PlacidDragon said:
Yup, that is correct. Its called deception, hehe. Army Group B launched a feint attack, and the French / British fell for it, and charged in.
*cough* competely successful ? The Germans controlled the field after the battle of Hannut, subsequently managing to repair a number of the tanks that had been knocked out, as well as capture a number of French vehicles.
No. It was not a feint. A feint means implies fake. There was nothing about the attempt by Hoepner's troops to cross the Meuse that was fake. Crossing the Meuse and breaking out of the bridgehead there was an important military objective all on its own, which the Germans pursued agressively, as part of their plan to squeeze the Allies and knock the Belgian army out of the war. It was, if anything, in the grand scale of things a pinning action.
This does not mean that the Germans pretended to attack, and does not mean that the fighting was not real and intense. Hoepner's orders were to make a bridgehead, and advance, while the French orders were to hold Hannut,
for two days. That is what they did -- it was not one of Hitler's ridiculous stand firm orders. Success is measure on how well one carries out ones mission: The French Cavalry succeeded in their mission and then withdrew as according to their plan.
But that is really irrelevant to the whole issue at hand, because, even if it was a feint, as part of a larger operation to fool the French and English into making bad choices, that has nothing to do with doctrine. Generals have been trying to fool each other, and disguise their intentions, since the dawn of war, and that has nothing to do with "Blitzkreig" as a doctrine.
Gamelin was an old man, completely inflexible, and so steeped in WW1 tactics that he for the life of him probably couldnt comprehend what mobile warfare meant.
You have no evidence to support this assessement. I have outlined specific things that Gemelin did that entirely fit within a concept of mobile warfare, using the French Cavalry Army to stem the advance of the German attack in Belgium, in order to delay the attack in order to set up proper defenses is one, ordering an immediate counter attack from the North against the flank of German attack in the Ardennes is another.
Try not to forget that the assements of contemporaries such William Shrirer, are highly influenced by politics, and that he was first and foremost a journalist trying to sell popular books, while anything said by the British, especially Winston Churchill are also highly political statements intended to argue a case that reflects well on the British army that he led during the war.
This is not to say that Gamelin was a superior commander, and indeed I have quite clearly outlined his mistakes in all of my posts, but to say that he was not particularly hindbound or stuck in a WW I framework is very hard to support, as can be seen by his actions on the field. He obviously believed in the value of rapid manouver, provided by mechanized divisions, as opposed to static warfare, otherwise he would not have immediatly dispatched the French armour to the front, as he did. There was a lot of blame to go around, and Gamelin is a particularly easy target for a number of reasons.
As Stephen T points out the problems were to do with the lack of co-ordination, and the British attack at Arras would more rightly considered a probing action, one which almost defeated Rommel, and had this attack been part of a larger assault carried out with French support, and hypothetically speaking had not the Allied command misintepretted the German actions, and had the First French Cavalry been on hand, then I dare say the attack on Rommel at Arras would have been succesful.
StephenT said:
Considering that the British Expeditionary Force was only 10% of the size of the French army - and even the Belgian Army was twice the size of the British - I'm not sure how many divisions Gamelin expected Gort to produce...

But anyway, this is incorrect. The British did launch an attack on the German spearhead attempting to cut it off, at Arras on 21 May; it was defeated, just as the French attempt four days earlier had been. (And yes, the failure to coordinate the two attacks was a major failure of Allied command.)
But not 10% of the forces in the operational theater.

It is quite obvious that Gamelin and Gort were not on speaking terms, and this is at least part of the reason that Gort refused to provide even a single division from his front to attack to the south. Even Ironside went to Belgium to try and convince Gort to attack with the French to the south. And he refused. It is pretty clear that Gort was committed to running away as soon as the actual German intentions were revealed.
Regardless, Gort had no problem trying to run his divisions away, in an effort to save them. I find Gort's explanation uncovincing -- Either they were needed on his front, or not. This action doomed not only the BEF, but also the Belgian army, and the French army by ripping out the center of the Allied line.
In short, it looks like Gort panicked.
Technically speaking the pocket the German created by encircling the BEF and allies in Belgium was a huge beechead, and hardly one that was not defensible on its own. Belgium is indeed a country and one that was almost certainly easy for the British to resupply with the support of the Royal navy. The Germans would have been stuck with a very difficult decision based on continuing the attack into France, and leaving this potentially dangerous army intact or reducing it by siege. Reducing it would probably have taken a great deal of time, and time bought in this way might have done a lot to change the fortunes of the French in the war.
A situation not unlike the one the Russians faced in 1944/45 with the Courland pocket. It survived until the war was officially ended. The Russians, having plenty of men, simply surrounded it and bypassed it, but this might not have been feasible for the Germans to do in 1940.