kosovo ? maybe
Gulf War ? well that was not a victory...
but yeah, air poer alone alone doesn't work.. I'll give douhet a 6 though...
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kosovo ? maybe
Gulf War ? well that was not a victory...
but yeah, air poer alone alone doesn't work.. I'll give douhet a 6 though...
Kosovo was hardly a stirring example of the use of airpower. It was just the last straw after years of economic sanctions. Slobodan's support was already cracking pre-bombardment, one of the reasons why he was being so hard-line in Kosovo.
Still, two possible examples seventy years after Douhet convinced the world it was inevitable isn't that good a track record.
you've got a point, but of course my note is more on theorics than pratics.. in theory it was a great idea.. not to win wars erhaps, but to make current (at the time) arms obsolete like fortifications or battleships.
IIRC Either a Battalion or a Division of German troops in Southern France surrendered without an infantry attack, in the face of bombing by allied attack planes.
I can't remember where I read it, maybe someone else has heard of this?
Airpower should be divided into strategic and tactical. Strategic air alone cannot win wars - in Vietnam, the USAF dropped 3x the tonnage used in WW2 - but in protracted wars it is very useful in disrupting and destroying enemy industry. Tac air is a prerequisite for modern battles, but obviously can't win wars on its own.
During WW2, I guess such battles like BoB, air war over the Reich, naval air in the Pacific, were critical in determining the war's outcome. In that sense, they should get partial credit for being war-winners. IIRC, a strong force of German fighter-bombers and Stukas busted up a Soviet tank corps during Kursk without help from ground troops.
During WW2, I guess such battles like BoB, air war over the Reich, naval air in the Pacific, were critical in determining the war's outcome. In that sense, they should get partial credit for being war-winners. IIRC, a strong force of German fighter-bombers and Stukas busted up a Soviet tank corps during Kursk without help from ground troops.
Re: To Piero
Well, that's not entirely true. As previously somebody mentioned here, he was the commander of the White Army a.k.a the troops of the Finnish Senate during the Civil War of 1918. Shortly after the war, he resigned from the public life and didn't have pretty much doing with the Finnish military until 1931, when he was appointed as the chairman of the Defence Council. And naturally that wasn't part of the army. Not until the outbreak of the Winter War he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces. Thus he barely affected to the development of the Finnish tactics and operational art. It was the jägers of the Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion 27 who actually developed the typical Finnish tactics during the early years of independence. "The Old Army officers" and those who had served in the Imperial Russian Army, like Mannerheim and Nenonen. These two generals were pretty much the only "Russian" officers, who were accepted by the jäger officers. Mannerheim was the some sort of leader figure, and General Nenonen developed the Finnish field artillery tactics and firing methods. Most of the other old officers had to leave the army and their tasks where filled by the relatively young jäger officers.
The victories in the eastern border were achieved because of the frontline commanders and the soldiers, not because of Mannerheim.
He was the commander-in-chief, his duty was to look after whole war, so I don't think he had much time to give detailed orders to frontline commanders what they should do next. Besides, the Finns naturally made operational plans before the war and Mannerheim didn't have (to my best knowledge) anything to do with them either.
So giving 10 to Mannerheim because of the success of the Finns in the motti warfare is, in my opinion, rather odd.
Yeees... but the motti tactics had it's shortcomings and wasn't so gigantic success as someone might think. If the Finnish army had received more fundings before the war, it's possible that the motti tactics wouldn't have existed in such form as the did. After all, even if the Russians were surrounded, they fought tenaciously, starving but fighting. And those motties had usually a good firepower in form of tanks and artillery pieces, which Finns didn't have. And even if they had artillery, they were most often too light (caliber 75-76mm) to have an effect against entreched enemy and they didn't have much munitons. This in turn lead to way too heavy Finnish casualties and was a slow progress.
And by the way, the victory in Tolvajärvi is a bad example about motti tactics. The reckless Colonel Paavo Talvela can be called as the victor of that battle, but he did it with some bloody frontal assaults, envelope attacks didn't have such large key role as in other battles in the eastern frontier.
