The Time of Troubles
From the first hesitant expedition of Halle in 1587 until the final breakup of the Global Customs Union in the 19th and 20th centuries, Bremen’s character shaped – and was shaped by – its expansion overseas. Of the great colonial powers, by which we mean Bremen, England, Spain, France, Genoa, Venice and Portugal, only Bremen was able to continuously expand a colonial empire. The reasons for this are simple in their roots if somewhat complex in their interaction, and it is this interplay that we will examine.
The first colony was established in what would later be the province of Carolina and served three purposes. Firstly, the excellent harbor of Karlstadt provided a forward base for further exploration. Secondly, the settlement was able to establish a profitable trade with the native inhabitants and export small amounts of sea island cotton. Later (after the invention of the cotton ‘gin’) to become the ‘white gold’ of the southern provinces, cotton at this time was difficult to clean and only marginally profitable, but did help defray some of the enormous cost of founding the colony. Thirdly, the exploding population of the German states led to immense pressure for emigration, and the peculiar nature of the Colonial Corporation and the provincial Proconsulates gave this pressure a ready outlet.
Where the Latins – the Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Genoese and Venetians –went to the New World to trade, rule and convert the natives, the English and Germans came to settle, build and occupy. So the flow of German colonists became a river and then a flood, lured in by the Colonial Corporation’s promise of land grants and the Proconsuls’ desire to see their provinces grow and prosper.
With the accession of the former French settlements on the Gulf Coast, Bremen’s colonial holdings began to assume the complexion of a multilingual and polycultural empire. The French holdings, Spanish Matagorda and Rio Grande and English Delaware were easily accommodated because so little effort was made to ‘Germanize’ those territories. Proconsuls were appointed, trade regulations enforced and customs collected, and little else was changed. Of course, over the years, Germans settled there in large numbers and the overall character of those lands changed – all those provinces are now overwhelmingly of the Protestant faith, for example. Yet Galveston retains its Spanish look and feel as Nouvelle Orleans remains flamboyantly French, even if a majority of their citizens now have German surnames.
The reader may reasonably ask what Bremen’s colonization program had to do with the European Time of Troubles. Since the greatest single expansion of the Bremen colonial empire came during that era, it will be instructive, I think, to examine the linkages in some detail.
The Time of Troubles, a period roughly spanning the years 1650 to 1750, saw an ongoing struggle among European states for internal security and order as well as external expansion in power and extent. Chief among the aspirants for power in Europe was France – so-called ‘an Army in pursuit of a State’ in von Holmann’s famously pithy snub. And the record of France during this period is a weary cycle of war, rebellion, disaffection among the dukes and war to reestablish royal power – similar to virtually every European power except Bremen.
Why did Bremen escape the Time of Troubles? Without going into a level of detail inappropriate for this essay, we may say that Bremen’s territorial ambitions in Europe were largely satisfied by this date. Peaceful expansion of the GBCU (Greater Bremen Customs Union) did occur, but almost all of Bremen’s military operations in Europe in this period were defensive in nature. Her burgeoning population – and all of her disaffected elements – found ready sponsorship by the Colonization Corporation. Thus while her neighbors ground up their youth and treasure in the mills of war, Bremen flooded North America and the Far East with settlements and profited from world-wide trade.
The chief checks on the expansion of France were England and Bremen. Austria was fully occupied with her eastern and southern borders, and Spain with the ragged remnants of a once-vast overseas empire. English possession of Normandie, Poitou and Gascogne meant that France could never be free of threat from the west while Bremen’s stout defense of the Rhinelands ensured no French expansion to the northeast and east. Had France been free to concentrate on one enemy at a time, she might well have overrun western Europe, but so long as England and Bremen stood together, France could be contained.
Thus, the central tenets of Bremen’s foreign policy were the creation of an English alliance and the prevention of an alliance between Austria and France. The central pillars of Bremen’s grand military strategy were defense of the Rhine, naval defense of the Channel and aggressive war only in the colonies.
