperate. We are absolutely honest, really! Oh, and don't expect any lands back, maybe some token concessions".
This was obviously impossible. The very position of the Nationalist Chinese administration and the centralisation of power hanged on the promise of a strong state, with the implied promise of restoration of Japanese-occupied land. Without a clear unifying goal and enemy the country was on the verge of collapsing into the warlord era again.
Because even in Japan, there was a lot of opposition to this line of thought.

But the war was one that neither side wanted.

Chiang Kai Shek was content to sit on his hands vis a vis Japan for a few years while the Japanese wanted to be able to focus on the Soviets.

Remember that Kwangtung Army drove the strong anti China policy and they were the ones who actually switched their view in 1936-1937. The failure of the Suiyuan incident and their own insecurity vs. the Soviets made them happy to keep what they had.

My point was that the war was not the one the Japanese wanted to fight, if they could have chosen.

The war essentially started via heuristics. Japan reacted to July 7th by sending reinforcements and the Chinese weren't willing to let the local peace that happened after the first 2 weeks hold without a formal assurance of peace from the Japanese High Command.

 

[hkrommel]

If Japan is going to invade the USSR they're going to take a different strategy with China. Don't assume OTL actions when considering alternate history. The Japanese would likely find a favorable front line in China and, depending on whether or not they were amenable to peace, they would probably sit there and move the bulk of their army to Manchuria. They did have experience fighting in the area, and they would be adopting tactics suited to fighting the Soviets (again, don't assume OTL decisions here), so I think the Soviets have a rough time of it trying to hold off the Axis forces in the west and Japan in the east. Given the situation I wouldn't be surprised if Stalin made concessions to Japan so he can resolve that theater quickly. Simply put, it was a close enough call for the Soviets that they really can't afford a 2-front drain, especially considering that Vladivostok accounted for some 50% of all Lend-lease shipments to the USSR.

Essentially the Japanese don't even have to make major gains into Siberia to push the Soviets close to the edge, if not over it entirely. The USSR would lose half of its lend lease, including most of the trucks, food, locomotives, and raw materials it received. This means that it's industrial situation is much more dire due to the lack of resources, machine parts, and labor freed up by the supply of food. Its food situation will also be serious, and Soviet locomotive production during the war was abysmal, basically negligible, so the logistical situation there would be serious.

Relocating industry to Siberia would likewise be more of an issue, as Japanese forces will be threatening it with air power if they make any substantial gains in Siberia. Finally, Soviet manpower, equipment, and resources will be more drained due to combat taking place in the Far East.

To answer the question, yes I think the Soviet Union loses if Japan goes after them. It won't be an occupation/annexation loss, but they will be forced to settle with the Axis or collapse internally under the pressure and lack of support with the severing of the Pacific lend-lease route.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

I figure it's coming sooner or later if Japan joins the war against the Soviets. Unless Japan isn't in the same faction as Germany. Then we get in a whole weird alternate history where Japan doesn't sign the applicable treaties with Germany and Italy (thus not joining the Axis faction in game terms), but is a co-belligerent against the Soviets.

Then again, if Japan attacks the Soviets without joining the Axis, and Germany wins, the US might have its hands full helping the British in Europe. A second war against Japan might not be a priority.

I guess we'll see how World Tension and the US AI works as Japan.

The UK still ties things together, recall that the central conflict of allies vs axis was UK vs Germany and it was around this that further belligerents were pulled in. Japan was obviously hostile towards British interests even if they left the US and China alone and the British certainly viewed the Soviets as a key ally in defeating Germany. Convincing the US to become fully involved may have taken more time but lend-lease didn't need Pearl Harbor to take place so supporting the Soviet Union would still be possible, though it would likely involve a greater proportion taking the harder North Sea route then is desirable.

