"If I may interject a moment, gentlemen" Marcos' voice rings across the assemblyhall through the PA system, with just enough force to immediately calm the entire room "I was under the impression that I was on trial here, and not Admiral Tulp." She smiles, and there are some soft chuckles throughout the assembly.
"Per Park, I thank you for your concern, but I believe I can handle myself. I will answer your scenarios as best I can briefly, though each could easily be the subject of a 50 page judicial memo, or an essay test of somewhat smaller stature. In so doing, I will only apply our current Constitution, as to do otherwise would be a quaint history lesson, but a waste of this body's time. I can only give general answers, because a full opinion would require some research into precedent and a full set of facts and circumstances which you can't hope to provide in a concise format. Each case is different, but I can give you a general opinion.
Your first question poses a situation where a minister acts outside of his portfolio to the economic damage of another, who then sues to recover their damages. If a minister could not make a valid Constitutional argument for why the tariff falls under their responsibility, then the tariff would be void and the foreign lumber company would be entitled to compensation. However, under our current Constitution, both the Finance Minister and the President would have valid standings to enact such tariffs, as they can be considered part of 'foreign policy'.
Next, there is Amric Al'Aeshir. Despite Per Al'Aeshir's clearly discriminatory practice in selling his property only to foreign bidders, he is still a private actor. Were AAH a government agency, then the circumstances would be different, but as it is there is no 'state action' on which to base a Constitutional claim. It is the right of private citizens to sell their property to whomever they please in such a case, and the High Court cannot force Per Al'Aeshir to do otherwise.
As for Admiral Tulp, Courts Martial are not my area of expertise, nor are they a civilian court's jurisdiction. I would certainly not allow a civilian prosecutor to file followup charges or continue a Court Martial after Per Tulp's was suspended. Under our current Constitution, it would be outside of the President's authority to grant a pardon or commute a sentence, but as Commander-in-Chief it is his responsibility to ensure the security of our borders. As I understand, Per Tulp's situation was extraordinary, in that his trial was suspended during wartime. To initiate a new Court Martial is the prerogative of the President as Commander-in-Chief or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or if farther down the line, a similarly situated officer. It is not the place of a High Court justice. A civilian court could hear any civil suits filed against him by victims, but not his criminal case, as that is solely the province of a Court Martial.
As for why the President chose me, that is a question better directed at him. I assume he did so because I struck him as the best choice. I have no information about his pecadillos or anything else of his, having just recently met the man, and would never consent to any sort of arrangement on my future rulings." She leans back and takes another drink of water, then rolls her neck a little before leaning forward into the microphone again.
"As for Admiral Tulp's question defining murder, that is trickier than you think, I believe. Ask that question to any first year law student, and their response will be 'what degree?' The act of killing someone is not always murder...it can be manslaughter, or there are multiple degrees, etc. The simple answer to your question is, under our Criminal Code, murder is defined as 'when one person engages in conduct which results in the death of another person, and the first person intends to cause, or is reckless as to causing, the death of the other person by the conduct.' Note that the person charged with murder does not actually have to kill the victim by pulling the trigger or what-have-you...directing others to do the actual killing is 'engaging in conduct'. That criminal code can of course be amended by this body through a simple majority vote. Our Constitution does not define murder except in the nature of the 'right to life', which if I perceive your line of questioning correctly, does not currently apply to executions or abortions. To change the Constitution's definition there would require a Constitutional amendment be passed by this body; and without the over-arching guide of the Constitution in place, I imagine that both the death penalty and abortion would fit within our criminal code's definition of murder.
Finally, Reverend Park's question concerning Leary v. Lundgren. While I believe that all avenues of extrajudicial resolution should be pursued before filing suit, I recognize that to do so is not always possible or even advisable. I do not see the harm in issuing advisory opinions that the late Justice Onazaker saw, and had I my choice I would have joined the majority opinion. As for whether I would intervene in the administration of the General Assembly at present, I believe I could imagine such circumstances, but they would have to be of such an unconscionable nature as to render their likelihood of occurring very low, such as a flagrant abuse of power by the Speaker to censor debate. Even then, suit would have to be brought before the High Court before we could rule...I am loathe to stick the nose of the Court where it does not belong, and certainly would not take the Court anywhere uninvited."