No more unqualified than Soviets throwing rifles after the fall of Moscow.
Your point? I never said anything like that.
Dunno what do you mean here.
Unconditional surrender is unnecessary. It was extremely unlikely that the Germans could have accomplished that anyways (I'm loathe to say "impossible" because who knows what
could have happened?). I'm kind of waiting for Secret Master to swoop down and ask "what does a defeated Soviet Union and victorious Germany look like?" Basically my point is that you're not wrong in saying that it was near impossible for the Soviets to surrender unconditionally, but as far as a peace settlement that favors Germany goes there's plenty within the realm of possibility, and even probability in certain scenarios.
...it is clear that Moscow could by bypassed by quite some extent. Even supplies from Archangelsk could be send around. Now, even though Germans did not take Moscow, their armies were standing on top of direct Moscow-Stalingrad line. Did it help?
Ah, but you're ignoring the capacity the rail lines could take. The best lines were through Moscow, as you could see from the map. If you can only have trains running one direction on the tracks at a time compared to two or three going different directions, it's a whole different ball game when it comes to supply. The Soviets were already strained as far as rail capacity went, and compromising the Moscow hub would be crippling if not fatal to defensive efforts where they stood at the end of Barbarossa and especially Fall Blau.
As for Stalingrad it most certainly
did help, it just wasn't decisive. It seems like you're not finding the middle ground here, something doesn't have to be decisive to help victory, and in fact I would argue that what usually is decisive is just the culmination of things helpful to victory, it's just the "straw that breaks the camel's back."
Indeed they were dry but in much better shape than Germans. If opponent has way bigger reserves than you it is clear you are ad disadvantage, that's why Germans tried to win as fast as possible, to exploit their initial success.
Yes and no. You're certainly correct about the manpower point but remember that the Soviets hemorrhaged manpower much faster than the Germans until they got their act together tactically in 1943. This was compounded by the Germans having their equipment decimated. A Panzer division missing half its panzers is going to lose men
a lot faster than a Panzer division with 75% of its panzers.
As for why the Germans tried to win as fast as possible, that's a large combination of factors. Politically, Hitler and high command were pushing as hard as they could to accomplish Barbarossa's objectives, Guderian was reckless, Hitler was obsessed with capturing Stalingrad, etc. More prudent generals who would have stopped along the Don-Smolensk-Leningrad line would have seen a much stronger Germany kicking off 1942. Winter attrition would be much less because the Germans could ship winter gear instead of ammunition for Typhoon. They could dig in so defensively they would be much more effective. They wouldn't lose massive amounts of equipment in reckless drives towards Moscow followed by disorganized retreat. Their officer corps, particularly the NCO corps, would remain intact. Given how well the Germans did during the first bit of 1942 this would just compound that success. Perhaps the effort devoted to Typhoon would be diverted to Leningrad? Either way it doesn't just come down to manpower, it's more how you use that manpower. The Germans were much, much better at using their manpower early on.
Or Soviets would get their wits back much sooner and regain initiative or be better prepared and thus resistance Germans encountered even harsher. As I mentioned they were exploiting their success, there is no clear are good answer here, just life.
But they didn't in reality. What did the Germans realistically gain by pushing past Smolensk? What did the Soviets lose? It seems to me that a disorganized, depleted Soviet Army with poor tactical and operational knowledge (at the time) with political powers driving them to counterattack against a prepared and well-supplied German line in the mud and later the infamous winter would leave the Germans with even
more of an advantage. Certainly if the Soviets held back and didn't do anything they could recover but they'd still be facing a much stronger and well-positioned adversary.
