Selected Essays: Building a Better Bremen

[Director]

IIRC, my first slider move was for centralization, as Bremen starts out completely decentralized. Aftetr that the priorities were Free Trade and army morale improvement (freeing the peons, mostly - they de-serf it).

Owen is right in the bullseye. Bremen begins with around 350g, riches indeed. This went for an immediate tax collector, a fancy all-cavalry army and a treasury slider of around 8% inflation. There is no navy, so their maintenance doesn't matter.

I've deliberately kept the treasury slider down around 8% (12% or a little more in wars when the army must be fully maintained).

Maximum research went first to trade, a standard opening move for earlier versions and entirely consistent with Bremen's historic dependence on trade. However, it will be 1536 before trade brings in more monthly income than taxes. This happy event is followed by the 'Years of Horror' as all of the world wages trade war on Bremen. More on that, later. I'll only say that leading by 3 trade tech levels doesn't always protect you from 'powerhouses' like Morocco and the Lenape.

The Essays are going to begin skipping around a lot in chronology. Examples will be drawn from different years and not presented in 1-2-3 sequence. If this gets to be distracting, let me know.

Thank you all for the compliments. Is the tone too dry?

And now for a few more words of wisdom from the Doktor...

 

[Director]

The Labrys and the Chain: Models of Governmental Form and Policy



The palace of King Minos of Crete, lavishly decorated with copies of the double-headed labrys axe that was his symbol, is widely regarded as the origin of the term labyrinth. The palace undoubtedly began as a smaller, simpler structure and expanded as the years went by, either to accommodate the expanded size of the king’s court or to provide employment for surplus labor – or both. Whatever the reason, the sprawling unplanned growth of the palace reached a point such that persons who did not reside therein required guides, hence the term labyrinth.

The various studies of the governmental structure of Bremen can be easily summed into two camps: those who believe the habitual maze-like bureaucracy was intentional, and those who maintain it occurred by happenstance or lack of plan and effort. As will become apparent in our study of the doctrines of Doktor Gropius, both camps contain an element of truth.



Most governing bodies are organized in a top-down, hierarchical pattern, the chain of command running down link by link from the topmost position of greatest power and responsibility to the manifold lesser positions at the foot. Each link of the chain has precisely defined areas of responsibility and carefully circumscribed freedom of action, and enormous energy is expended in moving decisions up and down the ponderous chains.

The stress on obedience to doctrine is no accident. The earliest bureaucracies were invented by the military to manage the increasing size and complexity of armies and fleets. The great success of the method led to its application in virtually ever other field of governmental action, with famously mixed results.

Since level of responsibility is clearly fixed for any given operation, the bureau system discourages the making of decisions and encourages the rote application of formulaic routines. These may be incorrect to the case at hand or even disastrous, but they provide a set, predictable method for managing information and action. All of the success of the bureau system thus falls naturally from the degree to which intelligence and initiative are removed from it and blind obedience used.

The very word ‘bureau’ is French, and it was under the centralizing power of the monarchs of France that the system was invented, refined and made into an institution. All power leads down from the throne to various ministers, departments, prefectures and army commands; all responsibility flows naturally upward along the same paths.

In its basic structure and operation, the bureau lacks flexibility, originality and speed but provides meticulous records and requires no particular genius to operate.



In the case of the nascent city-state of Bremen, this model did not apply – indeed could not be made to apply. The archbishop presided - partly; the town council ruled - somewhat; the Hanse gave every member city a say-so but issued no commands.

In these early days of 1419 we see the first steps toward the Bremen that was to come, and the peculiar genius of Gropius for turning weakness into strength and liability into asset. “The concept of obedience is proper in some cases but not in all; the superior man discerns when disobedience to the command is obedience to the intent.”

Thus, with the army reformed but untried, revenue-producing ordinances enacted though untested and war-clouds gathering on the waters of the Baltic Sea, Bremen attacked.

South, to Hannover.



Judging from the few accounts we do have, it is debatable whether the archbishop, the city council or the Hanse was the more surprised. The attack was accomplished by the simple expedient of secret orders issued by Gropius under Baumann’s seal while the army was gathered for a few days of drill. Bremen had never had such a complex mounted force, so it must have seemed perfectly natural for them to vanish into the countryside for a few days of hard riding and practice at arms.