Savage? Well, I don't have heard, that many Finnish war veterans would have called the Russians as savage...
The proportions were much less than 1 to 10. At the start of the war, it was something like 1 to 1.5 in favor of Russians. In numbers of artillery it was less favorable to Finns, and in numbers of air planes, tanks and artillery rounds it was worst.
At the end of the war Russians probably had superioty of 1:3 in manpower and even higher in other factors. So truly speaking, the situation was desperate for the Finns and would have shortly become hopeless, if it wasn't already. At least in the main theater, in the Karelian Isthmus, where you couldn't make much use of motti tactics.
IMHO, you can't really say Frenchmen were worse than Finns, because they lost. The situations were quite different.
Hmmm, hopefully someone understands what I'm saying...
Well, that's not entirely true. As previously somebody mentioned here, he was the commander of the White Army a.k.a the troops of the Finnish Senate during the Civil War of 1918. Shortly after the war, he resigned from the public life and didn't have pretty much doing with the Finnish military until 1931, when he was appointed as the chairman of the Defence Council. And naturally that wasn't part of the army. Not until the outbreak of the Winter War he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces. Thus he barely affected to the development of the Finnish tactics and operational art. It was the jägers of the Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion 27 who actually developed the typical Finnish tactics during the early years of independence. "The Old Army officers" and those who had served in the Imperial Russian Army, like Mannerheim and Nenonen. These two generals were pretty much the only "Russian" officers, who were accepted by the jäger officers. Mannerheim was the some sort of leader figure, and General Nenonen developed the Finnish field artillery tactics and firing methods. Most of the other old officers had to leave the army and their tasks where filled by the relatively young jäger officers.
The victories in the eastern border were achieved because of the frontline commanders and the soldiers, not because of Mannerheim.
He was the commander-in-chief, his duty was to look after whole war, so I don't think he had much time to give detailed orders to frontline commanders what they should do next. Besides, the Finns naturally made operational plans before the war and Mannerheim didn't have (to my best knowledge) anything to do with them either.
So giving 10 to Mannerheim because of the success of the Finns in the motti warfare is, in my opinion, rather odd.
Yeees... but the motti tactics had it's shortcomings and wasn't so gigantic success as someone might think. If the Finnish army had received more fundings before the war, it's possible that the motti tactics wouldn't have existed in such form as the did. After all, even if the Russians were surrounded, they fought tenaciously, starving but fighting. And those motties had usually a good firepower in form of tanks and artillery pieces, which Finns didn't have. And even if they had artillery, they were most often too light (caliber 75-76mm) to have an effect against entreched enemy and they didn't have much munitons. This in turn lead to way too heavy Finnish casualties and was a slow progress.
And by the way, the victory in Tolvajärvi is a bad example about motti tactics. The reckless Colonel Paavo Talvela can be called as the victor of that battle, but he did it with some bloody frontal assaults, envelope attacks didn't have such large key role as in other battles in the eastern frontier.
Savage? Well, I don't have heard, that many Finnish war veterans would have called the Russians as savage...
The proportions were much less than 1 to 10. At the start of the war, it was something like 1 to 1.5 in favor of Russians. In numbers of artillery it was less favorable to Finns, and in numbers of air planes, tanks and artillery rounds it was worst.
At the end of the war Russians probably had superioty of 1:3 in manpower and even higher in other factors. So truly speaking, the situation was desperate for the Finns and would have shortly become hopeless, if it wasn't already. At least in the main theater, in the Karelian Isthmus, where you couldn't make much use of motti tactics.
IMHO, you can't really say Frenchmen were worse than Finns, because they lost. The situations were quite different.
Hmmm, hopefully someone understands what I'm saying...
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I'll add my voice to Sean's-unless its' been mentioned in passing the event's new to me. HB, where are you?
One wonders if this was during the landings in southern France, or after the link-up between the two invasion forces (which left a German corps wandering around south-western France desperately looking for someone to surrender to!
)
Originally posted by Agelastus
I'll add my voice to Sean's-unless its' been mentioned in passing the event's new to me. HB, where are you?
HB is truly our trusty "fire brigade" armored cav unit.
