Well, they attacked without declaration of war during both cases, so maybe.
Quick Thought on Early Carriers
- Thread starter OutsiderSubtype
- Start date
-
We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
Well, they attacked without declaration of war during both cases, so maybe.
People seem to forget just how long the distance from Pearl Harbor to the nearest Japanese base. They had to carry extra fuel to be able to make the trip and it was part of the reason that the USA didn't think that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
Last edited:
From what I have read I would say that is highly likely. A case of learning the wrong lesson from the past. It fit into their rationalization that they could somehow keep a war with America short so they could ignore the insurmountable economic advantage that America possessed.
- 1
Well, the Boshin War, First Sino-Japanese War, and Russo-Japanese War all features the small guy crushing the big guy in a short war and won big prizes, so the argument was even stronger (until proven false).
Some admirals of USA were afraied of Japanese air attack from aircraft carriers. It is written in "The Admirals" by Walter R. Borneman.
The Akagi and the Kaga were pretty much the most expensive ships ever built/converted in the IJN, so I am not entirely sure that a player could afford to rebuild very many ships in time for WW2. Also, the four Kongo Class Battlecruisers were probably the only ships suitable conversion, due to their inherent speed and natural displacement. They would have been smaller than the Akagi and Kaga, probably about as big as the Shokaku and a little bit inferior, being conversions. You would most likely be better off not building the two Yamato's and building two or maybe three more of the Shokaku class, leaving the four Kongo's as carrier escorts. That's just my 2 cents.
Im pretty sure you can't convert ships if not that have been changed.
The developers have said they wan't you to build balanced navies so only using carriers and screens may not work well.
The developers have said they wan't you to build balanced navies so only using carriers and screens may not work well.
An ahistorical Japan which doesn't build Yamatos means the possibility of an ahistorical America that builds more carriers instead of several South Dakotas or Iowas; because why should prescience be limited to one nation?
In hindsight spending on battleships in 1937-1940 was generally a bad move, but at the time nobody was really sure yet how effective the carriers would turn out.
Generally, those involved in carrier tactics (that's what the book focuses on btw), though prewar they're a small minority.
In which case the war would've dragged on for another year or two. In a nutshell, US shipbuilding capacity won the war - destroying Pearl Harbor doesn't change that.
Single hits at extreme range do not constitute good gunnery. It is the favorability of the gods.
It is possible that an untrained shooter can make a bullseye on their first round, but that does not mean they are superior marksmen.
German fire control was adequate, doctrinally they had different priorities than the brits, and at any given instant in a battle, german gunner was better/worse than their opponents, by design.
With regards to radar controlled gunnery; it was never really worth it for the Germans to pursue hard; their capital fleet was fairly small and focused on avoiding any major enemy surface combatants.
- 1
- 1
Not just shipbuilding capacity.
Anything compatible by industrial power would be western Europe combined.
SU in wesernized parts had half the population of US.
As far as fire control goes - and we have wandered far afield from 'Early carriers - the answer is a little complicated, facts are hard to come by and opinions vary.
Really, no-one had 'good' fire control, in the sense that, in good weather and at decent range, you could expect maybe 5% to 10% of your shells to land on-target; in WW1 3% to 5% was considered decent shooting. There is a reason that battleships carry hundreds of shells, and it isn't because they need the ballast., it's because you are moving at 25 miles per hour, changing course, shooting at a target 10 miles away that is moving at 25 miles per hour and changing course. It's not that the math is complicated, it's that the possible rate of change of all of the variables turns it from science into fortune-telling.
And the ability of navies to land ordinance on-target changed significantly over time.
Here's my ranking - mostly subjective, but an informed opinion:
1) United States, probably the best from the 1930's to 1945. Decent optics, great computers*, adopted radar for surface action (thank you, Britain), well-trained crews and had a culture (almost a religion) devoted to landing ordinance on-target. Terrible at night-fighting until surface-scan radar was widely adopted. Good in 1940, great by 1944.
2) Great Britain, I think is second overall. Decent optics, decent computers, adopted radar, good crew training (not as much time devoted to gunnery practice as the US is my impression), some ships had great gunnery and others so-so. Really good at night-fighting (and gets historically little credit for it). Gunnery tended to improve as action went on. Good in 1940, good in 1944.
3) Germany. Great optics, fine computers, no ability to accurately fire by radar, started the war with great doctrine and training but this rapidly declined as good crewmen were pulled off for U-boat duty, had a culture (early on) of rapid fire and getting in the first hits; accuracy tended to decline as an action went on. Surprisingly little ability to fight at night or in bad weather. Great in 1940, terrible by 1944.