My personal choice for the award of ‘Most Amazed’ would have to be the city of Hannover, which was experiencing no worse relations with Bremen than usual. Astonished they certainly may have been but surprised in the military sense they were not. A disaffected servant from the Baumann household rode hard out of the Bremen gate scant hours ahead of the advancing cavalry, giving Hannover the better part of a day to arm her militia and prepare.

“Surprise,” says Doktor Gropius, “takes many forms. Surprise is subtle, powerful and should be employed whenever practicable. The object is for ones actions to surprise the enemy rather more than ones own people.”

The discerning among you will have suspected that the good Doktor himself sent that messenger and the warning, and those suspicions would be correct. Had Hannover fallen to a true surprise attack, which is unlikely, the able male citizenry would have remained capable of disaffection and insurrection. As it was, they armed themselves and marched out of Hannover to a prepared position – a position whose location was less secret than they had supposed. The force from Bremen moved rapidly down the road, delayed its deployment until the proper moment, and then struck.

The most vulnerable moment for an infantry-based militia force is while it is moving into its prepared position. Pre-vehicular infantry are stubborn in prepared defense and notoriously more fragile while in motion. The Hannover levies were utterly unprepared for the speed of advance of an all-cavalry formation. They were half-formed when the first massed crossbow volleys came down, they were shattered by the following charge, and at the end of the day they not only were beaten but knew in their hearts they were beaten.

Enlarged by the population, revenues and trade-goods of Hannover, Bremen turned her attention north to the onrushing threat of the Danes.



From this first small seed grew not a lofty oak but the vast sprawling thorn-bush that typifies Bremenist government practice even today. Clearly a descendant of the labyrinth, the maze-like overlapping responsibilities will lead the stranger astray but present no difficulty to the initiate. One never quite knows which officer – even which department – is responsible for which actions, a great advantage in intelligence work of all kinds.

Only in far-off Nippon have we seen the development of a comparable institution. In that government, enormous value is placed on attaining consensus. Elder officials – and military officers – are expected to yield to the politely-worded demands of their more hot-headed juniors. If they resist too much or too long they may find themselves ignored – or assassinated.

What the system loses in duplication and Byzantine complexity it has shown, over the years, it can make up in flexibility and power. Rest assured, the people who work in it understand it very well, and they all can quote the Doktor’s well-known maxim.

“Initiative is to be encouraged by the pruning of the weaker limbs.” The real questions are who decides the weakness, and who wields the shears. Those questions will be taken up in a later installment.

 

[stnylan]

Bah I disagree with the essay-writer already.

Personally my theory is that Gropius picked up a copy of Sun Tzu.

 

[Commandante]

The structure of bureaucracy is indeed fascinating, even more so when working in one, I can tell you that!

This AAR has a very original set-up, Director! Good show!

 

[Stuyvesant]

Don't worry about the writing being 'dry'. I like the academic tone and there's plenty of juicy tidbits too, not to mention the memorable quotes from Gropius.

I like this a lot. <Has a brainwave> In fact, I'll subscribe!

 

[Director]

stnylan - Yes, but... how could he read it?

Commandante - Decentralized is as decentralized does. However, you have the wrong depatment. Please take form 11-R to the SolAARium...

Stuyvesant - I've tried a couple of different approaches and this one just 'feels right'. Give me some feedback as we go.

And now, it's time to let the Doktor speak for himself.

 

[Director]

Return on Investment



“Thrift in the attainment of a goal is of primary importance. Expenditure of men and gold is as fatiguing to a state as hard labor is to a man. Therefore wage war only for great gain, and stop when you have won.”



The true purpose of ‘Gedanken auf Kriege’ has been long and hotly debated among scholars, most of whom have never read it in its entirety. Corbeau’s classic detailed study of the Baumann family (“Master Merchant of the Baltic”, Adrienne Corbeau, PhD, Geneva Presse) gives us for the first time a glimmer of an answer. Baumannn’s son, Johann, was reaching maturity in the last years of the Doktor’s life. It seems possible that the manuscript was intended as a textbook for a young man who was to succeed his father as master merchant and military chief. The pedantic, didactic tone that suffuses the book is explicable – even forgivable – if a young, impressionable mind is the intended reader. Much as Clausewitz’s ‘On War’ was intended for the education of later crown princes, ‘Gedanken auf Kriege’ was to educate and stimulate the young of this earlier age.

A great deal of space and effort is expended on the concept of ‘thrift’ in a military context. Bremen in its early days had a small population and, while wealthy in contrast to its neighbors, was desperately poor in comparison to the forming states in Austria, France and England or even the trading republics of Venice and Genoa. Hence the Doktor argues passionately that ‘investment’ – with its dual military meaning – must be made prudently, thriftily – and, above all, profitably.



