so if Japan opted for USSR instead of US

[Amur_Tiger]

Sources for this?

If you check out the wiki for Barbarossa it confirms what he's saying about the bulk of the casualties occurring then. Likewise the various bits of information I presented are all pulled from wikipedia, you should be able to search the specific battle I'm referencing to line up the figures.

 

[Loke]

I gave you one source, the same one he is using (the Battle of Khalkin Gol article on wikipedia, go read). The numbers are simple math: 4 million casualties killed/missing/captured from the USSR in Operation Barbarossa, out of a total of 10 million dead for the entire war. See how easy that was? Now can you stop holding up the actual discussion by asking for sources for information that is already widely available on this forum and on the wider internet for anyone who cares to go looking?

It is not as if these sources are particularly important either, since my main point is the lack of valid reasons to attack north for Japan and their inability to score a victory even if they were.

"60% of Red Army losses were inflicted within the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, from June 1941 to December 1941. After that the USSR starts trading soldiers about one to one with the Axis on the Eastern Front."

So how do you get 4 million men out of a total of 10 million losses to become 60% losses for op Barbarossa?

Sources are #1 thats the first thing you learn when study history at university.

 

[Loke]

If you check out the wiki for Barbarossa it confirms what he's saying about the bulk of the casualties occurring then. Likewise the various bits of information I presented are all pulled from wikipedia, you should be able to search the specific battle I'm referencing to line up the figures.

If you do not present a source, it is like you are giving us your own homemade ideas.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

For what's it worth I think the conclusion to war aqvamare speculated on based on casuality estimates is somewhat dubious because it makes the assumptions that Soviets would be fighting a total war with decisive outcome in mind against the Japanese while fighting against Germans. The two Axis partners are too far away to co-operate very closely and Japanese are too far away to pose an existential threat to Soviets. This allows Soviets the strategic opportunity to break a unified war into two seperate wars. A low intensity delaying action against Japan and a decisive battle, much like historical, against Germany. They can fight Japan or negotiate peace or whatever after Germany is defeated, trading space for time to defeat Germany before that. Just like there is not much of stategic worth for Japanese in Far East there is not much there for Soviets either in the case Japan is at war with Soviets at all due to Vladivostok being isolated from Pacific by Japanese occupied and fortified straits (except narrow shallow Strait of Tartary between Sakhalin and mainland, easily occupied by Japan).

I think it's also important to note how convenient the Vladivostok route was historically. There are no German subs or surface units so you don't need to worry about convoys or escorts or material losses, it's a relatively established rail-line, it's also quite close to US via the northern routes. Japanese allow everything except contraband of war sail through straits under their coastal artillery on Soviet flagged ships that might as well be built in US. It's obvious it would get used a lot. But just because it's convenient does not mean the materiel could not be redirected on other routes when it suddenly becomes the most dangerous route of all.

 

[Gethsemani]

"60% of Red Army losses were inflicted within the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, from June 1941 to December 1941. After that the USSR starts trading soldiers about one to one with the Axis on the Eastern Front."

So how do you get 4 million men out of a total of 10 million losses to become 60% losses for op Barbarossa?

You know what, you are totally right. I meant to type 40% but apparently wrote 60%. Either way, my main claim, that the USSR traded more equally with the Axis still stands though, as we are down to 6 million vs 4 million (which doesn't take into account the massive amount of prisoners that the Red Army took, which would tip the scale in their favor post-1941).

Sources are #1 thats the first thing you learn when study history at university.

Source?

 

[Loke]

You know what, you are totally right. I meant to type 40% but apparently wrote 60%. Either way, my main claim, that the USSR traded more equally with the Axis still stands though, as we are down to 6 million vs 4 million (which doesn't take into account the massive amount of prisoners that the Red Army took, which would tip the scale in their favor post-1941).

Source?

So you lost 2 million soldiers....

Although it doesnt have anything to do with the thread I will show you the text, it was taught in History class at unilevel.
Linneus university
Source criticism on the internet
Source criticism for the internet board for psychological defence
and source criticism on Wiki in english...

 

[Gethsemani]

Although it doesnt have anything to do with the thread I will show you the text, it was taught in History class at unilevel.
Linneus university
Source criticism on the internet
Source criticism for the internet board for psychological defence
and source criticism on Wiki in english...