4) Japan. Great optics, decent computers, no ability to accurately fire by radar, started the war with great doctrine and training but this rapidly declined. Terrific night-fighters; began the war with excellent gunnery but rapidly declined. Great in 1940, terrible by 1944.
5) Italy. Decent optics, fair computers, no ability to fire by radar, poor crew training and gunnery practice, noted for slow rate of fire, no ability to fight at night or in bad weather. Bad in 1940, terrible in 1944. (To be fair, their light forces were generally good and well-fought, even in night-actions).
* by computers I include range-finding systems (but not the quality of optics), fire-control computers, direction control systems for salvo firing, doctrine on how to 'fire for range' and how soon to 'fire for effect' and so forth.
Really, no-one had 'good' fire control, in the sense that, in good weather and at decent range, you could expect maybe 5% to 10% of your shells to land on-target; in WW1 3% to 5% was considered decent shooting. There is a reason that battleships carry hundreds of shells, and it isn't because they need the ballast., it's because you are moving at 25 miles per hour, changing course, shooting at a target 10 miles away that is moving at 25 miles per hour and changing course. It's not that the math is complicated, it's that the possible rate of change of all of the variables turns it from science into fortune-telling.
And the ability of navies to land ordinance on-target changed significantly over time.
Here's my ranking - mostly subjective, but an informed opinion:
1) United States, probably the best from the 1930's to 1945. Decent optics, great computers*, adopted radar for surface action (thank you, Britain), well-trained crews and had a culture (almost a religion) devoted to landing ordinance on-target. Terrible at night-fighting until surface-scan radar was widely adopted. Good in 1940, great by 1944.
2) Great Britain, I think is second overall. Decent optics, decent computers, adopted radar, good crew training (not as much time devoted to gunnery practice as the US is my impression), some ships had great gunnery and others so-so. Really good at night-fighting (and gets historically little credit for it). Gunnery tended to improve as action went on. Good in 1940, good in 1944.
3) Germany. Great optics, fine computers, no ability to accurately fire by radar, started the war with great doctrine and training but this rapidly declined as good crewmen were pulled off for U-boat duty, had a culture (early on) of rapid fire and getting in the first hits; accuracy tended to decline as an action went on. Surprisingly little ability to fight at night or in bad weather. Great in 1940, terrible by 1944.
4) Japan. Great optics, decent computers, no ability to accurately fire by radar, started the war with great doctrine and training but this rapidly declined. Terrific night-fighters; began the war with excellent gunnery but rapidly declined. Great in 1940, terrible by 1944.
5) Italy. Decent optics, fair computers, no ability to fire by radar, poor crew training and gunnery practice, noted for slow rate of fire, no ability to fight at night or in bad weather. Bad in 1940, terrible in 1944. (To be fair, their light forces were generally good and well-fought, even in night-actions).
* by computers I include range-finding systems (but not the quality of optics), fire-control computers, direction control systems for salvo firing, doctrine on how to 'fire for range' and how soon to 'fire for effect' and so forth.
- 1
- 1
This is why I would argue that once good quality RADAR and fire control computers are in the mix, there's not a lot else you can do to improve accuracy in a naval gunfire contest without invoking post-WWII stuff like laser rangefinders and thermal imaging devices. You can shave a few numbers here and there, but at the end of the day, you're still dealing with the RADAR horizon, optical horizon, unguided munitions, flight time of shells, and both moving shooters and moving targets.
It's the same problem with unguided torpedoes. Sure, you can use RADAR to find targets and range them. You can use complicated optics to tell your computers the information they need to create a firing solution for a spread. But at the end of the day, you are still firing weapons that take time to reach a moving target that can change course and speed. If the weapons can't change their course in mid-attack, it's still a crap shoot with odds that get much worse at longer ranges.
- 1
Not just the Germans. The US had the MK 24 in action by 1943.
Acoustic torpedoes are one reason submarines were able to continue being useful in combat even when battleships found themselves outclassed. The inherent problems of unguided torpedoes were overcome by a fundamental change in weapon performance.
Without a similar change in battleship weapon performance, naval gunfire was not going to remain competitive with air power. And while acoustic torpedoes were a WWII technology, there is no comparable tech for naval gunfire to be found in the 1940s or 1950s.
- 1
To nitpick, first converted rocket cruisers appeared in the second half of 1950's.
Also there are actually two things you can do - increase muzzle velocity and improve rof.
Still not enough to combat carriers unless you have railguns.