Therefore, let us examine some events from the Doktor’s putative perspective, beginning with the converse.

A good example of the abandonment of the principle of thrift is the Omani War of 1636. The fleet was entirely unready, overseas forces were meager and bases were few. There was a general misapprehension of the scale of forces that would be required, especially so of transport capacity in the Far East. A number of Omani trading posts were occupied and after some hard fighting the colonies of Table and Kalimantan were taken. Destroyed Omani trading stations were replaced with Bremener posts and colonies in Borneo, Senegal and Sumatra.

But the fleet suffered greatly from the lack of naval stores and repair facilities in foreign waters, and Madurai - a key way-station on the route to the Indies - was taken. And when peace came, the fruits of victory (the Muslim colonies of Table and Kalimantan) proved difficult to govern, expensive to garrison and generally less profitable than German-settled colonies. Great expenditure in fortifications and governance was required, along with difficult and sensitive efforts by Protestant missionaries.

A confessed failure from a purely economic point of view, the Omani War has been touted as a success on the geopolitical stage. Those holding to this school of thought, notably Breen and Kuyper, believe that the increase in national size, power and prestige offset purely financial considerations. This view, that imperial stature required imperial conquest, fails of two obvious tests. Firstly, Bremen’s international reputation suffered immediate and long-lasting harm among her European neighbors, not improvement. Anger, envy and fear all contributed to the ending of the English Alliance, which loss significantly lightened Bremen’s diplomatic and military weight. At home the theft, graft, corruption and incompetence that the war revealed drove the Last Archbishop (Friedrich II, Prince of Denmark) from office in 1648 and led to the popular but less effective ‘Sprech Chor’ governments.



Bremen came very late to the colonial scene, Halle making his famous first voyage in 1587. Therefore only a toehold had been settled on the Atlantic coast of northern America in 1601, centered on fortified cities in Carolina and Roanoke. The declaration of war by France (and her ally Siena) in that year offered a golden opportunity to take an empire that another power had bought and paid for. An expeditionary force was assembled in Bremen and the entire Atlantic Fleet was committed to its convoy. They were easily able to take possession of unfortified French Mobile and Biloxi as well as the small colony of Bayou and the many French trading posts in the Mississippi River valley.

On the European front, France shared only a small common border with Bremen – the mountainous, heavily fortified zone of the Palatine. Diplomatically isolated, France proved unable to find a way around this bottleneck. The French infantry were committed in massive waves, and though they came closer than they knew, they were unable to drive Marshal von Braun’s covering army from the area. There is no direct evidence that Bremen gold paid for the revolt of Luxemburg in the French rear, but the reopening of this slender line of supply fully occupied the French for the remainder of that war.

The loss of the better part of her colonial empire, coupled with the disastrous assaults in the Palatine and domestic unrest in Luxemburg, drove France to the negotiating table. There the French offered up the bulk of their colonial holdings and 120g for a peace the Bremeners were delighted to sign. With Mobile, Biloxi and Bayou in hand, the stage was set for Bremen’s second great colonial expansion.

In subsequent wars with the French the trading posts of the Mississippi River valley served as a check-rein to her ambitions. Coupled with a strong defense of the Palatinate, occupation of these trading posts usually moved the French to seek a speedy exit from the war. “To allow one’s opponent to cover a weak spot is the height of folly,” says the Doktor. “Sensitive points should be exploited but not absolutely relied upon.”

For a decade, the grandees of Spanish Tejas observed that Catholics in the former French colonies were treated with deference and consideration – and were, in comparison to Spain’s colonies, only lightly taxed. Disgusted with the King of Spain’s long wars and ruinous exactions, half of northern Mechico defected to the Navaho in 1610 (including the gold mines of Jalisco) and in 1613 Rio Grande and Matagorda defected to Bremen. Thus a vast swath of the Caribbean coast, sans Florida and Savannah, was had for the cost of a single campaign and 12,000 men.



These lessons were consciously applied in the accession of Delaware province in 1624. England was in the midst of a protracted and indecisive war with the Indian tribes of northern America. Native war bands had raided throughout the English possessions, taking fortified communities along the Susquehanna River valley and overrunning the undefended Powhatan.
Delaware found itself pillaged by marauding war bands and foraging English soldiers alike. When Catholic James I came the throne, religious unrest was added to an already critical situation.