As to how the Soviet Union would fare, not that much worse, they'd shown that they could crush the Japanese army before and while the release of Siberian troops was certainly a benefit I don't think it would have tipped the scales. As I've mentioned in some other threads suggesting that 'take Moscow, win war' was achievable the amount of resources needed to actually take the city were beyond what the Germans could deploy by that point in time, in large part due to tremendous logistical and maintenance challenges that had more or less consumed the bulk of the vehicles and aircraft that they'd started Barbarossa with. It would take time and supplies to fix those vehicles and aircraft and the supplies ( parts ) portion was always in short supply even under good logistical conditions and in winter 1941 those parts were waiting behind deliveries of food, ammunition, winter clothing, etc.

As time goes on this would also likely prompt the British to become more active in the Pacific themselves as even by 1941 the main threat of German and Italian surface navies had diminished and given the clear need for the British to do their utmost to draw pressure off the Soviets I think you'd see British carriers and battleships in the South-West Pacific by 1942.

If Japan is going to invade the USSR they're going to take a different strategy with China. Don't assume OTL actions when considering alternate history. The Japanese would likely find a favorable front line in China and, depending on whether or not they were amenable to peace, they would probably sit there and move the bulk of their army to Manchuria. They did have experience fighting in the area, and they would be adopting tactics suited to fighting the Soviets (again, don't assume OTL decisions here), so I think the Soviets have a rough time of it trying to hold off the Axis forces in the west and Japan in the east. Given the situation I wouldn't be surprised if Stalin made concessions to Japan so he can resolve that theater quickly. Simply put, it was a close enough call for the Soviets that they really can't afford a 2-front drain, especially considering that Vladivostok accounted for some 50% of all Lend-lease shipments to the USSR.

Essentially the Japanese don't even have to make major gains into Siberia to push the Soviets close to the edge, if not over it entirely. The USSR would lose half of its lend lease, including most of the trucks, food, locomotives, and raw materials it received. This means that it's industrial situation is much more dire due to the lack of resources, machine parts, and labor freed up by the supply of food. Its food situation will also be serious, and Soviet locomotive production during the war was abysmal, basically negligible, so the logistical situation there would be serious.

The problem with this theory is that when the Soviets were close to the edge the Japanese couldn't do anything to change the situation, winter 1941 was the most critical time for the Soviet Union by a long shot and at that point in time the only impact a Japanese invasion would have would be to tie up the Siberian divisions. While these were helpful those alone weren't the margin that the Soviets kept Moscow by, the Germans would have had to do something very differently themselves. Apparently this was a myth anyways and that the bulk of the new forces around Moscow were newly formed units.

The biggest problem of all with Japan going after the USSR is that it's a mismatch of strengths to requirements, Japan going after a stronger land power risked much for little gain, it would be more of a sacrifice play for Germany's benefit and there's no reason why they'd want to do that. There was a huge risk that instead of 'taking Siberia' a Japanese invasion turns into 'losing Manchuria' and after the experiences of combat between the Soviets and Japanese before WW2 this wasn't a gamble worth making, since most of the gains end up going to someone else anyways.

 

[CaptRobau]

I think the war with China would need to be complete by then,/QUOTE]

If the focus shifts to Siberia, it probably means that China is left alone for the moment. No-one plans so that they can get into a two-front war, when they don't have too. China wouldn't attack them, so they would have the freedom to just focus on the Soviets.

 

[Daelyn75]

Depends on how much Soviet troops Japan would really take. Soviet army group in manchuria was more or less equal to Japanese troops on Manchuria, most of the time, with late 1941-early 1942 being only exeption.

If Japan could take out 2-4 millions of Soviet troops, SU could lose. If SU would be able to blitz thrugh Manchuria in 1942-1943 instead of huge failed counter-offencives in 1942-1943, situation could be even worse for Axis.

Not really. SU did have the troops manning those regions even in the worst moments on 1942. Japanese army was severely underequiped and undertrained. Infrastructure would force Japan to go thrugh very narrow Trans-Siberian rail road, which makes region very defencible, After towns around Chinese border were lost. Soivet also wasn`t that close to collapsing, so it is not obvious that Japan could muster enough troops to actually make a difference.

I said that china would be defeated already in that scenario. The entire Japanese army could focus just on Siberia if they wanted to. It's not a war that is won in a year. It usually takes me in my HOI games 3+ years. In HOI III I am forced to build infrastructure as I go.