Neither of these state the importance of sources, only how to remain critical of them and how to validate them. Your claim is that sources are #1 and that it is the first thing you learn at university level history studies. You failed to source you claim.

However, my point was a facetious one, namely that calling for sources all the time is neither good science nor good discussion technique or etiquette. Some things are so common knowledge that stating them don't need sources (Hitler was the leader of Germany during WW2), others are so easy to find out by even cursory searching that sources aren't needed (casualty figures for WW2, the caliber of the T-34's gun). A source is needed when a claim is made that either breaks with common or easily accessible knowledge or brings forth new information that might be hard to find or obscure. So when I make a claim about casualty figures for the Eastern Front it is easy to find information, it would be another thing if I discussed something like the number of man-packed artillery pieces in the Kwantung Army or the average calorie intake of a Soviet soldier in 1944.

Your constant asking for sources is, at best, ignorance of actual scientific method or at worst attempts to block proper conversation by constantly derailing the discussion into forcing people you disagree with to source everything they write when such isn't needed. My claim that Aqvamarin's numbers are bad doesn't require me to present numbers on my own if I (like I did) explain why his argument is flawed. I didn't make a counter-claim or contest his numbers, I argued the flaw in his extrapolation of the numbers. I was, in scientific language, pointing out the weakness in his method, something that does not require supporting sources.

And as an aside, I've been through University myself, hold a Bachelor's Degree and regularly engage with scientific articles, so there's absolutely no need for you to act as if you are trying to enlighten the plebs with your fancy education.

 

[Loke]

Gehtsemani - When a person (this time it was aqvmare) writes a text and his text is supported by sources it is far more valid than the arguments against it from people without sources(calling aqvamares source for false, pure fiction and that they mean nothing is very rude in my world).

Either you write something as your own opinion/idea or you link to a source or give a source when asked for one. If you do not give a link/source, well its up to you but your text will be considered your own opinion. By the way; nobody is asking for sources of who the German leader was during WWII.

There is no need for you to get personal, you do not know me.

 

[Porkman]

Got back to this thread after a while out and it seems idiocy is in the air.

1) The Question is not "What if Japan had intervened in Barbarossa in 1941 instead of OTL?"

The Question is "What if Japan had sat on their gains as of 1936, no buildup for a Pacific War, no outbreak of full scale war with China, and instead put most of that industry an planning into fortifying the NE Asian Mainland and then opportunistically helped Germany in 1941?"

Khalkin Gol changes since that was still post Marco Polo. A Japanese army that had more troops to spare for Mongolia since they weren't in an active war with China may have done better.

2) The assumption that Japan has to present an existential threat to the Soviet Union in order to alter the result of Barbarossa.

Wars have been won, lost, and ended when the "facts on the ground" suggested that the war could have gone on in material terms. A neutral Japan that achieves its 30 division goal in Manchuria by 1938 changes a lot of the Soviet calculus and defense posture. It means more troops in the East. It means less transfers to the west before and during Barbarossa. It means more equipment and fuel being sent East. In aggregate, it makes the Western half slightly weaker.

In addition, there is the psychological aspect of the Soviet Union being thrust into a 2 front war in 1941. It could cause the sort of moral collapse that causes a surrender or just enourage command chaos that makes the defense of Russia in 1941 go worse than in OTL.

Would the Soviets have surrendered had the Germans taken Moscow?

It's impossible to say.

Would the Germans have been more likely to make it to Moscow and completely surround Leningrad if they had faced less opposition in 1941 and a more panicked Soviet Command?

That question is a definite yes.

3) The Japanese would be underequipped if they went against the Soviets.

Again, this ignores the idea that the Japanese are not in a massive war with China. It also ignores that the Navy isn't getting as much as it wants for a Southern Strategy which isn't going to happen.

China was hole for men, supplies, and equipment that the Japanese were dumping in OTL from 1937 onwards. The topic of this thread assumes this isn't happening. They could build up a stockpile in Manchuria and have decent equipment. Similarly, the same oil reserves that can fuel the IJN for a year can just as easily fuel a land force for 1941-1942. (Which is when any Soviet collapse would have to happen. Later, and the Soviets win.)

4) The US cannot intervene fast enough to prevent 1941-1942 from going worse for the Soviets than OTL due to Japanese intervention.

Let's say the US goes all out to stop Japan. Embargo from 1940 as in OTL (even without China) and starts attacking Japan in a full scale war and supporting the Soviets with everything starting in June of 1941.