Force structures no longer have the strategic/tactical prefix, a theatre commander has call on all assets and uses them acording to his need. If he wants the B52 to act as direct support for a ground mission that is his call. I think i posted the relevant document in the "slaughterhouse 5" strategic bombing debate some time back.
As to air power, Kursk saw the first distruction of a Sov armoured corps from the air, the attack was stooped cold solely by air power. Not quite so effective, as it also involved ground action is the crushing of the Mortain counter in Normandy(47 Pzr Corps), but the armour was severly hammerd from the air, Hill 112 near Caen was a pivotal battle between Uk and german forces, at one point the hill was taken by Uk armoured forces, allied air assets were called in and in the poor visability wrought havoc on their own AFVs that allowed a counter attack to reclaim the tacticly important hill. There are 00s of such examples, but we need to relise that combined arms was the order of the day, for battlefield use, no one expected the airforce to win it on their own, unless your talking about naval actions. SB on the other hand offerd the hope of winning the war without major loss of life for the side that protected its lands from the enemys bombers.
The south of france one. i think Seans on about when Patton whipped out into southern france and caught some divs before they manouverd out of harms way, would have to look it up, i rember the 11 panzer fought an excellent withdrawl, or he might mean the Marseilles garrison that was caught in place by dragoon.
Hanny
As to air power, Kursk saw the first distruction of a Sov armoured corps from the air, the attack was stooped cold solely by air power. Not quite so effective, as it also involved ground action is the crushing of the Mortain counter in Normandy(47 Pzr Corps), but the armour was severly hammerd from the air, Hill 112 near Caen was a pivotal battle between Uk and german forces, at one point the hill was taken by Uk armoured forces, allied air assets were called in and in the poor visability wrought havoc on their own AFVs that allowed a counter attack to reclaim the tacticly important hill. There are 00s of such examples, but we need to relise that combined arms was the order of the day, for battlefield use, no one expected the airforce to win it on their own, unless your talking about naval actions. SB on the other hand offerd the hope of winning the war without major loss of life for the side that protected its lands from the enemys bombers.
The south of france one. i think Seans on about when Patton whipped out into southern france and caught some divs before they manouverd out of harms way, would have to look it up, i rember the 11 panzer fought an excellent withdrawl, or he might mean the Marseilles garrison that was caught in place by dragoon.
Hanny
Found something
http://www.p47pilots.com/guestbook.html
"John R. Willingham Passed away May 16, 2000 from a heart attack caused by complications from diabetes. Willingham was a veteran of 101 P-47 missions in Europe during 1944-45. He was in the 511th F.S. 405th Gp. He was known as the "Aerial Cowboy" a name given him when some three hundred Germans surrendered to his flight (to avoid annihilation). Willingham herded the reluctant Germans to Allied lines with hand signals as the flight flew menacingly above them. He didn't make the May 7th Reunion in Savannah but was there in spirit"
Not quite a division, perhaps the remnants of a Battalion. Now all that remains is to find out where.
http://www.p47pilots.com/guestbook.html
"John R. Willingham Passed away May 16, 2000 from a heart attack caused by complications from diabetes. Willingham was a veteran of 101 P-47 missions in Europe during 1944-45. He was in the 511th F.S. 405th Gp. He was known as the "Aerial Cowboy" a name given him when some three hundred Germans surrendered to his flight (to avoid annihilation). Willingham herded the reluctant Germans to Allied lines with hand signals as the flight flew menacingly above them. He didn't make the May 7th Reunion in Savannah but was there in spirit"
Not quite a division, perhaps the remnants of a Battalion. Now all that remains is to find out where.
RE: Atlantic Wall.
It must be remembered that Rommel had to play with the resources given him - or rather not given him. A fair number of divisions did not have, and apparently could not get proper transport. The only thing useful that could be done with such troops is to stick them in static defensive positions, and build those positions up as much as possible.
It should also be noted that the Atlantic Wall was incomplete in Normandy - though one wonders if it could ever have been 'complete'. Still if Rommel had been able to spend more time on the defences, the Allied invasion would have run into more trouble, eh?