 

[Daelyn75]

To CaptRobau, well, the core of my view was that China is already defeated, so that Japan can focus elsewhere.

 

[hkrommel]

The problem with this theory is that when the Soviets were close to the edge the Japanese couldn't do anything to change the situation, winter 1941 was the most critical time for the Soviet Union by a long shot and at that point in time the only impact a Japanese invasion would have would be to tie up the Siberian divisions. While these were helpful those alone weren't the margin that the Soviets kept Moscow by, the Germans would have had to do something very differently themselves. Apparently this was a myth anyways and that the bulk of the new forces around Moscow were newly formed units.

The biggest problem of all with Japan going after the USSR is that it's a mismatch of strengths to requirements, Japan going after a stronger land power risked much for little gain, it would be more of a sacrifice play for Germany's benefit and there's no reason why they'd want to do that. There was a huge risk that instead of 'taking Siberia' a Japanese invasion turns into 'losing Manchuria' and after the experiences of combat between the Soviets and Japanese before WW2 this wasn't a gamble worth making, since most of the gains end up going to someone else anyways.

More eastern divisions were transferred for the winter counteroffensive as opposed to the actual defense during Typhoon, but regardless, you're assuming OTL decisions. If the Japanese invade, it will be with much greater numbers since they will not be fighting in China simultaneously. They will adopt tactics suited to fighting the Soviets. The Soviets will take losses, lose equipment. They will need reserves, more supply depots, additional air power. All of these things mean that transfers may have to go the other way. The Soviet formations could not hold back an attack (without significant reinforcement) from the IJA if the IJA was focused on Siberia.

Japan will be going after a reeling country that cannot afford another front opening, especially as it needs the Lend-Lease coming in from Vladivostok to get its industry operational and working at full capacity. It needs the food from Vladivostok to feed its people and free up farmers for the army. If the Japanese invade in 1941 Soviet eyes will not be on Manchuria, they will remain on Moscow. Japanese benefit would likewise be great as they will control the entire Pacific coastline of Asia from the North Pole to Shanghai, with plans to take link up with their divisions holding Hong Kong and other ports. If Germany brings the Soviets to their knees (which is entirely likely as the Soviets would lose 50% of lend-lease, their entire Pacific fleet, the entirety of their Pacific ports, and would have to devote significant resources to keeping the Japanese at bay). Even if the Japanese don't advance further than Vladivostok (which they would be easily able to do), that alone would probably bring the Soviets to collapse due to the lack of food and additional strain of another front.

As for what they gain, a Germany and Japan unhindered by the Soviets are free to focus on the British, drawing their attention away from the colonies and opening the door to Japan.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

More eastern divisions were transferred for the winter counteroffensive as opposed to the actual defense during Typhoon, but regardless, you're assuming OTL decisions. If the Japanese invade, it will be with much greater numbers since they will not be fighting in China simultaneously.

Those numbers top out at around 27 divisions, the Far-Eastern Military Front had 20 divisions of their own and the Trans-Baikal Front had another 8 while it was sending 300000 men, 1440 tanks and 2230 guns west. Troops which, as you point out, weren't present in large numbers during the critical moment in the west.

Moreso, the Japanese weren't able to equip their forces to the degree the Russians, those 2230 guns the Russians sent west in late 1941 were about as much artillery as the Japanese had total and those 1440 tanks were twice as many as the Japanese had total. There's a reason why they took such a long time to work through Chinese territory. Fundamentally an attack on the Soviet Union at that point in time was suicide for the Japanese and that's why they were terrified of the Soviets even if one day they hoped to be strong enough to invade.

If Germany brings the Soviets to their knees (which is entirely likely as the Soviets would lose 50% of lend-lease, their entire Pacific fleet, the entirety of their Pacific ports, and would have to devote significant resources to keeping the Japanese at bay). Even if the Japanese don't advance further than Vladivostok (which they would be easily able to do), that alone would probably bring the Soviets to collapse due to the lack of food and additional strain of another front.

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of when Germany had it's best opportunities and when and how lend-lease had it's effect.

