After the supreme defeat of the campaign in southern China, Japanese strategists were forced to re-assess the best way to resume the war. The Manchurian front clearly remained a strong theatre of operation, with troops now in most of the provinces of the region, and Gen. Yasukata Okubo having great success at Mukden.
It was decided to take the forces retrieved from Hong Kong – the only survivors of the southern debacle – and the other reinforcement fleets, and land them along the coastal provinces bordering the Korean Bay. Two armies went onto the Shantung Peninsula, at Laizhou, while another army landed at ill-fated Chengde, and a fourth smaller army landed to attack the remnants of the Chinese army that killed Gen. Oyama’s army at Chengde recently. It was hoped that their victorious, but very tired, army would fall quickly.
The landing at Laizhou was prompted because it had seemed a defensible location, there were few Chinese armies in the vicinity, and, not least, because Japan had declared its intention to ask for the region as war spoils. It had not been so vulnerable when the south China operation was planned, or the whole expedition might have gone there instead. But at the time, there were too many enormous Chinese armies in the region, transiting from the south toward Manchuria. They would have merely had to shift their direction of march, and they would have fallen upon the invasion. In a way, south China was the sacrifice that enabled both, victory in Manchuria, and this invasion of Shantung.
The initiative that had been gained in Manchuria allowed Japanese armies to spread out. Gen. Goro Ichinohe engaged Gen. Zhou’s larger army at Jirim Chuulgan, but initially the Japanese attack went relatively well. A Japanese army occupied Jinzhou, and would soon control the area.
Gen. Goro Okubo, at Mukden, was capably handling a Chinese army twice his size – both armies were ragged, exhausted from combat, but the Japanese spirits were higher, and still had a technology edge. On March 4, Okubo’s army was victorious, with the Chinese losing 23,000 men for the loss of only 9,000 Japanese (+3.7 warscore).
On the Shantung Peninsula, Gen. Gentaro Nire, Japan’s most brilliant general (+5 attack, +3 defense), led a sizeable force south to head off a Chinese army approaching from the south at Yizhou. This move protected the occupation forces, which had spread out in an attempt to secure the whole peninsula. Chinese Gen. Sonin Shangzhi wasn’t particularly skilled, but he experienced some incredible luck, and was able to surprise Nire’s army in the passes, such that during the first week of combat they suffered terribly. During the second week, Nire turned things around, and Chinese casualties approached 900 per day, but it was too late to make the situation right. Nire retreated on the 11th, just 2 weeks after initiating the attack, and withdrew further into the peninsula. Losses on both sides were several thousand.
After this victory, on top of the astounding collapse of the south China campaign, the Chinese government issued an insulting proposal that Japan keep the island of Formosa, which China had absolutely no chance of recovering, and be satisfied with that. The envoy was rudely ejected from the palace where he had presented the script.
The great powers of the world were still coming to terms with Japan’s newfound celebrity. But Japanese diplomats had been busy in the halls of foreign powers, attempting to use its newfound influence to acquire new markets and allies. Johore was an obvious target. And the Netherlands – the European colonial power whose strength, as with Spain, had waned in recent decades – was a tempting target also, given its large Asian population and colonial holdings. Backchannel dealings were also made with Chinese authorities, though the Chinese court was a relative den of thieves, full of officials from the world’s governments, all meaning to make from China what they wished.
((OOC: There is NO WAY I should have been able to do this – if I’m at war with them, influence is supposed to be blocked off. I figure since I became a great power after the war had already started, some error check must have missed the violation. And I didn’t realize until later that I wasn’t supposed to be able to influence a country during war either.))
The hopeful revenge attack upon the army that had defeated Gen. Oyama failed. Those troops withdrew to Chenge on the 11th of March, but fortunately Chengde was a more hospitable place by then, despite the earlier Chinese victory. Gen. Yasukata Okubo was waging a struggle with Gen. Oboi there, at Chengde, and the impressive casualty totals were reminiscent of earlier wars, with only 1 Japanese falling for every 12 Chinese (1,500 per day at times).
Meanwhile, Gen. Goro Okubo was busy putting down another Chinese attempt to retake Port Arthur, and he was also seeing incredible disparities in casualty rates, just like old times. The remnants of 8 separate Chinese armies were there, and on March 30, Gen. Zhou surrendered the 29,000 survivors of his campaign (OOC: total dead or captured from this battle of Port Arthur was 37,000, but you know those 8 armies probably numbered 160,000 at one point – now they’re all gone, permanently lost to the Chinese – makes up a little for my loss in S. China.)