Even as Bremen worked tirelessly to improve its relations with the English court (the best way to capture James’ attention, his contemporaries agree, was with large quantities of gold), supply convoys were organized in Chesapeake province. Tons of salt cod, cheeses, fresh vegetables and venison, hogsheads of beer, cloth and household necessities, nails, tools and amenities of every description were loaded onto the brig Pfeil and shipped into Delaware port for free distribution.

The openhanded charity of their neighbors contrasted cruelly with the rapacious demands of the English army. The calm prosperity in Chesapeake’s Port Gropelingen (present-day Georgeburg) seemed an idyllic dream when compared to the blackened ruins of farmsteads and devastated crops the Delaware families saw all around themselves. And it seems certain that with all the free foodstuffs and supplies came friendly Bremeners who were all-too-willing to talk about their own happy lives.

In short, with some prompting from Bremener merchants who were resident there, the Delaware people voted in their town meetings to appeal to Bremen for protection. As Chancellor Thielman famously observed, ‘Delaware is bought for a schooner of beer.’



Possibly the best example of ‘thrift’ as Gropius meant it will be found in the example of the Great Danish War. Denmark declared war on the city-state of Hamburg in May of 1419 while Bremen was invading Hannover. Unaffected by the pitiful standing army in Holstein, the Danes occupied the countryside and besieged and took the city.

Diplomatically, this set off a storm of protest in Europe. Ever since their Viking days, the Danes had inspired fear and trembling on every coast of Europe. For them to simply dispose of another Christian nation might mean that they were reverting to their Viking ways. Every member of the Hanse pledged to fight for Hamburg, but being sorely pressed by the Brandenburg-Polish-Lithuanian invasion, none acted.

Before the protests could gel into something more solid (Martin V, newly elected sole Pope was in Switzerland and Germany and would not arrive in Rome for some time), the Danes left a garrison in Hamburg and shipped their army to Prussia. Only then did Bremen act.

Freed of the need to meet the Danes in battle, the Bremeners were able to take advantage of refugees from Hamburg and their knowledge of its fortifications. The city eventually capitulated, as did the various small towns in the Jutland peninsula. Bremen then concluded a separate peace, keeping Hamburg and the appearance of coming as a liberator. Only in later months and years would it dawn on the citizens of Holstein that they would never again be independent.

The sum total of casualties, according to Gropius, was a few hundred men – a triumph of thrift even by modern standards. One can only admire – if ruefully - the man who ensured that Bremen would possess her rival port of Hamburg while sticking the Danes with the blame. This same ploy of ‘Schmieren der Farbe’ (‘smearing the paint’, or smearing another with the blame for ones own sins) was often used by Bremen, too often to even attempt a list. Anyone with more than a passing knowledge of Bremener history will recognize the tactic.

 

[Valdemar]

Nasty trick you played there at thw end (or beginning actually ) but that will give Denmark CB on oyu rather than on Holstein wuldn't it?

V

 

[Commandante]

So Bremen is carving out a piece of the "New World" for itself? Interesting indeed!

As for the dry, academic tone in this tale: I love it!

Screenies?

 

[stnylan]

How would he he?

A strange mysterious Doktor that no one really knows where he comes from? Need there be another reason

Another very good passage.

I like the way you included later events with earlier ones. They fitted together very well. What I also like to where it appears like a broad knowledge of these events is already known like is the case in any history text. Very well done indeed

 

[Director]

Valdemar - I had to treat Denmark nasty early on - they were much more powerful and they would not leave the Hanse alone. It's not giving away anything to say that they've been a strong colonial nation and my firm ally since 1500-something. They own part of Sweden and most of the Caribbean.

The CB wouldn't matter - either they or Mecklenburg was going to restart the war anyway, as the next essay will explain. There were (I think) eight Danish wars, several Swedish and at least six Austrian and five or six French. No-one loves me.

Commandante - Bremen got a very late start in the colonial race. I didn't think I was ever going to get an explorer - but pretty quickly after the first explorer I got naval tech 17 which helped a lot with unveiling coastal provinces.

Most of my early colonial empire I picked up by war or secession. But I'm doing OK now (1670).

First screenshot will be in the next essay.

stnylan - you win. I like the fact that no-one knows anything about him except for this weird book. Make up your own biography - it's probably better than mine.

What I'm trying to do is group similar 'events' into essay topics, even if the essays aren't strictly in 'essay' form. Glad you're enjoying it - this is nice, light entertainment after sweating HistoryPark. That game nearly gave me a nervous breakdown.

