As July 1900 wore into August, battles across the whole front of the 4th Russo-Japanese War seemed stymied and indecisive. Where one side or the other wasn’t gaining a slight advantage, one side or the other possessed an advantage in one aspect, but disadvantages in others.
For instance, at Qiqihar and Aigun (Manchuria), and at Susuman (Siberia), the Japanese were inflicting serious casualties upon the Russians, but it wasn’t clear if they would be able to stand. The hope, on the Japanese side, was that the mass casualties would translate into organizational issues which would sap the Russians faster than themselves.
In fact, the Russians yielded at Susuman in the 1st week of August, having suffered nearly 5,000 casualties (+0.9 WS). Another 4,000 Russians fell at Ulusamudan (Manchuria) August 16th(+0.8 WS).
But fresh Russian troops from the west were appearing in theatre, and the worries about the staying power of the Japanese formations became even more acute. A fresh Russian offensive was opened at Yakutsk, where the attackers suffered more casualties, but it was the same old story – the Japanese were not disciplined enough to stand for weeks against a sustained Russian offensive.
And at the end of August, a Japanese probe into Mongolia was turned back by defending Russians under Gen. Denikin (-0.7 WS). But then the Battle of Aigun was won by Gen. Okada, with the Russians suffering 9,000 casualties and Japan only 100 (+1.9 WS). No one side was demonstrating any kind of strategic advantage over the other. Morale on both sides flagged. Japanese staff generals began ordering troops to the rear areas to recover from the meatgrinder along the front.
In September, the outlook seemed to brighten for Japan. The Russians had committed 15,000 troops to retake Okhotsk, but Gen. Yoshida Arisugawa’s army had held them off, and barely taken any casualties in the process of inflicting 7,000 upon the enemy (+1.4 WS). And at Ayan, on the 11th, another small victory was won (+0.5 WS). Other battles raged across the entirety of the warfront.
But despite Japanese successes and Russian failures – both at the beginning of the war and recently – the Russians steadfastly refused to admit there was any chance of losing the war. They would not budge even one inch at the negotiating table, regardless of how badly the overall war was going for them. This had an infuriating effect upon the Japanese diplomatic team.
The war waged on, but each side had something to prove. Three indecisive battles were fought, at Ziryanka, Qiqihar, and Chernomin. Qiqihar was considered a strategic victory for the Russians, even though they had lost nearly as many troops. A Japanese loss at Ulaan Chab Chuulgan, in Russian Mongolia, had as little effect on the course of the war.
October was little different, and initiative was not seized by either side. At the beginning of November, Gen. Matsudaira gained the advantage over Russian Gen. Nikolaevich at Jirim Chuulgan (again, in Mongolia), and punished him severely.
When a Japanese fleet finally arrived off the coast of Russia’s Persian Gulf colonies, they found that their Johori allies had already captured Bahrain, and were in the process of investing a Russian fortress at Doha. This allowed the Japanese to immediately turn their attention to Abu Dhabi.
Gen. Yoshida Katsu, in mid-November, began to reduce an isolated Russian garrison in northern Siberia, at Verkhoyansk. Unfortunately, Russian reinforcements arrived in December, and the character of the battle changed.
Gen. Kuroda had flanked Gen. Brusilov at Ayan, and was similarly punishing him. The significance of both of these battles was not just the casualty ratio, but that in both cases it was the organization and staying power of the Russians which had began to be seriously sapped, and the morale of the Japanese was keeping them engaged in the battle. The old paradigms had begun to shift.
At the end of November, Russia’s Gen. Tukachevsky defeated a much smaller Japanese force at Yakutsk, but the Russians had suffered more than 13,000 casualties – more than 3 times as many as the Japanese. More “victories” like these might sap Russia of the ability to continue the war.
Another of those “victories” happened at the very beginning of 1901. Russian reinforcements had flooded into Yaksa, and it was clear there was no point to continued Japanese resistance there. Nearly 8,000 Japanese were left behind in shallow graves, but 20,000 Russians had fallen. There had been no other situations of particular significance through the end of 1900.
The Russians won another Pyrrhic victory at Verkhoyansk, the next week, losing 11,000 to the Japanese 5,000. But then the battle began anew…
Ultimately, Gen. Kuroda was victorious at Ayan (+2.4 WS). Gen. Brusilov was bruised by 15,000 soldiers lost in battle. Kuroda’s losses were sustainable, and he soon returned to the task of securing the province and making it a rear area (along with Okhotsk, whose approaches Ayan guarded).
An epic battle was being set up at Jirim Chuulgan, with 180,000 Russians engaged against a Japanese force nearly 1/3 its size, but who were holding doggedly under Gen. Matsudaira’s defensive genius. There were a good number of Swedish divisions in the confused mix, alongside the Russians, and problems were already identifiable in the Japanese defensive structure. But reinforcements from both sides were en route, and the battle would become even more complex before it was finally resolved, in March.
In other, non-military, news…
During the new century – in 1900 – the Emperor was being convinced by his advisors that his government would have to change, subtly, in order to keep up with the times.
He was further told that if he was willing to extend the vote to his people – the Japanese people being very conservative, in general – that this democracy would eventually return a government that was of a character more to his liking.
So in October, 1900, he granted the first step of democratic reform – the vote was extended to property owners.
The problem was – paradoxically – that Japan’s richest class was actually the most socialistic of all the classes, the farmers and miners being more conservative. The strategy backfired in January, when the electors returned nearly a supermajority of socialists to the Japanese upper house. A more conservative correction might be difficult, and take a long time, as these socialists had no interest at all in further political reforms. Was Japan stuck in a nightmare?
On a more positive note, in November, Japan brought Brunei into its sphere of influence with a very firm mutual agreement. Now, Brunei would come in alongside Johore as a member of the Japanese alignment.
The new century would be a very challenging one – perhaps more so than the 19th Century. How would Japan lead? Or fall?