Despite recent foibles, not least south China, it was clear to those on both sides that Japan was still winning the war. The Shantung Peninsula had stabilized, despite a thinness of troops, and lack of preparedness to face a serious challenge. Enemy armies steered clear, at least temporarily. The Japanese armies recovered and prepared. Chinese envoys had, of late, been conciliatory, and signaling a willingness to deal. Japan, however, now wanted revenge more than ever. This would not be the end they would accept.
Gen. Okubo withdrew from combat at Chengde on the 25th of April, having inflicted 26,000 casualties upon the attacking enemy, but Gen. Tokugawa (+3 attack) was prepared with fresh troops to march in and renew the offensive there. It was a strategic reordering of objectives – it was felt Japan would be better off on the offensive, choosing the field of battle, rather than attempting to hold defensive lines against the enormous enemy army. Tokugawa struck in the first week of May.
Laizhou was declared secured, and free of enemy troops, on the 25th of April, and an army immediately advanced to seize the advantage at Qingzhou, beginning an occupation. But the Chinese took advantage of the vacuum this left, and instead of attacking at Qingzhou, they slipped into Laizhou, and then began to threaten Qingdao. While a certain calculated risk had been accepted, when Japan advanced to Qingzhou, it was anticipated that the Chinese would try to retake Laizhou, rather than marching immediately upon Qingdao.
The unexpected Chinese move threw operations into disarray. Qingdao was almost secured, but this would be prevented if the Chinese attacked, and the Japanese army there wasn’t strong enough to hold for long. It was a race for Qingdao. Fortunately for the Japanese, the province was declared secure before the Chinese could arrive, and at that point the Chinese advance was called off. A sigh of relief was breathed.
On May 20 the ground at Jirim Chuulgan was yielded to the Japanese. The battle was not so lopsided as others, but with 37,000 Chinese soldiers dead, the loss ratio had been 2.5:1 – a clear Japanese victory in an interior Manchurian/Mongolian) province. This came quick on the heels of securing Aigun and Qiqihar, immediately to the north.
The Chinese, sensing an opportunity to repeat their complete victory in south China, and redeem themselves in this war, did decide to march upon Qingdao once enough troops were present to mount a serious attack, during the middle of May. Initially, Gen. Chang believed he had a good position from which to turn the Japanese position, but as May wore into June, Gen. Okubo improved his situation defensively, and it seemed as if he might hold out. Losses were heavy on the Chinese side, but Okubo’s army weakened faster – he ordered a retreat onto ships in the harbor on June 7, having again stunned the Chinese with tremendous losses.
Gen. Nire, for his part, mounted a counteroffensive against the Chinese army that had been left to occupy Laizhou, hoping to dislodge them. It would be a supreme contest, and Nire didn’t get so much of an advantage as he’d hoped for in the early days of the campaign. Gen. Oboi’s forces had set up defenses, which the Japanese were finding it hard to overcome. Meanwhile, reinforcements were landed at the docks at Qingdao before the Chinese could arrive, and another battle began there. A small army at Weihaiwei completed their task of securing that province, and marched to help Gen. Nire at Laizhou. Which way would this campaign turn?
By July, Gen. Nire was achieving his more typical casualty rates against the Chinese. The bad luck – or was it the machine guns? – of south China seemed forgotten by the arbiters of fate. Such success was not being had by the new defenders of Qingdao, but neither were they in dire straits – the Chinese would eventually tire, and need to withdraw, and now they had Gen. Nire perched upon their avenue of escape. More reinforcements arrived by sea in Qingdao in mid-July, and then the Chinese really began to suffer at the hands of Gen. Okubo. That battle concluded on 21 July, with the surrender of the entire Chinese command, whose survivors plus dead totaled 15,000 (+2.2 Warscore).
(((OOC: No easy way to work all this into the narrative – I achieved Army Risk Management, which gave me another +100 in Military Tactics, which is a sort of a force multiplier in combat. I followed up by beginning research on Point Defense, which improves my defensive values, dig-in values, and fortress levels. That would be achieved by May of 1895, about 11 months away).
By the end of July, Gen. Nire had been victorious at Laizhou, killing 30,000 of the enemy (+4.8 Warscore). Qingzhou, to the north, had been secured, meanwhile, and Gen. Goro Okubo then took command of that force and led them south to punish the Chinese army at Yizhou (where the Chinese survivors from Laizhou would soon march through).
The battle at Chengde had again been lost, as was inevitable, considering the small size of the army Gen. Yasukata Okubo had led there. Eleven thousand Japanese had died, and 29,000 Chinese, which seemed a relatively acceptable trade, considering.
At this point, in August, 1894, the Japanese marshals believed the war was going well enough that it was time to ask for more from the nervous Chinese officials. The Aigun region of Manchuria (green in the map above) was added as a third claim, in addition to Formosa and the Shantung Peninsula (Lizhou state).
And, back home, Japan’s first railroads were going into service in the region around the capital of Edo.