So Far From God (Mexico 1836-'76)

[Eams]

And hearing Diaz refered to as a liberal isn't that surprising. Aside from real life precedent, it puts him in line with most Victoria players who decide to take on the challenge of Mexico. We start off in the 1850s with high, liberal, intentions, seeking to govern peacefully, defend from American aggression and modernise slowly and gently. We end in the 1900s taxing the peasantry at 50% + tariffs with no social reforms or voting rights, a massive army oppressing everybody, shouting "F****** MAYA! RESPECT MY GODDAMNED AUTHORITAH!" at the computer. While drunk.

:rofl:
Now I understand why some of you are so adamant that Vicky is PI's best game ever.

 

[J. Passepartout]

The Pierce/Davis aid is great, especially after the recent war.

I've been sort of absent from reading my aars, and am trying to catch up.

 

[ComradeOm]

Lecture Thirteen: The One and Indivisible Republic (1856-57)

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past"
Karl Marx​

Neither time nor civil war had dimmed Benito Juárez's sense of social justice or his antipathy of conservative institutions, and for most Mexican observers his election to the presidency in March 1856 was first and foremost an indication that radical puros held the balance of power in the Veracruz Congress. These were the reformers who argued passionately, and often in the Jacobin tradition, for immediate laws to modernise the country and to aid in the millions of Mexican peasants living in the most wretched of conditions. Above all they despised the privileged legions of the army and clergy who, supposedly, continued to retard the march of progress and sought to concentrate all power in the hands of the Mexico City elite. Most moderate liberals (moderados) shared this passion for democracy and were ardent supporters of the Republic but many maintained great reservations over the social revolution promised, in increasingly explicit terms, by the new president. For the santanista faction - caring nothing for social reform and more enamoured with their leader than Republican ideals - the ascension of Juárez was a unmitigated disaster that precluded any possible national reconciliation. The very different hopes and fears of these factions were fully realised within weeks of the new president's election with the announcement of the Ley Iglesias - an ambitious programme of land reform that would see millions of acres of land forcibly purchased from the Church and wealthy landowners by the government and redistributed amongst the peasant communes and poor peón. Compared to later 20th C examples, in both Mexico and beyond, this was a relatively tame redistribution effort but in 1856 such a move was completely unprecedented and could only be construed as a direct challenge to the landowning classes. This was in itself a significant gamble while still engaged in a bitter civil war but, no doubt buoyed by military and political successes, President Juárez was apparently determined to firmly establish a new and staunchly republican base of support. By shifting real power away from the landowning class and professional military, both of which the Veracruz government continued to rely upon to an uncomfortable degree, the hope was to usher in a new era of Mexican politics and end the dominance of military caudillos. It does not take much effort to imagine which individual was to the forefront of Juárez's mind when considering the latter

Perhaps surprisingly, the initial reaction from those landowners within the liberal coalition was somewhat muted. Juárez's political victory at the beginning of the year had been emphatic enough to quell open dissent and the pragmatic President surely knew that it would take some months, if not years, to put such an ambitious programme into action. In any case grandiose declarations of intent were hardly a novelty in Mexican politics and the need for constant campaigning kept rivals such Santa Anna isolated from the politics of government; the caudillo scoring a significant victory in July with the seizure of Zacatecas. What ultimately tested the bonds of the liberal alliance was the unexpected reaction of those most affected by the reforms - the peasants themselves. Such was the passive nature of this class that our history has barely mentioned them to date, politics remaining the preserve of the educated elite, but throughout 1856 news of the proposed reforms served to stir the peasantry against conservative institutions for the first time since the days of Miguel Hidalgo. With the peasant communes so far removed from the political sphere, and seeing little distinction between privileged liberals and privileged conservatives, it was not long before such unrest spread to the estates of federalist generals and politicians. Santa Anna himself was forced to cancel a planned offensive in August 1856 so as to restore order to his own extensive lands around Veracruz and similar concerns amongst conservative generals brought an early end to the active campaigning for that year. This alarmingly real spectre of social revolution was an extremely serious matter for the liberal coalition and old divisions began to widen with startling rapidity