IT STILL DOESN'T HELP.

The Soviet Union would be significantly worse off than OTL in 1941-1942 due to the loss of the Vladivostock route (which the US can't force open) and the extra troops needed around Manchuria. Even if those troops defeat the Japanese in Manchuria, that's bullets, bodies, and vehicles that are being used against Japan INSTEAD of Germany. Every soldier, tank, plane, shell, and artillery piece that the Soviets have to use to fight Japan is one that they won't have against the Germans in the critical 1941-1942 period.

The US may destroy Japanese shipping from the Philippines but they won't be able to hurt Japan enough to stop it from causing some very bad times for the Soviets. The US would still win against Japan, maybe even faster than OTL. But they wouldn't be able to stop Japan from making the Soviet Union's position in 1941-1942 worse than in OTL.

I'm interested to hear if anyone disagrees.

 

[Loke]

Got back to this thread after a while out and it seems idiocy is in the air.

1) The Question is not "What if Japan had intervened in Barbarossa in 1941 instead of OTL?"

The Question is "What if Japan had sat on their gains as of 1936, no buildup for a Pacific War, no outbreak of full scale war with China, and instead put most of that industry an planning into fortifying the NE Asian Mainland and then opportunistically helped Germany in 1945?"

Khalkin Gol changes since that was still post Marco Polo. A Japanese army that had more troops to spare for Mongolia since they weren't in an active war with China may have done better.

2) The assumption that Japan has to present an existential threat to the Soviet Union in order to alter the result of Barbarossa.

Wars have been won, lost, and ended when the "facts on the ground" suggested that the war could have gone on in material terms. A neutral Japan that achieves its 30 division goal in Manchuria by 1938 changes a lot of the Soviet calculus and defense posture. It means more troops in the East. It means less transfers to the west before and during Barbarossa. It means more equipment and fuel being sent East. In aggregate, it makes the Western half slightly weaker.

In addition, there is the psychological aspect of the Soviet Union being thrust into a 2 front war in 1941. It could cause the sort of moral collapse that causes a surrender or just enourage command chaos that makes the defense of Russia in 1941 go worse than in OTL.

Would the Soviets have surrendered had the Germans taken Moscow?

It's impossible to say.

Would the Germans have been more likely to make it to Moscow and completely surround Leningrad if they had faced less opposition in 1941 and a more panicked Soviet Command?

That question is a definite yes.

3) The Japanese would be underequipped if they went against the Soviets.

Again, this ignores the idea that the Japanese are not in a massive war with China. It also ignores that the Navy isn't getting as much as it wants for a Southern Strategy which isn't going to happen.

China was hole for men, supplies, and equipment that the Japanese were dumping in OTL from 1937 onwards. The topic of this thread assumes this isn't happening. They could build up a stockpile in Manchuria and have decent equipment. Similarly, the same oil reserves that can fuel the IJN for a year can just as easily fuel a land force for 1941-1942. (Which is when any Soviet collapse would have to happen. Later, and the Soviets win.)

4) The US cannot intervene fast enough to prevent 1941-1942 from going worse for the Soviets than OTL due to Japanese intervention.

Let's say the US goes all out to stop Japan. Embargo from 1940 as in OTL (even without China) and starts attacking Japan in a full scale war and supporting the Soviets with everything starting in June of 1941.

IT STILL DOESN'T HELP.

The Soviet Union would be significantly worse off than OTL in 1941-1942 due to the loss of the Vladivostock route (which the US can't force open) and the extra troops needed around Manchuria. Even if those troops defeat the Japanese in Manchuria, that's bullets, bodies, and vehicles that are being used against Japan INSTEAD of Germany. Every soldier, tank, plane, shell, and artillery piece that the Soviets have to use to fight Japan is one that they won't have against the Germans in the critical 1941-1942 period.

The US may destroy Japanese shipping from the Philippines but they won't be able to hurt Japan enough to stop it from causing some very bad times for the Soviets. The US would still win against Japan, maybe even faster than OTL. But they wouldn't be able to stop Japan from making the Soviet Union's position in 1941-1942 worse than in OTL.

I'm interested to hear if anyone disagrees.

You hear one agreeing with you...

 

[MGL 86]

Got back to this thread after a while out and it seems idiocy is in the air.

1) The Question is not "What if Japan had intervened in Barbarossa in 1941 instead of OTL?"