Last edited:
1 Thing that cannot be denied about Battleships .......case: Guadalcanal
Battleships and cruisers could do two things which carriers cannot (at least to an extent)-
- fight at night
- support and protect landing operations due to carriers vulnerability is spotted and necessity to keep far away from enemies
if the USS Washington was not at Guadalcanal the Japanese would have been successful and, since it was night time no amount of carriers could have made a difference.
without battleships to support landings which they can do both at night and during the day one side would exploit this and use fast moving cruisers and destroyers in to eliminate the supply/troop ships
then if the other nation does have battle ships then you want to make sure you have the better one.....
even if an attack happened during the day time it would be very difficult for a carrier fleet to destroy a battle ship task force supported by land based aircraft or even none at all before the battle group wipes out the landing operation and can then withdraw
another case were this almost happened was Leyte gulf and guess what only a group of old battle ships stopped the Japanese from breaking through and wiping out the landing operation
thus it is extremely dangerous for a nation to not invest in battleships the yamoto was simply a case of an over investment and poor operational use.
To conclude fleets need battle ships and they need carriers
Battleships and cruisers could do two things which carriers cannot (at least to an extent)-
- fight at night
- support and protect landing operations due to carriers vulnerability is spotted and necessity to keep far away from enemies
if the USS Washington was not at Guadalcanal the Japanese would have been successful and, since it was night time no amount of carriers could have made a difference.
without battleships to support landings which they can do both at night and during the day one side would exploit this and use fast moving cruisers and destroyers in to eliminate the supply/troop ships
then if the other nation does have battle ships then you want to make sure you have the better one.....
even if an attack happened during the day time it would be very difficult for a carrier fleet to destroy a battle ship task force supported by land based aircraft or even none at all before the battle group wipes out the landing operation and can then withdraw
another case were this almost happened was Leyte gulf and guess what only a group of old battle ships stopped the Japanese from breaking through and wiping out the landing operation
thus it is extremely dangerous for a nation to not invest in battleships the yamoto was simply a case of an over investment and poor operational use.
To conclude fleets need battle ships and they need carriers
- 1
- 1
German had self-guiding torpedoes, yes. But UK had eliminated its effect by pseudo sound. That effect would have been not much, I think so.
"if the USS Washington was not at Guadalcanal the Japanese would have been successful and, since it was night time no amount of carriers could have made a difference."
As much as I admire Ching Lee and Washington's single-handed demonstration of a master-class in gunnery, the fact is that if the US had enough carriers the Japanese would never have committed heavy forces to bombard Guadalcanal. The US resorted to surface action out of desperation, not choice.
A strong carrier force posted north of Guadalcanal would have forced Japanese naval units back far enough that they could not reach Guadalcanal and return to safety during cover of darkness. Conversely, a strong Japanese carrier force similar to that deployed at Pearl Harbor or Midway would have crushed the American planes at Henderson Field and opened the way for the IJN to run troops and supplies in to the island around the clock. It was the lack of carriers and planes on both sides that led to the switch-off standoff around Guadalcanal.
That said, when the Japanese decided to commit some heavy units to blast Henderson Field the US admirals found their cupboard almost empty and, in desperation, put in the fast battleships. There are a lot of 'what-ifs' in the Pacific war but the naval battles off Guadalcanal were almost all capable of going either way. First Guadalcanal was a stupid slaughter on par with Savo Island; Second Guadalcanal was a combination of utter incompetence and stellar brilliance. It does show that, against a battleship equipped with radar and run by an admiral devoted to the Church of 'Ordinance on Target', you need to bring your best game. Nobody ever out-shot Willis Lee; he may be the best, least-known admiral of the war.
As much as I admire Ching Lee and Washington's single-handed demonstration of a master-class in gunnery, the fact is that if the US had enough carriers the Japanese would never have committed heavy forces to bombard Guadalcanal. The US resorted to surface action out of desperation, not choice.
A strong carrier force posted north of Guadalcanal would have forced Japanese naval units back far enough that they could not reach Guadalcanal and return to safety during cover of darkness. Conversely, a strong Japanese carrier force similar to that deployed at Pearl Harbor or Midway would have crushed the American planes at Henderson Field and opened the way for the IJN to run troops and supplies in to the island around the clock. It was the lack of carriers and planes on both sides that led to the switch-off standoff around Guadalcanal.
That said, when the Japanese decided to commit some heavy units to blast Henderson Field the US admirals found their cupboard almost empty and, in desperation, put in the fast battleships. There are a lot of 'what-ifs' in the Pacific war but the naval battles off Guadalcanal were almost all capable of going either way. First Guadalcanal was a stupid slaughter on par with Savo Island; Second Guadalcanal was a combination of utter incompetence and stellar brilliance. It does show that, against a battleship equipped with radar and run by an admiral devoted to the Church of 'Ordinance on Target', you need to bring your best game. Nobody ever out-shot Willis Lee; he may be the best, least-known admiral of the war.
Last edited:
- 2