The idea of hardpoints on the beaches, in my opinion, is not to stop the invasion directly, but to channel the invasion into managable zones - areas that could be quickly neutralized by agressive counterattack.
michael
It must be remembered that Rommel had to play with the resources given him - or rather not given him. A fair number of divisions did not have, and apparently could not get proper transport. The only thing useful that could be done with such troops is to stick them in static defensive positions, and build those positions up as much as possible.
It should also be noted that the Atlantic Wall was incomplete in Normandy - though one wonders if it could ever have been 'complete'. Still if Rommel had been able to spend more time on the defences, the Allied invasion would have run into more trouble, eh?
The idea of hardpoints on the beaches, in my opinion, is not to stop the invasion directly, but to channel the invasion into managable zones - areas that could be quickly neutralized by agressive counterattack.
michael
of course, since the allied troops were quite green.
What if Normandy failed ? Soviets in Berlin in spring 1946 and Fuhrer shoots himself in his bunker in Berchesgaden in summer 1946 ? All of Europe under Soviet liberation... 60% plus communists in most of European countries in the 50's and 60's...? very different world indeed.
of course, since the allied troops were quite green.
What if Normandy failed ? Soviets in Berlin in spring 1946 and Fuhrer shoots himself in his bunker in Berchesgaden in summer 1946 ? All of Europe under Soviet liberation... 60% plus communists in most of European countries in the 50's and 60's...? very different world indeed.
oh and on my ranking of generals I forgot some of the most grotesque ones :
Goering : 3
Hitler : 4.5
Mussolini : 2
Stalin : 2
and forgot the Japaneese
Yamamoto : 2
Yamashita : 6
Hata : 5
(still on a scale of 1 to 10, manstein andf Kesselring beeing betwewn 8 and 9)
Agree with Goering and Hitler. but IMO Stalin deserves 4 to 5 at least. Considering how powerful the Ostheer was in 1941 and how weak and surprised the Red Army was, the great 1941 defeats cannot simply be attributed to Stalin's incompetence. And Stalin DID WIN the war by quickly mobilizing the whole country's vast resources/manpower, and he DID listen to the advice of his best generals. I mean, if he had thrown Zhukov, Konev et al into a gulag then maybe he'd get zero but he didn't.
I give Yamamoto a 7, mostly for the audacity and perfect execution of the Pearl Harbor strike. And he was one of the earliest admirals to recognize that naval aviation was the way to go, as opposed to great battleship duels. (Of course, the British raid on Taranto was the first, but Pearl was many times greater in scale and scope)
Midway disaster was a great combo of factors going in USN favor, not so much a lousy plan per se. If the US had not broken Japan's codes, they would likely have lost that one. Yamamoto 7 too, for the conquest of Singapore and Malaya, also tenacious defense of Philippines.
More than a two, but definitely not a seven-as fine a plan as the Pearl Harbor strike was, it was exactly the wrong move for Japan to have started the war with, as it destroyed any remote chance Japan might have had to get what it wanted-a fait accompli peace, with the Americans not willing to suffer the losses entailed in taking SE Asia back from the Japanese. Japan never believed it could beat the USA in such a way as to force them to make peace.
It was at Yamamoto's insistence that the pearl Harbor strike was launched................even though he himself knew that Japan hadn;t a chance against an aroused USA.
chernyakovski
chernyakovski = 8
Russian general, commanded 60th army at Kursk, then 1st Belorussian front until kia february 1945. Extremely effective in combined arms combat, and planned attacks carefully.
chernyakovski = 8
Russian general, commanded 60th army at Kursk, then 1st Belorussian front until kia february 1945. Extremely effective in combined arms combat, and planned attacks carefully.
Re: chernyakovski
I must agree that he was a great general..
on this thread, one should differentiate between division, corps, army, and front comanders.. as skill and rating then varies...
I must agree that he was a great general..
on this thread, one should differentiate between division, corps, army, and front comanders.. as skill and rating then varies...
here are some famous soviet guards tank army commanders:
Rotmistrev
Katukov
Lelyushenko
Rotmistrev
Katukov
Lelyushenko