 

[Commandante]

Originally posted by Director
There were (I think) eight Danish wars, several Swedish and at least six Austrian and five or six French. No-one loves me.

Ouch! It must have been tense to guide Bremen through that barrage!

They own part of Sweden and most of the Caribbean.

Denmark owning most of the Caribbean? I'm impressed!

 

[Syt]

Originally posted by Director
Only in later months and years would it dawn on the citizens of Holstein that they would never again be independent.

NOOOOOOOOO!!!!!!!



Another credible installment of fictionous factual writing of alternate history.

Two very minor quibbles, however:

- "Bremener": I assume you wished to avoid "Bremenish" (as corresponding to "England" - "English"). "Bremer" would have been more correct in that case.
- "Gedanken auf Kriege": I take it you were translating "Thoughts on Wars"? "on" in that meaning would best be translated as "über" -> "Gedanken über Kriege".


However, these two indeed very much neglectable flaws do not distract at all from the joy that reading your AARs is.

 

[Director]

Commandante - Golly, gee - there IS an advantage to being completely decentralized. In the early years Bremen had the nervous system of a jellyfish, which helps with long, drawn-out wars. I made lots of money on war taxes and peace settlements (1400g in one year).

And I conquered a lot of territory quickly, as we will see in the next essay. I get so nervous without a lot of provinces around me. And you don't want me to get nervous...

Sytass - That's what I get for using an automated translation. What I had in mind was more like 'Thinking of/on War' or 'Thought Experiments on War'. I should have asked you or Sorcerer. Unfortunately, I didn't and now I suppose I'm stuck with the title. Sorry. How bad is it? If you think it proper, I'll edit the existing posts to some other title.

Yes, Bremener was an attempt at a possessive that didn't sound too strange. My first choice was 'Bremeni'. At least I didn't try Bremse or Brummer... I'll use Bremer from here on out. Should I edit the existing posts?

No territory ever secedes from Bremen - although Heaven knows Holstein tried. Repeatedly. The record for revolts has to go to Brandenburg, however. They also whipped my armies time after time... after time... after time... (*sigh*).

 

[Commandante]

Originally posted by Director
The record for revolts has to go to Brandenburg, however. They also whipped my armies time after time... after time... after time... (*sigh*).

That's my Berliner boys!

Ah, being decentralised lessened WE, right? Imagine I've had this game for almost a year and I still don't know the sliders by heart...

 

[Syt]

Director, don't worry. Those nitpicks are not too large, and you could sell them as further particularities of Johann.

 

[Stuyvesant]

What can I say that hasn't been said already? The style is perfect and the way the essays take for granted that people already know about the history of Bremen gives it a very 'authentic' feel.

More! More! More!

 

[Director]

The Great Race – Bremen versus Lubeck


Part One

The medieval Hanseatic League of Baltic trading cities never officially ceased to exist. Instead, the ports, products and markets were all consolidated as the city-states combined to create states. But how and why did this combination occur in Germany, and why was Bremen the focus?

Bremen, of course, was the ultimate winner, and if the Hanseatic League were to meet today a clear majority of the voters would be citizens of Greater Bremen. But merely because history did take this path does not mean that it was inevitably so. Other cities possessed commercial, military or political powers to rival Bremen, and had events taken a slightly different path Germany might well have coalesced around any of twenty candidates… or not at all. We will here consider the respective claims to primacy of Brandenburg, Lubeck and Bremen.

Before we look at the effects, however, let us consider the starting conditions. Of the three contenders in 1419, Brandenburg controlled the most territory (Brandenburg and Kustrin with Magdeburg as a vassal) and possessed a large, powerful army. Lubeck (Mecklenburg) controlled the great bourse of the Hanse and wielded great political power in that body, which met in Lubeck. Bremen had some trading wealth and a reformed (if untested) army.

So begins the race for power. In 1419, Bremen opened war on Hannover. While that campaign was in progress, the Great Danish War erupted, pitting the Danes, Norse and Swedes against Holstein, Mecklenburg, Bremen, Pommern, Prussia and the Teutonic Order. One month later, in June, Brandenburg attempted to profit from the situation by attacking the Hanseatic League from the south. Allied with Poland and Lithuania, Brandenburg invaded Pommern as the Danes rolled into Holstein.