The Question is "What if Japan had sat on their gains as of 1936, no buildup for a Pacific War, no outbreak of full scale war with China, and instead put most of that industry an planning into fortifying the NE Asian Mainland and then opportunistically helped Germany in 1941?"

Khalkin Gol changes since that was still post Marco Polo. A Japanese army that had more troops to spare for Mongolia since they weren't in an active war with China may have done better.

2) The assumption that Japan has to present an existential threat to the Soviet Union in order to alter the result of Barbarossa.

Wars have been won, lost, and ended when the "facts on the ground" suggested that the war could have gone on in material terms. A neutral Japan that achieves its 30 division goal in Manchuria by 1938 changes a lot of the Soviet calculus and defense posture. It means more troops in the East. It means less transfers to the west before and during Barbarossa. It means more equipment and fuel being sent East. In aggregate, it makes the Western half slightly weaker.

In addition, there is the psychological aspect of the Soviet Union being thrust into a 2 front war in 1941. It could cause the sort of moral collapse that causes a surrender or just enourage command chaos that makes the defense of Russia in 1941 go worse than in OTL.

Would the Soviets have surrendered had the Germans taken Moscow?

It's impossible to say.

Would the Germans have been more likely to make it to Moscow and completely surround Leningrad if they had faced less opposition in 1941 and a more panicked Soviet Command?

That question is a definite yes.

3) The Japanese would be underequipped if they went against the Soviets.

Again, this ignores the idea that the Japanese are not in a massive war with China. It also ignores that the Navy isn't getting as much as it wants for a Southern Strategy which isn't going to happen.

China was hole for men, supplies, and equipment that the Japanese were dumping in OTL from 1937 onwards. The topic of this thread assumes this isn't happening. They could build up a stockpile in Manchuria and have decent equipment. Similarly, the same oil reserves that can fuel the IJN for a year can just as easily fuel a land force for 1941-1942. (Which is when any Soviet collapse would have to happen. Later, and the Soviets win.)

4) The US cannot intervene fast enough to prevent 1941-1942 from going worse for the Soviets than OTL due to Japanese intervention.

Let's say the US goes all out to stop Japan. Embargo from 1940 as in OTL (even without China) and starts attacking Japan in a full scale war and supporting the Soviets with everything starting in June of 1941.

IT STILL DOESN'T HELP.

The Soviet Union would be significantly worse off than OTL in 1941-1942 due to the loss of the Vladivostock route (which the US can't force open) and the extra troops needed around Manchuria. Even if those troops defeat the Japanese in Manchuria, that's bullets, bodies, and vehicles that are being used against Japan INSTEAD of Germany. Every soldier, tank, plane, shell, and artillery piece that the Soviets have to use to fight Japan is one that they won't have against the Germans in the critical 1941-1942 period.

The US may destroy Japanese shipping from the Philippines but they won't be able to hurt Japan enough to stop it from causing some very bad times for the Soviets. The US would still win against Japan, maybe even faster than OTL. But they wouldn't be able to stop Japan from making the Soviet Union's position in 1941-1942 worse than in OTL.

I'm interested to hear if anyone disagrees.

Every action has its effect.

What if Japan and Germans are in active allies, and spy in Japan informs Stalin about their invasion plan? Would it have been able to sway Stalin to do something?
What if Japan and China are in peace, and Stalin tried to use Chinese to liberate Manchuria from south while Japanese were busy fighting with Soviets? Could they invade Manchuria from North and South right after Khalkhiin Gol since Germans were busy in Poland?
How will Stalin believe MR pact will hold until 1942 when Germans are in alliance with Japan?

If Japan actively manufacturing heavy equipments to match Soviets since 1936 and allied with Germans, how did Barbarossa would have achieve surprise? Prepared Soviets means they will do much better in initial German invasion months, meaning less casualties (less than 4 mill), less loss of land (Germans wouldn`t have reach Moscow).

Would Stalin purge his military in 1937 when Japanese clearly producing more tanks instead of ships?

See, if you do something different, your enemies will react differently.