Germany was closest to defeating the USSR in late 1941, the shock of the summer's invasion and the proximity to Moscow and the siege of Leningrad all looked like looming disaster. At this point the only lend-lease received was a rush of supplies from the British to shore up the situation, needless to say this didn't come from Vladivostok. So Japanese action had little chance of doing anything to change things but for locking down some of the Siberian divisions, for a number of reasons I don't believe these were the margin of victory for the Soviets, logistical fatigue and the aggravating effect of winter weather stopped the German advance, Soviet resistance and the nature of the key targets also made capturing those key targets nearly impossible.

Moving on to later years where US supplies would grow more important through Vladivostok we have to see what was delivered. Lots of food and steel as basic products, but also a lot of trucks, fair number of boots. The food was the largest tonnage component of lend-lease but amounted to at best 4% of Soviet Union consumption so losing out on this would not have resulted in mass starvation, next largest was likely petroleum products and then you're on to trucks and other items, the one thing almost all of this has in common is that while it was critically important to making the Red Army effective in offensive very little of it was needed to hold the line.

Finally the extent of Japanese success, even if they could somehow manage to overwhelm the forces directly tasked to holding the line against them would have been exceedingly slow, the Japanese army was in no way the German army expecting huge sweeps over the even larger landmass of Siberia in the much more rugged logistical environment, the opportunities for Japanese success were slim. Holding it would have proven impossible as well as the Siberian winter is, unsurprisingly, not kind and the sort of thing the Japanese would have fared well in against the Russians.

Any hope of defeating the Soviet Union would have required significant improvements on the part of the Germans in how they ran their wars, particularly in handling their logistics because as good as their war machine was their logistics network was as ready for Barbarossa as the Red Army was. This in combination with Japanese activity might have altered the outcome but the logistical issues of the German army would have prevented any complete victory otherwise.

 

[LauraMendezas]

In 1941 Germany and Japan Declare War on Soviet Union Instead of U.S., the Main Japanese Invasion of USSR Goal is Expansion into Soviet Far East and Soviet Can Cut-off from Pacific while Germany Takes European Russia for German Settlers or Aryans, Causing Soviet to Survive in Central.

 

[hkrommel]

Moreso, the Japanese weren't able to equip their forces to the degree the Russians, those 2230 guns the Russians sent west in late 1941 were about as much artillery as the Japanese had total and those 1440 tanks were twice as many as the Japanese had total. There's a reason why they took such a long time to work through Chinese territory. Fundamentally an attack on the Soviet Union at that point in time was suicide for the Japanese and that's why they were terrified of the Soviets even if one day they hoped to be strong enough to invade.

Again, focusing on OTL strategies. A Japanese focus on the USSR would mean a focus on heavy equipment as opposed to light infantry. You can't compare the IJA equipped to fight the Chinese and the IJA equipped to fight the Soviets.

Germany was closest to defeating the USSR in late 1941, the shock of the summer's invasion and the proximity to Moscow and the siege of Leningrad all looked like looming disaster. At this point the only lend-lease received was a rush of supplies from the British to shore up the situation, needless to say this didn't come from Vladivostok. So Japanese action had little chance of doing anything to change things but for locking down some of the Siberian divisions, for a number of reasons I don't believe these were the margin of victory for the Soviets, logistical fatigue and the aggravating effect of winter weather stopped the German advance, Soviet resistance and the nature of the key targets also made capturing those key targets nearly impossible.

This has to do with my main point because...? The entire dynamic of the war would be different if the Japanese prepare and invade the USSR alongside the Germans in 1941. You would have seen months of sustained fighting by the time the Germans reach Moscow, and the Soviets could not resist an unencumbered IJA with existing formations. That means either:

1. The Soviets ignore the Far East and keep trying to stop the Germans, leading to large IJA gains, possibly to the point of them threatening to move west towards Soviet industry.
2. The Soviets reinforce the Far East, drawing desperately needed resources from the Western Front and doing far worse there. Remember they only really started to turn things around in late 1942, and even then it wasn't until 1943 that they started making real progress.