Far to the west of the main action, Bremen was left undisturbed. Hannover was besieged and annexed by Bremen in February of 1420, Holstein was similarly annexed by Denmark in May of 1420 and Bremen rapidly marched its mounted force to Hamburg (Holstein) in the summer of 1420. Even with their primary forces engaged elsewhere the Danes continually strove to break the siege and Hamburg did not fall to Bremen until October of 1421.

In the meantime, Pommern had paid off the Poles and Lithuanians and ceded western (Vor) Pommern to Norway. A massive payment of Danegeld (148g) left Pommern at peace but halved in territory, broke and hopelessly in debt. Beset from all sides, the nobility of Pommern bowed to the inevitable and were absorbed into Brandenburg.



Bremen now secured her southern and western flanks with a series of shrewd marriages with nobles and merchants in Oldenburg, Munster, Hesse and Saxony. In spite of the aggressive war against Hannover, most of the anxiety of the other north Germany states was directed at the powerful Danish and Brandenburg alliances rather than at Bremen.

Between these two millstones, how then did Bremen survive?

Firstly because of location. Far on the west of the main theater, Bremen was shielded from the great powers by the small states of Magdeburg and Mecklenburg. Once the Polish and Danish armies were committed to Prussia and the lands of the Teutonic Order, they could not easily be pulled back to deal with threats in other areas.

Secondly, Bremen survived because of the formidable power of the Teutonic Knights, who kept the enemy at bay – and in part because she was too small and weak to make a decent target.



As the Doktor observed, “From a central position a force may strike at each enemy in turn, so long as the force possesses rapidity of movement and the ability to disengage at need.”

“Forces engaged on campaign are as lost as if they had died to a man, until such time as they again are disengaged. In weighing the balance-scales of war, only uncommitted reserves count. That is why even a tiny reserve force may upset the plans of a superior enemy; that is why victors kept reserves and the conquered did not.”

“The movement of separate forces upon a single objective is very difficult. If the forces are of different nationalities, or if their commanders are less than perfectly harmonious, coordination becomes all but impossible.”



Immediately upon the ‘rescue’ of Hamburg from the Danes, Bremener troops advanced onto the Jylland (Jutland) peninsula and laid siege to the various towns. By the summer of 1422, the peninsula was fully under Bremen control. After diverting south to smash a Danish raiding party in Holstein, the army again moved north and was able to cross into Sjelland. Immediately, the Danes conceded Holstein to Bremen and swore peace.

Bremen, still at war with Norway and Sweden in addition to the Brandenburg-Lithuania-Poland alliance, then moved her army into Norwegian-held VorPommern. Despite peasant rebellions in Hannover and VorPommern itself, Bremen stubbornly kept up the long and costly campaign. In the spring of 1424 the port of Stralsund finally capitulated, the winter ice having sealed the port and left the garrison starving.

One peace embassy to Brandenburg having been rebuffed, the Bremen council decided they must give their enemies more cause to desire peace. Thus, in the spring of 1424, the Army of Bremen – now hardened and experienced by five years of war – advanced along the broad highway of the River Elbe to Brandenburg.

As the war ground into a sixth year, the situation was as follows: the Mecklenburgers mostly sat at home, defended by their immense infantry levy. Prussia and the Teutonic Order were over-run by the armies of Poland and Lithuania, but their powerful fortresses continued to hold out. Brandenburg’s men operated from Kustrin and Hinter (eastern) Pommern, attempting repeatedly and unsuccessfully to break the siege of their capital.

And in Hannover, local nobles declared their allegiance to Bremen was broken, and they carried the garrison with them into rebellion.



The situation now approached a crisis. Bremen had been striving for years to simultaneously expand her territory and her share of the Hanseatic trade. Taxes were high, manpower depleted, and the war was becoming increasingly unpopular. Despite the vast sums expended, little actual increase in trade had occurred. Ferocious competition in the Hanse led to high expenses and nonexistent profits. Fortunately, Brandenburg fell in February of 1425, and this put a gloss of triumph on what was becoming an increasingly desperate struggle: Holstein lost to rebels, Bremen’a army drawn further east to Kustrin and Brandenburg’s troops fighting in Brandenburg and Kustrin.

The beginning of the end can be found in the events of early spring of 1426. First, Norway offered 200g for peace. This meant giving VorPommern back to the Norse, but as it was awash in rebels that seemed no loss. Secondly, a series of trials for treason convicted numerous prominent men of Hamburg and Hannover. Their estates and assets were seized and declared a gift to the state, amounting to another 200g. Lastly, the province of Kustrin was secured and Bremen’s army moved on into Hinter Pommern, the last Brandenburg possession.