Soldiers of the conservative junta. As with those of the Republic, these colours and uniforms varied widely from formation to formation​

For the moderados and santanistas the overturning of the existing social order, the inescapable result of dismantling the venerable hacienda estate system, was simply unacceptable. This sentiment was particularly acute amongst the military where Santa Anna had overseen a comprehensive transformation from irregular militias to a professional army with a corresponding mellowing of officers' revolutionary fervour. Disagreement between civil and military authorities is always dangerous and, as we have seen, this was particularly true of 19th C Mexico. There was little open, or at least notable, discontent from the officer class but a series of prominent military and political bosses did make their way to the campaign headquarters of Don Antonio's Army of Central Mexico over the latter months of 1856. For his part Juárez was no fool and he recognised the threat posed by the divided loyalties of 'his' generals. Paradoxically this only encouraged him to accelerate the pace of reforms and shift further responsibility/power away from moderate figures and towards radicals, the loyalty of whom he was more confident of. Indeed behind the ideology and rhetoric of this web of intrigue was a relatively straightforward clash of powerful personalities with both Santa Anna and Juárez striving to place their own agents in positions of influence. As such it can be seen as a continuation of the polarising of the liberal movement - in turn a product of the wider generational divide - that dated, at the latest, to Santa Anna's return from exile. Juárez's firm control of Congress severely constrained legal avenues of opposition and we can say with confidence that by autumn 1856, at the latest, a clique had formed with the purpose of overthrowing the President. It is difficult to say from which date Santa Anna had become involved with this conspiracy but his central role in directing the military operations of the Republic ensured that any coup was clearly impossible without his support. He was almost certainly irrevocably opposed to the Juárez government at the end of 1856 by which time preparations for the next year's push towards Mexico City, nicknamed the Ofensiva de la Victoria, were already well underway

It was within the framework of this planned offensive that Don Antonio chose to approach his Generals Mariano Escobedo and Porfirio Díaz to seek their support for a move against the radical Congress. Negotiations continued over the winter but once this was approval was gained events quickly began to accelerate and santanista envoys approached selected conservative generals. Even the weather played its role and an unusually warm winter allowed for campaigning to begin in the first week of February. The Ofensiva de la Victoria offensive proved to be somewhat anticlimactic as the conservative army holding the road to Mexico City - commanded by Tomas Meija - simply defected to Santa Anna and the capital fell without a fight on 26 February 1857. The next day the generalissimo followed up this success by formally issuing his Plan de Ciudad de México which, in the typical language of deploring factionalism and internal strife, declared against both the monarchist junta and the Veracruz radicals in the name of national unity. This was a calculated gamble to unite the middle ground, weary of continued struggle and wary of a stirring peasantry, but like all good gamblers Santa Anna had made sure to load the dice beforehand. The pronunciamiento was deliberately intended to invoke memories of Iturbide's famous Plan de Iguala some three decades previously but, as a participant in this original affair, Don Antonio knew well that in Mexico it was military might that determined political success. Indeed his return to power rested solely on his position as the country's preeminent military commander

Soliders of Santa Anna's Army of Central Mexico circa 1857​

So while Santa Anna's revolt certainly did not meet with universal approval it was enthusiastically supported by his fellow jarochos (inhabitants of Veracruz) and the local garrison there, bolstered by santanista formations from Texas en route to the front*, declared for the new Mexico City government within days of the pronunciamiento. Naturally this placed the liberal government in immediate peril and Juárez barely escaped the city; being forced to set sail from the port less than an hour before santanista soldiers under Colonel Pedro Rincon Gallardo assumed control of the town and arrested Congress. Throughout the rest of the country the transition was far less orderly but equally startling in its rapidity - Escobedo and Díaz upheld their part of the deal and delivered their fiefdoms and armies but Alvarado of California stubbornly supported the 'legitimate' government for a month until Santa Anna was able to promise him further autonomy and it became apparent that Juárez was unable to muster a meaningful response. In conservative held lands affairs were even more confused as the conservative junta fractured with the fall of Mexico City and many prominent leaders, including General Miguel Miramón, sided with the santanista cause. More intransigent monarchists, true believers such as Felix Zuloaga, attempted to organise continued resistance after fleeing the capital but this was clearly a lost cause. These few generals were typically betrayed by their subordinates following the announcement of a general amnesty in March 1857 and yet another wave of exiles departed for Cuba and beyond. Juárez himself, on leaving Veracruz, attempted to land at Tampico but was rebuffed by its garrison and the President was forced to enter an ignominious exile in the United States

