so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US
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According to your link.
Italy produced 3368 tanks/spg of different types. 83000 vehicles, 7200 arty, 22000 mortars. 1 carrier(never operational) 13402 aircraft.
Japan produced 3724 tanks/spg of different types. 165945 vehicles, 13 350 arty, 29000 mortars. 18 carriers, 71580 aircraft.
Seems Japan has more construction muscles than Italy.
Yep. Hence, Japan could have produced ~2800 tanks A YEAR (if we assume, that it will build more tank factories), while Italy produced 3368 over the course of THREE years. Once again, you failed to read my post properly.
Once could have been a mistake, twice is a start of a pattern, although not necessarily.
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The StuG III is cost effective and we know how the opponents will attack.
If I remember correct, many of the later war German Pz divisions were substituted with StuG III instead of tanks...?
What about that is relevant in any way to what we're talking about? lol, the argumentation on this forum astounds me sometimes.
Pointing out consistency in Soviet practices and doctrines and contrasting that with the differences between German and Japanese doctrines is definitely Rusophobia. Stop trying to be a victim.
If I'm totally missing the point you're trying to make I apologize but GDP is a very sketchy metric to measure total economic production, to say nothing of the production of war materiel. GDP is mainly used to measure growth between years, since that's the only thing it can do relatively consistently. As a measure of total production there's an awful lot that falls through the cracks.
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Using my brain.
Yearly steel production to tank production. Good enough for rough estimate. Italy and Japan had similar industrial practices, tanks were similar in characteristics, etc.
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Why, because if we extrapolate the result of ONE battle to an entire possible war, we get results that will be quite astounding - and unreal. Once again - why do we use Khalhin Gol as an example of potential losses in USSR-Japan conflict, and not the August Storm numbers?
I say, best estimates would be the average between the two, proportionally of course.
Then give estimates of different numbers. Your words - what are your sources?
Since you like to totally ignore opponents words without such things, I will ignore yours on this matter, until then. Tit for tat, and all that.
I dont have an estimate on Japanese imagined tank production I leave that to you...Then give estimates of different numbers. Your words - what are your sources?
Since you like to totally ignore opponents words without such things, I will ignore yours on this matter, until then. Tit for tat, and all that.
I do not ignore other peoples information, if their info is strange I ask them were they got it from.
But if they cant present facts/sources backing their information, its just their own thoughts/ideas and not so relevant in other words.
One thing that is cool, is when this to the left in my signature happens not the right one....
guys are you all talking about an early engagement in the 38'? or something on the line of common invasion in mid 41 in barbarossa stile? you have to get the set up right because it is gonna change A LOT. in the 39 the USSR have literally nothing similar to the t-34, only bt-5 bt-7 and t-28 garbage like those in japan hands, probably still better than their but you are going to raise the whole word tension by a LOT if you invade manchuria in 39 but anyways the red army is so fucking bad in that period that is impossible to get them advance in manciuria if all the division of the IJA are there entrenched and with the cover of all the japan aviation, and if the japan is able to get a break trough in the north parth of the manchurian border, severing the railway, Vladivostok is doomed like the rest of the kurily and karafuto. if you are talking about the 41 japan has probably invested a lot in pack artillery and AT weapon alongside with combat vehicle and the red army in the east in 41 had all the major official protagonist of Khalkin Gol purged for the exception of Zhukov transferred in the 40 to kiev so even if they have better and more equimpent i'm sure they have not the leadership to win easy in manchuria and again, if you manage to invade manchuria (don't have a lcue how) you are going to get manchu partisan ( they were pretty happy with their independence from mailand china and a commie occupation is not a cakewalk[see in poland in 39] ) and you have supplie issue like those got the german, you have thousands of km from the center of production european russia so good luck getting those supplies with the red army in the shapes of the 41.
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Firstly, I was pointing out that Khalkhin Gol was not anything close to a crushing Soviet victory, in fact it could hardly be called a victory at all. Iwo Jima is completely irrelevant as a comparison, since the US didn't view it as an easy, crushing victory. Significant? Yes, but hard fought and hard won.
August Storm is far less relevant to the discussion at hand.
1. Khalkhin Gol is far more representative of the Soviet force composition and doctrine closer to when any conflict would take place. The only thing that would change is the scale of the conflict and closer material parity on the Japanese side.