The situation you reference does not exist in this timeline.

Moving on to later years where US supplies would grow more important through Vladivostok we have to see what was delivered. Lots of food and steel as basic products, but also a lot of trucks, fair number of boots. The food was the largest tonnage component of lend-lease but amounted to at best 4% of Soviet Union consumption so losing out on this would not have resulted in mass starvation, next largest was likely petroleum products and then you're on to trucks and other items, the one thing almost all of this has in common is that while it was critically important to making the Red Army effective in offensive very little of it was needed to hold the line.

Looking at product tonnage fundamentally misunderstands lend-lease. It was specialized components, machine tools, etc. that really made the difference. Soviet industry would take until late 1943 to get back on its feet without that lend-lease. Also, looking at really any of this quantitatively, like you are, is a fundamental flaw in this sort of analysis. The food supplied made a huge difference in that it freed up farm workers, and was (generally speaking) enough to feed the whole Soviet army for the duration of the war.

You also reference "holding the line" as if there is some static trench that is "the line." Defense didn't even work that way in World War I. Petroleum and trucks are not only sorely needed for logistics, but also defense in depth. It's impossible to counterattack and stop a breakthrough if you have no fuel.

Other than this, the Soviets only produced 92 locomotives over the course of the war. The Allies supplied 2,000 (built for Soviet rails, obviously), over the Pacific route.

Without Vladivostok, Soviet industry takes over a year longer to get back up to speed. Soviet logistics are much more sluggish, and defense in depth becomes more difficult.

Finally the extent of Japanese success, even if they could somehow manage to overwhelm the forces directly tasked to holding the line against them would have been exceedingly slow, the Japanese army was in no way the German army expecting huge sweeps over the even larger landmass of Siberia in the much more rugged logistical environment, the opportunities for Japanese success were slim. Holding it would have proven impossible as well as the Siberian winter is, unsurprisingly, not kind and the sort of thing the Japanese would have fared well in against the Russians.

Nobody is saying that the Japanese are on the outskirts of Novosibirsk by 1942. All they really need to take is Vladivostok and then start pushing west slowly, and the damage is done.

Also, I can't help but laugh at the old "General Winter" trope, as if winter is disproportionately harsh to non-Russians. As if they didn't have cold winters in Germany, or snow in Japan! Do you honestly think they wouldn't be equipped properly? Even the Germans had winter equipment, they just prioritized the shipment of ammunition and other items before that. The Japanese would simply have to take Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Yakutsk would be cut off and forced to surrender. Then they push in the general direction of Irkutsk but even then they don't need to push far. Then they just dig in and dare the Soviets to come after them. Poor logistics works both ways. The simple fact of the matter is that the Soviets could not withstand the initial Japanese push, and then would be forced to oust them, a nearly impossible endeavor since the terrain negates the Soviet numerical advantage.

the logistical issues of the German army would have prevented any complete victory otherwise.

Depends on what you mean by "complete victory". Nobody is saying that the Japanese and Germans split the USSR and annex it, simply that they force the Soviets to collapse. The strain on two fronts, the loss of 50% of foreign support, and the loss of Siberian security for industry would topple Stalin and bring the USSR to a conditional surrender.

 

[Porkman]

I think a Japanese attack would have been most devastating psychologically.

1941 frightened the Soviets when they were just fighting the Germans. News that the Japanese are invading in the east is going to cause a lot of paralysis at the command level.

The Soviets would be less effective even if there were few immediate practical consequences for barbarossa from the Russian far east.

 

[Guaro90]

just asking: the far east got spared from the great purge and Zukov was not killed because it was in the far east, far away from the political concern of Moscow and stalin paranoid mentality, but in 1940 was relocated west, so how was the leadership in the far est in the 41? could it have affected soviet performance vs an eventual Jap intervention? soviet had superiori equipment in number vs the German but the got utterly crushed for leadership reason, in 41 we would have a veteran army from the china campaign ( if NAT CHiNA get rekt) or a fresh army who probably trained in order to defeat a greater and better equipped ground force with air superiority. what do you think?