Fighting throughout the country would continue for a number of years but there were no more armies capable of challenging the new junta's authority. Instead both the monarchist and radical causes lived on solely through the petty warlords, peasant discontent, and ever-present brigands that continued to plague the country. Mexico was once again in a state of permanent instability but it was no longer openly at war with itself. Given everything it is little wonder that foreign historians often struggle to decide who actually won the Mexican Civil War. Nominally the liberals had won and, while military fueros were reinstated during the next war, many of the original reforms were respected by the new ruling junta. Santa Anna, former arch-conservative, was once again a champion of liberalism and the post-civil war constitution was undoubtedly more federalist and egalitarian than previous santanista efforts. Nonetheless the ambitious land distribution plans of Juárez, and other progressive measures, were unquestionably abandoned and the opportunity for thorough reform of either the economic base or political superstructure was lost. Yet it is debatable as to whether such ambitious plans were ever possible in Mexico at the time and in the face such entrenched opposition from the privileged classes. It hindsight the radicals were almost certainly moving too far and too fast. Perhaps the ultimate irony of these years is that it was Benito Juárez who came closest to, inadvertently, destroying the Mexican Republic and that it was Santa Anna, of all people, who ultimately proved to be its saviour. It would not be long before the survival of the Republic was again tested... this time by the United States of America

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* Since its failed revolution in 1836 Texas had suffered a heavy National Army presence. For a variety of reasons - including the continued stirrings of pro-Independence groups, fear of US intervention, and the lack of domestic strongmen - these formations, while suffering somewhat, had retained a degree of cohesion. It was not until the closing stages of the civil war that they began to move south in any numbers and generally their officers remained loyal to the Napoleon of the West. For a Texan perspective see 'Philips, E. D., (1862), Texas and Its Late Military Occupation and Evacuation' for a first hand account of these events

 

[ComradeOm]

So we're back. I hope you all enjoyed your marriage of faith and consumerism

Images above are from Osprey's "The Mexican Adventure". And incidentally, the more things change...

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Enewald: 36 is actually slightly less than the historical number at this point. I've been keeping track of Mexican presidents the AAR's title page. It really says everything about the instability of 19th C Mexican politics

Eams & Capibara: The problem with 19th C liberalism, as Cinéad IV puts it so well, is that its twin objectives of liberty and progress are not necessarily mutually compatible. Its something that even Juarez historically struggled with and one reason why Diaz could rely on much liberal support even during the Porfiriato

robou: Cheers. What bothered me about the last update was that it was a lot of describing but little action. For example, I had intended to mention Juarez's reforms in the previous update but they got pushed into this one

GeneralHannibal: Not a huge amount if truth be told. Right now I want to keep things focused on Santa Anna and Juarez. Still, expect to the action to shift back to Texas in the next update...

RGB: Hmmm... almost as good as Mystic Meg

Cinéad IV::rofl:

Director: Perhaps Santa Anna is so unpredictable that he's become predictable?

As for Davis (I must have been thinking of Kevin Davies, I'll fix that now) that was one of those last minute additions that happens to work out. Expect his reaction to Santa Anna's victory to figure largely in the coming updates

J. Passepartout: I'm in the same boat and have almost a dozen AARs that I have to catch up on over the next week

 

[J. Passepartout]

You can only take measures that alienate your allies like this if you know you are going to win anyway. It is interesting to see Santa Anna preserve the reforms and I am also interested to see how long it will be before he (or someone) starts meddling with them.

By the way, you mention 1936 instead of 1836 in your footnote.

 

[Enewald]

Santa Anna a saviour`? :rofl:
Soon he shall become fascist or marxist. Or become martyr of every ideology. :rofl:

Usa shall fail.

 

[unmerged(59077)]

And you know, it's not a bad place to be, biographically speaking.