 

[Had a dad]

And as an aside, I've been through University myself, hold a Bachelor's Degree and regularly engage with scientific articles, so there's absolutely no need for you to act as if you are trying to enlighten the plebs with your fancy education.

and there is absolutely no need for you to make this personal

 

[Opanashc]

To counter the 1.300.000 million ground army of japanese, without china, in 1941 in far east, soviets had to dopple there far eastern army from 700.000 to 1.400.000....to understan this number, during 1942 when soviets fought stalingrad, to secure stalingrad soviets used 1.400.000 troops, the counteroffensive in moskau in 1941 used 1.000.000 troops. the failed attack in near moskau in 1942 against AG center used 1.400.000 troops?
where the hell should the soviet army get 1.400.000 more troops for the far east,. when they reduced there starting army from 1941 to 1942 from 700.000 to 200.000 in far east to help at western front?

On 1 December, 1941, Red Army numbered 1343307 men, 8777 guns and mortars, 2124 tanks, 3193 combat aircraft in their Far Eastern Front. Not quite the 1.4 million that you were arguing for, but close.
Also, why do you take the Khalhin-Gol numbers of losses? Why not the average of those and August Storm? Unless you are willing to claim, that during the Pacific part of the War, losses between USA and Japan were akin to those of the Philippine campaign of 1941-42, with 9,000 dead Japanese vs 25,000 on the other side.

 

[D Inqu]

Got back to this thread after a while out and it seems idiocy is in the air.
The Question is "What if Japan had sat on their gains as of 1936, no buildup for a Pacific War, no outbreak of full scale war with China, and instead put most of that industry an planning into fortifying the NE Asian Mainland and then opportunistically helped Germany in 1941?"

As it was dicussed, it's a loaded question. Japan could not sit on their gains in 1936. A number of politcal figures in China and Japan wanted a peaceful settlement, but they were in the minority. The Nationalist Chinese government was unifying the country with Japan as the main threat. They had to gain back Manchuria. As for Japan, they had to take out the Nationalist government before they unify and modernise.

Khalkin Gol changes since that was still post Marco Polo. A Japanese army that had more troops to spare for Mongolia since they weren't in an active war with China may have done better.

Khalkin Gol does not change in the slightest. The limiting factors in Khlkin Gol were not troops, but 2 completely different factors:
1. Supply, with Mongolia being literally in the middle of nowhere
2. The status on the conflict, being and undeclared "border conflict", rather than a declared war.

Neither changes whether or not Japan involves in China.

A neutral Japan that achieves its 30 division goal in Manchuria by 1938 changes a lot of the Soviet calculus and defense posture. It means more troops in the East. It means less transfers to the west before and during Barbarossa.

Those sentences are not logically connected. If the Japan builds up on the Soviet border, the Soviets would react. By establishing more fortifications on the Amur. By beefing up China far more to encourage them to threaten Manchuria. By escalating 1938-1939 conflicts further to deal with the threat. It would be strange to assume the Soviets would carry like IRL

In addition, there is the psychological aspect of the Soviet Union being thrust into a 2 front war in 1941. It could cause the sort of moral collapse that causes a surrender or just enourage command chaos that makes the defense of Russia in 1941 go worse than in OTL.

Again, this ignores the idea that the Japanese are not in a massive war with China.

And it mights still be. With no Japanese invasion, the Nationalists will complete unification of the country by fully pacifying the warlords and defeating the Communists. The obvious next step would be prepare to reclaim Manchuria.

China was hole for men, supplies, and equipment that the Japanese were dumping in OTL from 1937 onwards. The topic of this thread assumes this isn't happening. They could build up a stockpile in Manchuria and have decent equipment.

Some stockpiles could be prepared, it would not change the fact the Soviet far east is a area with very little infrastructure, in an easily defensible terrain (the border with Manchuria being mostly a major river and mountains/marshes). The much better german logistics collapsed much more densely built western Russia.

The US cannot intervene fast enough to prevent 1941-1942 from going worse for the Soviets than OTL due to Japanese intervention.

Sure they could. In the OTL, Japan has a skeleton navy to fuel the army effort, so US can easily dominance in the Sea of Japan or even outright send divisions to shore up soviet defences if the Japanese actually make any progress with their invasion.

 

[Porkman]

Every action has its effect.

What if Japan and Germans are in active allies, and spy in Japan informs Stalin about their invasion plan? Would it have been able to sway Stalin to do something?

That's my point. Whatever "something" Stalin does for Japan is probably going to weaken the Western defences.

What if Japan and China are in peace, and Stalin tried to use Chinese to liberate Manchuria from south while Japanese were busy fighting with Soviets? Could they invade Manchuria from North and South right after Khalkhiin Gol since Germans were busy in Poland?

