Originally posted by Sire Enaique
First, fortifications: there's never been a single example in history where well-designed fortifications have been detrimental the the defending side. By well-designed, I mean without major flaws like Eben-Emael's lack of top defenses (the importance of which had been stressed at Verdun, paratroops or no paratroops) or technological backwardness (like medieval castles against cannon).
Sean, You say the Maginot line was a white Elephant: I don't agree with you at all: without the Maginot line enabling the French Army to hold half the line with only minimal forces, the mobile wing simply couldn't have existed. That it didn't really matter in the end because the French simply squandered those forces doesn't change the fact that it was the Maginot line that made it possible to assemble an army group the Germans had to find a way to deal with.
The Maginot line held less than 50% of the line, and failed absolutely in it's goal to defend France. Remember, at time of building that was it's promise, to keep German troops from entering France.
It was not some minor set of forts, but a mammoth undertaking which allowed the French army to feel a false sense of security.
You are correct that well designed forts are not detrimental in themselves, however unless part of a coherent strategy they may undermine their own army's ability to conduct a sucessfull campaign.
Off the top of my head a nice example is West Point. Excellent defensive position, as a strategic position it neatly divides the population of the 13 colonies in two, and when it fell proved disasterous for Britain. Another would be Wavell's Gazala linem the reliance upon it responsible for the fall of Tobruk, and with a better German occupied port the fall of North Africa.
You might argue that these were flawed defenses, but the problem is that all breached defenses might be argued as flawed.
OK, what would have happened if they HADN'T been there?
I'll stick with the 1944 landings because the case is both simpler and it was the main point under discusion.
Do not defend the coast and what you get is a June lodgement in the Pas-de-Calais, with several major ports safely inside the beachhead on the very first day of invasion, within a half-hour sea crossing from Dover and so close to airbases and radars in Britain that air defense of the beachhead can readily be integrated within the British air defence command structure. This beachhead can be reinforced much faster than Normandy even before the ports can be repaired and is in fact easier to defend.
A lodgement in pas de Calais does not necesarily drop intact ports into allied hands. With competent demolitions, the best the allies can hope for is severely damaged ports which may be no better short and medium term than Mulberry + damaged Cherbourg.
As for air defence being upgraded, again, unnecesary when air superiority was total.
As France fell within weeks of the Normandy breakout, the fortifications at Calais failed absolutely to defend France. They may have prevented an earlier allied assault into Holland and Germany, but at most they prolonged the war for 6 months. Not exactly an achievement commensurate with their investment.
Finally, if logistic requirements were such that the allies chose to land in Pas de Calais, reversing their deception so that German HQ expects Patton to land in Normandy, do you think that the fortifications were sufficient to keep the allies on the beaches?
The Germans faced an opponent with complete air superiority and awesome tac air, and more generally with a considerable material edge. Once the Allies were ashore and they could get organized, it would be extremely difficult to push them back into the sea.
Without the Atlantic Wall, what could Germany build instead? More fighters/tanks/AT guns? Assuming they are deployed on the Western Front do these assets have a greater impact than fortifications.
Now if there'd been, say, three full-strength Pz divs around Caen on June 6th instead of a single not-that-full-strength one, the British would probably have run into a lot more trouble. As it was, counterattacks by 21st Pz on June 6th eventually led to closing down Sword Beach. What more divs could have achieved is open to endless debate but the fact is the single available one DID have an effect. It wasn't enough to be decisive, but it lets one wonder what would have happened had Rommel had its way with the Pz.
With Rommel in absolute command, there is a chance of driving the allies out of France. However, the critical element is the placement and swift counter attack by Panzers, not the number of intact blockhouses on the seafront.