Gain reputation of saviour, lose none of personal power.

How tough is the US when playing Mexico? I'm sure you can beat them again...

 

[Capibara]

So the americans are coming again, they shall meet with the mighty mexican armies, let's hope the internal problems of Mexico doesn't cause a lot of trouble in the war against the US.

 

[robou]

It would seem, as I understand it, that Santa Anna is, and practiaclly always has been, stuck in a horrible paradox. Whilst he does not institue proper land reform and give the pesants some kind of power, Mexico will always fail to be a pathetic democracy, and the instability of the landed classes, split as they always are into factions, constantly changing whose hands the government is in, will continue. However, if he does reform the land, then his base of power, with the officer-class and therefore the military, will be lost. As that goes, so goes his Vera Cruz estates, his wealth, and his chance of always coming in to be Mexico's saviour when things fall apart... it seems he will choose instability and poverty for Mexico and wealth and fame for himself, as usual!

 

[Cinéad IV]

I have to say, I'm a bit worried by your note that the USA will be testing Mexico. The USA by the 1860s is a much more powerful nation than the one you fought in the first Mexican-American War. You'll need a VERY powerful army, and possibly an alliance with the Confederates.

 

[Maximilliano]

i just read through this and i am amazed with what you have written so far. I'll certainly be following this!

 

[ComradeOm]

Lecture Fourteen: The Mexican Adventure (1857-'59)

"Mon centre cède, ma droite recule, situation excellente, j'attaque"
General Ferdinand Foch​

In the political instability of Mexico’s post-Independence era most prominent actors on the national stage came to accept foreign exile, however brief and temporary, simply as a fact of life. There were very few politicians/generals of note who had not been forced to flee the country at some time or other and small communities of Mexican political exiles dotted the capitals of the Caribbean. Most refugees tended to make for the familiar environs of other Latin nations (Cuba and Colombia being particular favourites) but there would have been little surprise when the recently deposed Benito Juárez disembarked at Boston in April 1857. The former president's ties with the United States were well known but even so it must surely have caused alarm in Mexican City to see just how swiftly he was ushered to the White House. Within days of his arrival on American soil Juárez had met with President James Buchanan (1791-1868), Franklin Pierce having vacated the executive office the previous month, and strongly forwarded the case for foreign intervention in his home country. This was an argument that senior US politicians were receptive to; Buchanan, like his predecessor, was a decided sympathiser of Southern interests and his cabinet included a number of strong proponents of slavery (such as John B Floyd, Howell Cobb, and Jacob Thompson). Further pressure was felt from the Senate where Jefferson Davis led a vocal campaign demanding nothing less than a military invasion in Mexico, the former Secretary of War knowing well just how much effort had been expended in financing and equipping the liberals in the expectation that their victory would lead to a renegotiation of existing treaties and a resumption of westward expansion. With the Union's politics becoming increasingly fractured and volatile Buchanan cast out for a foreign popular war that the nation could rally around. In Mexico the "restoration of Republican institutions" in the place of "petty and wicked despots" offered just that opportunity

The Buchanan Cabinet (L-R): Jacob Thompson, Lewis Cass, John B. Floyd, James Buchanan, Howell Cobb, Isaac Toucey, Joseph Holt and Jeremiah S. Black​

Of course Washington was not the only capital whose workings were deadlocked with bitter sectarianism and in Mexico City a similarly embattled president may well have welcomed the timely distraction from domestic instability and intrigues. The spectre of another war with the United States did not unduly trouble the Mexican masses, who remained largely unreceptive to nationalist sentiment and numb to the difficulties of war, but it did aid in rallying the political class, in particular conservatives and monarchists, to the santanista banner in the cause of national unity. Still ruling as dictator, and owing his survival largely due to the exhaustion of his opponents, Santa Anna cleverly made use if the mounting tensions to both divert attention from his struggling domestic programme and emphasise his personal strengths and expertise. There were many conflicting, and few flattering, opinions of Santa Anna the domestic reformer but as conflict with Washington loomed ever closer it was memories of the conquering hero that once again rose to prominence in the national mind. In the summer months of 1858 the generalissimo succeeded, through a mixture of intimidation and bribery, in ordering the bulk of the newly reformed National Army to the Texan border - happily removing many rival generals from their southern powerbases while gambling that internal strife would not immediately flare up again - before finally leaving Mexico City himself in early November 1858 to take up command in Texas. With simmering domestic tensions to his rear he would once again face the fires of war abroad