In January of 1427, envoys from Brandenburg arrived in Bremen offering Kustrin and HinterPommern for peace, plus a staggering indemnity of 825g. With Holstein wracked by unrest and Hannover still in rebel hands, this peace may have prevented the destruction of Bremen; it certainly paid for much of her future activities. The peace also eliminated Brandenburg as a power in Germany, their absorption into Bremen coming in 1468 during another war with Bremen in which they found themselves on the wrong side.



In 1438 the real contest for primacy in the Hanseatic League began to take shape: Mecklenburg stripped Nyland, Vastergotland and Smaland from Sweden, and in 1440 assumed control of Skane when it seceded from Denmark. Thus we can see that Lubeck, spurred by a rapidly expanding Bremen, acquired an empire of her own – of equal size if lesser population and productivity.



It is perhaps stretching an analogy beyond use to conclude that the Bremen-Lubeck rivalry was merely, as DuPont would have it, Rome and Carthage writ upon a later, northern stage. Yet there are some useful points of congruence and it may assist the reader for me to expand on this theme.

Lubeck (Mecklenburg) possessed some Carthaginian virtues. Her army was powerful, if old-style infantry, and it had a limited manpower base. The army’s limited logistical support was obviated by Mecklenburg’s control of the broad watery Baltic. She was supported through political alliances in which she was the senior partner, and she was rich through control of the Baltic trade. Her empire was haphazard, scattered around the Baltic without any overall strategic plan except usefulness as ports and trading stations.

Bremen, considered as Rome, had a newer-style army of superior power but lower absolute strength paid for with looted gold and supported by a relatively deep manpower pool. Her logistical support, particularly up the waters of the Weser and the Elbe, was more advanced than the other German states. She struggled for credibility as a trading power partly because so many of her best men were in the army, but largely because of the jealousy and mistrust of the other Hanse ports. Every expansion of Bremen’s territory had one common theme: the encirclement of Lubeck.

If Carthage lost the Second Punic War when Rome landed in Africa, then we must consider that Bremen and Lubeck were always on the same shore, and not so very far apart. In contrast to the enormous carnage and destruction of those wars of antiquity, the two Baltic states remained ostensible friends and allies until the end.

 

[Judge]

Nice update, your reference to the struggle between Carthage and Rome was wonderful

 

[Director]

The Great Race - Part Two



During this period we can see an ongoing reluctance on the part of the other members of the Hanse to allow Bremen to gain any share of the Baltic trade. The preferred weapon of Hanseatic power – trade blockade – could not be openly employed against Bremen for two reasons. First, Bremen always loyally supported the Hanse in war and peace, and secondly Bremen’s lands almost surrounded Lubeck. Had it come to war between the two Hanseatic powers it is by no means certain Mecklenburg would have emerged victorious.

So Lubeck launched a bitter if covert trade war. Every trick and shady practice was employed to steal cargoes from Bremen merchants from rumors to price-cutting and sabotage. The other Hanse members did not take an active part but merely protected Lubeck in council when her actions grew excessive. Such a house divided, with fear on one side and jealous envy on the other, could not long survive. Such a house, its residents might well conclude, was not worth keeping.



A border dispute with Magdeburg led to a long and bitter war that Bremen eventually won in 1442. Mecklenburg then dragged the Hanse into the Second Danish War and Bremen opened that campaign on the Jutland peninsula. Rebels having driven Brandenburg out of Danish VorPommern (Denmark having annexed Norway), Bremen moved an army into that province also – the last step in the encirclement of Mecklenburg.

Gelder at this point pulled the Hanse into a war with Burgundy and England. Considering carefully whether the Hanse was more dangerous as a friend or a foe, Bremen supported the alliance – although with great misgivings.

The next three years saw Bremen suffer revolts, invasions, devastation of her trade and great loss of life and treasure. Militarily, Bremen managed to hold her own in the west and to conquer Jylland, Sjelland and Vorpommern in the north and east. With the cession of VorPommern and peace with Denmark, the tide entirely turned. The English in Holstein were smashed, the Burgundians driven from Munster and pursued across the Rhine to Flanders. The fall of that latter province brought the war to a close for Bremen in 1446: to secure the return of Flanders the Burgundians paid an indemnity of 275g.