2. August Storm took place against an army that was literally starving in many cases, had broken-down and outdated equipment, and had essentially been all but abandoned as its veteran units and senior personnel were redeployed to other locations throughout the war. In other words, the bare remnants of the IJA, barely fit for combat at all.
Because of this Khalkhin Gol is a decent measure of how things would have played out if the Japanese had attacked in 1941, the only difference being that the Japanese would have closer material parity (and likely better results because of this), and the Soviets possibly might redeploy more forces east to counter them (but this would hurt them greatly against the Germans).
If the Japanese had (for whatever reason) attacked in 1945 OTL, August Storm is a good metric. Other than that it's largely irrelevant.
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You really can't you read?
This is is from the same wikipedia page you linked to. It never ceases to amuse me how people cherrypick just one line from an article. It nothing can be funnier then people asking for sources, when all they use for a source is wiki quote mining.
That the German divisions ran out of armor is a fact. That the "turkey shooting" LSSAH and DR had to to be refitted for several months is a fact. And the amazing numbers magic of German recordkeeping is also a fact.
That's from Jentz's "Panzertruppen" and is literally the classic example of how Germans just didn't suffer losses. It's only their operational tanks which plummeted, put on paper they were doing totally fine, "turkey shooting" time and time again.
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about the T35 if i remeber correctly they build them in number of less than 100 (60-70) and they were stationated near moskow and they were garbage, for the t-26 i forgot
almost 10k of them t-26 The end result was that the Japanese failed to use their numerical and material superiority in the first 2 months of the conflict, and then got utterly annihilated when the soviets got numerical superiority. If that's not a crushing victory, I don't know what is.
Translation: the Japanese would not have the initial material and numerical advantage they had in the first 2 months of Khalkin Gol, would be attacking prepared positions, and the Soviets would be well supplied from the start.
They held the field and achieved their goals, trying to claim it wasn't a victory is just your blatant bias showing itself.
In fact in search of a more detailed account of the 4 months of combat I came across this which at the very least makes it clear that actual Soviet deaths were lower then Japanese deaths and makes some suggestions that the Japanese losses may have been much higher still. Also there's bits like
which suggest that in terms of numbers of soldiers the Soviets didn't have such an advantage.
Now alone this source may simply be wrong, though it seems well documented but when combined with how the Japanese reacted it certainly is possible that the skirmishing and battles in the far east were in fact a great Soviet victory.
What is certainly clear is that it was a Soviet victory, whatever you might believe and be it a costly one for the Soviets or one no more costly to the Soviets then to the Japanese the victory was convincing enough to banish the thought of going after the Soviet Union from Japanese minds.
Then you don't know what is. It's been discussed earlier on but given the political goals of the Japanese not being the destruction of Soviet/Mongolian forces but pushing them back to their side of the border, and the aforementioned massive advantage the Soviets had, the Soviets performed extremely poorly. It was a victory, sure, but not crushing. Bagration was a crushing victory, Khalkhin Gol was Pyrrhic.
Prepared? Yes. Well-supplied? No, especially if the Japanese wait a few months after Barbarossa starts so Soviet supplies, men, and equipment will be directed west.
Also, as has been covered earlier in this thread, the IJA OTL had an advantage of at least few hundred thousand men over the Soviet Far Eastern Theater up until 1943. This advantage would certainly be expanded upon, as would a material advantage, should Japan shift its focus northward (which, as established earlier, would most likely happen sometime around early 1936 or late 1937).
Combine this with the fact that the Japanese would have to move a mere 50km from their norther border to cut the trans-Siberian railroad (less than that to cut it, but to cut and safely occupy we'll go with 50km), they really don't have to push far to put the Soviets in some serious hurt.
They didn't hold the field on the Japanese side of the border, and the conflict ended politically, not militarily (the Japanese were planning a counterattack). Also accusing someone of bias without showing any evidence thereof is bad form, not that these forums have given me expectations of the contrary
The Soviet advantage was almost 2:1 in soldiers over the course of the battle, but the real disparity was in terms of equipment, including a 7:1 tank advantage and 6:1 truck advantage. The Soviets lost vastly more equipment despite these advantages.
Also, the Japanese not taking on the Soviets due to Khalkhin Gol is a myth. The results of the battle were seen as a sign of material disparity, which the IJA sought to rectify. The reason Japan chose the Southern Strategy was the lobbying of the IJN and the Tōseiha faction of the IJA holding more influence than the Kōdōha faction.
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