Mexico and the United States may not have been equals in their first war but we have seen that in military terms there had been a rough parity between the two. By 1858 such equivalence in arms was very obviously a thing of the past. The United States dwarfed Mexico in terms of population (roughly 20 million to 7 million circa 1849) and its impressive industrial base had been increasingly directed towards servicing the needs of the US Army in preparation for a revanchist war with Mexico. By 1858 the standing army, traditionally anathema to US politicians, numbered some 120k well-armed and well-trained men. In contrast the National Army of Mexico was in a state of chaos as military organisation effectively collapsed during the infighting and instability that followed 1849. Santa Anna's immediate priority following the Civil War, aside from securing his own position, was salvaging what he could from once proud formations and rebuilding the institutions of the military. This was no small task - unity and cohesion had never been defining features of the Mexican army but the collapse of central government in the 1850s had given independent minded officers unprecedented freedom from oversight. Santa Anna had made little progress in reconstructing the central authority of the military prior to 1859 but he was, due in no small part to his role as a powerful general in his own right, able to secure the nominal loyalty of most leading officers

Major deployments immediately prior to the outbreak of war. Santa Anna personally commanded approx 40k men in Austin while McClellan had 60k in Arkansas​

More measured preparations were underway to the north as General Winfield Scott readied his armies for an invasion of Mexico. The northern US states, grudgingly willing to approve of war but refusing to contemplate mass disruption of their economies, had refused to sanction the mobilisation and deployment of state militias. Nonetheless the United States could still call on close to twice the number of men in Mexican colours for the war effort. This was an advantage that Scott planned to maximise by exposing the limited Mexican positions to a broad assault along the entire border. The old warrior would not be leading an army himself - now in his seventies he was both too old and too rotund to mount a horse, never mind lead a campaign in the field – and political manoeuvring saw McClellan take command of the prestigious Army of Occupation and thus the responsibility of leading the main thrust through Texas and into Mexico proper. Generals McDowell and Johnston were charged with the northern and central fronts respectively, while General Beauregard was tasked with maintaining a substantial garrison in New Orleans as theatre reserve. This strategy was a success insofar as it forced Santa Anna to despatch the bulk of his divisions north under generals Ortega and Zaragoza while he held Texas with a mere forty thousand men; but Scott's plan backfired in that by dividing the front so he failed to capitalise on the poor coordination skills of the Mexican generals and allowed them to function in their preferred role as semi-independent armies. The numerical advantage was also more tenuous than first appearances as Santa Anna, making full advantage of his extra-constitutional powers, launched an aggressive impressment campaign, drawing on both state militias and rurales, to bolster his slender numbers. Again Mexico's disadvantages were somehow reversed - the troubles that had so negatively impacted the professional military had also spawned a large number of men with at least cursory military training. It would however take some time to equip and gather such reserves and when McClellan’s Army of Occupation finally crossed the border on 4 January 1859 it was with a heavy numerical advantage*