Although the English alliance was lost during the Cromwell Protectorate it was warmly reestablished when James II came to the throne and was held unwaveringly until early in the twentieth century. Only during the Time of Troubles did frictions threaten to split the two partners, and revealingly these frictions had their base in colonial policy.
England initially settled on an inexpensive militia for colonial defense. However, native raids in the 1670’s and the nearby Bremen garrisons (some 25,000 Bremen troops were permanently stationed in North America during this period) required the English to begin an expensive program of garrisons and fortifications in their North American provinces. This program, begun in 1700, of course had to be paid for – and while Bremen’s colonial defense was funded through duties and fees that were assessed worldwide, the English government decided that colonial defense should be paid for solely by the colonies involved.
The resumption of the Bremen-English alliance in 1685 should have led to an easing of tensions and lesser need for armament in the colonies, except for one factor: Denmark. In that same year the English negotiated a protectorate over the Danes to the dismay and consternation of Bremen, who had been seeking such a protectorate for generations. The alliance endured, however, chiefly because of the danger from France and because Bremen hoped that English influence in Denmark might be some day overturned.
Queen Anne came to the English throne in 1702 and the English secured the Meuthen Agreement in that same year, reducing Portugal to the status of vassal. Again, Bremen was left envious and shaken. Only a cool appraisal of the relative size of their colonial empires – that of England, Denmark and Portugal combined being scarcely a third that of Bremen alone – enabled the alliance to be renewed in 1704.
In 1708, while the French and Spanish alliances were at war, Bremen moved to link her Atlantic and Caribbean holdings. This meant forcibly incorporating the lands of the Creek Indians in a belligerent and unprovoked war, and fixed her full attention on this theater.
And then Civil War broke out anew in England.
Despite the tranquility of the surface, the political waters of England in 1708 were turbulent, muddy and deep. The religious Civil War had been fought between Catholic and Protestant, roundhead and cavalier and the Protestants had won… only to see a monarch reinstated who was sympathetic to the Catholic cause. By the time James II - an avowed Catholic - came to the throne, all the old hatreds were ready to bubble over again. His own daughters, Mary and Anne (raised staunchly Protestant), supported his overthrow and Mary (with William of Orange) came to rule in his stead after the Glorious Revolution. With the death of Mary and then William, Anne came to the throne in 1702.
Widely viewed as a good-hearted, somewhat simple woman, she soon displayed a positive genius for political infighting. Her dismissal of ministers, disdain for Whigs and royal vetoes became the most talked-about subjects in London. Her marriage to Prince George of Denmark was popular, and they seem to have genuinely loved each other. She bore him some seventeen children, but all perished in miscarriage or childhood. Thus, the heir to the throne of England was Sophia, electress and dowager-duchess of Hanover and her eldest son, George Louis – both citizens of Greater Bremen.
Given the deaths of all her children, it is perhaps understandable that Anne failed to warm to the German ‘cousins in waiting’. As a political maneuver, the Whigs induced George to ask to take his place in the House of Lords as the Duke of Cambridge in 1708, and the Queen exploded. Anne wrote to Sophie, asking the cousins not to come to England in her lifetime, and the Whigs then foolishly made that letter public. The leaders of that party quickly came to understand what ‘royal displeasure’ truly meant; within weeks half the Whigs in Parliament were in prison or cowering in Scotland.
And in the midst of this, James III launched an attempt to regain the throne of Scotland, and England simply went mad.
Rather than dwell on the ugly details of this Second Civil War, let us look to the effects on Bremen and on England’s international position. With the Indian Wars raging in North America and English garrisons stripped for service at home, it was only natural for the colonies’ German neighbors to assume the burden of defense. This quickly came to include port control, duties, customs fees and – with most of the English merchant ships occupied by the war – the shipping of goods in Bremen hulls. There is no record of any concerted takeover by Bremen interests, just a recognition that essential services needed to be provided and paid for. Only Bremen was able to fill the political and military vacuum.
