When I have a primary source stating that once Germany had enough Semi Automatics to start equiping battalions with them when fighting America it sounds pretty significant, when I have a primary source from the United States Army that states the Germans doctrine was an abysmal failure against them until they adopted the G43 and MP44 on a widescale in the west, when the same primary source states than in 1943 the British, Canadians, French, Polish, Australians, New Zealanders and pretty much every occupied military force requested the M1 Garand and that the only reason the US declined most of them was due to production just Gearing up.
It makes me wonder what you're thinking, going "it's a matter of doctrine" is such a double standard it's mind blowing. The fact is that the US attributes the Garand to why they were so successful in fire fights, not the 105 mm howitzer, not the M4A3 Sherman, not their doctrine (which they re-evaluated after the war). The main thing I look to is that things on the tactical level afect things on the strategic level. A German soldier failing to get to a detonator because of suppressive fire means the bridge survives, the bridge surviving allows heavy armour across, heavy armour across means forces can smash the hard point. It's a butterfly effect, even the most minor things on a battlefield that seem trivial to people who haven't seen combat can have a major life changing consequence.
Lol, what? You're not just taking Patton's thowaway quote (and pretending it's a "primary source") at face value, are you?
If your primary sources are claiming that the Garand is more important than the 105mm howitzers or other forms of artillery then they are most likely myopic infantry-centric sources that, as usual, forget that they are part of a much larger conflict. Or they are simply written by gun nuts who likewise have no sense of perspective, which is also sadly common among military writers. Any serious strategic writer of the Second World War knows how much more important artillery was than small arms; and are very dismissive of useless sources who keep trying to conflate their own role in the war when the statistics are extremely clear-cut in this case: Artillery > Small arms. By an enormous landslide.
First of all, anyone who thinks that small arms are awesome forget that less than 20% of infantrymen apparently ever bothered to actually shoot their small arms anyway; whereas the tonnages of shellfire delivered by artillery is pretty much unquestioned. Most infantrymen, of all nations, quite frankly ultimately decided that they would not cross the line of murder. It wasn't until Vietnam that methods were found to force infantrymen to shoot their weapons all the time, and all that resulted were countless cases of unresolved PTSD.
Secondly, statistics have been compiled for casualties inflicted by artillery - and artillery in fact killed more than all types of small arms combined. In fact mortar casualties (a subtype of artillery) alone accounted for more casualties in Normandy for the US Army than any kind of small arm, which I think is more reasonable than the British version. Because equivalent British studies indicate as much as 80% of their casualties were caused by mortars (the Germans being very short of heavy artillery) - and that is seriously not a typo. The British seriously claim that mortars killed four times more men than all other types of weapon systems combined in Normandy.
Quite simply, anyone who thinks that small arms are a big deal in World War 2 are simply plainly wrong and the strategic level statistics have proven it a long, long time ago. The reality is that you're not affecting the strategic level by pettyfogging small arms; much like Hitler's insistence on the StG44 this is just people conflating very minor and very irrelevant things into strategic war-winners that they never were as a placebo for the much more real problems of the real battlefield.
Both the First and Second World Wars were artillery wars. It bears the title "God of War" for a reason.
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And this is all before the simply plainly wrong assertion that the US Army didn't think the Sherman was good (they evaluated it was better than the Panther by a factor of 3:2), or that the doctrine was flawed. Those shortened the war far more than any small arms pettyfogging by measurable amounts.
Sure, there was a change of doctrine in the Cold War, but that's a result of the prevalence of nuclear weapons and the US Army trying to excuse its utterly retarded Cold War era doctrine by pretending the WW2 doctrine was bad since so few people are actually knowledgeable about doctrine.
In reality the US Army's warfighting doctrine against the Nazis was in fact quite good - it hit upon the correct strategy from the get-go and executed it properly, with only minor misses like the Tank Destroyers. Their Post-War doctrine was by contrast utter insanity. Forward Defense? Netrocentric fighting? The former was a formula for rapid certain defeat while the latter was old generals not understanding how computers worked and tried strapping them on to soldiers to make them look cooler.
Want to contest that? Then explain to me why the Wedemeyer Plan - or more popularly called the Victory Plan - was wrong then.
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