As with the previous war it was a border skirmish that sparked a formal opening of hostilities as aggressive posturing and raiding by both armies finally led to the death of several American and Mexican troopers. Again the "spilling of American blood on American soil" was pretext enough for Washington to deliver a declaration of war and within days the first US formations had crossed the border. McClellan's strategy was simple – he would race south and destroy his opponent in the vicinity of Austin, thus opening up the road to Mexico City. Geography and poor luck intervened however as Santa Anna refused to rise to the bait and instead also divided his army by despatching the twelve thousand men of the Pacheco Infantry Division (over a quarter of his force) under General Ignacio de la Llave northwards to hold the small settlement of Dallas and stall for time. In an unusually wet year the Trinity River, which snakes across north Texas before flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, had swollen to the point where this semi-abandoned village provided the only real fordable crossing for many kilometres. De la Llave was hopelessly outnumbered (by almost six to one) and as the soldiers frantically entrenched their positions (barely complete for the arrival of McClellan's vanguard on 9 February 1859) they would have known that their only hope for salvation lay with the reserve army of General Diaz almost two hundred kilometres away. With a ruthlessness that was quickly becoming his trademark, Diaz sought to answer Santa Anna's summons by driving his army across the arid plains of Texas while conscripting any soul unfortunate enough to encounter him. In fact the 'Deliverance of Dallas' was actually a twin miracle – that de la Llave successfully staved off McClellan's superior forces for almost three weeks and that Diaz forced march reached their objective on time. In both cases horrendous losses were incurred and when the relief army did arrive it was little more than an exhausted rabble. Nonetheless it was enough to maintain the town's defences and 's forces spent to further two months futilely assaulting this fortified strongpoint before McClellan finally withdrew his mauled formations, battered beyond recognition, towards Camden (8 April). Even worse was to follow with news of Santa Anna's activities during these crucial months

The opening moves of the Second War of US Aggression​

Having ensured that McClellan was fully preoccupied with reducing the defences at Dallas, Santa Anna took it upon himself to indulge in his fondness for bold offensives by engineering a rapid thrust into US territory that would be considered daring if it were not an almost identical repeat of his famed Louisiana offensive of over a decade previously. Once again the Army of Operations, some thirty thousand strong, bypassed major US formations and raced east to seize an almost unprotected Biloxi before turning south towards New Orleans. The objective of this operation was classically Napoleonic in seeking to locate and destroy Beauregard's army before it could coordinate an advance with McClellan. Indeed the latter was suddenly faced with a strategic dilemma which he proved unable to solve. Presented with a stubborn defence at Dallas and Mexican raiding parties to his rear, McClellan vacillated before dividing his forces further - by sending twenty thousand men from Dallas to disrupt Santa Anna's progress he merely weakened his own position, and opened himself to Diaz’s counterattack, while failing to significantly hinder his foe. The two divisions despatched south, under Robert E Lee, were brushed aside when they attempted to retake Shreveport on 10 March and compounded their error by retreating into New Orleans. When the city did fall to Santa Anna (3 May) almost forty thousand US soldiers were taken prisoner as yet another US ambition died in the swamps of Louisiana. For McClellan, who arrived back in Camden (16 May) with less than half the men he had departed with, these embarrassments spelt the end of his career. For Washington however the full consequences of the failed Texan offensive were rapidly becoming dire. Between Santa Anna's reckless offensive and the defeat at Dallas, the entire US Army of Occupation had either been destroyed or received a mauling that would take months to recover from. This gave free reign to Don Antonio and Diaz, the latter of whom had switched to the offensive following victory at Dallas, to move through the southern states of Louisiana and Mississippi at will, defeating US detachments and garrisons in detail

There were no such dramatic reversals further north where the forces were more evenly balanced and the need to take the offense less pressing. The armies of both sides were initially content to manoeuvre without committing to a major engagement that could blow the front wide open (as occurred to the south). The expectation of US commanders was that victory in Texas would pull the opposing Mexican forces south in order to defend Mexico proper. As it was, the exact opposite occurred and the shattering of McClellan's offensive into Texas threw US deployments all along the border into disarray as formations were hastily despatched south to oppose Santa Anna's startling advance. This was an opportunity that not to be missed and the Mexican armies, bolstered by reinforcements from the south, began crossing the border in significant numbers - Ortega launched his offensive towards Goodland and Zaragoza crossed into Little Rock on 5 May and 26 April respectively. Both armies enjoyed success, if nothing comparable to the amazing progress made to the south, and by June 1859 the outlook for the United States was grim enough to convince its Congress to commit wholeheartedly to the war. As Mexican armies surged towards the mighty Mississippi the US industrial machine was turned entirely over to the mission of fielding and supplying new armies**. Even in late summer it was far from clear as to whether the sheer size and resources of the US could halt the Mexican momentum and stave off the terrible consequences of Scott's failed gamble