The struggle for control of the Hanse raged on. Mecklenburg retained control of the bourse – the trading center of the Hanse – and political control of the alliance, while struggling to grow in physical size and power. In mirror image, Bremen grew in physical size and power while jockeying for political and financial control of the Hanse. One may fairly say that in this period Bremen used her army to gain land and wealth, which was invested in trade, while Mecklenburg used wealth from trade to acquire land.



The Hanse was almost continually at war in these years, wars either initiated by or directed at Mecklenburg. Bremen participated in these wars but was always denied any fruits of her efforts. For example, in 1457 the provinces of Jutland and Sjelland were handed back to the Danes when Mecklenburg made peace for a paltry 33g. This sum, when divided among the six or seven members of the Hanse military alliance, so enraged the Bremen council that they had it cast into a golden chalice, filled it with thirty silver coins and sent it back as a Christmas gift.

Another example is from the Bohemian War of 1464. Attacked by that kingdom, Bremen was campaigning in Silesia and Erz when Sweden brought on another war with the Hanse (1465). Despite Bremen’s pleas to the Hanse for assistance, the Hessians were allowed to annex Bremen’s protectorate of Munich in 1466. Bremen received Erz from Bohemia in that same year, annexed Brandenburg in 1468 and took Anhalt from Saxony in 1470. This rapid string of victories increased the anxieties of the other members of the Hanse while doing nothing to lessen Bremen’s feelings of persecution and resentment over Munster. For, with Bremen’s armies finally on the verge of taking Hesse and Munster, Mecklenburg brokered a peace deal with Hesse that gave Bremen 30g instead.



Although Doktor Gropius had long since passed away, there is no doubt that men in Bremen were studying his work with great care. For did the Doktor not write, “Friendships between nations are the actions of peers. As the ratio of power changes, so friendship must change to dependence or mastery.”

The meeting of the Hanseatic Council in the summer of 1470 would have seemed no tenser than any other of the last five years. Many smaller members, fearing strife and turmoil, had sent proxies or opted out entirely. Everyone knew the central issues – the waxing power of Bremen and the hobbling of their trade – could no longer be ignored. Nor, unfortunately, could it be dealt with through the political machinery of the Hanse – the merchants’ league was simply not a central government and did not have the ability to become one.

Forewarned by Gropius that, “The necessities of a political campaign are identical with those of a military operation. Intelligence, logistics, manpower, funds and secrecy all have their place, as does the genius of a leader who may recognize a decisive moment.” The object of this political campaign was simple: one power would remain in the Hanse. The methods adopted and their outcomes are most instructive.

Meckenburg’s men contented themselves with meeting prominent members of the other delegations and holding out promises of concessions and payments. The delegates of Visby and Novgorod were particularly courted.

The Bremeners advanced a more subtle argument, arguing that the bourse should be completely independent and not subject to the whims of any one power, not Bremen or Lubeck or even Visby, Novgorod or Flanders. They also gave assurances of concessions and gold but added the promise of effective military support. And they conceded Visby and Novgorod to the other camp and concentrated on courting the delegates from the Steelyard in England and all of the smaller delegations.

Throughout the spring of 1470, the merchants of Mecklenburg found themselves on the receiving end of their own dirty tricks. Contracts they had pursued were snapped up by Bremen on terms that guaranteed a loss, commanders of trading stations were found dead in their beds, warehouses burned. Vast quantities of amber, salt, iron and furs were purchased and sold only to friendly or independent traders – those from Lubeck and their friends paid ruinous prices or sailed empty. Debts – even debt papers held by the Church – were bought up and billed for immediate payment. Finally, a fully-laden cog sank in Lubeck’s shipping channel, not overly deep or wide in any case, and as soon as it was raised another promptly sank in the same spot. The effective closure of the port, on top of the other pressures, was decisive: promised bribes could not be paid.

Heinrich II, Count Schwarzburg, Archbishop and Bishop of Bremen, accepted himself – as Bishop of Lubeck – as vassal. Shortly after, the Hanse voted to confine itself strictly to commercial and industrial affairs. This is usually accepted as the end of the Hanseatic League as an independent, multinational body.



Lubeck had lost, Bremen was triumphant, the Hanse was dead. The generations-later plebiscite that would fully incorporate Mecklinburg’s provinces into Greater Bremen was nothing short of anti-climax.

[COLOR=FF0000]The Race to Power[/COLOR]



If I may quote once again from the Doktor, “Gold will not always purchase good soldiers. Good soldiers, however, can usually provide you with gold.”