The Chinese might try it and that would be interesting, but I don't think the Chinese in 1941 even without the war could force Japan to divert more than 3-4 divisions if the Japanese just maintain a defensive posture. That said, refighting Shanghai in 1941 with the Japanese already engaged in Russia could go a lot better for the Chinese. It's interesting.

You're also assuming that the Soviets would want to be more aggressive and that aggression would be successful.

The Soviet success in invading Manchuria in OTL is in 1945 in the context of Japanese army in Manchuria that has been starving and stripped of equipment for use in other theatres. In 1939, going by actual Japanese plans, the Kwangtung Army would be 30 divisions with a designed posture of fighting the Soviets. A Soviet Union that attacks Manchuria in 1939 is a weaker Soviet Union in the West and also may have to put things like the Winter War on hold.

How will Stalin believe MR pact will hold until 1942 when Germans are in alliance with Japan?

The Japanese were actively hostile to the Soviets since the seizure of Manchuria in 1931. IN OTL, the Soviets had a Non aggression pact with Japan after Khalkin Gol. Without such a pact in the East, it becomes more, not less, important for the Soviets to have a Non Aggression pact with the Germans.

If Japan actively manufacturing heavy equipments to match Soviets since 1936 and allied with Germans, how did Barbarossa would have achieve surprise? Prepared Soviets means they will do much better in initial German invasion months, meaning less casualties (less than 4 mill), less loss of land (Germans wouldn`t have reach Moscow).

Barbarossa would achieve surprise since it would still be the Germans who launched it with the Japanese piling on a little later. If the Soviets perceive the Japanese as a threat, they will assign them a higher priority than they did OTL with the consequence that defenses in the West will be weaker.

I fail to see how worrying and preparing for a Japanese confrontation in the East will make the West more prepared or make Stalin want to risk a more confrontational stance towards the Germans.

Would Stalin purge his military in 1937 when Japanese clearly producing more tanks instead of ships?

See, if you do something different, your enemies will react differently.

He did that when the Germans were producing more tanks than ships... Why would he care more about Japan?

There were certainly reactions the Soviets could make to confront Japan if Japan takes a more belligerent stance, but almost all of those actions would be to the detriment of defenses in the West.

 

[Opanashc]

You're also assuming that the Soviets would want to be more aggressive and that aggression would be successful.

Hey, if your camp can assume things, then don't complain about the other side doing the same! USSR was launching counterattacks all through 1941, being aggressive and all, why should it not be same against Japan?

 

[Loke]

USSR was launching counterattacks all through 1941, being aggressive and all, why should it not be same against Japan?

But how succesful were these attacks prior to the Russian counteroffensive in december 5, 1941 and its casualties?(eventhough succesful in grabbing land, the Russian casualties are roughly x2 the German.)

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

I'm interested to hear if anyone disagrees.

A good post, but one thing I take issue with is the apparent suggestion that Japanese naval buildup after 1937 was for sake of executing a southern plan or for preparing for war with United States, as opposed to being a preparation in case of war with US. It was essentially a doctrinal thing that became dogma, the specific 70% ratio being based on pre WW1 IJN strategic study which itself was apparently done mainly for reason for justifying national status (it has been said IJN picked USN as it's budgetary ally against the Japanese Army). The Navy attempted to get their ratio ever since, even in midst of WW1 and to the point of actually being allowed large enough spending to potentially bankrupt Japan while the Army was busy intervening in Siberia. The Washington treaty (which enforced 60% ratio) caused lots of bad blood and seemingly resulted in the kind of view that Japan would be unable to defend her interests, and by 1936 the anti-treaty faction seems to have been securely victorious (this was misguided view in hindsight, as there was no way Japan could maintain 70% ratio with USN if United States was also unhindered by limitation treaties).

The point of all this is to say that Japan was a country with mixed (and even self-serving) strategic priorities, and that the stage had been set for major Japanese naval buildup starting in 1937 long before 1936 and even long before Nazi party took power in Germany.

Sure they could. In the OTL, Japan has a skeleton navy to fuel the army effort, so US can easily dominance in the Sea of Japan or even outright send divisions to shore up soviet defences if the Japanese actually make any progress with their invasion.