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*In a genuinely innovative manoeuvre McClellan divided his army further into a number of smaller columns and as he moved towards Dallas from several directions. By approaching in separate columns and assembling just prior to the battle a commander could confuse the enemy and, most importantly, alleviate the massive logistical burden of 19th C armies. While the offensive was a failure, the manoeuvre was keenly observed by Prussian military attachés attached to the Union army and subsequently used to devastating effect by German armies in Austria '66 and France '70. See, 'Columbia, F.T., (2001), The Military Studies of Justus Scheibert'

**Four new divisions received their standards in July 1859 alone and the pace of mobilisation increased sharply as the immense resources of the USA were directed towards fielding and maintaining new armies. This impressive effort is detailed in 'Van Creveld, M.L., (1979), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton'

 

[ComradeOm]

Apologies for the delay all but real life has been simply crazy of late. I would promise a more regular update schedule but whenever I do that I fall even further behind

A note on the above update, I'm aware that it is very vague on hard numbers regarding troop levels but the truth is that I don't have any. Unfortunately. What I can say is that based on military score the US would have had roughly a 25-33% numerical advantage (including reserves) over Mexico. In fact my standing army had just about recovered to its 1842 levels by the time this war rolled round, although I did use the intervening decade to bolster my reserve numbers

As for why it took the US this long to DoW me again, well that's Paradox's fault for programming crappy AI p). Most of this AAR (actually all of it up to 1859) was played in one sitting and at some point the AI went to sleep. When I started the second game session the first thing the US did was DoW

Oh, and please ask if any of the movements/deployments are confusing or unclear. I don't really read military or operational history so feel free to criticise or provide pointers as to where I could improve

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J. Passepartout: Probably one of the most damning things you can say about Santa Anna (in this AAR and historically) is that if a law didn't directly impact his career or fortunes then he just didn't care about it

And good catch on the typo

Enewald: Given the rate at which he jumps from liberalism to conservatism (and back again) it can't be too long before he finds something more exotic

RGB: There's no denying that Santa Anna's a survivor. But then pride cometh before the fall...

(Not that I'm planning anything, you understand. Its just that the man's career resembles nothing so much as a yo-yo)

Capibara: Normally the US armies would stroll into a devastated Mexico with relative ease. Historically they did pretty much that in 1846 and that was without Mexico fighting itself to a standstill. But this is Vicky so events will go somewhat different. Just try to suspend disbelief

robou: A very incisive analysis. I won;t say too much for fearing of giving the plot away but expect the last update or two to concern themselves with an overall analysis of Santa Anna (not necessarily agreeing with your own of course)

Cinéad IV: We'll see how things go. Normally you're 100% correct and I've had some very tough games as Mexico. But I did better than I expected in the first war so fingers crossed

Maximilliano: Thanks! Its always great to get a new reader, especially so far into the story. I'm just sorry that my update schedule went to hell just as you started reading but I'll do what I can to rectify that

 

[robou]

Don Antonio doing what he does best. It seems quite bad of Lee and Beuregard with so many troops between them (can't recall you saying how many Beuregard had but it has to be at least 10,000 so 30,000 between him and Lee) failing to stop a depleted Mexican army. Diaz looks to be quite the rising star, but we'll see which side he chose to go, with or against Santa Anna. I would say the USA will sue for peace, or break in two. This will definately exaccerbate the Civil War, as I don't think the north will be best pleased when they lose another war because of Southern Agression, and that might be the spark that lights the nation into arms... but of course, in this case the nation is alreayd in arms which could be dangerous if something happens internally now...

 

[J. Passepartout]

As Robou mentions, losing a war is bad, and starting the lost war is going to rebound poorly on the perpetrators.

It is telling that Santa Anna had to bribe and cajole his generals into moving north. The rest of the description of the army proceeds from that point.

 

[unmerged(59077)]

Diaz seems to be the man to watch in the future...

Meanwhile, the war must be brought to a definable conclusion as the US mobilises...

 

[Quanto]

Absolutely beautiful updates. I do so love this AAR.

 

[Enewald]

Border to Missisippi?

 

[HannibalBarca]

Took up most of the morning reading this. Great stuff, do continue please.

 

[CCA]

Good update! Looking forward to more.