But the net effect was that by the end of the decade of the Second Civil War, England’s provinces of Manhattan, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Penobscot were firmly integrated into the GBCU and showed no enthusiasm for a return to English rule. Given the debilitated state of the country after the long and bitter war, the English chose to swallow their bilious humiliation and decided not to press the issue.
Rebounding swiftly from the war and Anne’s death, England turned her attention away from the lost Atlantic colonies and back to Europe. She maintained and strengthened her Canadian holdings and the inland provinces that ran down the Adirondacks to Powhatan, but the explosive growth was over. Instead, she established a protectorate over Sweden in 1717 to match her claims to Denmark and Portugal. Predictably, Bremen was outraged at being outmaneuvered in what they had long considered their sphere of influence, but given their recent gains in North America, they again chose to ‘say nothing and wait for a better hand of cards,’ as First Consul Johann von Reden observed.
The English Alliance held through wars with Genoa (1718-1719, with Aragon and Scotland), Austria (1742-1747, with Prussia and Poland) and the French-sponsored Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745.
And finally, in 1757, came the showdown with France.
Wars with France had been a regular fact of life for Bremen for generations, and they all had assumed a similar form. The French would attack in waves up the narrow channel of Luxembourg into the Palatine, Bremen would occupy the French trading posts in North America, and a peace would be settled. Usually the French would then spend a decade putting down revolts and independence movements before making another attempt. Other than requiring Bremen to maintain a large standing army, none of these wars had any serious outcome.
So the Bremen political and military leadership can be forgiven for being a bit slow on the uptake in 1757. French annexation of Alsace and Lorraine (and subsequent claims, through marriage, to Baden and the Palatinate) had fixed Bremen’s attention on the expanded theater of the Rhinelands. It was only after the first, half-hearted invasion of the Palatine was turned back that the Germans began to wonder what the French – and their allies Genoa, Scotland, Eire and Aragon – were really about.
The strategic goal of France was no less than the total destruction and dismemberment of England. The Scots put 50,000 men into Northumberland, the Irish were retaking Connaught and Ulster, and the French had committed 100,000 men to Normandie alone.
It was at this crux that the notorious diplomatic mission of the Comte de Raymond arrived in Bremen. Their proposal – that Bremen retain any Genoese and French colonial possessions in return for remaining north and east of the Rhine – must have been sorely tempting. After all, a reduced England might have found herself unable to retain her dominance of Denmark, Sweden and Portugal, and who but Bremen could profit from that?
In their extremity the councilmen sent First Consul Volhard Mindemann to consult with Archbishop Friedrich III, still titular ruler of Greater Bremen. And from those three days came the response that literally shaped our modern world: it was a stinging, contemptuous rebuke of France, and it had teeth.
Unless France and her allies negotiated an immediate treaty, in good faith, Bremen would reinforce her squadrons in the Channel and move immediately on all enemy overseas possessions. The 250,000 men of the Rhine armies would be launched immediately into Artois, Luxembourg and Alsace, and England would be encouraged to seek a permanent solution to the Irish and Scottish questions. She would be supplied with interest-free credit of some 2000g and every resource that Bremen could muster, to that end. To say that the French were stunned by the ferocity of this response is a vast understatement.
As every schoolchild knows, France returned a virulent diplomatic response but secretly began negotiating in earnest. The final Peace of Heidelberg ended the war virtually status quo ante bellum with France paying a small indemnity and undoubtedly preserved England from destruction.
From this, Bremen derived little immediate gain. She was secured in a long-standing friendship and spared an enlarged, triumphant France but her dreams of hegemony over Denmark and Sweden were forever ended.
No essay would be complete without at least one quote from our shadowy master of the shadowy arts of war and governance. “Honoring an alliance is always expensive, but sacrifice of honor for expediency is a transitory profit. Honor is a coin that, once expended, can never be regained. A nation that chooses expediency over right action may only hope to be served the same.”