I do not think they could. US carriers avoided major confrontation with Japanese land based air-power until later in the war. Sea of Japan is also, and again, in terrible strategic position. It would be rather like running supplies to Malta with Axis in control of Gibraltar. There are 16in guns in the batteries at Pusan, Tsushima and Iki for example, plus 12in pieces. The Soya battery at La Perouse strait should really be beefed up tough as they only seem to have been given field artillery - not even enough range to cover the entire 40km strait (though it was fortified from both ends).

 

[Porkman]

As it was dicussed, it's a loaded question. Japan could not sit on their gains in 1936. A number of politcal figures in China and Japan wanted a peaceful settlement, but they were in the minority. The Nationalist Chinese government was unifying the country with Japan as the main threat. They had to gain back Manchuria. As for Japan, they had to take out the Nationalist government before they unify and modernise.

Khalkin Gol does not change in the slightest. The limiting factors in Khlkin Gol were not troops, but 2 completely different factors:
1. Supply, with Mongolia being literally in the middle of nowhere
2. The status on the conflict, being and undeclared "border conflict", rather than a declared war.

Neither changes whether or not Japan involves in China.

Those sentences are not logically connected. If the Japan builds up on the Soviet border, the Soviets would react. By establishing more fortifications on the Amur. By beefing up China far more to encourage them to threaten Manchuria. By escalating 1938-1939 conflicts further to deal with the threat. It would be strange to assume the Soviets would carry like IRL

In addition, there is the psychological aspect of the Soviet Union being thrust into a 2 front war in 1941. It could cause the sort of moral collapse that causes a surrender or just enourage command chaos that makes the defense of Russia in 1941 go worse than in OTL.
And it mights still be. With no Japanese invasion, the Nationalists will complete unification of the country by fully pacifying the warlords and defeating the Communists. The obvious next step would be prepare to reclaim Manchuria.
Some stockpiles could be prepared, it would not change the fact the Soviet far east is a area with very little infrastructure, in an easily defensible terrain (the border with Manchuria being mostly a major river and mountains/marshes). The much better german logistics collapsed much more densely built western Russia. .

Your biases are showing.

Japan did not want to destroy the Nationalist Government. That was a step taken when it became clear that CKS could not be induced to surrender. What they wanted out of CKS was cooperation and de facto acceptance of the situation in Manchuria. Something that they were very close to getting by the end of 1936.

The Japanese feared that a united China could be hostile but there is no reason to assume that CKS would want to throw down instantly with Japan before he felt ready.

It's like how the British always worried about Franco and Gibraltar but Franco never did anything against the British despite uniting the country and being nominally hostile.

Similarly, more resources to the Russian Far East in response to a Japanese buildup means less resources in the West. Is there any part of this where you disagree? The Soviets can somehow double their commitment in the Far East without there being a commnesurate loss in some other places?

Sure they could. In the OTL, Japan has a skeleton navy to fuel the army effort, so US can easily dominance in the Sea of Japan or even outright send divisions to shore up soviet defences if the Japanese actually make any progress with their invasion

D Inqu, you usually make smart insightful comments and do your homework. This statement is not in that storied tradition.

You seriously think that Japan with total air superiority, interior sea lanes, a strong Navy, (they were still the third strongest Naval Power in the world in 1936, it would have slipped a bit but not enough that the US could approach with impunity.)

1) Where do the troops come from?

It takes a long time to get divisions together and ship them somewhere. The US would have to ship said divisions from the US mainland or maybe from the Philippines. In any case, it would take longer than 2 months to get the logistics sorted.

2) In what world can the US dominate the Western Pacific in a month? Japan with no new construction after 1936 still has 6 aircraft carriers and 10 battleships. That can fight and ambush any US fleet that gets close to the home islands, which they would have to to help Russia. Please explain how the US can operate a fleet or sail ships within range of Japanese airpower to help the Russians? They could dominate the Sea of Japan..... Eventually. But my point was they can't make an impact in 1941-1942.

3) How would the US land troops once the Japanese take Vladivostock? If the Japanese don't take Vladivostock and the Soviets are winning, why would the US send troops at all?

It would be the invasion of the Aleutians again.

My point is that the US cannot stop Japan from making life a lot harder for the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942 while the response you gave was one sentence saying that the US could somehow dominate Japan in its home waters and ship troops across the Pacific in the critical period between the start of barbarossa and the end of 1941.

 

[EU3NOOB]

Khalkin Gol changes since that was still post Marco Polo

Nope. Khalkin Gol began two months before Marco Polo.